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Abstract 
The pervasiveness of global interconnectedness has necessitated the re-imagination of the 
breadth and scope of citizenship. No longer should citizenship conceptualisation be restricted 
to the nation-state. There is arguable consensus of the normative necessity to cultivate 
cosmopolitan citizenship whose scope of duties transcends national borders. However, the 
question of what the form and substance of cosmopolitan citizenship should be remains 
contested. A given conception of cosmopolitanism directly informs the nature of education 
for democratic citizenship. The prevalent model of cosmopolitan citizenship outlaws national 
particularism ostensibly for being inherently inimical to the impartiality of universalism. The 
underlying logic is that equal concern for all people of the world is achievable only through 
impartiality over all particularism. There has however not been much research about the 
normative implications, especially for developing nations, of an impartiality that necessarily 
extinguishes national belonging. The context of developing nations demands a fundamental 
re-think of the potentiality of an exclusively impartial cosmopolitanism for such 
cosmopolitanism risks entrenching global inequality. 
The removal of Malawian History from the primary school curriculum and of mother-tongue 
instruction for the first four years of primary education has normative motivations and 
implications. This dissertation argues that the systematic diminishing of the role of 
nationality through the removal of national History from the curriculum in Malawi, and 
adoption of English as the sole medium of instruction in primary education, are advancing a 
problematic cosmopolitan citizenship model that is incompatible with ideal human equality. 
Such a cosmopolitanism undermines the normative value of mother-tongue instruction. The 
cosmopolitanism also regards national history as inherently promoting parochialism and thus 
inherently inhibitive of universalist cosmopolitan duties. 
Building on Seyla Benhabib’s (1992; 2011) idea of the concrete (differences) standpoint of 
universalism of human equality, as opposed to the general (commonality) standpoint of 
universalism, this dissertation argues that since nationality hosts people’s sources of 
concreteness, nationality has normative value and ideal cosmopolitanism is therefore 
essentially a duality of the particular and the universal. The two are mutually dependent and 
regulating ideals such that supplanting one for the other undermines human equality. An 
essentialist universalism is problematic because by excluding subjectivity and particularism, 
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it denies normative value to what individuates the peoples of the world as the concrete (not 
merely generic) human beings that they are.  
The dissertation further argues that the idea of the detached transcendent self for whom social 
relations are not constitutive of being is flawed because it ignores the care he or she receives 
from others to achieve autonomy. Achievement of autonomy is dependent on the relations 
and institutions of care-giving typified by such elements of nationality as language, history, 
common culture and territory. With respect to democracy, nationality, though often assuming 
a background role, is the principle that makes civic patriotism possible. Civic patriotism 
cannot sustain democracy without continually drawing from nationality. 
The dissertation argues that ideal authenticity-oriented education ought not to avoid 
subjectivity or else the education will lose meaningfulness to the people. Education should 
acknowledge that learners as citizens share a common fate through nationality. In education, 
the marginalisation of the national subjective for citizenship in favour of exclusive 
impartiality, amounts to tacit assimilation because the ostensible objective impartiality 
prejudicially marginalises valid moral perspectives of the world’s other peoples.  
In Malawi, despite being the motivation and catalyst of colonial resistance, nationality was 
abused in the independence era. Currently, there are tokenistic commitments to nationality 
due to a lack of political will coupled with the prevalence of neoliberalism. Global 
interconnectedness, which necessitates and enables the imagination, of cultivation of 
cosmopolitan duties is itself characteristically inhered by Eurocentric particularism, 
neoliberalism and inequality in the representation of global people’s particular interests. 
Consequently, the marginalisation of the local promotes attitudes that regard local language 
and local epistemologies as subaltern. In such a context, mother-tongue instruction is stripped 
of its normative value. National History is regarded as advancing particularity, and narrow-
mindedness. However, particularism is an indispensable component of ideal universalism. 
Further, there are valid relational normative conceptualisations of human nature besides 
individual-centrism that found a relational (and not individual-centric) universalism.  
This research contributes towards the re-imagination of an education for citizenship that 
challenges the prevailing global homogenisation of the unprivileged and unrepresented 
epistemologies and voices, marginalised on account of their otherness, ultimately compelled 
to assimilate involuntarily into the mainstream in the name of impartiality of equality. 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
1.1. Study Introduction 
This dissertation is a normative evaluation of the foundation and moral implications of the 
prevailing model of education for democratic citizenship in the Malawian primary school 
curriculum. It is about how education for democratic citizenship should be conceptualised in 
the light of global interconnectedness and particularly what, if any, should be the role of 
nationality in the cultivation of an ideal citizenship for an individual living in the modern 
globalised world.  
The ever-increasing entrenchedness of global interconnectedness continues to exert pressure 
to profoundly re-imagine the human condition, re-conceptualise ideal citizenship and how 
education should help attain the citizenship. For a long time citizenship has been conceived in 
terms of the nation-state. The citizen’s duties and entitlements have been limited to co-
nationals only. This conception of citizenship thrived as the nation-state had the ability to 
effectively assert sovereignty within its borders through exclusively determining and 
regulating public policy. However, the rapid weakening of state sovereignty due to the 
political, economic, security, health, and environmental interconnectedness of all the people 
of the world, has necessitated a re-constitution of citizenship to emphasise and embrace 
cosmopolitan values, in order to cater for the unique challenges presented by the globality of 
modern life. 
As a normative ideal, cosmopolitanism is a moral principle, which holds that the individual 
and not any other collective to which he or she may belong, is the ultimate unit of moral 
concern and therefore ought to be “entitled to equal consideration regardless of nationality” 
(Tan, 2006: 1). Cosmopolitanism therefore entails human equality, which it pursues through 
exclusive recognition and universalisation of impartial duties individuals owe each other as 
members of the human race and not as members of a national community. The foundational 
and generally non-controversial implication of the cosmopolitan ideal is that human beings 
across the globe have certain moral duties towards all humanity of the world, unrestricted by 
national, cultural, religious, racial, and geographical differences, among others. Growing 
global interconnectedness, coupled with its challenges have necessitated a new imagination 
of citizenship beyond the limitation of the nation-state, ultimately contesting the normative 
value and role of the nation in modern citizenship altogether. 
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1.2. Focus of study 
Whilst the normative claim of human equality transcending national boundaries is not 
contentious, debates arise as to what should constitute cosmopolitan citizenship, especially 
with respect to nationality. This debate spills over to the domain of education for democratic 
citizenship, where questions arise as to what should be the form, content, and mode of 
implementation of education for democratic citizenship that is meaningful to a 21st-century 
learner citizen. Whilst the moral and pragmatic necessity of cultivating a cosmopolitan 
citizenship imagination is arguably indisputable and inevitable, drawing from the Malawian 
context, this dissertation discusses the following two theoretical questions that pertain to the 
form and substance of cosmopolitanism:  
1) What should be the nature, scope and substance of an ideal cosmopolitan 
citizenship, and how should education realise it? 
2) Does (national) particularism have a place in the normative constitution and 
implementation of  ideal cosmopolitan citizenship? 
Whilst cognisant that there are numerous orientations and motivations of cosmopolitan 
citizenship, this dissertation is concerned with the dominant and mainstream version of 
cosmopolitanism, to which David Miller (2007: 43) refers as strong cosmopolitanism. Strong 
cosmopolitanism holds that since the individual is the ultimate unit of, and entitled to, moral 
concern, all hitherto differentiating attributes, particularly nationality are morally arbitrary 
(Habermas, 2001: 73; Nussbaum, 2002a: 8; Nielsen, 2005: 274; Nili, 2015: 245; Arneson, 
2016: 560). According to this major strand of cosmopolitanism, citizenship and indeed duties 
of justice, therefore, need not be restricted by national considerations. Thus, the main point is 
that nationality has no moral weight, and is actually an impediment to achieving the 
cosmopolitan aspiration of equal concern for all humanity of the world. 
In the domain of education for democratic citizenship, strong cosmopolitanism practically 
demands that education must refrain from offering national history as a subject, as history 
ostensibly prizes the ‘arbitrary’ local over morally valid universal global obligations 
(Nussbaum, 2002a; Brighouse, 2003; Nili, 2015). The school therefore should neither 
advance nor nurture aspects of nationality. Instead, education for democratic citizenship in 
the school, must exclusively develop universalistic impartial global citizens able to fit in 
every part of the world, now that the world is a global village. The implication one draws 
from this model of education and citizenship is that mother-tongue instruction wherever 
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feasible, is justified only on grounds of efficiency in teaching and learning, rather than on a 
basis grounded in the normative value of nationality. In other words, mother tongue 
instruction cannot be defended in terms of the normative value of national belonging, since 
strong cosmopolitanism regards aspects of nationality as being morally arbitrary and 
therefore ought to be restricted to the private sphere. 
This study explores the normative validity of a strong cosmopolitan-inspired education for 
democratic citizenship in the primary school curriculum of Malawi to determine whether it is 
consistent with human equality, a norm that is cardinal in cosmopolitan universalism (Tan, 
2006).  
1.3. Background Context 
Located in southern central Africa, Malawi has three administrative regions (Northern, 
Central and Southern) with each comprising at least two different tribes. For each region, 
there is generally at least one commonly shared language. The dominant language for the 
Northern region of Malawi is Tumbuka, Chinyanja for the Central region, Yao and a dialect 
of Chinyanja are the major languages for the Southern region (National Statistics Office of 
Malawi, 1998: 33). The most recent national language census conducted in 1998 reports that 
70% of the population use Chichewa or its dialect Nyanja as their household language, while 
0.2% use English as their home language (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 1998: 33). In 
Malawi, 54% of the population lives below the poverty line and 85% of the population lives 
in rural areas (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 2006; 2008). With respect to access to 
information and technological services, 44% of the population own radios; and 17% have 
access to television. Mobile phone ownership is at 34% of the population, with 4.1% being 
computer literate (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 2014).  
Two major developments that have a direct bearing on education for democratic citizenship 
have taken place in Malawi. First, Malawian History was removed from the primary 
curriculum, and has been replaced by Social and Environmental Science (UNESCO, 1994: 9; 
Hauya, 1997: 22; Ministry of Education, 2005). Social and Environmental Science, although 
it has sporadic references to and unsystematic accounts of Malawian history, is generally 
about democratic values and practices, and sustainable environmental management. Part of 
the justification of this curriculum change is that the world has changed; hence, appropriate 
responsive reforms are also due (Ministry of Education, 2005: v). In the current curriculum, 
Social and Environmental Science has substituted History, Geography, and Civics, which 
previously were standalone subjects (Hauya, 1997: 22). Malawi History was being taught 
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from the fourth to sixth years of primary school and African, and World history were taught 
in the last two of the eight years long primary school (Hauya, 1997: 22).  
Social and Environmental Science does not contain a chronological account of the (political) 
history of Malawi. By and large, its focus is on impartial knowledge and skills of democracy. 
Sporadic historical references to Malawi political history are made only with respect to 
explaining certain concepts of democracy. Social and Environmental Science is also focused 
on sustainable environmentalism. Such systematic de-emphasis of locality embedded in 
nationality is consistent with strong cosmopolitanism commitment to impartial knowledge in 
the cultivation of global citizenship. 
It is worth noting that while there is no systematic learning of Malawi’s political History at 
the primary level, African History is offered throughout the two years of junior secondary 
school but does not include Malawi History. World history is offered in the two years of 
senior secondary school. In other words, the reality is that the profound value of political 
history to democracy and democratic citizenship notwithstanding, in the Malawian education 
system, the Malawian learner does not learn Malawian history, but only African and World 
histories. This dissertation finds this systematic exclusion of learning local history while 
offering world history, to be adverse for local democratic citizenship and contends that such 
exclusion is a result of the mode of cosmopolitanism Malawian education is pursuing which 
ultimately undermines human equality in global citizenship.  
The second major policy development is that in 2013, the government changed the law on  
language of instruction (Malawi Government, 2013, sec. 78 (1)). Prior to the change, the first 
four years of primary school used either Chichewa, the national language, or the most 
convenient vernacular language of the area (Moyo, 2002; Matiki, 2006; Chiuye & Moyo, 
2008). Under the new law however, English has been made the language of instruction right 
from the first year of primary education through to the tertiary level (Malawi Government, 
2013, sec. 78 (1)). The major motivation for this policy shift is to make the Malawian learner 
an effective participant and competitor in the global world (Ministry of Education, 2005: v; 
Masina, 2014; Nyondo, 2016). Thus, global considerations are exerting a substantial pressure 
on the nature of education Malawian learners get as well as the form and content of the ideal 
citizen that modernity ostensibly demands.  
While there are defences of mother-tongue instruction for efficient effective learning in 
Malawi (Mtenje, 2002; Chiphanda, 2007; Kamwendo, 2016), this dissertation argues for 
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mother-tongue instruction on the grounds that mother-tongue instruction has normative value 
and is hence necessary as it is a recognition of a situated learner’s concreteness in the context 
of global education and global citizenship. A vernacular language is directly connected to an 
individual’s way of being in the world, as an Other (Benhabib, 1992, 2011), because the 
language embeds a people’s philosophical perspectives and is hence worthy of active 
recognition and support especially in endeavours of cosmopolitan citizenship. The otherness 
of one’s language typifies one’s being in this plural world and should not be extinguished for 
the sake of global economic convenience. It is arguable that the demand to fit and compete in 
the global order that informs prevailing forms of cosmopolitan citizenship is overriding such 
pertinent normative worth of local languages. 
Cultivation of cosmopolitan citizenship in education can be analysed through either a critical 
examination of pedagogical experiences or through an analysis of educational policies that 
have direct bearing on education for citizenship. This dissertation analyses the impact of the 
two Malawian educational policies regarding subject content and language of instruction, on 
the assumption that they have a profound and unique effect on cosmopolitan citizenship 
education, notwithstanding the nature of pedagogical experiences in the school. This is 
because such policies are informed by a particular form of cosmopolitanism which they will 
also perpetuate.  
This study finds the two policy decisions problematic for being inherently inhibitive of ideal 
cosmopolitan equality and universalism. In other words, there is a need to re-think the role of 
local situatedness as embodied in nationality, in the cosmopolitanism that Malawian primary 
education is advancing.  
In global citizenship education, the relevance of history which is a major property of 
democratic national communities across the globe lies in that historicity is a major 
constitutive property of human communities across the world. History is one of the major 
features that constitute the concreteness or situatedness of a people. It is a fundamental 
attribute of human communities, partly constitutive of one’s being and the community that 
forms a democratic community. In so far as education for cosmopolitan citizenship 
endeavours to achieve human equality across the world, recognising the historicity of the 
peoples of the world ought to be part of recognising their concreteness and situatedness as 
different yet equal human beings. Furthermore, history also has a bearing on democracy 
especially in global citizenship in that democracy and democratisation of a community are 
devoid of meaning once they are uprooted from their historical context. History makes 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
6 
democracy meaningful because democratic communities are historical communities that 
shape and are shaped by their historical contextuality. In cosmopolitan citizenship, exclusion 
of local history in the name of de-emphasizing nationality to ostensibly avoid 
narrowmindedness and achieve cosmopolitan universalism and equality is therefore worth 
exploring in the interest of both the concreteness of communities of peoples across the globe 
and in the interest of ensuring sustenance of democracy both locally and globally. 
1.4. Locating the debates: cosmopolitanism and the nation.  
There is arguably, a consensus among thinkers that today the scope of education for 
democratic citizenship cannot be exclusively about national partiality (Kymlicka, 2002a; 
Nussbaum, 2002a; Miller, 2007; Arthur, Davies & Hahn, 2008; Hansen, 2011; 
Papastephanou, 2015). In other words, education for democratic citizenship in the modern 
interconnected world cannot be about making a choice as to whether learners should cultivate 
normative values, duties, and entitlements of citizenship that are either restricted to the nation 
only, or that also have transnational perspectives. Therefore, the moral necessity and practical 
urgency for a cosmopolitan awareness and skills in education for democratic citizenship is 
generally no longer debatable. Rather, what is debatable is how cosmopolitanism should be 
conceptualised especially with respect to the role of national attachments. Should ideal 
cosmopolitan citizenship necessarily displace and exclude nationality or does nationality have 
unique moral value indispensable in the realisation of cosmopolitan citizenship? Sub-sections 
1.4.1. and 1.4.2. give a brief discussion of arguments that favour a cosmopolitanism that is 
neutral over national sentiments relegating them to the private sphere, and also those that 
argue for an active place of the national sentiment in cosmopolitan citizenship 
conceptualisation respectively. Subsection 1.4.3. gives an overview of how citizenship 
education has developed in Malawi. 
1.4.1. Strong cosmopolitan citizenship 
Different thinkers conceive cosmopolitanism differently. One of the key elements that 
determine a form of cosmopolitanism is the role of the nation in the conceptualisation of the 
breadth and scope of cosmopolitan citizenship obligations and entitlements. The contentious 
question is whether national attachments among national members have normative value 
worth necessitating their inclusion in conceptualisation of cosmopolitan citizenship.  
As stated earlier, this dissertation focuses on one prevalent, dominant type of 
cosmopolitanism which holds that since the human being is the ultimate unit of moral 
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concern, duties and entitlements of justice must equally extend to all the people of the world, 
transcending nationality, because nationality has no moral worth to restrict them (Habermas, 
2001; Nussbaum, 2002a; Nili, 2015; Costa, 2016). As such, this brand of cosmopolitanism is 
dismissive of patriotic commitments, holding that equality means treating people equally in a 
substantive sense hence emphasis on patriotic pride in principle inhibits attainment of 
cosmopolitan equality. Miller (2007: 43) refers to this brand of cosmopolitanism as strong 
cosmopolitanism. Henceforth, this dissertation refers to this brand of cosmopolitanism as 
‘strong cosmopolitanism’. Defenders of strong cosmopolitanism argue that although, in the 
nation-state, patriotism may and has historically helped in serving some moral ideals such as 
justice and equality, it has no inherent moral value. Hence, at the global level patriotism is 
subversive of the very ideals it serves in the nation-state (Habermas, 2001: 73–74; Nussbaum, 
2002a: 4). For such thinkers, in the modern interconnected globe, the moral principles of 
justice and equality would be better served by a cosmopolitan ideal which demands 
allegiance to the global community of human beings and democratic cooperation other than 
to a particularistic nation community (Habermas, 2001: 73–74; Nussbaum, 2002a: 4; Nili, 
2015: 245; Arneson, 2016: 560). 
According to Martha Nussbaum (2002a), whose work was among the seminal works calling 
for strong cosmopolitan education for democratic citizenship, this conception of 
cosmopolitanism does not necessarily demand that people should do away with their local 
identifications, which she acknowledges can have special meaning in their lives. Rather, she 
argues that such commitments need not play a role in the way we understand our moral 
obligations which transcend national borders to all humanity in the world (Nussbaum, 2002a: 
9). In other words, national commitments must only pertain to the private discretion of the 
individual. To be a cosmopolitan for strong cosmopolitanism, is to think of all human beings 
on the globe as constituting a moral community to whom one must be morally obliged to 
extend the same duties and obligations one has to co-nationals within the nation-state 
(Nussbaum, 2002a: 12–14; Nielsen, 2005: 274; Arneson, 2016: 560; Huber, 2016: 4). Thus, 
nationality is a characteristic that does not have moral relevance, unlike universal moral 
duties owed to all other human beings in the world on account of their humanity (Habermas, 
2001; Callan, 2006; Nili, 2015). Nationality in this case has such major features such as a 
common language, history, geographical territory, and a public culture (Miller, 1995: 27). 
Strong cosmopolitanism demands that the moral norms of equal human worth and concern 
must therefore be the regulative constraint on political actions and political aspirations. As 
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such, in political deliberations and action we must first and foremost regard ourselves to be 
global citizens, and not as mere national citizens (Nussbaum, 2002a: 7). This being the case, 
education for democratic citizenship should cultivate the factual and imaginative prerequisite 
for recognising humanity in all people across the world (Nussbaum, 2002b: 133). Such a 
version of cosmopolitanism does not regard patriotic commitments as a morally necessary 
ingredient for (global) citizenship. Patriotism is its detractor.  
This brand of cosmopolitanism holds that patriotic history should not be taught as part of 
citizenship education in liberal-democracy schools (Brighouse, 2003; Schumann, 2016). For 
its proponents, the relatively inoffensive national identities that national history advances, 
intrinsically violate the equality norm in that national identities still embed within them a 
sense of superiority over other nationalities and ultimately lead to undermining the legitimate 
normative entitlements of non-nationals as well as other members  of the nation (Brighouse, 
2003: 164–165). From the strong cosmopolitan perspective, national history as a subject is 
essentially coercive, and children being uniquely vulnerable, must not be subjected to it so as 
to respect their capacity of developing fully-fledged views by themselves as to what 
constitutes the good (Brighouse, 2003: 165). Since, following this reasoning, culture is a 
private good, determination of the value of culture is up to the autonomous individual, it 
needs not be presented to learners as an objective good for every human being. Learners 
should be prevented from taking in the aspects of the nation’s history and culture as valuable 
just because the state, through the curriculum, considers the history and culture to be so 
(Brighouse, 2003: 165). Thus, in the interest of individual freedom the curriculum must not 
be aimed at cultivating or sustaining a national identity as part of efforts towards the 
realisation and sustenance of democracy in the nation-state.  
Thinkers subscribing to strong cosmopolitanism explicitly or implicitly pit cosmopolitanism 
against patriotic interests, as two distinct and mutually exclusive ideals. Mostly, wherever 
some concession is made about the role of nationality, it is only instrumental and tokenistic, 
rather than normative. They esteem cosmopolitan citizenship to be normatively superior to 
national citizenship on account of the cosmopolitan universalisation of human impartiality, 
and consider patriotic commitments as morally inferior on the ostensible grounds of its 
particularism (Nussbaum, 2002a: 16; Nili, 2015; Costa, 2016; Rundell, 2016). The 
implication of this school of cosmopolitanism is that education for democratic citizenship 
must rid itself of national particularism. Instead, education must commit itself to cultivating 
knowledge and skills that are universal, and compatible with all people in the world. Put 
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differently, strong cosmopolitanism is a discourse of conflict over the inherence of normative 
value between universalism and particularism in citizenship theorisation where the universal 
is supreme and must always be prioritised. The ostensible normative superiority and 
exclusiveness of strong cosmopolitan universalism entails that in education for citizenship, 
subject content and pedagogy must necessarily be detached from local embeddedness to 
achieve moral universalism. It is, in other words, a pursuit of moral impartiality, which is 
regarded as the means to universalism, where the universalism is itself a vehicle for achieving 
human equality for all humankind globally.  
1.4.2. Nationalist cosmopolitanism 
The second brand of cosmopolitanism, whilst conceding the fundamentalism of human 
equality, is against the alleged necessary exclusion of patriotic particularism by universal 
moral ideals. Such cosmopolitanism acknowledges the existence of universal duties to all 
humanity of the world. There are however, variations among thinkers over what is to be the 
scope and breadth of such duties. However, generally this brand of cosmopolitanism is 
against the regarding of nationality as morally arbitrary. This brand finds nationality as 
having a unique normative value that is incomparable with the universalism of duties of 
human equality (Kymlicka, 2002a; Turner, 2002; Miller, 2007; Hansen, 2011; Etzioni, 2014; 
Papastephanou, 2015). It further finds nationality to be of significance in the actualisation of 
both local citizenship and global citizenship.  
Generally, nationalist or patriotic cosmopolitanism is against the implied hierarchical ranking 
between the cosmopolitan and the national ideals, where only the ostensibly (superior) value 
of the cosmopolitan is accorded moral worth and its recognition necessarily excludes the 
national local (Tan, 2006; Hansen, 2011; Papastephanou, 2013a). For much of patriotic 
cosmopolitanism, nationality is not morally arbitrary, but has some ethical meaningfulness 
for its members.  
Besides the meaningfulness of nationality, national cosmopolitanism also contends that 
nationality makes the political community possible and has a role in helping realisation and 
sustenance of local democracy in such a way that contrary to strong cosmopolitanism, you 
cannot have a democratic culture only, bereft of nationality (Papastephanou, 2015: 185–186). 
The self-government movements in established democracies in developed nations, for 
example in Spain, Canada and Belgium, are cited as instances where national groups are 
demanding secession despite already participating in vibrant democratic institutions in the 
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liberal democratic states that they demand to secede from (Kymlicka, 2002a: 91–92). Such 
trends, for nationalist cosmopolitanism, offer clear evidence that sharing universal democratic 
principles and sharing the basic structure alone are not sufficient for realisation and 
sustenance of the political community and citizenship (Kymlicka, 2002a: 92).  
Defenders of the value of locality (MacIntyre, 2002; Taylor, 2003; Etzioni, 2014; 
Papastephanou, 2015) argue that it is through the voluntary organisations of the civil society 
(churches, mosques, families, unions, ethnic groups, neighbourhood associations, charities 
and support groups) that an individual comes to learn civic virtues such as mutual obligation, 
reciprocity, respect and self-sacrifice. The political society does not form such virtues, 
although they constitute its foundation and its survival largely depends on them (Kymlicka, 
2002a; Etzioni, 2014). For Kymlicka (1997: 18) the civility of mutual obligations that makes 
democracy work is learnt in these associative networks of the civil society where failure to 
live up to the responsibilities of these groups, is usually met with members’ disapproval and 
not state-sanctioned coercion. For Kymlicka (1997: 18) it is not the state’s sanctions, but 
rather disapproval from family members, friends, comrades, and community, which functions 
as a powerful incentive for acting responsibly and being sensitive to fellow members’ 
interests and expectations. Political citizenship does not build these capacities. Rather it is 
itself built upon the capacities and competencies of voluntary self-restraint, mutual obligation 
and responsibility that only the civic associations cultivate (Kymlicka, 1997: 18). Thus, this 
civility is not achieved through laws made by the state, but it is a result of the spirit of 
community and togetherness. It is in this sense that certain aspects of nationality are worth 
affirming and supporting by the state, in the interest of democracy. 
With respect to education for democratic citizenship, nationalist cosmopolitanism therefore 
holds that citizenship education should reasonably lean towards developing a critical national 
identity and not merely be committed to only impartial universal principles of democracy, as 
these by themselves are incapable of sustaining democracy and democratic citizenship 
(Kymlicka, 2002a: 295). The national identity it defends is not a ‘thick’ ethno-culture that 
excludes non-members (Kymlicka, 2002a: 25). Rather, teaching of the nation’s critical 
history and use of the common language people share as the medium of instruction in 
schools, are the most basic goods which members share non-coercively (Kymlicka, 2002a: 
25). These are the basic and shared cultural elements education for democratic citizenship 
must promote. Most of the other cultural elements are ‘thicker’, hence cannot be included, as 
that would amount to undue coercion. For defenders of locality, it is therefore imperative that 
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citizenship education advances a ‘societal’ culture of a (liberal) democratic nation-state 
(Kymlicka, 2002a; Meyers, 2005; Etzioni, 2006). Such a culture is inclusive even of those 
who do not share it. This is in contrast with a monolithic ‘thick’ national culture (that) exists 
and is advanced for citizenship in non-democratic and illiberal nation-states or in 
discriminatory liberal nation-states; whose membership depends on discriminatory 
requirements such as race and nativism (Miller, 1995: 26). Kymlicka argues that it is 
therefore a legitimate role for schools to promote students’ emotional identification with the 
history of their nation as their history, taking pride in its accomplishments and feeling shame 
about its injustices (Kymlicka, 1997: 21).  
Perspectives sympathetic to the value and role of nationality in education for democratic 
citizenship are motivated by a conception in which cosmopolitanism “constitutes an 
orientation in which people learn to balance reflective openness to the new and reflective 
loyalty to the known” (Hansen, 2011: 1). Therefore, for Hansen (2011), cosmopolitanism 
should be about balancing local values with those of general humanity, unbound by 
territories, and that valuing the local should not include perspectives of fixity of one’s culture. 
Such perspectives, Hansen (2011) claims, prevent mutual understanding between two 
different  cultural backgrounds. Since all cultures are porous and permeable to external 
influences and interaction, cosmopolitanism therefore is an orientation that assists people in 
sustaining their cultural integrity and continuing (not fixity or purity) through change 
(Hansen, 2011: 87).  
With respect to education, Hansen (2011: 98) argues that acquisition of a cosmopolitan 
awareness does not necessarily depend on having a specific ‘impartial or neutral’ type of 
body content, which will make the curriculum cosmopolitan. Rather, it is about the kind of 
perspectives and outlooks that learners develop about the world and other people that make it 
cosmopolitan. It is about the learners’ thoughtful receptivity, and not about mere 
familiarisation with a predetermined body content (Hansen, 2011:98). For Hansen (2011), 
cosmopolitanism is about a way of living, and this does not necessarily demand that learners 
grasp some final universalistic truths. Instead, it is about respecting the diversity-laden reality 
of the world, respecting the other and respecting the self (Hansen, 2011: 117). He therefore 
argues that learning of whatever subject, be it science, training for sports, equation solving, 
composing music, etc., can be used to expand learners’ orientation towards the wider world 
(Hansen, 2011: 117). Teaching and learning any other subject should therefore involve 
traversing between the local and the global, using the same body content as a vehicle. This 
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shows that cosmopolitanism is not so much about what subject content (national or 
transnational) learners are taught. It is about cultivating learners’ ability to constantly reflect 
on how the scope of what they learn bears out on their local context and onto the rest of the 
world’s humanity with whom they are in a web of mutual dependence (Hansen, 2011).  
1.4.3. An overview of education for democratic citizenship in Malawi 
Much of the available research on education for democratic citizenship in Malawi, largely 
focusses on praxis: whether education practice and policy are consistent with established 
democratic expectations (Hauya, 1993; Kadzamira & Rose, 2003; Chiphanda, 2007; Evans & 
Rose, 2007; Kendall, 2007; Porter, 2014; Namphande, Clarke, Farren & McCully, 2017). In 
my literature search I did not come across much literature examining the philosophical 
foundation of the stated and assumed education for local and cosmopolitan citizenship in 
Malawi. The most outstanding and relatively comprehensive work on the philosophical 
examination of education for democratic citizenship in relation to cosmopolitan citizenship is 
by Divala and Enslin (2008). 
Divala and Enslin (2008) explore education for democratic citizenship in Malawi primary 
education in the context of its historical development. After acquiring political independence 
from the British in 1964, education for citizenship in Malawi concentrated on the anti-
colonial struggle values of unity, loyalty, discipline, and obedience, which the post-
independence, one-party state subsequently abused to justify its dictatorial tendencies (Divala 
& Enslin, 2008: 219). Any perceived deviation from these values faced atrocious state 
sanctions. These values became constitutive of education for democratic citizenship in 
Malawi for 30 years (1964–1994) and served to glorify Kamuzu Banda (the dictator declared 
life president) who abolished multiparty pluralism (Divala & Enslin, 2008: 218). The goal 
was to have passive and unquestioning, loyal citizens (Divala & Enslin, 2008). This being the 
case, post-independent Malawi discouraged active critical citizenship, as it was bound to 
undermine the grip on power of the one party regime. As such, Divala and Enslin (2008: 220) 
argue that following the struggle against the 30-year dictatorship of that one party, which 
collapsed in 1993, paving the way for the re-introduction of pluralistic politics, citizens at the 
dawn of democracy were ill-prepared for and not adequately informed about democracy and 
cosmopolitan citizenship. Even after the dawn of democracy, education for citizenship in 
schools took off in an ad hoc manner between 1993 and 1999 (Divala & Enslin, 2008: 220).  
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After the re-introduction of pluralistic politics, which followed a long period of oppression, a 
human rights approach to education for democratic citizenship became attractive. There was 
an urgent need for relief from the oppressive system, and the alternative human rights 
approach was appealing, while anything to do with the nation was treated with trepidation 
(Divala & Enslin, 2008: 220). There was a clear abandonment of developing a national 
identity for citizenship, since this was an unpalatable idea as the memories of the atrocities of 
the one-party dictatorship were fresh. The regime had abused the very idea of patriotism to 
suppress dissent and commit human rights violations to maintain its grip on power (Divala & 
Enslin, 2008). In principle, Divala and Enslin (2008: 220) argue that at this point, a shift 
towards a sense of belonging that transcends national boundaries started to emerge. With 
respect to global citizenship, Divala and Enslin (2008: 225) lament that the post-democratic 
education for democratic citizenship in Malawian schools still retains nationalistic elements 
that are aimed at passive citizenship. For Divala and Enslin (2008: 225), although it aspires to 
be global, the content of some of Malawian education for democratic citizenship subjects 
such as Social Studies does not promote active critical citizenship. 
It should be noted that the work by Divala and Enslin (2008) focusses on the 1964–1999 
period only. Although they manage to discuss the context and evolution of education for 
cosmopolitan citizenship in Malawi, their work however does not interrogate the foundation 
and form of the cosmopolitan citizenship being aspired to in their study, as this dissertation 
does. Since 1999, different developments have taken place in Malawi, greatly changing the 
landscape of citizenship education. The Social Studies curriculum has been revised and 
English has just been declared the sole medium of instruction from the first primary school 
level through to tertiary education (Ministry of Education, 2005; Malawi Government, 2013, 
sec. 78(1)). These recent developments warrant detailed probing as they have wide normative 
implications. 
1.4.4. The place of this research 
This research is in agreement with patriotic cosmopolitanism, which holds that ideal 
cosmopolitanism essentially ought not to be reducible to a choice between either the local or 
the global (Miller, 2007: 263; Hansen, 2011: 106; Papastephanou, 2013a: 27) in the selection 
of curriculum content, and in making curriculum-related policies. Such a choice between 
ostensibly antagonistic ideals should not exist, because in principle, cosmopolitanism and 
patriotism are uniquely different, yet mutually reinforcing and regulating ideals 
(Papastephanou, 2013a: 27). As such, ideally, it is not possible to have one without the other. 
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This dissertation argues that their mutual dependence is not based only on instrumentalist 
grounds, as in ensuring efficiency in democratic practice and in the teaching and learning 
processes. Rather, each has unique normative value that cannot be substituted by the other.  
There is still room for further research in cosmopolitan education for democracy. First, as can 
be derived from Sub-sections 1.4.1. and 1.4.2., much of the debate about cosmopolitan 
citizenship is premised on an explicit and assumed individual-centric conception of human 
nature as the exclusive determinant in citizenship conceptualisation by both the proponents 
and opponents of strong cosmopolitanism. However, as this dissertation shows, the 
individualistic conception of the human being, besides being limited in its capacity to 
adequately account for the diversity and plurality of global interconnectedness, is not the sole 
exclusive benchmark for the conceptualisation of human nature and the human condition. It is 
one of other normatively valid perspectives such as the relational rationality of ubuntu 
(Murove, 2014: 37).  
Secondly, it is also worth highlighting that in much of the literature surveyed about the 
cosmopolitan citizenship debate, the question of mother-tongue instruction in schools is 
scarcely emphasized as a normative matter that has a bearing on acceptability of 
cosmopolitanism. This would partly be due to the fact that much of the research dominating 
cosmopolitan citizenship discourse originates from the context of developed nations 
(Parmenter, 2011: 368) where the mother tongue is also the official language. The official 
language is mostly also the dominant or the sole national language (i.e. the most widely used 
language in non-official domains). In other words, people do not have to employ a distinct 
language in the home or public places and a foreign one in the school or in official domains. 
In such situations, it is tempting to overlook the role of language in cultivating and 
demonstrating a sense of national community.  
In Malawi and much of Africa, however, there are very stark linguistic boundaries between 
the language of the home and public and the official language or medium of instruction in 
schools. Therefore, learners have to navigate two distinct linguistic (and ultimately cultural) 
contexts when they attend school and when they are home. In other words, critics who 
dismiss the role of nationality in cosmopolitanism overlook the national effect languages 
possess in creating a sense of national community, which as national members they hardly 
notice. The members do not notice, just because generally in their contexts, there is only one 
linguistic community and the official and regular domains are not marked by distinct 
languages. The reality of a national community sharing a language is hence taken for granted; 
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yet, it is not inconsequential in as far as creating a sense of nationality is concerned. The 
question of mother-tongue instruction is therefore urgent in cosmopolitan citizenship, 
especially in the interests of developing nations who face the ‘necessary’ threat of global 
homogenisation (Canagarajah, 2005; Pashby, 2011).  
Thirdly, it is evident that strong cosmopolitan citizenship theorisation is largely motivated by 
the reality of global interconnectedness which necessitates cultivation and implementation of 
impartial universal duties. However, the challenge is that strong cosmopolitanism assumes 
that the representative nature and outcomes of global interconnectedness are even across the 
global peoples and that the interconnectedness is a neutral vehicle that must make possible 
global equality among global equals. Strong Cosmopolitanism scarcely recognises the nature 
of the prevailing global order that  hides and perpetuates linguistic, economic, and cultural 
imbalances and inequalities as it parades itself as an ostensible vehicle for global equality. 
Most significant is that, both perpetuation as well as the possible resolution of such global 
challenges reside in whether cosmopolitanism is sensitive to local particularity or not. This 
too necessitates exploration of the normative relevance of nationality in global citizenship 
formulation. 
1.5. Statement of the problem 
Given the growing prevalence of global interconnectedness, it is necessary that education 
cultivates cosmopolitan citizenship. The immensity of humankind’s interconnectedness 
makes vivid the necessity for emphasising the ideal of human equality in education for 
democratic citizenship. This now necessitates the need for cultivation of universal duties 
transcending nationality towards all humanity. However, cosmopolitan universalism does not 
necessarily have to be preconditioned on the exclusion of meaningful particularism. Neither 
should particularism be regarded as a morally empty category. 
This dissertation focusses on the question of the normative justifiability and implications of 
exclusion of national particularism as the necessary precondition for achieving cosmopolitan 
equality in education for democratic citizenship in Malawi. The removal of Malawi History 
from the primary school curriculum and its replacement with a largely nation-neutral 
impartial subject, Social and Environmental Science in Malawi, as well as the adoption of a 
global language English as the sole medium of instruction right from the first year of primary 
school education, in principle undermine the normative value of nationality regarding it as 
morally arbitrary.  
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Nationality is still generally the ultimate host to the sources of global peoples’ situatedness, 
which substantially and substantively contributes to their concreteness. The peculiarity of 
their concreteness gives meaning to their collectives’ lives as well as to their constituent 
members’ individuation. Advancing an education for democratic citizenship that extinguishes 
such concreteness, which informs global diversity, in the ostensible pursuit of strong 
cosmopolitan impartiality, risks undermining the very ideal of human equality. Questions 
therefore arise as to whether an impartial and ostensibly only universalistic education for 
democratic citizenship can be meaningfully just and achieve equality whilst necessarily 
excluding national particularism from the normative configuration of ideal global citizenship. 
Is inclusion of national particularism in the conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism’s 
universalism incompatible with and inherently impeding of cosmopolitan citizenship’s 
equality? 
Secondly, there is also the largely unexplored question of the normative and practical 
implications of the ostensible impartiality of strong cosmopolitanism on developing nations. 
Upon critical analysis, strong cosmopolitanism’s impartiality (and the education for 
democratic citizenship it inspires) is discovered to be itself characterised by developed 
nations’ own Eurocentric particularism, yet it is advanced as the exclusive ultimate standard 
for universalism. Strong cosmopolitanism’s exclusion of crucial aspects of national 
particularism therefore has high potential to compel the learner in developing nations to 
undermine the relevance of his or her linguistic, social, cultural, and historical embeddedness 
which significantly contribute to giving meaning to his or her being and the democratic 
community. Therefore, strong cosmopolitanism’s homogenising condition that one regards 
oneself and all humanity as detached disembodied beings in order to fulfil the duties of 
human equality’s impartiality is bound to have adverse implications on global people’s 
concreteness and otherness. As a result, the potential for homogenisation risks undermining 
both global diversity and human equality. Upon critical examination therefore, strong 
cosmopolitanism-inspired education for democratic citizenship has a huge potential threat of 
advancing tacit assimilation.  
Lastly, strong cosmopolitanism’s fixation with a detached autonomous self as the exclusive 
ultimate standard of human equality by implication dismisses alternative valid 
conceptualisations of human nature and equality that are not necessarily grounded in 
individual-centrism such as relational conceptions of human nature, that nevertheless value 
autonomy. There is a need to explore and acknowledge alternative normative frameworks for 
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imagining cosmopolitan citizenship, that are inherently suited to resolve some of the 
limitations of strong cosmopolitanism’s exclusiveness of otherness that inevitably and 
adversely manifest in its global citizenship. 
1.6. Research statement and objectives  
The aim of this research is to analyse whether the education for democratic citizenship being 
pursued in Malawian primary education is consistent with ideal equality or needs 
reconsidering. The central claim of this dissertation is that by diminishing the role of 
nationality through the removal of national history from the curriculum and adoption of 
English as the sole medium of instruction in primary schools, primary education in Malawi is 
advancing a model of cosmopolitanism and citizenship that is incompatible with ideal human 
equality.  
The objectives of this dissertation are to: 
• examine the nature, value of and mutual dependence between ideal cosmopolitanism 
and ideal nationality; 
• explore the ideal conditions for the relationship among citizenship, education, and 
equality; 
• evaluate, through the ideal interaction between nationality and cosmopolitanism, the 
normativity of  education for democratic citizenship in Malawi; and  
• explore the normative validity of a cosmopolitanism rooted in a relational rationality 
that also generates community duties;  
 
1.7. Justification of study 
Prevalently, strong cosmopolitanism dominates the conceptualisation and practice of 
education for democratic citizenship. It is effectively substituting aspects of locality in 
education for democratic citizenship with an ostensibly impartial education for global 
citizenship.  
The necessity for this dissertation lies in its ability to draw out normative implications from 
three largely ignored assumptions of strong cosmopolitanism, which in principle undermine 
concreteness and ultimately render strong cosmopolitanism incongruent with ideal human 
equality. However, resolution of such normative incongruences depends on re-
conceptualising the central claims of strong cosmopolitan universalism through inclusion of 
what is dismissed as subjective and morally arbitrary of human nature.  
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First, this dissertation joins criticisms of strong cosmopolitanism as being incapable of 
anchoring and sustaining a just global citizenship owing to the strong cosmopolitanism 
precondition of excluding nationality. This dissertation takes this discourse further by 
particularly examining how postulates of strong cosmopolitanism undermine the concreteness 
of individuals and communities, especially in developing nations, whose social and economic 
context uniquely makes invisible the iniquities they face under strong cosmopolitan 
impartiality’s dismissal of (national) particularism (Andreotti, 2011a; Abdi, 2015). 
Secondly, this dissertation highlights that Eurocentric particularism and neoliberal 
motivations inhere strong cosmopolitan citizenship and this also, in principle, makes it 
amount to assimilation. The dissertation takes cognisance that much of cosmopolitan 
citizenship theorisation is inspired by Kantian and Rawlsian liberalism. The challenge with 
such liberalism, as other thinkers, such as Young (1990: 100–101), Benhabib (1992: 152–
159, 2011: 58–69) and Code (2012: 88–96) have observed, is that it prejudicially categorises 
affective attachments as subjective; hence, absolutely disqualifying them from citizenship 
conceptualisation. This, dissertation goes further by drawing that in principle, strong 
cosmopolitanism’s universalism dismisses as morally empty, other meaningful and 
normatively valid reality perspectives and lived experiences of the other of the world 
(Benhabib, 2011: 68), ultimately making strong cosmopolitan education for democratic 
citizenship undemocratic and undermining the very equality it sets out to defend. What this 
dissertation seeks to show is that the lauded impartiality of the prevailing strong 
cosmopolitanism informing global citizenship conceptualisations, is itself inhered by 
particularism that ironically outlaws any other particularism on the basis of being particular.  
Relatedly, the third theoretical significance of this dissertation is in its examination of the 
often taken for granted assumptions of global interconnectedness, which necessitate 
extension and implementation of moral duties beyond the nation (Habermas, 2001; 
Nussbaum, 2002a; Nili, 2015). This study shows that ideal global interconnectedness for 
cosmopolitanism ought to presuppose equity among the peoples or individuals of the world. 
This would inevitably have to concede and include the normativity of diversity of collectives 
based on national language and history and others. In non-ideal theory, an analysis of strong 
cosmopolitanism reveals that strong cosmopolitan citizenship claims are based on 
assumptions of an interconnected globe of equity, yet glaring global inequalities typify the 
global order. However, there is not much research especially regarding the normative 
implications of strong cosmopolitan impartiality in education for democratic citizenship on 
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the moral interests and prospects of people in developing nations who are uniquely situated in 
the global order. Their unique situatedness demands a unique conceptualisation so as to stop 
their unique invisibility.  
With respect to education policy, this dissertation is valuable in that it calls for a review of 
how the content of education curriculums is selected and how pedagogy is enacted, especially 
in developing nations. Cognisant of the embeddedness of particularism and neoliberalism in 
strong cosmopolitanism leading to denigration of the local, the dissertation demands a new 
understanding of the value of the local as being uniquely valuable to the learner and 
constitutive of ideal cosmopolitanism. Significantly, this dissertation contributes towards 
reinforcing the ground upon  which the prevailing, subtly assimilationist education for 
democratic citizenship may be confronted and reformed so that it is made just. This may 
inevitably lead to hitherto marginalised and undermined local epistemologies having presence 
in academic spaces and being developed as alternative paradigms of conceptualising reality.  
In education practice, the value of this research is that it would help render what is particular 
about Malawi and much of Africa become legitimate objects of academic inquiry and debate. 
Consequently, African and local epistemologies would be equal participants in the global 
order’s cooperation, bringing unique authentic interests and perspectives to the global order, 
whilst also being open to hybridisation by adopting some other elements from others. The 
claims of this research significantly contribute to the re-examination of the prevailing status 
quo in global cooperation where Malawi and much of Africa are largely only on the receiving 
end of global interaction and scarcely making solid contributions that the rest of the other 
global interlocutors would adopt in hybridisation endeavours.  
It is worth emphasizing that the central argument of this thesis is not to elevate and promote 
nationality as an end in itself in cosmopolitanism. Rather this thesis argues that the 
cosmopolitanism informing education for global citizenship should not be necessarily 
exclusive of concreteness of the linguistic, historical, and cultural situatedness of the peoples 
of the world, which in global citizenship are embodied in nationality, regarding them as being 
morally arbitrary. By necessarily excluding nationality, strong cosmopolitanism 
simultaneously marginalises the elements of concreteness and situatedness such as language, 
historicity, and shared public culture as antithetical to cosmopolitan equality and 
universalism. 
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1.8. Theoretical framework 
This research is grounded in Seyla Benhabib’s (1992: 167–169, 2011: 65–69) idea of a 
difference-grounded communicative universalism  in order to account better for the moral 
relevance of nationality in the normatively and practically diverse complex global world. 
Nationality in this case is not a mere tool for realisation of cosmopolitanism, but is one of the 
elements that constitute it. Unlike other communicative approaches that endeavour to 
establish universality based on overlapping consensus, i.e. commonality in the context of 
difference, Benhabib’s model (Benhabib, 2011: 67–69) recognises the value and 
indispensability of the differences to the moral agents concerned. Since such differences are 
mostly essential to the other’s being, any legitimate reflection on universalism necessarily 
ought to start from and with the differences as the point of departure, other than exclude 
them. In other words, ideal universalism must also focus on and include difference rather than 
avoid it. Anything short of this fails to recognise the full humanness of persons, as it 
marginalises what individuates them, making the other not only other, but human too, an 
individuated human (Benhabib, 2011: 130).  
Benhabib’s (2011) theory of universalism does not require dismissal of the (non-offensive 
and non-oppressive) typifying identities of the other’s embeddedness, unlike the prevalent 
neo-Kantian and Rawlsian conceptions of universalism (Benhabib, 1992: 161) that inform 
strong cosmopolitanism and build universalism on commonalities only. Rather, for Benhabib 
(1992, 2011), active recognition of differences is a cornerstone for achieving meaningful 
universalism that is consistent with ideal human equality. Benhabib (2011: 68) understands 
universalism to be a lifelong aspiration of attempting to ground commonality across the 
different, and at times conflicting cultural, political, sociological, and religious divides 
achieved not through human nature essences alone but more importantly through deliberation 
among the different (Benhabib, 2011: 68). Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) theory is suitable 
because her universalism is not reducible to an essence or recognition of certain primary 
attributes applicable to all human beings to which individuals and institutions must conform. 
Rather, universalism and equality, for her, are realisable from our differences and not just 
commonalities (Benhabib, 1992: 165; 2011: 68). Ideologically, this is in sharp contrast to 
strong cosmopolitanism’s universalism advanced by most thinkers discussed before, which 
also underlies the Malawian primary education curriculum.  
The dissertation particularly builds on Benhabib’s conceptualisation of a difference 
communicative universalism because it offers a critical alternative to the dominant radical 
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liberal conceptualization of equality, implications of whose postulates are inimical to the very 
ideal of equality. This is because such neo-Kantian theories validate rights and 
responsibilities based on human equality that recognizes people’s similarities only as 
normatively valuable (Benhabib, 2011). Such neo-Kantian theorisations, as Benhabib (1992: 
153) holds, only consider the generality of all human beings as the sole foundation for human 
equality, rights, and duties. She calls this the “general otherness” conception of a human 
being (Benhabib, 1992: 153). However, only recognising human generality or commonality 
excludes the particularity and uniqueness of human beings, yet the particularity is what gives 
the human being concreteness, individuating him or her from the generic of humanity’s 
commonality. This is why for Benhabib  (2011: 67) exclusion of such concreteness of the 
other (even by other communicative freedom theorists), in essence undermines what makes 
the other so other, which is in principle also what makes them human. Benhabib (1992: 162) 
therefore calls for a “concrete otherness” conception of the human person that is built on 
people’s differences, where through deliberation they achieve a universalism that centrally 
takes into account the concreteness of the being human for each of those concerned. Under 
this conception, one fully recognises the worth of the other when one considers and 
acknowledges him or her as an affective, embodied being who possesses a particular 
constitutive concrete individual and social history, with unique ties and enmeshed in webs of 
valued relations with others (Benhabib, 1992: 161). 
This dissertation argues that in global citizenship conceptualisation, nationality is the host of 
global people’s sources of concrete otherness. Unlike strong cosmopolitan citizenship (which 
exclusively restricts itself to a general otherness standpoint of being human), this dissertation 
argues that global diversity and embeddedness of the peoples of the world need not be 
stripped of their moral worth so as to enable realisation of a universalism that serves human 
generality or commonality only as strong cosmopolitanism entails. A universalism that views 
all the people of the world in terms of their general commonalities, extinguishing their 
differences succeeds in undermining and marginalising what makes a particular people the 
people they are, which also is partly constitutive of the individuation of the individual 
persons that form the nation group. The possibility, and indeed validity, of a difference-based 
cosmopolitanism is not only accommodative of mother-tongue instruction and teaching and 
learning of national history. Rather, the cosmopolitanism is in part largely dependent on the 
flourishing and nurturing of such particularity.  
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1.9. On method 
The method of the argument of this dissertation is phenomenological in orientation. The 
thesis adopts a phenomenological approach because of the primacy of values, meanings, 
feelings, and life experiences of human beings in making a morally comprehensive account 
about being human (McPhail, 1995: 160) which the dominant cosmopolitan citizenship 
approaches undermine. Positivistic scientific paradigms as those informing strong 
cosmopolitanism are incapable of adequately accounting for global citizenship because they 
necessarily marginalise the subjective meaning-making capacity of human beings (McPhail, 
1995: 160). 
In evaluating the nature of the cosmopolitanism being advanced by Malawian primary 
education for cosmopolitan citizenship, this dissertation initially deconstructs the 
predominant conceptualisations of nationality and cosmopolitanism in order to account for 
the normativity of the difference embedded in nationality that strong cosmopolitanism 
maligns. Such a deconstruction of the dominant conceptualisations of both nationality and 
cosmopolitanism is also necessary to reveal that the two ideals other than being incompatible, 
are in principle necessarily complementary such that in ideal theory, one does not exist 
without the other.  
Through a critical commentary of the postulates of and conditions for strong cosmopolitan 
universalism, the dissertation deconstructs the positivistic scientific assumptions of 
universalism of strong cosmopolitan citizenship that is informing Malawian education for 
citizenship. The deconstruction exposes the unquestioned metaphysical assumptions about 
being human and the consequent universalism that anchor strong cosmopolitan citizenship, so 
as to reconstruct a new model of cosmopolitan citizenship and cosmopolitan citizenship 
education that recognise the normativity of difference. 
The dissertation first discusses what constitutes tolerable nationality, and why such 
nationality has normative value in conceptualisation of citizenship that is consistent with the 
norms of equality and individual freedom. This is achieved by arguing that when re-imagined 
under a difference-grounded moral framework, elements of nationality partly, yet 
significantly, constitute people and an individual’s embeddedness, which is their 
concreteness. As such, aspects of nationality have normative value and are not inherently 
inimical to cosmopolitan universalism. Later, the study examines the foundation and 
normative implications of strong cosmopolitanism, ultimately showing that dismissal of 
national particularism is inconsistent with the logic of ideal cosmopolitan equality. The two 
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are, in principle, ideals which mutually correct and regulate each other (Papastephanou, 
2013b).  
Upon establishing the compatibility and mutual dependence of nationality and ideal 
cosmopolitanism, the dissertation explores how a just education must realise ideal 
citizenship, an education that is sensitive and responsive to both embeddedness 
(concreteness) and general commonality of humanity, without in principle being 
assimilationist through the parading of an inherently particularistic education for democratic 
citizenship as impartial. 
Having established the normative ground for education to be necessarily compatible with and 
nurturing of embeddedness, the study makes an examination of trends in citizenship and 
education for democratic citizenship during the main political epochs of Malawi: the colonial 
(1890s to 1964), independence (1964–1993), and democratic (1994 to present) eras. The 
focus is on how consistent education for democratic citizenship in Malawi has been with 
ideal cosmopolitanism, which is characteristically reflectively open to the global, and 
critically loyal to the local (Hansen, 2011: 1). The dissertation evaluates the implications of 
prevailing education for democratic citizenship in the context of the argued-for necessity of 
the local in the global.  
In defence of the necessity of the local in the global, the dissertation argues for a 
complementary possible paradigm of a normatively valid conception of universalism. The 
dissertation therefore contends that ubuntu universalism, which is characteristically different 
from the mainstream neo-Kantian and Rawlsian universalism, in that it is grounded in a 
relational rather than individualistic rationality, is capable of resolving the highlighted 
limitations of strong cosmopolitan citizenship. Without necessarily pitting the two models of 
cosmopolitanism against each other, the ubuntu one demonstrates that strong 
cosmopolitanism’s agent-centric universalism is only one of morally valid other alternative 
perspectives of human nature and equality, and it is not the sole exclusive standard.  
It is worth highlighting that this study is not making a case for a nation-only education for 
democratic citizenship. Neither is it arguing for outlawing of moral impartiality and 
universality of moral norms. Rather it is arguing that there is normative value in nationality 
and that cosmopolitanism, necessary as it is, must interactively exist on mutually dependent 
terms with nationality. 
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1.10. Chapter outline 
Following this introduction to the research, the second chapter argues for the normative 
validity of nationality for a democracy that is meaningful to its constituent individual 
members and the collective, whilst still respecting individual autonomy. I argue that members 
of a democratic community are embedded beings that variously and inescapably have a 
special attachment to the nation, through its aspects of geographical territoriality, language, 
shared culture, and common history (Miller, 1995: 27). Usually, such elements of nationality 
are dismissed as pertaining to the affective and therefore subjective domain of human nature 
and hence, are unfit for inclusion in moral configurations of citizenship. Employing 
Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) theory of a difference-grounded communicative freedom, the 
chapter aims to show that such morally undermined aspects of nationality are actually sources 
of communities’ concreteness for peoples across the world (although in varying degrees), 
which ultimately enable meaningful choice-making for their autonomous members. The 
normativity of nationality cannot just be dismissed by a prejudicial, ostensibly objective, 
category of the universal. Dismissing the public recognition and responsible advancement of 
inclusive aspects of nationality, by regarding it as a private matter, in principle recognises in 
the peoples of the world only the generality of their being human, whilst dismissing that 
which individuates and makes them peculiar as individuals and collectives. It is to deny their 
concreteness, which is the flipside of denying them equality. I therefore also argue that the 
substitution of national patriotism with an impartial procedural or constitutional patriotism is 
unattainable and would not be meaningful to the people concerned. 
Chapter 3, examines strong cosmopolitanism. The chapter argues that strong 
cosmopolitanism’s precondition of impartiality towards all human relationships is informed 
by an atomistic conception of human nature. This leaves out and outlaws other valid 
alternative conceptions of universalism of human equality that are not exclusively grounded 
in human agency alone. The chapter also contends that cosmopolitanism and nationality are 
not antagonistic, incompatible ideals. Instead, they are mutually reinforcing and correcting 
ideals, such that the two are ideally inseparable. Meaningful universalism therefore needs 
both to exist simultaneously. The chapter further argues that the impartiality towards all 
human relationships as the precondition of ensuring global justice, betrays a misdiagnosis of 
the primary sources of global injustice, inequality, and tension that motivates strong 
cosmopolitanism and sets out to resolve. Strong cosmopolitanism leaves untouched the core 
problem of the skewed nature of the global structure.  
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Chapter 4, argues for the normative necessity that education for democratic and cosmopolitan 
citizenship should be responsive to tolerable aspects of nationality. Whilst conceding the 
paramountcy of developing authenticity and autonomy in learners as arguably one of the  
fundamental aims of education, the chapter contends that such  a fundamental endeavour does 
not necessarily demand the exclusion of community or patriotic interests reducing them to the 
private sphere and unworthy of determining public policy. National members in a democratic 
nation-state share a foundational fate that is grounded in elements of nationality, contestable 
as the content of such elements may be. The shared fate underlies the people’s public 
institutions including educational ones. As such meaningful education must necessarily be 
connected to the lived experiences of the learners. However, in education, the major problem 
of strong cosmopolitan impartiality is that it presupposes that educational experiences are 
culture-neutral. However, in the school the formal and hidden curriculum are biased towards 
one epistemological orientation and metaphysical conception of human nature that ultimately 
promote attitudes that denigrate and marginalise otherness. Upon close examination, one 
discovers that the ostensible objectivity and impartiality of strong cosmopolitan universalism 
that motivates and dominates the epistemology in education and education for global 
citizenship is inhered by philosophical and cultural particularism. Such an impartiality 
therefore has the real risk of passively coercing learners especially in developing nations to 
ignore their particularity and in principle assimilate into the dominant ostensibly ‘impartial’ 
mainstream.  
Chapter 5 is an analysis of the evolution of education for citizenship, with respect to the 
nature and role of nationality and cosmopolitanism, in Malawi primary school education for 
citizenship during the colonial era (1891–1964), the independence era (1964–1994), and the 
democratic era (1994 to the present). The chapter shows that colonialists advanced a 
generally essentialisist, and assimilationist form of cosmopolitanism enacted by colonial 
education as well as the other-denigrating experiences of colonialism itself. However, during 
this era, nationality played a crucial liberation role as nationality embodied the people’s 
concreteness which the people defended from colonial hegemony. Nationality was also the 
vehicle through which mobilisation for political solidarity against colonialism was 
achievable. 
The 30-year independence era that followed colonial liberation, however, was characterised 
by a bounded uncritical nationalism under the guise of achieving national unity as there was a 
one party dictatorship. There was systematic and direct violation of the fundamental 
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cosmopolitan tenet of the individual having inviolable dignity hence being the ultimate unit 
of moral concern. The chapter further argues that primary school education for democratic 
citizenship during the democratic period (1994 to present) in Malawi makes only tokenistic 
commitments of including morally relevant aspects of nationality. The education is 
characteristically inspired by strong cosmopolitanism. The chapter attributes this to both a 
lack of political will on the part of national leadership and the homogenising effects of 
neoliberalism that informs the global order. The ultimate result of the essentialist strong 
cosmopolitan impartiality in Malawi is that it is marginalising the concrete and epistemic 
otherness of the Malawian in the global arena.  
The chapter argues that it is normatively imperative that Malawian education for democratic 
(and global) citizenship affirms and embraces the tolerable aspects of nationality, whilst 
promoting visions of citizenship that trasncend nation boundaries. Malawi must embrace a 
global citizenship that does not necessarily require sacrifing the local for the universal global 
or vice versa, because each of the two has incomparable and indispensable worth. The 
chapter therefore argues for a cosmopolitanism orientation founded on Seyla Benhabib’s 
(2011) difference-grounded deliberative universalism. It is only such a universalism that 
would manage to accord due value to the otherness that is constitutive of global peoples 
without compromising on duties originating from human commonality. 
Chapter 6 discusses principles of ubuntu ethics, and how they provide alternative 
perspectives of human nature in the conceptualisation of global and democratic citizenships. 
As a representative of relational ethics approaches, ubuntu is a demonstration of how the 
limitations that orginate from the individual-centrism that inspires strong cosmopolitan 
impartiality can be overcome or avoided by an alternative conceptualisation of human nature.  
In other words, there is no inherent conflict between relational being and agency as strong 
cosmopolitanism entails. Community commitments are not antithetical to the human equality 
value of equal concern. More importantly, the chapter shows that the nature of ubuntu is 
characteristically deliberative. Ubuntu can therefore anchor a universalism that is grounded in 
difference thus coming to the aid of the prevailing strong cosmopolitan citizenship that 
inherently undermines community interests. Lastly, the chapter sketches the practical 
relevance of ubuntu in education for citizenship in conceptualisation of education aims, in 
curriculum design and implementation, assessment practice, and environmental education.  
The last chapter draws conclusions from the study. It highlights the limitations of this study. 
It also draws out areas of the study that require further researching into.  
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Chapter 2:  
The value of nationality 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the normative value of nationality. I argue that nationality has 
normative value and that it is therefore indispensable in the conceptualisations of both local 
and global citizenships. I build on Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) idea of the concrete standpoint of 
human equality, which regards human subjectivities as equally crucial cornerstones in 
normative conceptualisations of a human being and the relations he or she establieshes. 
Subjectivities constitute individuality. As such, a full account of human equality must include 
differences of otherness as an essential part of the foundation of the conception of moral 
universalism. I therefore argue that nationality is the host of different sources of concreteness 
that enable the autonomous individual achieve his or her self-determining capacity. 
Achievement of this capacity is indispensable from the social relations of care, their attendant 
institutions, and the elements within them that make community life possible, such as shared 
language, a common way of life, shared history, and a common geographical territory. 
Actualisation of the ‘objectively’ autonomous person is dependent on these ‘subjective’ 
relations of care although they are marginalised as normatively inconsequential (Code, 2012). 
In this chapter I therefore contend that the strong cosmopolitan conceptualization of the 
normativity of the relations of the autonomous self-determining individual whose autonomy 
ostensibly depends on the condition of detachment from social relationships, is a result of an 
undue privileging of the rational ‘objective’ over the affective ‘subjective’, and is 
inconsistent with the complexity and irreducibility to essences of human nature. In other 
words, it is impossible to achieve such an autonomous capacity under such detachment.  
With respect to global citizenship, I argue that nationality hosts the sources through which the 
global peoples self-express their otherness, which is an indispensable ingredient of their 
concrete being (Benhabib, 2011: 130) in the world. In other words, a global citizenship built 
on ‘objective’ similarities only, hides away these sources of concrete otherness (Benhabib, 
2011); thus, normatively speaking, undermining what makes the people of the world the 
actual and not abstract peculiar people that they are. 
Secondly, in this chapter I further argue that the normative value of nationality renders it 
indispensable in the realisation and sustenance of a political culture for a flourishing 
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democracy. Thus, contrary to the advocacy for the sufficiency of a constitutional patriotism 
alone (Habermas, 1994, 2001; Nussbaum, 2002a; Nili, 2015), the role of nationality in 
political communities is not restricted to the operational utility of nationality as a mere 
effective and efficient principle for the organisation of people into communities suitable for 
political cooperation, and that nationality is in itself devoid of any moral value. Rather, 
nationality cannot be detached from the political community for nationality is what makes 
democracy both possible and meaningful. Nationality cannot be substituted by constitutional 
or civic patriotism because constitutional patriotism is built on  aspects of the people’s 
nationality. Constitutional patriotism cannot therefore single-handedly sustain a democracy 
without regular national patriotism. Building on the mutual dependence of constitutional 
patriotism and nationality, I further argue that the inherence of national interests in ostensibly 
neutral institutions of global cooperation, such as in the global economy, is not due to 
malfunctioning or mal-structuring of such institutions. Rather, it is a result of the 
indispensability of nationality from such aspects of global cooperation.  
Ultimately, I argue that national history and a national language as elements of nationality 
must of necessity be included in the curriculum. Critical national history is not a collection of 
indoctrinations about otherwise gone events now decaying in the past. I argue that national 
history is an indispensable component of determining the justness of a community’s present, 
which is always intelligible and meaningful in relation to the past. 
In the next section I discuss the major elements of a tolerable nationality and address some of 
the common criticisms levelled against it. I later discuss Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) idea of a 
difference-grounded dialogic universalism that offers a clealer framework for the 
appreciation of the normativity of nationality. In the subsections under Section 2.4., I argue 
drawing from Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) theory of universalism that aspects of nationality 
qualify as sources of the individual and community’s concrete otherness  
2.2. Key aspects of nationality 
This section discusses the major aspects of nationality. There are always variations in how 
different people place value on different aspects of collective life (MacIntyre, 2002; Taylor, 
2003), including nationality. This renders defining ideal nationality complex and 
complicated. However, according to Miller (1995: 8) there are general elements of nationality 
that are commonly shared by a people who constitute a nation group, especially those living 
in a nation-state without necessarily excluding the people’s other sources of identity. Shared 
elements of nationality, are thus the people’s conscious appropriations that serve as a means 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
30 
for making sense of their social and political contexts (Miller, 1995: 10). Furthermore, for 
Miller (1995: 10), even though national allegiance has some instinctual basis, it can however 
not be reduced to mere irrational emotions and instincts. Nationality, for Miller (1995: 6), is 
not a force outside the control of human beings despite the fact that they generally conform to 
its demands (Miller, 1995: 6). The conception of nationality being advanced in this 
dissertation is not that which is based on religious, racial or ethnic homogeneity. It neither 
condones the nationalism that regards nations as organic wholes that demand that individual 
interests should be subject to and secondary to the interests of the nation (Miller, 1995: 8). 
Rather it is a nationality that is based on shared thin aspects of collective being that are 
tolerable, inclusive, non-fundamentalist and compatible with individual freedom and 
democratic life.  
Defending the value of nationality and that the state actively supports the different no-
excluding forms of nationality is not tantamount to compelling members that they conform 
their interests to the national interest (Miller, 1995: 46). This perspective of national identity 
recognises that the individual human being has numerous and complex identities not only 
with respect to nationality. Human beings are able to have and juggle with different types of 
identities. The necessity of recognising national identity lies in its worth to the individual 
member as well as sustenance of the democratic community, which is necessary for human 
flourishing (Miller, 1995: 67). 
Nationality has some outstanding characteristic aspects. These aspects are not always 
expected to manifest on every national group or every member of a national group in equal 
measure (Papastephanou, 2015: 195). According to Miller (1995: 23), the first aspect is that 
members have a belief that they belong to and constitute a common community. In this sense, 
they recognise themselves to be part of a community under which they have developed and 
would want to continue together under it. In the process, they recognise the commitments that 
come with being part of such a community. 
The second aspect of nationality is historicity (Miller, 1995: 23). Origins of national groups 
are traceable to a very distant past whose events and memories not only bond together 
different individual members, but also urge them to keep preserving the historical past for the 
future (Miller, 1995). The history of the nation captures both the accomplishments and 
failures of the ancestors, which the present members of the nation recognise, in which they 
take pride, and of which they are ashamed when necessary (Kymlicka, 1997: 21). The 
members appropriate the works of their ancestors, and have passive or active duties towards 
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the modification, preservation and advancement of the traditions, customs and legacy of their 
ancestors through to the next generations (Miller, 1995: 23–24). Thus, the historical property 
of nations renders them to be both backward- and forward-looking. The individual member 
today looks at himself as part of this history and wants it continued, altering its direction 
where he or she can. 
The third outstanding attribute of nations is that they have an attachment to a particular 
geographical territory  (Miller, 1995: 24). This property is closely connected to the sense of 
historicity in that nation groups mostly have an actual or aspired homeland, which is at the 
centre of their identity as well as history (Miller, 1995: 24). Thus one can derive that the 
histories and identitities of national members and nation groups are strongly attached to the 
territory. 
The fourth aspect of national identity is that nations are active and they decide collectively 
(Miller, 1995: 24). In contemporary times, there is an overlap between nations and states. 
Most nations actively make decisions over different phenomena that concern them through 
elected office bearers who are in general terms deemed to be active articulators of the 
national will (Miller, 1995: 26). The ability of nations to decide collectively has on occasions 
historically led to inappropriate decisions  (Merry, 2009: 379; Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). 
Nevertheless, one can safely argue that this by itself does not take away a nation’s tendency 
of expressing its will collectively in a favourable constructive way. This property of nations 
implies that national groups are not obliged to conform rigidly and unreflectively to the ways 
of life and activities as inherited from their ancestors without refining them or altering them 
where necessary. 
The fifth characteristic of nations is that they are communities, which share a common public 
culture (Miller, 1995: 25). According to Miller (1995: 26), one should not conflate this with a 
closed discriminatory nationalism whose common culture is based on biological descent or 
shared religious convictions. Other than having a monolithic form and content, this common 
public culture is inclusive of all other would-be members (Miller, 1995: 25). Although one 
may not exhaustively pick out all the elements that constitute a common public culture, it 
essentially consists of the members’ explicitly and implicitly agreed mode of living and 
conducting and arranging its affairs (Miller, 1995: 26). However, one major outstanding 
element of such a culture is language (Coetzee, 2003: 324; Simpson, 2008: 1). National 
members collectively, actively, or passively express a will and commitment to preserve the 
official status and purity of the national language(s) (Miller, 1995: 26). Other elements of 
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shared public culture may include the form of a nation’s beliefs, common foods, their social 
norms such as honour, politeness, cultural ideals such as festivals, holidays mostly about 
events or personalities that had bearing on the history of the community, maintenance of the 
national language, literature and art, and common architecture (Miller, 1995: 25–27). 
However, given the prominence of shared language as a marker and common rallying point 
of shared culture, this dissertation emphasizes on language as a dominant marker of public 
culture and sometimes interchangeably refers to language as the common public culture 
element of nationality. 
It should be underlined that neither of these aspects of nationality should imply inherent 
exclusion of those who do not share them (Miller, 1995: 26). Since the public common 
culture is not monolithic, its content and magnitude vary across members. There need not be 
a standard way of expressing it. Nevertheless, given  the numerous explicit and implicit 
relevances of modes of nationality expression, it is inconceivable how a member of a nation-
state can escape participating in it altogether as nationality underlies even the seemingly 
neutral affairs of individual life as well as of social cooperation (Miller, 1995: 164). 
Furthermore, members are not compelled to display the public culture in some minimum 
measure or have their interests conform to those of the nation (MacIntyre, 2002: 69; 
Papastephanou, 2011: 221). For Miller (1995: 26), this means that such a conception of 
nationality is tolerant of any would-be member or immigrant willing to become part of the 
life of the community. 
In summary, the five aspects of nationality which this research will constantly refer to as 
representative of nationality are belief about a community, a history, ability to decide actively 
and collectively, connection to a geographical territory and possession of a shared public 
culture, including and especially a common language. Individual members’ identities are 
shaped by these features in varying degrees.  
2.2.1. Re-imaginining nationality 
The concept of nationality or patriotism mostly invokes negative and extremist attitudes. 
nationality is usually associated with extremist and exclusive  political ideologies  that place 
premium moral value on nativism, race, religion or a mixture of these as essential attributes 
for membership into the group (Miller, 1995: 26; Papastephanou, 2013a). Such conceptions 
of essentialist patriotism are not only exclusive about membership, but the exclusion is 
reinforced by claims or insinuations of national superiority, which esteem the group as 
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morally, culturally and intellectually superior over all other groups and people in general 
(Williams, 2003: 208; Papastephanou, 2013a: 23). Such a conception of nationality always 
comes with horrible results, and history is replete with such forms of nationalism, such as the 
Holocaust, the two world wars, and genocide and ethnic cleansing being the recent outputs of 
such a nationalism. Today, racist and supremacist nationalism are emerging, manifesting 
among others through a rise in the support  for right-wing political ideologies and parties in 
Europe (Mieriņa & Koroļeva, 2015) and related groups in the United States of America  
(Goodheart, 2018).  
Nationality critics generally drawing  from a Rawlsian veil of ignorance perspective (Rawls, 
1999: 118–130), argue that nationality has no moral value worth promoting and inclusion in 
citizenship, contending that since it is unchosen, nationality is among the accidents of birth 
that render nationality morally arbitrary (Beitz, 2001; Nussbaum, 2002a; Bader, 2005; Caney, 
2005, 2015; Callan, 2006; Kateb, 2006; Abizadeh, 2008; Nili, 2015; Arneson, 2016). Such 
nationality opponents argue that whilst the relationships that exist between an individual and 
his or her family have strong bonds of affection that would necessitate some form of 
partiality, the same cannot be said to be the case with nationality whose bonds with fellow 
members rests on imagination (Arneson, 2016). Critics such as Arneson (2016: 560) extend 
this position further, to argue that although patriotic attachments are regarded as meaningful, 
it is hard to draw a line on what constitutes special attachments (especially based on 
characteristics that are not a result of one’s moral choice). Nationality can therefore not be 
distinguished from ‘moderate’ racists who without advancing racial supremacy, argue that it 
is important that they form a common group that will promote their interests as a racial group 
(Arneson, 2016: 560). 
Given this background, the tendency has been to regard nationality as inherently immoral 
(Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). Nationality is thus understood as not only something that should 
be excluded from normative configurations of citizenship, but rather it is an ideal that must be 
overcome altogether. However, as I intend to show in this chapter, nationality does not inhere 
evil. The thrust of this dissertation is that there are normatively valid conceptualisations of 
nationality that are necessarily worth defending especially in the light of globalisation of 
citizenship. It is worth noting that essentialism of culture, religion, race, nativism or a mixture 
of any of these does not constitute a morally defensible nationalism. The nationality or 
patriotism being defended in this dissertation is moderate and not only inclusive of but 
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welcoming of new membership. Whilst acknowledging a special affection for one’s country, 
nationality is incompatible with beliefs of its superiority over others, and whilst national 
belonging seeks the country’s flourishing, it is incompatible with dominating other nations 
since it also acknowledges the moral or cosmopolitan dimension of pursuit of national 
interest (Nathanson, 2007: 76; Papastephanou, 2013b: 173). The type of nationality being 
defended in this dissertation is one characterised by “critical, non-chauvinistic” perspectives 
(Nathanson, 2007: 76)  and therefore is incompatible with national exceptionalism and 
domination of other nations.  
Having discussed the elements of nationality and the challenges it faces, the sub-sections 
under Section 2.5. make a case for the normative justification of nationality in both local and 
global citizenship. However, to effectively account for the normativity of nationality and 
complementarity of nationality with human equality especially in global citizenship 
conceptualisation, it is necessary to employ a paradigm of universalism that is not rigidly 
dismissive of otherness but recognises the normativity of otherness to individuation and 
collective being. Therefore, I first discuss Seyla Benhabib’s difference-grounded 
universalism (Benhabib, 1992, 2011) in the next section. Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) 
universalism that recognises normativity in both difference and similarity is remarkably 
distinct from the Rawlsian universalism (Rawls, 1999: 118–139) and essentialist neo-Kantian 
universalism (Code, 2012) that inherently dismiss (national) difference and otherness as 
inherently morally arbitrary.   
2.3. Seyla Benhabib’s universalism 
This section discusses Seyla Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) theorization about the problem of the 
nature and conditions of ideal universalism that should inform modern political systems, 
especially in the light of global diversity. The relevance of her theory for this dissertation 
constitutes in the theory’s grounding of the the universalism of human equality in not only 
the commonalities people have as human beings, but more importantly in their differences. 
Benhabib holds that human equality resides in the fact that all human beings have the 
fundamental “right to have rights” (Benhabib, 2011: 26). This fundamental right is itself 
rooted in an individual’s right to communicative freedom, which is “your capacity to agree or 
disagree with me on the basis of reasons the validity of which you accept or reject” 
(Benhabib, 2011: 26). In other words, this means that by virtue of being language speakers, 
all human beings have the capability of communicative freedom. Thus, an individual has an 
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“ability to say “yes” or “no” to an utterance whose validity claims [he or she] comprehends 
and according to which [he or she] can act” (Benhabib, 2011: 67). 
What this reasoning means is that besides being an agent capable of formulating my own 
goals, I am also embedded in a shared social world (Benhabib, 2011: 68). I therefore have to 
acknowledge and respect those others (in the shared social world who will be affected in one 
way or the other by my actions). The others too have agency like me. Just like me, the others 
too have the capacity to agree or disagree with my action and the validity of the reasons of 
the action (Benhabib, 2011: 68). Sharing these two (agency and embeddedness) is what 
makes us equal (Benhabib, 2011: 68–69). What this means is that by respecting the other 
people’s capacity to agree or disagree with the validity of the reasons for my action, I am not 
necessarily looking for the other people’s approval, clearance, or endorsement of my action. 
Rather, I am only respecting the other people’s communicative freedom. Like me, the other 
people are beings capable of agreeing or disagreeing with the validity of my or anybody 
else’s claims or reasons for action. One can see that such considerations for action necessarily  
entail a dialogical relationship. As interlocutors, we are not looking for conformity to a 
predetermined acceptable position, nor are we looking for a common stand over a particular 
matter. Rather, our engagement with each other is motivated by our looking for mutual 
understanding, recognition and respect of the forcefulness, value, and relevance of the other’s 
position to him or her. My agency thus understood, is for Benhabib (2011: 68) the flipside of 
my communicative freedom and hence the conclusion that the capacity to justify goals is 
prior to the agency to formulate them. 
For Benhabib (2011: 68), the reasons for my action serve two purposes. Firstly, the reasons 
are the grounds, which motivate me as a being with agency. Secondly they are – 
[A]lso accounts of my actions as I project myself as a “doer” unto a social world which I 
share with others, and through which others recognize me as a person capable of, and 
responsible for, certain courses of action. [Therefore] agency and communication are two 
sides of the same coin: I only know myself as an agent, because I can anticipate being part of 
a social space in which others recognize me as the initiator of certain deeds and the speaker 
of certain words for which I must be able to provide an account (Benhabib, 2011: 68). 
What Benhabib (2011) demands is that an individual be understood not only as an agent 
capable of formulating own goals and pursuing them. Rather, this human being, with agency, 
should be understood as one situated in a social context of mutual recognition with others. It 
can be drawn that in this context, one is responsible for not only pursuing one’s 
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autonomously formulated goals, but also recognising that one must account for one’s deeds to 
the other members of society though not necessarily for approval. I do not have only the 
agency to act, but for every action I undertake I have a justification or reasons, whose validity 
I would ideally expect everybody to accept. Nevertheless, I realise that, in reality, some may 
not accept the  validity of the reasons. But after explaining my reasons to the others and they 
disagree with and reject the reasons, I still expect the other individuals to recognise and 
respect the value of my self-set goals to me.  In other words, the obligation to respect my 
capacity for agency necessarily entails an obligation to respect the mode and substance of my 
self-expression which is the exercise of my communicative freedom (Benhabib, 2011: 68). 
Ideally I would desire everyone to approve of my reasons for action. The other individuals 
too – by virtue of being equal to me – have the same legitimate expectation from me. I also 
therefore have the same ‘obligation’ to them. I must hear their reasons for their position and 
consequently accept the validity to the others of the norms underlying their reasons even 
when I find them unsatisfactory to me personally. All this requires that I recognise the 
capacity of the other (as well as my own) to provide reasons for actions and to accept or 
reject their validity (Benhabib, 2011: 69).  
What one draws is that this capacity to initially have reasons for action and later exercise 
agency, expecting others to recognise and respect my value of the reasons for the exercise of 
my agency makes universality of human equality place human differences at the center. The 
terms for the validity of the norms are not universal or abstract, demanding unconditional 
strict conformity from moral agents. The terms of such a validity are not prior to or external 
to the experiences of each of us, and is neither in a binding hierarchy to which all of us must 
conform. Rather, the validity is established through “justificatory processes through which 
you and I, in dialogue must convince each other of the validity of certain norms [which are] 
general rules of action” (Benhabib, 2011: 67). Thus universalism must be dialogical.  
In Benhabib’s (2011: 67) communicative universalism, unlike the essentialist one 
propounded by thinkers like Kant, the pivotal argument is not that the individual undertakes a 
moral thought experiment to identify absolute and universal moral maxims of action which 
every rational individual would will. A universalism rooted in discourse does not require that 
I establish principles through an imaginary process that is independent of and  mutes my 
social, gender, cultural and historical experiences and circumstances in a quest of arriving at 
impartial moral principles as does the Rawlsian universalism (Benhabib, 2011: 67). Instead, 
for Benhabib (2011), the centrality of the discourse is that the theoretical justification of 
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human rights and human freedom is based on the processes of justification through which 
two different people in a dialogue convince each other of the validity of each other’s norms 
(Benhabib, 2011: 68).  
What one draws is that the uniqueness of the deliberative approach to universalism lies in that 
the validity of the norms is not prior to the deliberation. The interlocutors embark on a 
conversation to ground the validity of the norms. The uniqueness of this model of 
universalism of human freedom and equality is that the model accords significance to two 
distinct but related conceptions of the ‘other’ involved in the discourse: the generalised other 
and the concrete other moral standpoints (Benhabib, 2011: 69). Through these conceptions, 
Benhabib’s (2011: 67) universalism avoids committing the error of elevating one conception 
of being human over another conception as the Rawlsian (Rawls, 1999: 118–139) and 
Kantian ethics do (Code, 2012). Ultimately denying all difference normative value. In the 
next sub-sections I discuss these two conceptualizations of the general and concrete moral 
standpoints of being human.  
2.3.1. The generalised other 
A comprehensive discussion of Behabib’s notions of generalised and concrete 
conceptualizations of the being human is in her earlier book Situating the self (1992). In this 
book, Benhabib (1992) is critical of Western tradition’s moral theories from Hobbes to Rawls 
for being substitutionalist. Such ethical theories only recognise the generalised common 
identity of all human beings as a basis for grounding universalism and human rights. Such 
theories completely exclude the relevance of concrete being, which they consider as having 
no moral value in establishing universal ethics (Benhabib, 1992: 152). 
The generalised other standpoint demands that we regard every individual human being as 
rational and entitled to the exact rights and duties which we ascribe to ourselves and this is 
achieved by abstracting “from the individuality and concrete identity of the other” (Benhabib, 
1992: 158). Thus, one recognises that just like one, the other is a being who has concrete 
needs, desires and concrete affects, nevertheless, his or her moral dignity does not reside in 
such attributes that differentiate us from each other (which conversely make each of us 
unique). His or her dignity instead is constituted in the commonality of our rationality as 
speaking and acting agents (Benhabib, 1992: 158). One relates with the other under the 
governance of formal equality and reciprocity and our interactions “are primarily public and 
institutional” (Benhabib, 1992: 158). This is why my interaction with the other occurs in a 
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context shaped by the moral categories of the duty and obligation we owe each other as 
beings with inherent dignity (Benhabib, 1992: 159). 
For Benhabib (1992: 152–153), much of political theory since Hobbes has been about 
universalism grounded on the standpoint of the general other where the universalism (of 
moral dignity and human rights) is based only on the general similarities human beings have 
in common with each other. In the choice of moral principles of justice, the Rawlsian original 
position makes the differences among those behind the veil of ignorance irrelevant but only 
common interests (Rawls, 1999: 118). However, such approaches, as Benhabib (1992) 
argues, ignore the crucially relevant standpoint of the concrete other. For Benhabib (1992: 
161), the individuals behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance (who are ignorant of their gender 
and social-economic situated-ness in order to effectively arrive at impartial and impersonal 
moral principles) are not human selves at all. In the quest of achieving objectivity and 
impartiality of moral principles, Rawls’ employment of Immanuel Kant’s noumenal agency 
(Benhabib, 1992: 161) lands into a problem in that noumenal selves cannot be individuated. 
This, as Benhabib (1992: 161) argues, is because individuated beings are “embodied, 
affective, suffering creatures [with] memory and history, [and] ties and relations to others” 
and they pertain to the phenomenal realm. Regrettably, in Kantian ethics, the phenomenon 
realm is not a site for objective moral principles. The generalised standpoint is therefore 
ultimately empty; it refers to everyone (that which pertains to all human beings); yet, at the 
same time it also refers to no one (as it dismisses people’s embeddedness in their social 
contexts that accord them distinctiveness) (Benhabib, 1992: 161). 
What I glean from the general other standpoint is that it ignores the individuating peculiar 
differences of human beings in its conception of equality and freedom. I further glean that the 
profoundness of the limitation of the general other moral standpoint lies in that  what gives 
the actual human being a sense of individuation are not the similarities he or she shares with 
everybody. Rather it is what makes him or her different from others. Otherness has some 
unique differences that do not only make me different but authentic. The erroneous 
assumption made by the generalised other standpoint is that it is only the public and 
institutional relationships the individual has that have normative value, and that such 
relationships are distinct and separate from the non-public or private ones the person has 
(Benhabib, 1992: 158–159). However, what the terms of interaction in public institutions do 
by extinguishing the differentiating features of a human person, in principle denies what 
individuates the person.  
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2.3.2. The concrete other 
The concrete moral standpoint demands that in acknowledging equality with the other, I must 
regard the other as an embodied individual rational being “with a concrete history, identity 
and affective-emotion constitution” (Benhabib, 1992: 159). Besides abstracting that which 
constitutes my commonality with the other, I must also “focus on individuality” (Benhabib, 
1992: 159). I therefore must endeavour to understand the other’s needs, what motivates him 
or her, what he or she values and how he or she values it. The norms of equity and 
complementary reciprocity govern our relationships with each other, as each legitimately 
expects forms of behaviour that will make him or her feel “recognized and confirmed as a 
concrete, individual being with specific needs, talents and capacities” (Benhabib, 1992: 159). 
Our differences complement us in our relationships, unlike in the generalised other where our 
differences exclude us in our relationships (Benhabib, 1992: 159). For Benhabib (1992: 159), 
the norms of our interaction are largely, although not always, non-institutional and they are 
private – “norms of friendship, love, and care” sympathy, and solidarity. Relating with the 
other through such norms and feelings confirms my recognition of not only his or her 
humanity (as does the general other standpoint), but rather his or her individuality.  
The individuality of the other not only constitutes in his or her being a rational being. The 
individuality is in his or her experiences as an embodied being with affections, a being with a 
particular memory, history and with interrelations with others (Benhabib, 1992: 159). Thus 
understanding the other only as an impersonal being undermines his or her being human 
(Benhabib, 1992: 161). The general otherness moral standpoint considers only our 
commonality whilst dismissing our differences as not being central in understanding the basis 
of equality and the attendant human rights and obligations derived from human equality. The 
implication one draws from the general otherness standpoint is that it deems aspects of 
concrete otherness as inhibitive of any prospects and endeavours of attaining the impartial 
conditions under which human dignity can be respected through autonomous agency. 
The goal of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance is that I who know who or what I am, must ignore 
all such knowledge to reflect and deliberate effectively on impartial principles of justice for 
society (Rawls, 1999: 118). I should equally freeze all such peculiarities about the other. 
However, for Benhabib (1992), such a thought experiment is defective. The fault lies in the 
fact that during the deliberation for principles of justice there is no way I will know who the 
others are or what constitutes and motivates them (Benhabib, 1992: 167). This is because, 
according to the Rawlsian universalism tradition  (Rawls, 1999: 118), all knowledge, 
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assumptions and prejudices I have about others must be extinguished once we are 
deliberating about principles of justice, behind the veil of ignorance. All I should know about 
others with whom I will relate in a scheme of social cooperation are our similar situatedness 
as impersonal beings. The alleged aim is to achieve symmetry; hence, impartiality in the way 
each relates to everyone else (Rawls, 1999: 123–125). 
However, for Benhabib (1992), the dismissal of such assumptions and prejudices has no 
meaningful role to play in the deliberation and realisation of the principles of justice. The 
dismissal only yields a morally problematic outcome. This is because these assumptions and 
prejudices that touch on the individuality of the concrete others are never accorded the space 
to be heard, shared, discussed, worked out and worked through dialogically (Benhabib, 1992: 
167–168). For Benhabib, (1992)  unless these assumptions and prejudices about otherness are 
confronted and deliberatively considered, there exists a real danger of misunderstanding and 
undermining the moral weight of what individuates the other. Ultimately, the Rawlsian 
original position still entrenches within it misunderstandings about and hostilities towards the 
other hidden behind the impartiality and impersonality of the veil of ignorance (Benhabib, 
1992: 167). One draws out that unfortunately, these prejudices and misunderstandings will 
still determine how the people as concrete beings will relate in the implementation of the 
‘impartial’ principles they will have agreed. 
Given this context, Benhabib (1992)  therefore concludes that the identity of any human self 
cannot be defined with reference to his or her capacity for agency alone. The identity also 
must include the actuality of my choices. It is about how as a “finite, concrete, embodied 
individual”, I re-create and shape “the circumstances of my birth and family, linguistic, 
cultural and gender identity into a coherent narrative that stands as my life’s story” 
(Benhabib, 1992: 167).  
The case for the normativity of nationality which this dissertation is making (see section 2.5.) 
is informed by Benhabib’s (1992) position about concreteness that basically holds that  
individuation does not pertain only to a transcendental self (to the disdain of neo-Kantians 
and Rawlsians) that is delinked from the empirical and distinctive aspects of particularity of 
the self. In agreement with Benhabib (1992), I argue in this dissertation that in cosmopolitan 
education for citizenship, a normatively full account of being human must actively take into 
consideration the individual’s context of social, economic, linguistic, cultural, gender and 
historical embededness. As I will argue later (see section 2.4.2. and 2.4.3.), this perspective of 
universalism must accommodate nationality as being important in our understanding of 
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individuals’ identities in the modern globalised world. We must avoid basing global 
relationships – that are based on the generalised other moral standpoint – on the exclusion of 
the concreteness of people’s nationality on the essentialist basis that national particularism is 
anti-ethetical to cosmopolitan impartiality. 
Remarkably, both the concreteness and the otherness of the concrete other cannot be known 
satisfactorily as long as the other’s own voice is absent, when he or she cannot self-define his 
or her concreteness and his or her otherness (Benhabib, 1992: 165). I become aware of the 
other’s concreteness as well as his or her otherness only after the other him- or herself has 
made me aware of his or her otherness and concreteness. In the absence of dialogue, 
engagement and confrontation we may (usually unsuccessfully) only assume what constitutes 
the other’s otherness or, at worst, ignore it altogether in indifference. For Benhabib (1992: 
165), this is where the distinction between “substitutionalist” universalism of the generalised 
moral standpoint and the “interactive universalism” of the concrete standpoint lies (1992: 
165). For Benhabib, (1992) moral universalism does not reside in an essence or human nature 
that we all allegedly have or possess as the generalised other perspective supposes. Instead, 
universalism consists in experiences of finding commonality in a context of mutually 
acknowledged diversity, conflict, divide and struggle (Benhabib, 2011: 68). I argue that such 
a universalism must include one’s nationality as part of one’s embeddedness, concreteness 
and otherness in forms of global relationships. Universalism is thus a perennial moral 
aspiration to strive for in the context of acknowledged divides and diversity (Benhabib, 2011: 
70). For Benhabib (2011: 70), universalism is neither a fact nor a description of the essence 
of the human being or of the world (Benhabib, 2011: 68). It is dialogical. 
For Benhabib (1992), such a discourse ethics does not regard the moral standpoint as 
primarily an abstract thought process, which the moral agent or moral philosopher 
singlehandedly undertakes. Rather, it is supposed to be a result of an actual dialogue context 
with other moral agents about what constitutes otherness and concreteness of the concrete 
other. Benhabib (1992: 169) further holds that the discourse model of ethics does not place 
restrictions on the object of moral reasoning or moral disputation as does the general other 
standpoint. The more the knowledge moral agents have about the other’s concreteness, the 
peculiarities of his or her society, how it intends to approach its future, the more meaningful 
will be the deliberations for the terms of cooperation and relation with each other among the 
moral agents (Benhabib, 1992: 169). Thus as Benhabib (1992: 169) highlights further, 
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communicative or discourse ethics enlarges the domain of moral theory since not only issues 
of justice but also questions of the good life come to form the discourse. 
Interactive universalism, as Benhabib (1992: 153) argues, acknowledges the role of reason in 
resolution of normative matters since moral deliberation requires the elements of fairness, 
reciprocity and some mode of universalisability. More importantly, however, interactive 
universalism regards difference (and this may include nationality) other than commonality as 
the crucial point of departure in moral discourse (Benhabib, 1992: 169). Such universability 
acknowledges the inescapability and relevance of the embodiment and embeddedness of the 
human identity in moral evaluations. The more moral agents have more knowledge about 
each other, the other’s history, “the particulars of their society, its structure and future, the 
more rational will be the outcome of their deliberations” (Benhabib, 1992: 169). 
2.3.3. Democratic iterations as moderator of communicative discourse 
One of the possible main counteractions to Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) difference-grounded 
dialogic universalism would be that it is bound to promote agent-relativism and oppression of 
minorities and the marginalised. A critic would hold, for example, that through the concrete 
other perspective, a community may justify gender, cultural or religious domination, by 
claiming that the community is just expressing what makes the  community  distinctively 
other and concrete in contrast with moral standards and way of life of any other human 
communities. The standpoint of concrete otherness, so would the critic possibly argue, can 
only serve to consolidate the unequal power balances in the society (e.g. gender inequalities 
where women are already both marginalised and disempowered to deliberate and take a 
position that really reflects their authentic interests). 
To counter this possibility, Benhabib (2011) proposes conditions for the deliberative 
processes and outcomes to be morally acceptable, that is to be non-coercive, non-
exclusionary and inoppressive. The concept of “democratic iterations” is what can check 
agaist the vices of marginalization, power imbalances, and insulation of a community’s 
culture from critique (2011: 89). Democratic iterations refer to the complex processes of 
public debate and deliberation, aimed at modifying, customising and recasting universalist 
rights claims through “public and free processes of democratic opinion and will-formation” 
(Benhabib, 2011: 89). Upon undergoing these processes, the people contextualise the 
universalist claims. The legal, political and civil institutions of society now acquire and 
express the localised form of the universalist claims (Benhabib, 2011: 128–30). For Benhabib 
(2011), besides giving the replica of the original intended meaning and or usage, the 
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repetition of terms or concepts produces a form of variation. As such, she claims that 
iterations are about making sense of the original, enhancing and transforming its meaning 
(Benhabib, 2011: 129). Ultimately, this leads to creative venacularisation, a local 
appropriation which strips the original of its ‘foreign’ authority on the local (Benhabib, 2011: 
126). The local or the vernacular now becomes the authoritative for us. Democratic iterations 
localise the global and globalise the local (Benhabib, 2011). 
One gleans that democratic iterations are crucial in determining whether a particular 
community’s social and cultural interpretations of human rights claims and social obligations 
are morally legitimate. A key condition in determining legitimate democratic iterations is that 
all affected members must be dialogically involved in legislation procedures and their 
consent must be given (Benhabib, 2011: 128–130). The condition to include of all affected 
can only be realised if the concerned community has a “communicative framework” 
underlying its institutions (Benhabib, 2011: 129). Thus, the individual participates in the 
collective will-formation about the nature and scope of laws that will govern the lives of their 
community. The major merit one can derive from such participation is that it guarantees that 
a community member’s autonomy and capacity to spell out and make sense of claims of 
rights in dialogue with others is respected. Under Benhabib’s (2011: 129) discourse ethics 
model, for the norms to be valid, all concerned must approve them. If there is arbitrary 
exclusion of individuals and communities from participating in the norms-formulating 
deliberation, then the consequent norms would be invalid. It is therefore necessary that the 
discourse of justification of the norms of the community should not be permanently stopped 
until the others’ objections have been taken into consideration and not just ignored 
(Benhabib, 2011: 173). With respect to possible concerns of nationality being defended by 
this dissertation degenerating into right wing segregationist nationalism, the concept of 
democratic iterations would function as the regulative safeguard against  exclusive 
nationalism. 
Although Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) conception of universalism is suitable and has been 
employed by this dissertation to found defence for normativity of nationality in global 
citizenship conceptualization, it is worth highlighting that she is indifferent regarding the 
normativity of nationality (Benhabib, 2011: 142). For Benhabib (2011: 142),  the nation-state 
today has lost its popular sovereignty (where the people are expected to be both legislators as 
well as obeyers of the law). This loss of people’s sovereiginity is due to economic 
globalisation under which multinational corporations have in principle and practice somehow 
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assumed the ability to force down their own preferred legislation for usually disempowered 
developing nations to attract the investment of the corporations (Benhabib, 2011: 104). Loss 
of the people’s sovereignity as Benhabib (2011: 104) holds, has resulted in the emergence of 
self-generated laws, particularly in global trade, which ironically are incongruent with the 
people’s interests. Global law that itself shapes the global economy lacks the representation 
of the opinion and will of the individual (Benhabib, 2011: 105). Such tendencies of lack of 
representation of the people’s interests also extend to the law of the nation-state as it is 
influenced by the conveniences of multinational corporations and not by the will of the 
people (Benhabib, 2011: 105). As such, Benhabib (2011) holds that the nation-state is no 
longer the site for popular sovereignty it has always been because global systems and 
economic institutions have compromised this ability by tacitly coercing nation-states to 
prioritise global economic interests. Benhabib  (2011: 142) therefore does not regard 
nationality as having normativity in the modern global order and that as long as alternative 
structures of human organization besides the weakened nation-state could be established the 
outcome would still be acceptable.  However, the position of this dissertation despite leaning 
on the conceptual cannons of Benhabib’s (2011) universalism, in contrast makes a case  for 
the normative necessity to recognize the nationality in the conceptualization of ideal 
cosmopolitanism. 
Benhabib  (2011: 142) is indifferent about the role of nationality as an important source of 
concrete otherness, holding that the principle of representation of the individual’s interests in 
different forms of legislation that concerns him or her is what justifies the existence of 
whatever form of units of democratic collective life (Benhabib, 2011: 142). For Benhabib 
(2011: 142), whether the peoples of the world may coalesce into a world government, supra-
federation or even break into smaller units, as long as the logic of representation is what 
guides any such decisions, such arrangements would be legitimate and acceptable. 
Benhabib’s (2011) position and justification of boundaries (not just national boundaries since 
she accommodates the possibility of national boundaries being re-drawn expansively or in a 
shrinking manner depending on what the concerned members may freely will) is based on 
and restricted to “the logic of representation and not on the primacy of some attachment to 
the national” (Benhabib, 2011: 142). Implicitly, she excludes nationality as a source of 
concrete otherness. 
In this dissertation, despite the non-recognition by Benhabib (2011), I show that nationality 
generally constitutes a background and bedrock for the preservation of different sources of 
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concrete otherness especially in global citzenship. I argue that a national identity that 
conforms to democratic iterations is an acceptable norm that is welcoming and inclusive of 
non-native members who seek to be part of the nation. Given the fact that  nationality is 
subject to democratic iterations, it is accommodative of multi-cultural identities as part and 
result of the iteration processes. National belonging is thus compatible with and a necessary 
unit of global citizenship. 
 
2.4. Nationality: Host of sources of concrete otherness  
In the next subsections, I argue for the normativity of nationality in local and global 
citizenship conceptualizations. I argue that realization of the autonomous transcendent self 
pursued by strong cosmopolitanism is inextricably dependent on provision of care by others. 
A recipient of such care is also obligated to provide it to others, thus perpetuating the sense of 
community as an indispensable component of individual self-actualization. I show that the 
community has different institutions of care that provide support to the individual for the 
development of the coveted capacity for rational choice. However, these institutions are, not 
detached from each other but cohere through elements such as shared language, pubic 
culture, common history, and geographical situatedness, which are also elements of 
nationality (Miller, 1995: 27). It is the coherence among these elements hosted by nationality 
that gives the sense of community. As such I argue that nationality, though mostly 
unrecognized because of its passive background role, informs the elements that make 
possible interaction among institutions of care and public life in a democratic society. Being 
the host of different sources of concreteness to the individual and the collective, nationality 
can neither be substituted by a purely political patriotism. The hosting of sources of 
concreteness for individuation and collective being  further shows that global (economic) 
cooperation among the peoples of the world ought to and does recognise  the value of 
nationality to be meaningful.  
The nationality being defended in this dissertation is not that which is based on nativism, 
race, and religion. The nationality neither entails subjection of one’s values and ways of life 
to that of the nation nor that the thick culture of the nation should underlie each of one’s 
conceptions of the good life. Rather, it is a nationality that is cognisant of the indispensability 
of individual freedom and of the pluralistic ways of being. The ideal national community 
defended by this dissertation is one that characteristically respects an individual’s right to 
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have rights by having functional and accessible institutions of communicative freedom for 
collective will-formation (Benhabib, 2011: 89). 
2.4.1. Dependence of autonomy on community care  
In this section I argue that realization of the autonomous individual (who is the end of strong 
cosmopolitanism) is necessarily dependent on care provision by the institutions of care of a 
community. As such, ignoring the role of care and the community is denying the concrete 
otherness (Benhabib, 1992) of the autonomous individual member of the community. The 
care and community are substantially informed by aspects of nationality.  
The cornerstones of liberal equality are individual agency, individual freedom and toleration 
(Tan, 2000: 2). Liberal equality thus prioritises the individual capacity to self-determine what 
counts as good for him or her (Tan, 2000: 2). Social goods, which the individual must value 
and which necessitate a partial curtailment of his or her autonomous choice-making over the 
good life are justified only in so far as they optimise the realisation of personal freedom 
(Kymlicka, 2002b: 55). Thus, the only justification for limiting individual freedom is the 
condition that the limitation will yield even more freedom, infringing liberty only for liberty’s 
sake (Rawls, 1999: 56). The  coercive duties of justice in the nation-state are justified on this 
basis of maximizing individual self-actualization despite their limiting of individual freedom 
(Kymlicka, 2002b: 62). In other words, the coercion for civic cooperation in the democratic 
society, although it restricts individual freedom, is a good that optimes the attainment of 
individual freedom for every person. However, some goods, such as patriotism, are usually 
not considered part of such inevitable and necessary primary social goods that help preserve 
the democratic liberal society (Nussbaum, 2002a; Nili, 2015; Arneson, 2016). The 
implication is that in liberal thought, at a maximum, the common good that necessitates 
coercion is that which secures optimizes the freedom of the individual to make own choices 
about what constitutes the good and promote political justice for the citizens (Rawls, 1999: 
71). The common good the state imposes on citizens is deemed ‘objective’ for it is necessary 
and in the interest of every citizen despite his or her preferences. However, goods like 
patriotism are deemed too substantive and in conflict with preferences of some individuals 
(Tan, 2000: 22), hence patriotism must be a private matter because it is subjective.  
Positions against patriotism within the nation-state build on this premise, claiming that 
nationality does not constitute an objective primary good that is of fundamental value to 
every member of the community (Habermas, 2001; Nili, 2015). Valuations of nationality are 
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up to the agency of the individual hence, they pertain to the private sphere only. Valuations of 
national life should not be part of public policy, such as constituting education for democratic 
citizenship, as such actions ostensibly amount to  an imposition of one good on an 
autonomous individual (Brighouse, 2003: 165). In other words, patriotism and patriotic 
education are understood as elements that effectively undermine the individual’s choice-
making capacity of what constitutes the good life for him or her. Opposition to nationality in 
education for democratic citizenship is mounted on the argument that valuation of nationality 
is a private matter, it should not constitute conceptualisations of citizenship, and citizenship 
must be grounded in universalism and optimisation of individual freedom as a means for 
achieving individual autonomy, which is what characterises human equality (Brighouse, 
2003: 165).  
Conversely, owing to the prevailing global interconnectedness, the critics of nationality 
(Nussbaum, 2002a; Merryfield & Duty, 2008; Arneson, 2016) further contend that nationality 
ought not to delimit duties of justice among the people of the world. Such perspectives 
demand that learners should essentially learn only about universal principles ideal for global 
co-existence and toleration without giving due recourse to the partialities of national 
citizenship (Nussbaum, 2002a; Brighouse, 2003; Demaine, 2004; Divala & Enslin, 2008). In 
other words, opponents of nationality demand that citizenship conceptualisation should 
include only universalisable attributes of the human being (such as human rights, freedoms 
and duties that establish and sustain the human rights framework) as the only relevant 
normative considerations (Nussbaum, 2002a). For this perspective, particularity has no 
inherent moral value. Such is the case in the Malawian education context, where national 
history has been removed from the education curriculum at the primary level and it does not 
form part of the secondary school curriculum either (Ministry of Education, 2005). Instead, 
learners now learn Social and Environmental Science, which essentially is about impartial 
democratic values (Ministry of Education, 2005). Furthermore, to compete effectively in the 
global arena, all mother-tongue instruction in the first four years of primary education has 
been removed in preference of English-only instruction (Malawi Government, 2013, sec. 
78(1); Masina, 2014). In other words, the goal is that the nation’s learners must compete 
effectively in the global arena where English is the language of science, trade and technology. 
However, the concept of the autonomous impartial individual of liberalism (which informs 
strong cosmopolitanism) who is the ultimate precondition for individual freedom and human 
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equality is problematic in that realization of the impartiality is based on universalisation of 
rational self-interests only, whilst  necessarily excluding the normative value of the human 
relationships that are the indispensable enablers of achievement of personal autonomy (Held, 
2006: 81). An instance of such autonomy-enabling relationships are relationships of care in 
the society (Held, 2006: 76).  
The idea of the autonomous and detached person is drawn from an essentialist conception of 
human nature and interests as always reducible to the domains of the objective and 
subjective. Relegating the commitments derived from the relationships of care of the 
community as subjective and hence pertaining to the private sphere only, undermines what 
indispensably enables individual autonomy. Recognising such care and communal 
commitments therefore does not impose on the individual what he or she must autonomously 
value. Such commitments as enablers of freedom are necessary for every individual, hence 
deserve public recognition and reasonable state support in the public domain. Such 
commitments are denied their due normativity because they are categorised as ‘subjective’ 
and hence private (Held, 2006: 82). However, such categorisation of the communal 
commitments as not being objective is arguably due to some embedded influence in the 
criteria for classifying objective and impersonal human interests such as patriarchy (Young, 
1990: 100; Benhabib, 1992: 161; Code, 2012: 92).  
The radical liberalism concept of the impartial citizenship detached from particularistic 
commitments has no place for care, its providers and their hosts, as well as the necessary 
interactions for provision of such care to be sustained, partly due to the association that exists 
between care provisions and femininity (Held, 2006: 76; Code, 2012: 92). Likewise, one of 
the weaknesses of strong cosmopolitanism is that it is only preoccupied with the idea of a 
global citizen who is necessarily detached from the duties of particularistic national 
commitments ostensibly in order to impartially execute commitments to universal humanity 
globally. The ultimate consequence for such a weakness is that there is very little regard for 
the processes and institutions that enable and develop this individual to achieve the much 
sought-after self-determining capacity, which freedom adherents so much emphasise.  
Extreme liberalism, which founds strong cosmopolitanism, conceives the human being as an 
abstract independent individual not under webs of interrelationships with others, and that 
such relationships pertain only to the personal level and cannot be generalised for 
configuration in moral theorisation (Held, 2006: 76). Most liberal theorists “fear that if we 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
conceptualize citizens in terms of their personal connections, we threaten [the citizen’s] 
autonomy and risk treating them paternalistically” (Held, 2006: 77). However, undermining 
such background and hidden institutions, networks and procedures in the name of pursuing 
individual autonomy and impartiality is in principle undermining the normativity of these 
much-targeted enablers of individuation. 
According to McIntyre (2002: 101) one of the unique features of rational human beings is 
that they have a capacity of understanding their being human through time and experiences. 
McIntyre (2002: 101) holds that among others rational human beings identify themselves 
with reference to their time of birth, the present and their coming death. All these stages of 
life are characterised by the need to receive and give care to both significant others and other 
members in one’s community (MacIntyre, 2002: 101). In the community, the individual, 
receives care from different sets of individuals from birth until death, and is expected in turn 
to give back related care later, although not necessarily to the same set of individuals, from 
whom he or she had received care since repayment is never determined by strict reciprocity 
(MacIntyre, 2002: 101). It is clear therefore that the self-determining individual owes a debt 
to the relationships from which he or she emerges from childhood and which also sustain him 
or her throughout adult life. Care in the context of this discussion does not refer to provision 
of basic needs only, but also to acts of common concern, responsibility over the weak and 
vulnerable, benevolence, self-sacrifice and togetherness that different individuals in the 
institutions of care in the community perform to a person from childhood to adulthood. 
According to (Held, 2006: 81), a glaring deficiency of the liberal impartial citizen is that – 
[I]t abstracts from an interconnected social reality, taking the ideal circumstances of an adult, 
independent head of a household as paradigmatic and ignoring all the rest. It overlooks the 
social relations of an economy that makes its members (including heads of household) highly 
interdependent. 
Different institutions in the society provide the care, among others, families, schools, 
neighbourhoods, churches, local associations and community centres (Kymlicka, 1997: 18; 
MacIntyre, 2002: 100; Etzioni, 2014: 48). These institutions are not detached from each 
other. The institutions mutually interact and influence each other. It is instructive to note that 
there are certain common bonds that synchronise and cohere these various institutions of care 
within the community. For instance, language and other related aspects of non-linguistic 
communication, shared geographical territory, a shared history and public culture thin as the 
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culture may be (Kymlicka, 1997), mutually interact mostly in subtle ways to provide the 
individual with care and support mechanism to enable achievement of  self-determination 
(MacIntyre, 2002: 69). The essence of a community lies in how the institutions of care 
mutually depend on each other in non-reciprocally providing care (MacIntyre, 2002: 101)  for 
the achievement of individual autonomy.  
What is evident is that this dependence on institutions of care challenges the contractarian 
tradition of conceiving human relationships in self-interest and contractarian terms in that the 
detached impartial self-interest-driven autonomous individual can neither exist nor flourish in 
the absence of such institutions. In other words, these institutions of care make community 
possible, holding the community together despite the diversity of the individual members of 
the community. For instance, virtues such as mutual responsibility, forgiveness, 
reconciliation and togetherness are cultivated in these spheres, transmitted and shared by a 
common language, revised and refined by such common institutions as the family, 
neighbourhood, friends, schools and local associations (Kymlicka, 1997: 6). No institution 
can cultivate them independently and neither can an independent individual single-handedly 
cultivate them without being in concert with others (Kymlicka, 1997: 6). What they help 
develop in the individual are what enables him or her as an autonomous rational chooser to 
have a range of meaningful and contextualised options in the exercise of his or her self-
determination. They are dialogical in nature (MacIntyre, 2002: 107; Taylor, 2003: 33; 
Etzioni, 2014: 48). 
Institutions of care and the individuals within them embed and incessantly re-define a shared 
public culture that defines interactions and relationships among members through democratic 
contestations (Held, 2006: 43). Thus, there is, underlying these relationships of care, a public 
culture in the community that influences the content and scope of the care to be provided to 
the others in society and also about when and how to provide this care. The expectation to 
provide care is not enforced by any state legislation. Care provision lies outside the ambit of 
procedural justice; yet, it is constitutive of the individual (Taylor, 2003), and the possibility 
of the existence of the institutions of procedural justice themselves, is rooted in them. 
Since the content and scope of the expectations to provide care are in part shaped and 
influenced by the public culture, the nature and contexts of care and care-giving distinctly 
vary across different societies. For self-determining beings, what actually constitutes 
generosity and respect varies from one community to another. However, as an autonomous 
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person living in such institutions of care, I have the liberty to ignore and not value the 
perspectives I encounter and acquire in these institutions. Nevertheless, I am constituted by 
and largely still acknowledge the immense value of the care I have received from significant 
others and all the institutions of care that I not only value but to which I am indebted. As 
MacIntyre (2002: 100) observes, much of the care I receive from the institutions of care is 
given unconditionally. This has a profound effect on the relationships that develop between 
the institutions and myself. The relationships provide me with perspectives through which I 
will exercise my self-determination. The autonomous individual cannot exercise his or her 
autonomy without making recourse to those with whom he or she shares care and care-
giving. The individual’s dependency on care-givers does not entail supremacy of society over 
the individual as a potential critic would hold. Such criticisms manifest the very problematic 
binary compartmentalisation of the social vs the individual, as though the two could 
successfully be disentangled from each other. 
Over and above relationships based on procedural justice obligations, there exist in 
democratic communities unique public cultures, which ultimately contribute towards the 
autonomous individual’s choice-making. According to  Taylor (2003: 33), in a liberal 
democratic society, identity formation for an autonomous individual requires an “acquisition 
of rich human languages of expression”. By languages, Taylor (2003: 33) refers not only to 
the words we use in speech, but primarily also to the different modes of expression by which 
a person defines him- or herself, such as the expressions of love and of one’s artistic and 
aesthetic values. What is crucial for Taylor (2003: 34) is that no one acquires all these 
different forms of language for self-definition without exchanges with others who matter to 
the individual. Identity formation is usually done in dialogue and at times in confrontation 
with the explicit and implicit identities, which others who matter in our lives expect in us 
(Taylor, 2003: 34). It is worth noting that the languages of expression and shared frames of 
meaning-making have a cultural and historical dimension (Kymlicka, 2002a: 245). The 
acquisition of such languages is dialogical and inevitably rooted in a societal culture and 
history which are elements of nationality (Miller, 1995: 27).  
The dialogues occur not only at the genesis of identity formation. We continue to engage in 
them throughout our lives. Among others, as autonomous rational choosers, we place value 
on certain goods – in part owing to our deriving satisfaction from them through common 
satisfaction with our significant others (Taylor, 2003: 33). As such – 
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[Identity] is “who” we are, “where we are coming from.” [Identity] is the background against 
which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make sense. If some of the things I 
value most are accessible to me only in relation to the person I love, then she becomes 
internal to my identity (Taylor, 2003: 34). 
The formation of my identity and opinion is thus dependent on others so that in choosing 
what is valuable for me, I consider whether it has intelligible significance to others who 
matter in my life (Taylor, 2003: 34). My choices are not just empty feelings; therefore, even 
my choices that run counter to the others’ probable expectation and conventions, are made 
and implemented with a recognition and respect of others’ interests. According to Taylor 
(2003: 34), individual identity is a matter of both who one is and where one is coming from. 
What one gleans from this is that the fact that an individual’s choices differ from the common 
expectations of the community does not necessarily nullify the value of the community to 
him or her.  
The autonomous individual, free as he or she is from state coercion in as far as choice of his 
or her preferred way of life is concerned, yet still leaves room for the others’ influence, which 
may either support or urge him or her to reconsider his or her choice (MacIntyre, 2002: 96). It 
is not a violation of individual autonomy for an individual to choose to accommodate the 
interests of his or her significant others by revising his or her interests or altering his or her 
initial goals of life. What one gleans from the autonomous individual’s dependence on others 
is that the dependence demonstrates that there are some relationships that have a type of 
coercion and influence over the individual unparalleled by the political coercion of the state. 
Furthermore, it can be drawn that the place of such relationships in influencing and being 
taken into consideration in an autonomous individual’s life is usually ignored in strong 
cosmopolitanism discourses about a transcendent self and individual freedom. The context of 
relationships with one’s significant others in the community can conveniently compel an 
autonomous individual to reconsider or re-arrange the priority of his or her choices 
(MacIntyre, 2002: 96). The relationships also partly have the privileged capacity to prompt 
the autonomous individual to identify errors in his or her purely personal choices or priorities 
and necessitate a voluntary change (MacIntyre, 2002: 96). 
2.4.2. Interaction among institutions of care 
What is worth emphasising about the autonomous individual is that the institutions providing 
the care he or she receives are not detached from each other. In the community, the 
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institutions of care are a coalescent scheme, cohered with each other by such factors as a 
common language and a common way of life (MacIntyre, 2002: 100–101). Because people in 
a community share a “a dense web of customs, practices, implicit understandings” (Miller, 
1995: 41), the nature of care and terms of care provision therefore are not exclusively arrived 
at in isolation from the historical, linguistic, social, and cultural background of the 
community. Though everyone does not necessarily equally value the shared values and 
conventions of the community, such values and conventions nevertheless substantially and 
inescapably overlap individual members’ lives (Miller, 1995: 41) as autonomous practical 
reasoners (MacIntyre, 2002: 66). The thriving of common virtues in the private spheres has 
an inevitable dimension of historicity. Sharing of a common culture and language are not 
arbitrary and merely spontaneous but are linked to events, to past experiences, and to some 
common values (Coetzee, 2003: 324). One can thus derive that a shared language and a 
societal culture are the flipside of the community’s history. 
It is also worth noting that receiving care obligates the recipient in turn, even upon attaining 
the autonomous capacities, to provide care to others (MacIntyre, 2002: 101). This implies 
sharing common understandings of dutty and entitlements, common frames of linguistic and 
non-linguistic communication, common understandings of appropriate and inappropriate 
conduct, as well as valued virtues since the care is not exclusively provided by one detached 
agent who does not draw from shared conventions and values (Coetzee, 2003: 324; Pettit, 
2014: 1656–1657). Given the foregoing, it is almost impossible to meaningfully 
conceptualise care and modes of care provision outside the linguistic, public culture, 
historical and geographical situatedness of the community. 
Claiming that the individual human being is embedded in and obligated to relationships of 
care and that his or her life choices are in a way dependent on others does not put the 
demands of the community over those of the individual. The claim neither demands that each 
of the choices of the individual human being should be coloured by the interests of the 
community (MacIntyre, 2002: 66). Furthermore, consideration of human relationships in 
moral theorisation does not entail that the ideal of autonomy is inferior and hence be replaced 
with a care ethics. Rather, the demand to recognise the normativity of care is a corrective 
position that highlights the obsession with a pursuit of a transcendent self as the only most 
primary moral ideal whose realisation necessarily excludes social relationships under which a 
self-determining individual develops (Held, 2006: 84). The idea of a detached impartial 
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autonomous person is incongruent with the affective nature of human beings that is neither 
morally arbitrary nor separable from the attainment and sustenance of their self-determining 
capacity. The autonomous rational member of the community is indeed at liberty to question, 
revise or reject the virtues one has received down from one’s significant others and all others 
in the community (MacIntyre, 2002: 71).  
What is worth noting however, is that I learn my individual good not through abstract 
theoretical reflections but through the shared activities of everyday life, as well as evaluations 
of different alternatives presented by those activities (MacIntyre, 2002: 136). In other words, 
community interests and values may not necessarily restrict the autonomy and the primary 
ways of being of the individual. However, some other aspects of life, some other ways and 
modes of being, and sometimes even a way of actually implementing certain moral ideals, or 
expression of one’s preferred way of life are largely shaped by relational life (Meyers, 2005: 
38). What makes a community a unity of characteristically and functionally distinct 
institutions that coherently coalesce are the shared values, languages, discourse systems, 
procedural protocols (Gay, 2000: 81), common understandings of success or failure, 
politeness, respect, and shame etc. These are collectively shared in the home, school, 
neighbourhood, community meetings, media, public life, and religious institutions of the 
community among others. The community and its constitutive units, such as the family, exist 
in interwoven and mutually dependent relationships. This is why a meaningful education is 
one that confronts, examines, interrogates, analyses and interacts with (although not restricted 
to) the situated context of the learner, namely his or her community (Waghid, 2004; Freire, 
2014). 
Calling for recognition of social relationships does not romanticise the heritage of one’s 
development from childhood in all its entirety. Actually, part of such a heritage may be 
tantamount to indoctrination in some cases. However, the most important aspect of this 
position is that there is a significant role played by the public culture and tradition that 
characterise the homes, schools, public life, communities and ultimately nations in which one 
develops one’s ability to make meaningful choices about one’s own life. Schools, homes and 
neighbourhoods are not isolated and insulated from each other. They variously interact with, 
influence and get influenced by the culture of the community. The detached impartial human 
being of strong cosmopolitanism is therefore not detached from their contexts of development 
and history. 
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2.4.3. Care relationships and national concreteness  
In as far as relationships of care occur in and are made possible by a coherent linguistic, 
common cultural, historical, and geographical location context, such relationships are 
grounded in nationality. These elements that form the background context for relationships of 
care are generally the major elements of nationality (Miller, 1995: 27). In other words, 
autonomous individuals living in these institutions shape and are shaped by the common 
societal  culture contested as the culture may be, shared linguistic and no-linguistic codes of 
communication and common values all of which have a historical dimension. The usually 
background passive influence of common public culture over autonomous individuals’ lives 
(Nieto, 2008: 128–129) is, for instance, the reason why an independent and free family and 
the shared public culture of the community (which essentially is the national culture) interact 
and influence each other mutually (MacIntyre, 2002: 133). It is worth noting that in a nation 
the influence of a common culture on institutions of care is mostly subtle, often taken for 
granted, and mostly not usually consciously and recognised by the agent (Gay, 2000: 77; Gay 
& Howard, 2000: 7; Nieto, 2008: 128–129). 
In their evaluation of marital and family therapy protocols, Platt and Laszloffy (2013) show 
how the socio-cultural context of the institutions of care under which an individual has 
developed, are influenced by the nationality of that context. The authors argue that in marital 
and family therapy (MFT) in developed nations (whose demographics include significant 
immigrant populations), it is necessary that nationality be considered among the variables 
shaping the context which determines human behaviour (Platt & Laszloffy, 2013: 442). This, 
they argue, is imperative citing a core MFT principle, which holds that an understanding of 
the context of occurrence of both behaviour and interaction is primary in comprehending 
family and marital problems with which therapists are confronted to help resolve (Platt & 
Laszloffy, 2013: 442). Platt and Laszloffy (2013) thus contend that an awareness of the 
client’s nationality is necessary because it would help therapists to determine how they are to 
shape and direct their interaction with clients of different nationalities to establish both a 
diagnosis and prognosis, even when the client does not make an overt connection between his 
or her problems and nationality. Platt and Laszloffy (2013: 446) hold that in MFT, the values, 
history and beliefs background of the client as well as those of the therapist greatly influence 
what the therapist can see or not see as pertinent in the analysis of a client’s problem and the 
background would also determine  the response of the therapist to the problem. 
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This demonstrates that different nationalities, owing to their differentiated cultures, 
understand and actualise family and marital relationships in diverse ways. The therapist’s 
interpretation of family and marital phenomenon and choice of possible solutions are also 
influenced by the shared culture embedded in his or her nationality (Platt & Laszloffy, 2013: 
445). This for Platt and Laszloffy (2013), is more pronounced in multicultural societies where 
different nationalities and their associated cultures appear in the context of the dominant 
culture of the host multiculturtal nation that embeds public institutions and everyday life. 
Besides the individuals in families among migrant communities in developed nations being 
private and self-determining beings, the mode in which they exercise their autonomy is owed 
in part to their shared public culture which is generally historically attached to a particular 
territory (Miller, 1995: 32; Kymlicka, 2002a: 25). One therefore observes that private 
autonomous institutions and a public culture mutually reinforce each other. It is important to 
realise that this very public culture and its associated elements of historicity, territoriality and 
a sense of community are what define a nation (Miller, 1995: 164). What can be derived is 
that in global citizenship, should such institutions be extinguished by an ostensible 
impartiality, such extinguishing will compromise the meaningfulness of being a concrete 
individual and the capacity of the detached person to self-determine. 
Platt & Laszloffy (2013) further argue that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) tool (a standard statistical diagnostic tool employed worldwide in family 
and mental therapy) is generally individual-centric, ignoring other relationships within which 
the client is enmeshed (Platt & Laszloffy, 2013: 444). As such, the DSM conceptualises 
clients’ problems as being only internal to the individual and not external, that is, unrelated to 
people’s socio-historical contexts which Platt and Laszloffy (2013: 444) argue, is a 
manifestation of the influence of the dominance of the individual-centric conception of the 
human person in MFT. 
Such individual-centric values embedded in the DSM diagnostic tool ultimately influence 
how therapists (most of whom have a Eurocentric conception of human nature and 
relationships) conceptualise health and pathology as well as how they go about settling for 
ideal treatment (Platt & Laszloffy, 2013). Platt and Laszloffy (2013: 444)  further hold that 
the DSM assumes that treatment of human suffering can only be achieved through biological 
means, ultimately excluding spiritual, relational, cultural and similar variables in human 
suffering. Platt and Laszloffy (2013: 444) cite an example of a condition where a client is 
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suffering from the effects of severe abuse or trauma, which in the United States, the DSM 
will diagnose as depression and only recommend treatment by prescription of drugs. 
However, Platt and Laszloffy (2013) argue that different cultures across the globe have 
alternative paradigms, which among others would understand depression as in part having a 
relational or spiritual dimension for example; hence, necessitating performance of certain 
spiritual rituals depending on the patient’s background and life outlook (Platt & Laszloffy, 
2013: 444). The point of the authors is that MFT therapists in multicultural developed nations 
must be aware of the value of their client’s nationality and its associated culture in 
influencing how both the client and therapist are to understand suffering and treatment in a 
particular context. Platt and Laszloffy (2013) call for this awareness principally because in a 
multicultural society, human relationships, behaviour, understanding and treating human 
suffering are not reducible to a single universal and exclusive paradigm, although the DSM 
paradigm implies such in its conceptualisation of disorders and therapy in marital and mental 
phenomena. Furthermore, one gleans that conceptualisations of what constitutes care and 
how to provide it have some peculiar differences across national and cultural backgrounds 
(Haegert, 2000: 497–498). 
It is evident that MFT and general mental health conceptualisations and practice are partly 
shaped by the values of the background cultures of both the client and therapist. Adequate 
information from the client about his or her background is as cardinal as the practitioner 
transcending his her individual-centric background in the processing of the client’s case to 
make both a diagnosis and prognosis (Platt & Laszloffy, 2013: 445–446). In a multicultural 
setup, it is worth recognising that the therapist has a particularistic conception of community, 
the family, and the nature  and value of relationships that matter (Haegert, 2000; Platt & 
Laszloffy, 2013). So too does the client. The perspectives of the client and practitioner about 
the operative paradigm for ideal family or community relationships are not always 
compatible with nor always reducible to a single universal model. The relevance of 
nationality in the family sphere reinforces the position of this dissertation that the unit of the 
family, although a private institution left to the intents of individual autonomy, is still under 
some influence of the shared public culture and values of nationality. Though mostly ignored 
and taken for granted or sometimes denied by the agent, the national culture influence is 
significantly constitutive of the being of the autonomous individual and therefore is an 
inescapable part of the individual’s concreteness. 
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A potential critic would likely argue that the mutual influence between nationality and the 
family pertains to the private sphere since nationality and the family are private institutions, 
and that since they already flourish as private institutions. There is therefore no need for the 
intervening hand of the state to actively support nationality in the public domain.  
However, demanding that the state recognises nationality in the public domain is not 
tantamount to the state coercing the valuing of every element of nationality. Recognising 
nationality as this dissertation is arguing is about recognising the representative and the most 
easily identifiable and non-exclusionist aspects of the nation community such as shared 
culture, supporting and according public functional status to national language, and a critical 
learning of national history in public education systems. These aspects are what enable the 
community to exist making individual autonomy possible and self-actualization meaningful 
by giving the individual a horizon of possible life choices to reflect on and revise (Taylor, 
2003: 52). Such elements of nationality or a shared public culture are what Kymlicka  (1997: 
25) calls a “societal culture”, and they still partly define and characterise a people. Such a 
culture cannot just be dismissed because it is not objective and that it pertains to the affective 
private sphere. Its functional role for everyday life renders is indispensable in enabling self-
actualization. The contention of this dissertation is that the shared, public culture, common 
language and shared history are largely the substance of the social coherence that enables the 
possibility of a sense of community among diverse individual personalities with diverse and 
at times contesting goals. Worse still, in the context of global citizenship, substituting 
nationality for impartiality in education for citizenship is catastrophic for the situatedness of 
global peoples. 
By marginalising the affective – which is the domain of individual concreteness – the strong 
cosmopolitan impartial human being is only conceived in generalised terms (Benhabib, 
1992). The consequence is that the social relationships that exist in institutions of care, which 
enable achievement of individual autonomy, are undermined as morally irrelevant; yet, 
without them the self-determination capacity cannot be achieved. The common linguistic and 
non-linguistic codes of communication, the shared virtues of mutual responsibility and 
respect, forgiveness, reconciliation, the coercive restraining sense of shame, a commitment to 
personal sacrifice and altruism, not only enable establishment of a political society, but also 
in significant proportions, they constitute an individual’s being, his or her way of 
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understanding humanity and relating with it. The autonomous individual can never be 
independent of these shared virtues. They are his or her sources of concreteness. 
A critic may possibly contend that developed capitalist nations are thriving with the 
independent individual model of contractual relationships among strangers who are motivated 
by self-interest. However, as Held (2006: 80) argues, the fact that there are relations 
established on this model does not make it a morally good model to sustain. This is why, for 
instance, in the advent of the challenges of global financial, climate,  and migration crises, 
developed nations most of whom are based on the detached rational self model, have 
struggled to appropriately avert or manage such crises (Mieriņa & Koroļeva, 2015: 186) in 
the best interest of all affected. Arguably it is partly due to a deficiency of the moral ideal of 
care in their democratic and economic ideologies that are based on the rational self model. 
This dissertation argues that recognition of the value of frameworks of relationships and care 
(by implication recognising the value of nationality) is even more paramount in justice and 
citizenship theorisation at the global level, than at local level. The argument is that the depth 
and complexity of global diversity demands global citizenship conceptualisations that 
consider global peoples’ concreteness. Recognition of only the generality of humanity across 
the globe, snubbing people’s languages, their shared ways of life, the historicity of their 
communities, and the meaningfulness of the placed-ness of the communities highly risks 
undermining these sources of concrete being, resulting in understanding the peoples of the 
world only through an ‘equalising’ prism of generality. Assigning normativity only to the 
generality of global peoples in principle effectively denies the people of their concreteness 
(Benhabib, 1992). Denying to recognise the concreteness of the global peoples inevitably 
leads to cultural homogeneity where as chapter 4 will show, globally, some dominant 
culture(s) will have to take the place of the displaced concreteness, resulting in assimilation. 
The relevance  of geographical placed-ness, common culture, shared history and common 
language, to both individual and community concreteness which are essentially elements of 
nationality (Miller, 1995: 27), is usually either taken for granted or downplayed in developed 
nations based on a detached autonomous person conception of citizenship. Largely, I argue, 
this is due to the deep entrenched-ness of such national concreteness underlying the 
economic, political and social structures of the community on which all the routines of 
‘normal’ everyday life revolve. Members in most developed nations, most of whose thinkers 
dominate the discourse about global citizenship theorisation (Parmenter, 2011: 368), do not 
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have to confront the everyday reality of negotiating between two worlds, one marked by 
one’s Bantu mother tongue for example, and another of official spaces marked by an 
incongruent European language such as English at school, which only less than 1% of the 
population use as their household languages such as in Malawi (National Statistics Office of 
Malawi, 1998: 33).  
In most developed nations, the role of language as an attribute of a shared national culture is 
often taken for granted and downplayed because the mother tongue (usually the national 
language) is also the official language (Simpson, 2008: 5–7). When the mother tongue is the 
official language, its effect as a nationality marker tends to be downplayed; yet, it is real. In 
developing nations, like Malawi, where global languages are not only effectively taking over, 
but effectively threatening the very survival of national languages, in the normative sense, a 
people’s way of life is at stake. A new and non-voluntarily chosen mode of perceiving reality 
linguistically is imposing itself on the people. Gradually, their literature and art is being 
forced into extinction, eroding differences unique to communities and individuals across the 
globe (Kamwendo, 1998; Moyo, 2001). The sense of national community and public culture 
in the national languages of developed nations is usually taken for granted and usually 
‘unfelt’ only because the predecessors acknowledged its worth and endeavoured that it be 
developed to be both the mother tongue and official language. However, although mostly 
unrecognised and denied, the nationality still embeds the languages today. The language 
retains national value through its having both the official and ‘national’ language statuses.  
Furthermore, in the communities of developed nations, nationality prevails and is sustained in 
schools among others through the very use of the mother-tongue as language of instruction, 
and through literature peculiar to the nation and linked to the history of the nation. The 
argument I advance is that the national cultures of developed nations, thin as they may be 
(Kymlicka, 1997),  mutually interact with and reinforce the culture underlying both public 
institutions and institutions of care in the community. 
A critic would also contend that these public cultures are not worth protecting just because 
they have demonstrated persistence since national members are only entangled in and 
captured by the fate of birth, therefore, active recognition of nationality should not reinforce 
their unchosen fate (Famakinwa, 2010: 162). However, what is problematic with such a 
criticism is that it presupposes a reductionist conception of an individual human being, 
abstracted from the social and cultural contexts of his or her situatedness. Such a criticism is 
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steeped in the dichotomies of rational versus affective, objective versus subjective evaluative 
categories of all phenomena where ostensibly the affective and subjective are deficient of 
value worth constituting a universalistic conceptualisation of ideal citizenship. However, such 
‘subjective’ categories are what constitute being a human being. The subjectivities of the 
particular relationships with others inextricably constitute the concreteness of the 
individuation of the autonomous person. My individuation is not based on my abstracted 
universal rational self. Instead it is my historicity I share with others, the attachment to a 
particular geographical territory with its memories that individuate me from the rest of the 
equal human folk. Therefore, stripping the linguistic, historical and cultural subjectivities as 
the strong cosmopolitan concept of impartiality demands, in principle, spurns what concretely 
individuates the being expected to act impartially and globally  (Benhabib, 2011: 130). 
It should however, be borne in mind that the ideal nationality being advanced in this 
dissertation  is that of a democratic society with functional institutions guaranteeing the 
fundamental “right to have rights” which in principle is prioritising communicative freedom 
of individual members of the the community (Benhabib, 2011: 59). Through democratic 
deliberation, members have freedom to contest what should not constitute their collective 
culture. In a society characterised by democratic iterations (Benhabib, 2011: 89), the 
assumption is that the members have in principle either explicitly or tacitly endorsed their 
public culture. Besides all this, the culture is incessantly open to more questioning, revising 
and re-constituting by its members as the collective will-formation must necessarily be all-
inclusive (Benhabib, 2011: 89). Furthermore, it is not mandatory that every member display 
the nation’s public culture, neither is it a monolithic thick culture (Miller, 1995: 26). 
2.4.4. A concreteness-grounded universalism 
Hitherto, the argument has been that a conceptualisation of citizenship must include 
frameworks of relationships which the impartial individual depends on to achieve autonomy 
and which strong cosmopolitanism dismisses on account of being subjective and hence 
private, unworthy of inclusion in the normative conceptualisations of citizenship. My 
argument however, attracts the inevitable question of how to include such ‘subjective’ and 
‘arbitrary’ aspects of human nature and still have a normative theory of universal equality 
that does not get entangled by relativism. To begin with, it is worth bearing in mind that the 
position for inclusion of frameworks of human relationships in the quest for universalism and 
equality does not undermine the normative value of ‘objective’ ideals. Furthermore, the 
position of this dissertation does not require replacement of the ‘objective’ category of moral 
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ideals with aspects of individual concreteness. Whilst acknowledging the immense value of 
individual autonomy and moral universalism, this dissertation contends that the strong 
cosmopolitanism perspective that you cannot have moral universalism and individual equality 
whilst essentially conceding the normative value of concreteness is essentially a false 
dilemma. The two types of ideals can be had simultaneously and they are compatible if not 
reinforcing of each other. Realising both of them, however, demands a re-imagining of what 
is normatively essential in human nature. Actualizing the moral worth of both the objective 
and subjective necessarily demands discarding the generalised fundamentalist dualistic 
conception of human nature. This is where a different universalism, as argued by Benhabib 
(1992: 153), becomes relevant. 
There is a need to change the framework in which universalism is conceptualised if we are to 
achieve a universalism in global citizenship that equally places the differences of 
concreteness at the centre of moral reflection. This dissertation argues that achieving a 
meaningful universalism based on human nature essences is the surest way of denying 
individuals and communities of the world their concreteness. For Benhabib (1992: 169) what 
individuates persons and what makes the communities under which they achieve their 
individuation, are not similarities with the rest of other humanity. Rather, the concreteness of 
individuation and community peculiarity resides in difference from the rest (Benhabib, 1992: 
61). This is why a dialogical type of universalism is necessary because in moral reflection, it 
starts with difference without excluding difference in preference of similarity, which is hardly 
telling of the concreteness of the autonomous but embodied individual’s social, cultural, 
geographical, historical embeddedness that mould his or her individuation (Benhabib, 2011: 
130). Individual concreteness and community peculiarity draw from such differences 
contrary to universalisms inspired by Kant (Meyers, 2005: 27–28) and Rawls (Rawls, 1999: 
118–123). Therefore, the validity of the norms of universalism must be dialogical and not 
based on mere projections of human essences in order to take into account what makes the 
other other (Benhabib, 2011: 69). This is meant to ensure mutual confirmation of not only 
each other’s humanity but individuation so as not to undermine what typifies the other 
(Benhabib, 1992: 159).  
This dissertation therefore argues that it is problematic to restrict equality and universalism to 
a detached autonomous transcendent self as the only cardinal consideration in cosmopolitan 
citizenship, ignoring the host of the sources of the situatedness and concreteness of the self. 
Inclusion of nationality in global citizenship is necessary because among the peoples of the 
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world, it is elements of nationality that generally embody the concreteness and otherness of 
global communities through language, history and common culture, among others. These are 
embedded in the social, economic and political structures of the people (MacIntyre, 2002: 
107). They are also constitutive of the sense of being of the individuals. This is why 
meaningful education for citizenship cannot only be about transcendental selves. For 
education to be meaningful and just, it necessarily ought to include aspects of particularity 
(Waghid, 2004: 57). Understood this way, nationality can therefore no longer be conceived as 
inherently antagonistic to citizenship, especially cosmopolitan citizenship. The false choice 
between cosmopolitan impartiality and local partiality therefore collapses. 
Recognition of tolerable inclusive aspects of nationality across the peoples of the world 
secures and preserves the people’s sources of concreteness, which could be rendered invisible 
and irrelevant by citizenship that is based only on a transcendent self. The recognition thus 
sets the ground for difference-grounded dialogues among the people of the world that aim at 
achieving a universalism that recognises the others’ concreteness without necessarily 
undermining the commonality of the generality of the humanity they all share. 
2.4.5. The concreteness of history and territoriality 
In modern education theory and practice, critics have questioned the relevance of including 
national history in the curriculum  (Nussbaum, 2002a; Brighouse, 2003). National history is 
dismissed as being particularistic. National history is as such considered morally irrelevant, 
since it is incompatible with the norms of universalism  (Brighouse, 2003). Making learners 
learn their national history is deemed as tantamount to indoctrination and imposition of 
patriotic values on learners who might have a completely different regard for nationality 
(Brighouse, 2003). In Malawi primary education national history has been removed (it is not 
offered at the secondary level either) and has been replaced with Social an Environmental 
Science, which essentially is about universal democratic principles (Hauya, 1997: 22; 
Ministry of Education, 2005). 
A characteristic of the nation is that it is a community with shared interests and commitments 
and the character is shown in its collective decision-making (Miller, 1995: 25). This 
dissertation’s contention is that what is usually ignored, however, is that communities 
demand and realise specific forms of democratic principles due to and in the context of the 
nation’s history. Further, most specific forms of democratic models and reforms result from 
historical experiences such as those relating to injustice and oppression. In other words, never 
are democratic forms and ideals demanded in and of themselves, removed from their 
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historicity. Democratic forms and reforms are therefore meant to correct the structure of a 
society owing to historical and particular experiences of the particular society, and not as a 
society in general. It is the submission of this dissertation that a people’s experiences (their 
history) cannot be divorced from the democratic form for which a society struggles and 
which the society realises. In other words, there canot be divorce because historical struggles 
are generally a collective quest for a fair and just structure (Gay & Howard, 2000: 13). Justice 
is essentially a property of our interactions and schemes of cooperation, i.e. how the 
community should be arranged and how it should distribute various social goods (Rawls, 
2002: 6). Being a property of the structures of a community, justice itself has a historic 
dimension. 
Why do human beings strive for just relationships and just communities? Usually, it is 
because they want their community, whose structure affects their options and potentialities in 
life, not to be inhibitive of people’s self-realisation (Rawls, 1999: 3). The actual contexts in 
which human beings exist are usually far removed from those aspired for as ideal. The human 
being constantly exists in a situation of (individual, social, economic and political) struggle. 
Every society or community has its own history of the struggles they faced and continue 
facing. It is self-evident that the goals for human struggles are as diverse as they are 
innumerable. The community into which one is born, is both a unit and a result of the 
incessant continuing historical struggles, which determine the scope and the breadth of justice 
and its attendant institutions. Every community is in a way a product of actual histories of 
real people and events which the community faced and confronted. Sometimes the histories 
constitute certain acts of (in)justice the community’s predecessors perpetuated (Miller, 1995: 
164)  which the political institutions and public culture of the current community are a result 
of and to which the community must always be sensitive. 
The foregoing background entails that as a member embedded in a given community today, 
my individual as well as my collective demands for fairness and justice are in a way fully 
intelligible with reference to the past. I am not just a general human being, in a generalized 
community. Specifically, I am an individual who is a member in this continuing chain of 
history (Miller, 1995: 24). This is why this dissertation argues that to political communities, 
history is not a mere impotent collection of organic events that occurred in time and are in 
every sense gone. In other words, to the national community members, history is the 
benchmark for evaluating the moral and political progress of this particular community. The 
justness of a society largely refers to how the society compares and contrasts with its past 
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(Ramphele, 2012: 41). Thus, removing the historical past from public life such as removal of 
national history from the school curriculum makes democracy, collective aspirations and 
achievements hollow and devoid of meaning. The strong cosmopolitan transcendental self of 
the contractarian tradition  therefore is stripped of not only a sense of community but also of 
how such a democratic community is a result and continuation of collective struggles and 
aspirations for a fairer social re-arrangement.  
It is worth noting that social cooperation models vary across societies owing to the unique 
attributes of the societies. Justice is a means of restructuring the frameworks of cooperation 
in a community so that inviolable dignity of each of the members is respected and not 
sacrificed for the benefit of others (Rawls, 1999: 3). Among others, this is articulated in 
demands of ensuring gender, economic, cultural and political equality among the people  
(Rawls, 1999: 6). Social cooperation also includes recognising and treating disadvantaged 
groups in terms that will affirm their equality, both morally and practically (Rawls, 1999: 72). 
It is in these senses that what actually constitutes justice is largely tied to the history of a 
community. As highlighted earlier, for Benhabib (1992: 159), the transcendent and detached 
conception of a person hides such historicity, which entrenches the inequalities that 
characterise the global society, by considering only a generalised other conception of equal 
human beings, which entails equal abilities and opportunities. Once the same people are 
viewed from the perspective of their concreteness, glaring and self-perpetuating inequalities 
become manifest. 
One therefore establishes that the idea of the detached autonomous individual – where society 
is only an aggregation of other rational self-interested transcendent selves – undermines the 
place of historical experiences in people’s political communities, which enables the 
achievement of capacity for authentic agency. Put differently, such a conception of autonomy 
regards as private and morally arbitrary the fact that this individual is not a detached unit but 
a participant in re-making the collective life he or she joined at birth. In a myriad of ways, 
such as through democratic iterations (Benhabib, 2011: 89), the individual community 
member constantly and normatively re-evaluates the nature, structure and operation of the 
community’s institutions of care provision to determine whether the instituions conform to 
human dignity terms. The significant implication one draws therefore is that there is both 
individual and collective determination of what is worth retaining and promoting in the 
community. In the community, decisions must also be made over what is worth discarding as 
well as what should be guarded against and what measures must be instituted to avert 
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recurrence of morally unacceptable experiences in future. It is in this vein that constitutions, 
although espousing ideal and universal principles of equality, create institutions and systems 
that are directly responsive to the history of the national community. This is because 
inequalities and injustices are not incidental. They are created, sustained and perpetuated by 
historical experiences. Therefore, conceptualisations and the realisation of citizenship cannot 
be divorced from the history of the community. 
My society today is in a way a continuation of the history of my forebears’ arguable pursuit 
of justice such that today, we overtly and covertly make reference to their moral failures and 
moral achievements in structuring our ideal community (Kymlicka, 1997). An awareness of 
the histories of injustices my society suffered and exacted on fellow members as well as 
outsiders is what makes us persistently demand specific democratic reforms, which we value 
and vigilantly guard in the context of our history (Ramphele, 2012: 41). Thus, whether the 
history is noble or ignoble, it still influences the type of democratic institutions we have and 
should have in our community today. Our community is part of the continuing story. It is a 
unit of the history. 
It is that affective attachment to the territory, the connection to and participation in its history, 
that compels and inspires citizens (some of whom later become iconic global leaders) to fight 
against injustice, despite facing different forms of risk to their personal lives although they 
have the convenient option of moving out of their home community. They risk their lives and 
of their families for this particular nation to whose territory they have an affective attachment 
unlike they have to any other part of the world. Nelson Mandela aspired to see justice 
everywhere in the world, but it was specifically the injustices of apartheid South Africa, 
particularly owing to his attachment to its territory and history, that made him ready to go the 
lengths he had gone in his struggle against oppression (Mandela, 1995: 35). Upon achieving 
political freedom in South Africa, we could not blame him for not having migrated to the 
next country in the world, such as Sudan’s Darfur, Siri Lanka or the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), to equally coordinate and lead a struggle against political injustices with exact 
sacrifices he made for South Africa. Not because to him the people of South Africa had a 
higher moral value than those of DRC. Rather it is because confrontation of injustice and 
oppression is mostly a result of ill-formed and malfunctioning particular local structures of 
social cooperation and human relationships in a community that is uniquely attached to one’s 
sense of being (Mandela, 1995; Ngwane, 2014). Rarely is it a result of pursuit of abstract 
ideas of justice. Interestingly, though, as Martin Luther King Jr. held, locally inspired 
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struggles against injustices are also an implicit statement against related injustices 
everywhere outside the local boundaries (King, 1963). 
Such affective attachments to a particular territory and community do not in any way 
undermine the moral worth of individuals in related struggles elsewhere. The attachments 
only demonstrate that territoriality is a source of an individual’s concreteness, despite the 
existence of global interconnectedness and the moral obligations one has towards all human 
beings of the world. This dissertation therefore argues that the moment such embeddedness is 
dismissed in favour of only the general allegiances one has to the wider and general 
humanity, we fail to recognise aspects of the individual’s concrete being. 
All this however, does not mean that beneficiaries of one’s sacrifices against injustice must 
exclusively be your co-nationals or those with whom you have attachments. On the contrary, 
as this dissertation contends, such sacrifices against injustice demonstrate the relevance of the 
autonomous individual’s attachments to a particular territory, history and culture and how 
such belongingness has some quite forceful compulsion on the individuals and development 
of the democratic communities. This orientation is still compatible with cosmopolitan 
commitments. One need not eliminate the reality of such attachments as a condition for 
cosmopolitan commitments. This perspective about the value of local attachments neither 
implies that one should accord a purity and fixed status to one’s local way of life. Rather, one 
must be a patriot who, whilst being critically loyal to the local, must at the same time be 
reflectively open to embrace the moral duties one owes humanity beyond your locality 
(Hansen, 2011: 9). 
2.4.6. Inadequacy of constitutional patriotism 
In this section I argue that patriotism based only on shared political values is incapable of 
sustaining a democracy without nationality-grounded patriotism. I also argue that a patriotism 
based on shared cultures is itself inextricably linked to elements of a people’s nationality. 
Criticisms against the moral relevance of nationality in the modern state hold that although 
national consciousness gave birth to republican freedom, which makes possible individual 
freedom, that was only necessary in the genesis and formative era of the state and that as 
such, citizenship conceptualisation need not be tied to national identity (Habermas, 1994, 
2001; Nussbaum, 2002a; Nili, 2015; Arneson, 2016). For Habermas (1994: 23), 
republicanism and nationality have only a “historically contingent” connection and not a 
conceptual one. Habermas (1994: 27) dismisses the requirement that procedural justice, 
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expressed among others through constitutionalism, should be necessarily rooted in the 
situatedness of a people’s national identity, citing the multicultural societies of the United 
States and Switzerland as examples. 
Habermas (1994: 32) argues for an interconnected world (starting with a supranational 
European Union) whose deliberative democracy is not based on “the people” of a given 
national community as “macro-subjects” but based on anonymously interlinked discourses. 
Ultimately, Habermas (1994: 32) holds that “citizenship can today only be enacted in the 
paradoxical sense of compliance with the procedural rationality of a political will formation”. 
As a result of globalisation, the spectrum of those affected by the self-determination of a 
nation is much wider than the territorial delimited-ness of the members (Habermas, 2001: 
70). Habermas (2001: 70, 2003: 86) therefore urges caution against the trap of territorial 
limitedness in theorisation of democracy in the global era since national interests today are no 
longer confined to local boundaries. 
For critics of nationality (Nili, 2015: 245; Arneson, 2016: 557), democracy must be 
embedded in an inclusive shared political (not necessarily national) culture where new others 
would not be required to conform to the cultural community of the nation. At this level, the 
cultural community that provided the solidarity upon which the nation was founded, now 
loses its value as the political culture of individual opinion formation and democratic 
collective will-formation now cohere society and are friendly to strangers (Habermas, 2001: 
73–74). As such, only constitutional patriotism remains relevant (Habermas, 2001: 73). 
Critics of nationality, are inspired by the fact that global interconnectedness has profoundly 
altered the human condition (Nussbaum, 2002a; Habermas, 2003). Elements of 
interconnectedness, such as global markets that determine almost all the world people’s 
condition and fate, transcend national limitedness (Habermas, 2003: 86). The implication 
here is that elements of global interconnectedness that ostensibly shape the modern-state are 
sensitive to market forces only and are insensitive to nationality (Habermas, 2003: 86). 
Habermas (1994: 28) is among those who believe that economic integration runs on its own 
logic, which excludes national sentiments.  
However, positions that substitute constitutional patriotism for nationality-based patriotism 
ignore the inescapable reality that the political community and its culture are embedded by 
and built upon the societal culture, language, history and conception of care provision of a 
community. Nationality and constitutional or civic patriotism inextricably interact with and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
69 
depend on each other such that it is impossible for political ideology to divorce itself from the 
elements of nationality. Such substitutionalist positions about civic patriotism are based on a 
generalised conception of a human being as an abstract citizen who is detached from 
institutions and networks of interdependence that give him or her a sense of being and of 
individuation. 
As this dissertation highlights, such substitutionalist positions take for granted the 
entrenched-ness of nationality in everyday life up to the point of mistaking it for being non-
existent. For instance, developed nations have their mother tongue as home language and as 
official language, with the learners not facing linguistic and cultural boundaries to negotiate 
between the home and the school. Their schools are full of their local literature, with which 
the learners easily identify. As a consequence, epistemologically there is close proximity 
between academic content in the school and the local experiences of the home. In such a 
social context, knowledge information and technology are accessible to all the citizen, 
making them effectively participate and compete in the global arena. 
A community is an inheritance and a critical evolution of actual languages of communication, 
an actual history, actual art, actual architecture, actual literature and actual cultural traditions 
from the past (Miller, 1995: 41). In the context of liberty and individual self-determination, a 
democratic community in time, sifts what to reject, what to retain or what to revise through 
incessant contestations. New and necessary economic, technological and political 
developments compel us to modify cultures, traditions and practices into ways that are 
compatible with new normative standards we have now discovered and embraced which the 
predecessors did not value. In the end, not all different forms of technological change would 
annihilate nationality and its consequent public culture. Since locality and modern 
developments such as technological ones mutually influence each other, nationality 
necessitates and enables localisation of such modern technological and political systems. 
Nationality only vernacularizes (Benhabib, 2011: 128) or adapts these modern systems to a 
new form as the new systems also conform to national localness. The national local and the 
modern new systems mutually interact because to be intelligible the new systems must be 
part of shared public cultures. 
Furthermore, competence in the public culture of a community enhances one’s meaningful 
participation in its political community (Kymlicka, 2002a: 245). I would be utterly 
disadvantaged in my participation in the key public institutions of the political community if I 
do not share certain elements of the public culture, such as its language and social values 
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(Kymlicka, 2002a: 245). I will not be able to participate meaningfully in its political 
deliberations as I will lack its shared linguistic and non-linguistic competences and skills for 
communication. I need more than linguistic competence to achieve communication because 
in the political community, what dominates or keeps recurring in the discourse is usually 
attached to the  social, historical and cultural experiences of the nation. Without 
familiarisation with such, I would be out of touch with the actual discourse. 
According to Pettit (2014: 1656), individual (or group) agency entails self-representation of 
the agent through his or her behaviour. Collective life implies and demands that the two or 
more self-represented subjects relate with one another in a “conversational or dialogical” 
manner. They each “each understand – typically as a matter of shared awareness – that in 
order to organise our relations with the other in a congenial pattern, we have to be sure to use 
words in representation of ourselves that will attract a desired interpretation and response” 
(Pettit, 2014: 1656). Each of the subjects operates “under conversational conventions – say, 
the conventions establishing what is an assertion or commitment or request – to make 
ourselves interpretable by the other and of course to interpret the other in turn” (Pettit, 2014: 
1656–1657). For Pettit (2014), successful communication in groups is achieved when there is 
– 
[A]n important form of mutual influence, capable of determining how each of us responds to 
the other and what we consequently achieve together. [Such a] form of influence will 
presuppose our each being able to adopt the conversational stance and our each being able to 
use conversational practice to our personal or mutual advantage (Pettit, 2014: 1657).  
Thus, achieving communication in a community requires more than linguistic competence. 
To be a meaningful citizen and to be intelligible in a given social, cultural and political 
context, one must acquire idiosyncratic competences, meaning-making frames, knowledge of 
dominant communal values, and non-linguistic codes of communication associated with and 
grounded in the particular way of life of the community.  
Evidently, practical everyday life is immersed in the public culture of society. How one 
negotiates one’s way in interactions with others is what makes everyday life meaningful. 
How people go about their routines of life, their language and their common traditions, are all 
as important as observing demands of procedural justice. 
Political and public culture are interconnected and mutually reinforcing (Miller, 1995: 164; 
MacIntyre, 2002: 107). It is thus worth noting that, in the context of shared democratic 
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principles, there is an anchoring and enabling common public culture (Miller, 1995: 164; 
MacIntyre, 2002: 107). The position of this dissertation is that  the interest of communities in 
democratic principles is not in the value of the principles themselves. Rather, these principles 
are valued because they make possible realisation of a context that is conducive to optimum 
flourishing of the individual. In other words, democratic ideals have value in so far as they 
shape and sustain the structure of our concrete collective life to enable self-actualisation. 
The civic patriotism and its attendant value for political procedures that will ensure justice are 
not ends in themselves. I contend that civic patriotism and value for political procedures are a 
means through which a community as a collective agent should structure itself in terms of 
what is of common concern as well as what optimises individual flourishing. A commitment 
to democratic procedures therefore cannot substitute national patriotism. The autonomous 
individual’s will is expressed and is part of the collective general will of the community that 
is democratically established. The substance and mode of deliberation are however inspired 
by the common culture. For instance, public positions about social welfare, tax cuts, and 
subsidies, are not uniformly managed and resolved purely by principles of economic utility 
across world democracies. Therefore, that questions of whether there should be reduced 
public spending towards national museums, national sports teams, and what should be the 
curriculum content that schools should offer, are political questions that ultimately appeal to a 
common culture and history in resolving them. 
The mutually reinforcing interaction between the political culture and the public culture is 
made possible by vernacularisation (Benhabib, 2011: 128–130). Democratic communities are 
always pursuing the ideal structure of society. However, such abstract ideals of the desired 
society are realised through democratic iterations (Benhabib, 2011: 89) where the universal 
and abstract ideas are through contestations and debate, modified, customised and stripped of 
their foreignness (Benhabib, 2011: 128–129). Looked at this way, there is no way one can 
divorce civic patriotism from the public culture, without emptying patriotism of its 
meaningfulness. 
This is why in Malawi, for example, the Local Government Act, includes Traditional 
Authority chiefs as unelected and non-voting members of district councils (Malawi 
Government, 2004, sec. 5(1c)). The law also stipulates that whenever deemed necessary, the 
council may bring up to three more special interest members with non-voting power (Malawi 
Government, 2004, sec. 5(1d)). This is an expression of the Malawian vernacularisation of 
the democratic principles of devolution of participation and representation. One may wonder 
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why include unelected traditional chiefs in local governments for democratic communities. It 
is cultural and historical contexts that determine what shape of democracy people need to 
have. Traditional leaders, although not elected, are historically central players in the 
management of communities in Malawi (Eggen, 2011: 319; Russell & Dobson, 2011: 739–
740). Besides being custodians and embodiments of community culture, they have a capacity 
for community mobilisation and for achieving attitude change, which the state may lack. One 
must, however, concede that like any form of representation, such frameworks are likely 
fraught with certain entrenched inequalities, such as patriarchy, which requires constant 
contestations about how to actualise such frameworks. How to address such challenges is 
however a different discourse not under focus in this study. However, what is being 
emphasised here is that such scenarios demonstrate that democratic principles are neither an 
end in themselves nor are they one-size-fits-all standards for all societies. They cannot be 
meaningful without being vernacularised. The necessity of such appropriation is that the 
systems should be intelligible to the people’s common culture and values. 
Vernacularisation (Benhabib, 2011: 89) is motivated by the need to improve the people’s 
existent nature and mode of social cooperation by adopting new concepts and reforms in a 
manner intelligible and compatible with the people’s concrete situatedness. The people 
integrate principles of democracy into the people’s history-inspired way of life. The people 
do not integrate their way of life into the democracy as though to the people, democracy has 
meaning by and in itself, independent of the people’s situatedness. Doing so would be 
attempting to live an abstract life that would be empty and meaningless. Such a denial of the 
people’s public cultural distinctiveness would amount to restricting being human to the 
generalised other standpoint only. It would rob the people of their authenticity and 
uniqueness, i.e. the people’s concrete otherness. 
It is worth noting that the people are not only looking for political principles under which to 
regulate their lives. They are more importantly making their way of life democratic. This is 
what motivates them. This is what they want to become. The people want to better their 
context of existence and its associated way of life into a more just one. They are living their 
lives embedded in this common culture. Its way of life shapes their outlook on life. Among 
others, the culture based on relationships and practices in the institutions of care in the 
community contributes towards the shape and content of the people’s non-political 
obligations and expectations to give and receive care from others (MacIntyre, 2002: 131). 
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The objects of common culture to be recognised by the state must however not oppress the 
members or undermine their liberty (Etzioni, 2006: 74). As already highlighted, the societal 
culture being defended is not fixed but is always under revision and modification by the 
members through democratic iterations (Miller, 1995: 6; Benhabib, 2011: 89). It can not be 
reduced to a mere political culture for this would fail to account for that which binds together 
members in institutions and relationships of care. Such relationships are outside the realm of 
procedural justice (Kymlicka, 1997). Thus one can hold that the public culture of a nation has 
practical dimensions that inspire the routines of everyday life that cannot be replicated by the 
state. The virtues of politeness, forgiveness, self-sacrifice, reconciliation, togetherness, 
conceptions of honour, and shame are not necessarily generated by the state through 
legislative coercion. These nevertheless shape the form and languages of political discourse 
(Baldock, 1999: 459). These virtues are still largely expressions of an actual historical and 
shared way of life. Objects of nationality are not mere social contructions but actual aspects 
expressing community and individual concreteness. Much of a people’s public culture cannot 
be captured by legislation. In other words, much of the substance of the societal culture that 
enables the solidarity upon which political action is founded cannot necessarily and fully be 
codified into state laws yet the the practicality of the political community depends on this 
uncodified public culture. In the individual’s daily routines, he or she voluntarily participates 
in societal culture that gives a practical sense of community without undermining one’s 
capacity for self-determination. 
2.4.7. Endurance of nationality in global cooperation 
This section argues that, since nationality constitutes the identities of the individual and of the 
community, it necessarily persists even in forms of global cooperation that operate on a logic 
that excludes national interests. I argue that the global economic order is inevitably sensitive 
to national interests, which trade liberalisation seeks to eliminate, because nationality is the 
site hosting sources of individual members’ embeddedness: the concreteness of their 
otherness. Although in varying degrees, nationality is integral in communities and in 
individuals’ constitution. As such, it is nearly impossible to ignore the relevance of 
nationality in all forms of global cooperation, for nationality is inseparable from communities 
and from the integration structures diverse national communities form together. Ultimately 
the argument is that each of the nations participating in the liberalised global economic order 
is so other and with concrete peculiarities. The implication is that such definitive 
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idiosyncrasies cannot be ignored and substituted by a generalizable and universal form 
suitable and fitting for all human beings in the world as market liberalization demands. 
Nationality both constitutes a people’s identity (Miller, 1995: 164) and as this dissertation is 
arguing, contributes towards shaping the people’s political and economic systems and 
institutions of cooperation. In other words, nationality contributes towards the shape of the 
people’s political and economic institutions. I have argued that is not possible for such 
institutions to be insensitive to nationality when they are meant to serve the people’s 
interests. Therefore, the prevalence of national interests in the global economy is not 
necessarily due to malfunctioning global frameworks, but rather due to people’s concreteness 
which cannot be dispensed with. Nationality just cannot be stripped from the collective 
affairs of the people since it is constitutive of the people and will always inevitably and 
necessarily creep in consciously or unintentionally (Miller, 1995: 163) because nationality 
embeds a people’s concreteness. 
The goal of liberalised markets is to render global trade free and unimpeded by the barriers of 
national interests which are regarded as arbitrary (Oxfam, 2002: 5). Free trade is meant to 
ensure free flow of goods and capital, self-regulated only by market forces, which are deemed 
to operate under an own rational logic (Habermas, 1994: 28; Dobos, 2011). Free trade is 
against active of interference by nation-states who may seek either to guard or to advance 
their national interests by intervening in the market (Ben & Woll, 2012). 
However, recent major global economic crises have exposed how individual economies of 
the global economy are still largely informed by national considerations also called economic 
patriotism (Dobos, 2011; Pogge, 2011). Economic patriotism refers to the practice whereby 
states (and even individuals) make economic choices in such a way that they favour the 
interests of their nation (Ben & Woll, 2012: 308). 
In response to the global financial crisis of 2008, there were suddenly enormous national 
interventions in the hitherto self-regulating global markets that had been thriving on neo-
liberal policies (Ben & Woll, 2012: 307). Among others, governments intervened through 
financial bailouts to big private corporations, such as banks and car manufacturing 
corporations to stimulate local consumption to prevent the collapse of the industries (Ben & 
Woll, 2012: 307). Despite the public being outraged, they still tolerated it because it was a 
‘necessary evil’ to be done or else many of their fellow citizens would be jobless and lose 
their sources of income. Nation-state neutralism over markets that has powered and nurtured 
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globalisation in general, was necessarily suspended as national interest actively re-appeared. 
Economic patriotism was invoked (Ben & Woll, 2012: 307). 
Economic patriotism is not activated in times of economic crisis alone. It is noteworthy that 
even in times of stability, the global economy is largely influenced by national interests 
although it is expected to run fully on liberal principles with respect to state de-regulation 
(Ben & Woll, 2012: 316). According to Ben and Woll (2012: 308), such crises only unearth 
the way even regional economic and trade integrations work. The authors argue that trade 
integration frameworks are designed not to be neutral about national intervention, since the 
interests of national governments are embedded in international economy and trade 
integration frameworks (Ben & Woll, 2012: 317). In other words, even the global 
frameworks integrating and driving global liberalised trade are primarily guided by strategic 
national economic interests (Ben & Woll, 2012: 317). In reality, according to Ben and Woll 
(2012: 317), compliance with the free trade requirement that national governments deregulate 
markets (remove restrictions) has in practice resulted in re-regulation: that is, recasting 
national considerations into the integration frameworks. Even after integration into the 
liberalised global market, nations still retain the obligation and mandate to set nation-specific 
standards for goods into their market that are more difficult for outsiders to meet than for 
insiders (Bandelj, 2011: 966; Ben & Woll, 2012: 318). 
Market liberalisation regards nationality as an arbitrary and irrelevant attribute not worth 
considering in global trade, which ostensibly operates on its own economic logic that 
excludes national sentiments (Habermas, 1994: 28) but the reality of the complexity of 
human nature has just proved the contrary (Ben & Woll, 2012: 317–318). As much as trade 
practices share the same universal principles, the motivations for participation of the people 
taking part in the trade practices have numerous and different sources. The people have 
different interests to safeguard. When nations commit to global or regional integration and 
deregulation frameworks, they do so in the context of interests of national members such that 
in principle the deregulation of markets is in essence re-regulation (Ben & Woll, 2012: 317). 
These motivations and interests cannot be generalised into some single universal form for all 
human beings in the world. Behind the economic integration agreements in global trade are 
embedded human beings with interests tied to their public way of life in their respective 
nations. Ignoring the embeddedness of the people is committing the same error committed by 
the generalised other standpoint of universalism (Benhabib, 1992: 161), namely to deny their 
individuality, their concreteness, which is their being human. Human beings have concrete 
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histories and territories from which they not only operate, but to which their identities and 
meaningfulness of life are attached. What one can glean from the scenario of economic 
patriotism is that people’s economic institutions are in part motivated by and embedded by 
the peculiarities of social contexts that have a unique way of life. Therefore, ignoring 
nationality, liberalized global trade thus effectively denies people their concrete otherness. 
Nation-states still retain some regulative control to protect the interests of their people from 
undue domination by external global forces. There are many dominating agencies – states, as 
well as economic pressure – in the global order today (Pettit, 2010: 77). Pettit (2010: 73) 
argues that an ideal non-dominating global order must be characterised by nation-states that 
are representative of their people’s aspirations in so far as each nation accords its people 
space and institutions for contestation. This is because non-dominating democratic 
communities thrive on shared beliefs and unique “channels of mutual control” (Pettit, 2010: 
76), and therefore the way in which they realise such ideals will remarkably vary and cannot 
be homogenised without compromising realisation of the ultimate output of individual 
freedom. This is because these individual and social beliefs and channels of mutual control, 
which are community-particular  pre-exist the political community, and the community is 
built on them (Kymlicka, 2002a; Etzioni, 2014). As an active collective agent (Miller, 1995: 
24), nationality is the principle which makes intelligebile collective aspirations and the 
demands of the individual members for the removal of subtle forms of domination of one by 
another peculiar to and only meaningful in the context of the community of the members.  
It is because of the relevance of the nation to make meaningful forms of domination that 
Pettit (2010: 76) therefore argues that in the context of global integration, it is imperative that 
the nation-state be not under the domination of another wider supra-state institution. Such 
supra-state institutions risk dominating the constituent members of the nation-state. Pettit 
(2010) therefore defends a non-dominating and non-interfering republican model of state as it 
ensures realisation of these ideals. He extends the spirit of republicanism to the global order 
to ensure the same ideals among the peoples of the world (Pettit, 2010: 76). For this reason, it 
is necessary, according to Pettit (2010: 77), that global arrangements should always be under 
the surveillance of nation-states to avoid global domination over the aspirations of nation-
states, which are the representation of non-dominated individual members. This necessitates 
the persistence of national interest in the global order. Two non-dominating nation-states are 
not exactly the same despite their sharing common political ideologies. Since non-dominating 
democratic communities thrive on shared beliefs and unique “channels of mutual control” 
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(Pettit, 2010: 76), the way in which they realise such ideals will vary remarkably and cannot 
therefore be homogenised without compromising realisation of ultimate output of individual 
freedom.  
The position this dissertation is advancing is that individual human beings who are embedded 
in their social and cultural contexts cannot manage to discard their particularised being and 
hence make global trade to be about purely transcendent selves detached from the 
concreteness of their territory, history and way of life (public culture). In most cases, the 
ultimate motivation for engaging in global trade is to ensure sustenance of people’s cherished 
way of life as the case of economic patriotism (Ben & Woll, 2012) has shown.  
What one gleans from the economic patriotism account of Ben & Woll (2012), is that in the 
event of global crises like the financial global crisis the primary concern of an individual is 
not in terms of how impersonal detached human beings across the world in general are going 
to survive it (although one still regards all people irrespective of nationality as being equal 
without qualification). Rather, one is specifically mindful about one’s community, which 
forms the backbone of the nation to which he or she is attached, and with which he or she 
identifies. In other words, the reality with such crises is that one does not conceive them in an 
abstract manner in terms of how they have hurt abstract humanity across the world. 
Responding to a global crisis in the impartialist manner would be hollow and a disregard of 
human affectivity. Rather, the response is consistent with our reasonable intuitions that 
besides sincere concern for the fate of humanity worldwide, it is usually the concrete terms in 
which the crisis has affected the real community and nation, of which one is affectively part 
of that makes vivid the effect of the harm.  
What is worth cognizance is that one meaningfully comprehends the adverse outcome of such 
crises on co-nationals, not because one has personal knowledge and encounter with each of 
the victims of the crisis one is in a more concrete community with apart from the very general 
global human community. Rather it is because you relate to the shared way of life with the 
co-national that has been adversely affected and you can more relate with what this entails in 
terms of one’s sense of concrete being. As a co-national, one might be in a position to relate 
with what concretely constitutes as loss, not only as general others but as concrete others with 
whom you share common particularised perspectives of reality, and interests, through your 
shared culture, history and territory. One can more easily and closely identify with the 
implications and reality of job losses in your community than you would about the same in a 
different nation. What a job loss would mean in a nation that is characteristically atomistic 
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with a nuclear family tradition would radically differ from a nation that characteristically has 
extended family tradition with more people beyond the immediate family depended on one 
person’s income. We all find meaning to our lives by attachments to the nation, its shared 
public culture; we all share a rootedness in this territory (Appiah, 2005: 233). It is hence not 
unreasonable for instance to expect that should a business enterprise of a co-national in one’s 
community fail and whose owner one will possibly never know or encounter, one gets 
concerned that somehow this has potential of affecting the continuance and sustenance of the 
commonly valued interests and institutions of the national community into which one is 
rooted and which gives context to one’s choices of life. 
A possible criticism against this position may claim that this argument is committing the is–
implies–ought fallacy: drawing imperatives from prevailing practice. The fact that national 
interests drive the global market is not an ideal we should accept as given; so would argue the 
potential critic. The critic would further argue that the prevailing nature of the global 
economy is not acceptable and is itself in need of moral restructuring to the standards of ideal 
liberalised trade, insensitive to national interest as most of the challenges of the global order 
are a result of the pursuit of national interest by developed nations. The character of the 
prevailing global economic order therefore should not constitute justification for the 
acceptability of nationality. The potential critic would thus conclude that the resilience of 
nationality does not tell us anything about the moral status of nationality. 
Drawing the conclusions of the justifiability of nationality from the operations of the global 
economy is not committing the it-implies-ought fallacy. It is worth conceding that the way 
the global economy operates favours the developed nations whose interests shape and 
dominate the global order (Singer, 2002; Collste, 2015). The ideal alternative in this case 
would be to reform the global order so that all nations have equitable benefit and bear 
proportionate obligations arising from global institutions. This is a valid moral concern but 
not the focus of this discussion. 
The presence of national interest in the deregulation orders of global integration is not 
preventable. It proves that nationality is not a social construct that can intentionally be 
extinguished. Contrary to strong cosmopolitanism, global itegration of nations is not a mere 
aggregation of trascendent selves of the world detached from their situatedness and 
cooperating exclusively under norms that are based on economic principles and rational self-
interest only as Habermas, (2001: 28) holds. Instead what one draws from the character of 
global integration is that the national economy is embedded in a web of localised 
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interdependent social relationships, where although the relations among members are not 
intimately close, such situated relationships nevertheless generate obligations of and 
entitlements to care. What motivates the autonomous member to get into schemes of 
interdependent cooperation in the nation, is the will to realise particular contextually 
meaningful “public policies and arrangements that will enable us to provide care to those we 
care about … and that will [also] enable us to receive care when we need it” (Held, 2006: 81). 
Conceptions of such care are not universal but vernacularized across different societies. This 
does not imply duties of care to non-nationals are inferior. Rather duties of care to co-
nationals and those to non-nationals belong to incomparable distinct categories of moral 
obligations. 
The fact that national interests have at times distorted global trade and the global economy to 
the detriment of others (Singer, 2002) still does not in itself nullify the positive normative 
potentiality of nationality. The distortion is a result of inequalities in power and 
representation of national interest in the global order. It is not about an ostensible inherent 
iniquitous nature of nationality. 
The persistence of national interests in national and global economies in a way expresses the 
inextricable link between being an individual or collective and the concreteness of your 
situatedness. The implication is that national economies are meant to serve the constitutes 
members’ concrete and not generalised interests. In other words, they are shaped in part by 
the values of the community. Economies are generally embedded by national interests with 
which they must mostly be compatible to be meaningful to the people. This requirement for 
national economies to be consistent with and be relevant to national concreteness is 
transferred to frameworks of global integration. This is why in the ostensibly neutral free 
global economy, as economic patriotism shows, nation-state communities cannot discard 
national interest, and become neutral as this risks annihilating their concreteness. The people 
behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1999: 118) are expected to detach themselves 
from their concreteness, their culture, their belongingness and their history, to arrive at 
impersonal universal principles of justice. This, however, has serious defective outcomes, 
which deny people’s differences, which are their idiosyncrasies (Benhabib, 1992: 167–168). 
One can therefore draw that by extinguishing the reality of the concreteness of nationality, 
global liberalised trade commits the same grave error committed by the Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance of extinguishing the concreteness of the people, their being actual equal human 
beings. 
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It is by now evident that economics cannot be divorced from people’s situatedness. The 
nation-state, its democracy and its economic institutions are not value-neutral. The meaning 
and relevance of such institutions lie in their service of their members’ interests. I do not 
value the institutions in and of themselves. My valuing them is based on how in cooperation 
with co-nationals the institutions enable my self-actualization and realization of the national 
community’s collective aspiration; individual and collective concreteness actualization. 
Arguably, this partly explains why democratic nation-states predictably have varying if not 
contrasting tax regimes. 
Although national economies are integrated into liberalised frameworks, national members 
always expect their governments to represent their interests in the context of the expectations 
of other nations (Morgan, 2001: 374). This is why ideal economic patriotism does not entail 
the unreasonableness of unconditionally prioritising national economic interests at whatever 
cost. Rather, it acknowledges the moral weight of serving insiders’ interests without being 
oblivious to the validity, implications and moral demands of global interdependence with 
other non-member human beings in other cooperating nation units (Morgan, 2001: 385; 
Papastephanou, 2013b: 171). 
It is evidently inescapable that there is a need for interdependence among national economies 
of the world. However, interdependence needs not be conflated with homogeneous fusion of 
the outlooks of different nations into one. Interdependence, in principle, presupposes some 
independence and distinctiveness of the involved agents. By implication, it recognises both 
overlaps and remarkable differences. By being sensitive to national interests, despite being 
under a liberalised framework, global trade and the global economy are just conforming to 
the idiosyncrasy that derives from the nation’s sense of community. Being a community 
acting under a common culture and prioritising this culture ought not necessarily mean that 
the others, the non-members, the outsiders, are of lesser moral weight. 
Persistence of patriotism (obviously this excludes unethical and segregationist nationalism) is 
not necessarily indicative of faltering concern for universal humanity, neither is its 
diminishing a mark of strengthening concern for humanity across the globe. The challenges 
of globalisation, such as the global financial crisis, have demonstrated that nationality – 
expressed through the agency of the nation-state – today still functions as a meaningful 
source of communities and hence individual identities (Miller, 2002). The challenge with a 
global integration that extinguishes national interest is that it creates space for people’s 
domination by either other state actors or transnational corporations that are hard to regulate 
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(Laborde & Ronzoni, 2016). Such transnational entities that transcend nationality undermine 
the national spirit of communities and channels of mutual control (Pettit, 2010: 79). 
As a first time presidential candidate, Barack Obama explicitly declared in a speech to 
thousands in Berlin that he was a global citizen when he stated that the challenges facing 
humanity today must be confronted with cooperation with the rest of the world (Croucher, 
2015). However, according to Croucher (2015: 9), an analysis of Obama’s subsequent 
inauguration speeches in his presidency as well as state of the union addresses have revealed 
remarkably more patriotic themes than cosmopolitan ones. For example, Croucher (2015: 1) 
cites President Obama’s constant urges for American patriotism and exceptionalism in the 
technology race with China and India. For Croucher (2015), such tendencies are not to the 
benefit, but rather to the detriment of the development of cosmopolitanism. Croucher’s 
position is that patriotism cannot flourish whilst also doing service to cosmopolitan ideals 
(2015: 1). The implication from this position is that flourishing cosmopolitanism demands, as 
a necessary condition, weakening of patriotic attachments. Put differently, the two are 
incompatible and each displaces the other. 
However, it is important to highlight that patriotic concerns about a nation’s competitiveness 
on the global technological and economic fronts should not be conflated with particularism 
that is not tolerant of cosmopolitanism, such as supremacist ideologies. Individuals, groups 
and nations characteristically have aspirations for development and flourishing (Miller, 1995: 
24). Demanding that one’s nation grows its economy to make sure such a nation favourably 
competes and leads in information and communication technology (ICT) is not to claim that 
your nation is superior to the rest. In other words, ignoring local interests for impartial ones 
does not in itself lead to morally permissible cosmopolitanism. Sometimes, this may 
paradoxically serve to suffocate cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism and nationality are not 
mutually exclusive ideals. 
Both nationality and cosmopolitanism have unique moral forces and are complementary to 
each other. What this complementary nature entails is that one needs not to be compelled to 
suppress the reality of nationality so as to fulfil cosmopolitan obligations. The tendency of 
undermining nationality and displacing it with neutral universal principles is therefore itself a 
form of cultural domination over all world cultures where abstract individualism is being 
elevated at the expense of many other diverse socio-cultural outlooks of reality (Bowden, 
2003: 354). It can be drawn that such alleged liberal impartiality that ignores people’s 
nationality, which embraces their wider embeddedness in global relationships, would 
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ultimately promote only the generalised conception of the human being that fits persons and 
their communities into a universalism that undermines particularism, which is what gives 
concreteness to individuals and their respective communities. As a result, such a 
cosmopolitan universalism undermines the normative value of the otherness of global 
diversity, which in essence is denying the diverse people’s humanness. Ultimately, this 
undermines the essence of human equality, which resides in recognising the normativity of 
differences (Benhabib, 1992, 2011). 
2.4.8. On the dangers of nationality 
A shared history effectively makes possible a sense of national community among people 
who have a range of diversities among them. However, it is undeniable that national leaders 
have ever abused the goods of history and that patriotism leads to untold human rights 
abuses. Sometimes patriotism is disdained because political elites use it to abdicate global 
justice duties they owe others outside their borders (Singer, 2002). But like any other object, 
historicity and the sense of community it generates can be utilised for good or for worse 
(Papastephanou, 2013a).  
Although political leaders may abuse nationality and indeed at times have abused it, 
nationality is not in and of itself bad, nor is nationality a fictitious community constructed by 
political elites (Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). Although it has aspects of myth, a national 
community is actual and real. It has a concrete history and territory that partly identifies the 
members themselves. The very fact that political leaders can use national sentiments as a 
common rallying point in the context of the diversities that characterise national membership 
is revealing of how nationality is a prominent component of citizens’ identities and 
belongingness. Nationality is largely an actual appropriation of the members and not political 
leaders, though the leaders may variously help contribute towards it and at worst abuse it.  
It is worth recognising that the reality of past historical events and experiences found in 
national attachments is the same tool that inspires members to rise up and hold political 
leaders accountable when they deviate from good governance and practice undemocratic 
tendencies. Since 2016, there has been a non-partisan movement (#ThisFlag movement) in 
Zimbabwe that was mobilising resistance against President Robert Mugabe’s dictatorial 
regime (before his resignation in 2017) by making reference to the inconsistencies of the 
practices his regime not only with democratic principles, but more importantly, with the 
aspirations of the nation’s history and founders as typified by the national flag. The symbol of 
the movement is the Zimbabwean flag representing the aspirations of the heroes who fought 
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the injustice of colonisation (Sevenzo, 2016). In the same vein, historical national 
monuments, such as public squares such as Tahrir Square, the epicentre of the Egyptian 
version of the Arab Spring revolution, and the pulling down of statues for persons who 
embody historical injustices such as that of Cecil Rhodes in South Africa, and those of 
confederate generals in the United States of America, are used as inspiration for fighting 
modern injustice.  
The nation-state is usually erroneously incriminated because of conflating the nation with the 
state, which others regard as a construction of the 19th century yet dates back to as far as the 
5th century BC, long before the emergence of the modern state (Papastephanou, 2015: 51). 
The nation has always been more than a political aspect of the individual’s being and ought 
not be dismissed as either private, obsolete or exclusionary (Papastephanou, 2015: 185). For 
Papastephanou (2013a: 27), ideal patriotism is not just inward-looking, that is only critically 
concerned about the justness of its internal workings. Rather, it is also outward-looking 
where patriots are expected to be critical of the role and responsibility of their collective in 
ensuring global justice as well as refraining from perpetuating global injustices 
(Papastephanou, 2015: 190). Politics and nationality are mutually reinforcing ideals and 
cannot be detached from each other (Papastephanou, 2015: 194) in both local and global 
citizenship. As such, it is erroneous and not necessary to disconnect political nationalism 
from its cultural heritage (Papastephanou, 2015: 186). 
National consciousness has historically aided justice such as through galvanising territorial 
and linguistic justice, where it provides the means and flesh to abstract democratic principles 
(Papastephanou, 2015: 194–195). The demand for national independence still persisting in 
modern times, such as in Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec, where people demand secession 
from developed democracies (Burridge, Carter & North, 2014), is largely driven by national 
considerations, some of which are linguistic and not mere democratic ones. It is worth noting 
that an individual’s national identities are usually at political rest until some threats emerge, 
which activate a situation of contestation of some space (Papastephanou, 2015: 195). The 
people in a particular democratic community are not only democratic beings. Rather they are 
people embedded in a particular history and in a particular territory with which they identify 
themselves. These are inseparable from the democratic society they create for individual 
members to flourish. 
Discussing the events around the tragic death of the president of Poland, his wife and his 
delegation in a plane crash that occurred in 2010, Szeligowska (2014: 491) holds that during 
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the tragedy, there was generally a sense of patriotism as in Poland people of different political 
leanings united in mourning the president (whose approval ratings by the time of the crash 
were very low) as a community, as one nation. Szeligowska (2014: 493–495) however, holds 
that when a decision was unilaterally made by some few key public officials to bury the first 
couple at a revered site for national heroes alone, it sparked debate between liberal parties 
and democratic conservatives about whether the president deserved to be buried there. In 
other words, these were questions about whether the president’s legacy, apart from the tragic 
circumstances of his death, qualified him to be a national hero. Szeligowska (2014: 494) 
holds that during the mourning period, this led to claims and counter-claims about who is or 
who is not a patriot. For Szeligowska (2014), the sense of national unity was shattered by 
such a division that followed partisan allegiances between conservatives and liberals. 
This disagreement was occurring on the heels of a perennial debate between the left wing and 
conservatives, prior to the tragedy, about the substance and magnitude of the nation’s history 
and what should constitute Polish patriotism (Szeligowska, 2014: 505). Szeligowska (2014) 
nevertheless argues that, in the context of national tragedy, the ensuing debate was an attempt 
by the citizens to try to understand whether conception of citizenship in terms of civic virtues 
alone was sufficient for the nation to handle the shock collectively. For Szeligowska (2014), 
appeals to the historical patriotism of the nation provided strong symbols and discourses with 
which people could identify in a somewhat more emotional way. Szeligowska (2014) 
however holds that the unity of the nation lasted only in the early period after the tragedy. 
The consequent divisions over the president’s suitability to be buried at the national heroes’ 
site, Szeligowska  (2014: 505) concludes, showed a departure from identifying patriotism 
with historical symbols to identifying it with civic virtues. 
However, contrary to Szeligowska’s (2014) analysis, the burial-site controversy  that resulted 
in split of opinion over the suitability of the deceased president’s legacy does not necessarily 
amount to the people no longer valuing national patriotism. Rather what one gleans is that 
both sides of the burial-site controversy had a sense of patriotic attachment to their nation and 
its heritage symbolised by their common valuing of the heroes’ site. The disagreement over 
the (un)suitability of the deceased president to be buried at the national heroes’ site, on the 
other hand, presupposes an implicit consensus of the value of having such a revered site, in 
the first place, exclusively for Polish national heroes. In the burial-site controversy, the 
people only disagreed on what should be the constitution of the legacy of a Polish individual 
for him or her to be buried there. They thus value both democratic principles as well as 
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Polish-ness simultaneously, not valuing one in substitution of the other. The symbolic value 
of the nation is thus generally incontestable to each of the disagreeing sides. Ironically, the 
symbolic value of the nation was in principle the very source of their polarised positions. 
Moments such as this political tragedy or an economic tragedy and natural disasters shake the 
stability of the democratic state. Surviving such crises relies in part on drawing from 
members’ affective attachment to this nation’s territory and its history symbolised by such 
national institutions as the heroes’ burial site (Miller, 1995: 164). Such tragedies, without the 
role of a shared history and territory may threaten the sustenance of the very democratic 
virtues upon which constitutional patriotism is built. It is therefore evident that the sense of 
membership to the community through bonds of shared history and territory secures the 
democratic ideals. 
The autonomous individual of the social contract tradition, is in essence not detached from 
the history of his or her community. This dissertation argues that history and placed-ness are 
not impotent irrational marks left by time to decay in the past. The individual is an active 
participant in the continuation and re-making of the history of the community. A people’s 
history constitutes their concreteness. The obligation towards struggles of injustice is more 
forceful in those places to which one has an attachment. Therefore, the teaching of a critical 
national history that allows learners to interpret and re-interpret the history in relation to the 
prevalent injustices is imperative for the sustenance of democracy. The particular struggles in 
different national communities of the world cannot just be left in the past to decompose 
hoping that humanity will flourish in the democracy that ensues from the struggles. The 
resurgence of racial supremacism, anti-migration hostility (Mieriņa & Koroļeva, 2015) and 
arms races are developments few ever thought would recur. Thus the necessity for critical 
history today to arm citizens against such directions cannot be over-emphasised. Indifference 
and muteness over the past would scarcely keep it away from recurring. The indifference may 
encourage recurrence.  
The strong cosmopolitanism critical conception of the nation as being antithetical to the 
realisation of the ideal detached autonomous person as a basis for human equality, amounts to 
an overplaying of human freedom. Take the ideal democratic state that is committed to 
justice and respecting individual agency for example. During a vote over non-fundamental 
rights issues, such as secession and local government development plans, it is generally 
ultimately the ‘majority’ that determines direction of policy of common concern. Thus, even 
where I passionately disagree with the outcome, ideal democracy expects that I still accept 
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the decision as an expression of our collective will. The basis for my accepting a policy with 
which I greatly disagree but will respect, is on the premise that it is tolerable, and if I always 
have to have my way in absolute terms, the very institution of social cooperation that 
guarantees minimum conditions for my autonomous agency is going to collapse. The ensuing 
state of nature will erode any minimal prospects of fully being what I choose. The same 
applies with aspects of nationality. Not everybody may value the common history, 
meaningfulness of the geographical territory, the language and shared culture in equal 
measure. Nevertheless, these elements are what make this democratic community able to 
exist in the first place. If my and our language is not supported by the state, there is a real risk 
that my perspectives of reality and how I articulate it will be under threat. Democratic 
deliberation will be compromised. 
In other words, given how foundational nationality is to the very existence of a political 
institution, one can expect that every member who seeks to continue under such a political 
cooperation must necessarily and implicitly endorse the tolerant, inclusive and open-to-
contestation aspects of nationality, that enable the aggregate of humans to be a community, in 
the political sense. The individual does not have to endorse every substance constituting 
tolerable nationality. Aspects of nationality generally conceived are what make  the political 
community, the community it particularly is.  
2.5. Conclusion 
The strong cosmopolitan conception of the disembodied individual detached from social 
relationships and motivated by rational self-interest only is drawn from an exaggerated 
comprehensiveness of the generality of human kind. Such a disembodied being undermines 
the affective domain, which is what makes expressing of individuation and otherness 
possible. In the affective concreteness and otherness reside the core of being a particular 
human being beyond the common generic ‘objective’ attributes all humans share. The 
‘subjective’ is not an inherently morally empty nor inferior nor secondary category. In moral 
reflection, what pertains to the subjective is equally paramount as the host of the concreteness 
of the individual and the collective such that undermining the subjective in principle 
undermines the individual’s very humanity. This is because an actual individual feels 
recognised as human especially on account of the difference that individuates him or her. 
In the light of this, the national languages, geographical territory, national history and 
common culture of the global peoples (contestable as they may be) are not morally arbitrary 
on account of their ostensible subjectivity. Such subjectivities constitute the way of being of 
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the communities and the members constituting the communities. This is why people have 
historically staged successful political resistance movements against external forces 
whenever such elements of nationality have been suppressed or marginalised. Not only have 
people fought for recognition of elements of their nationality, but they also employ 
nationality as the vehicle for resistance. A fair account of human equality and universalism of 
norms must not exclude the subjectivities of global peoples as encapsulated in nationality, but 
rather the moral reflection about human equality must start from and with such global 
subjectivities.  
People’s communities cannot be divorced from the embeddedness of their shared history. The 
justness of present political orders, is always with reference to the past. Injustices and 
inequalities of the present largely have roots in the past. The political systems that prevail 
today are significantly responses to the past without which they lose the meaningfulness of 
their peculiarity. 
Such an indispensable attachment with the past renders a constitutional patriotism existing 
independent of national patriotism inadequate to single-handedly sustain a democratic 
political culture. Nationality also avails the linguistic and non-linguistic competences of 
communication in a democratic society. Without acquisition of such competences, one cannot 
meaningfully participate in the democratic life of a community.  
Tolerable nationality does and ought to persist even when state sovereignty is declining 
because the two have distinct logics and groundings. The idea of global economic integration 
established only on rational economic principles is unattainable as it in principle undermines 
the host of the concreteness of the very people whose cooperation it seeks. Whilst guarding 
against the real possibility of nationality being abused as an exclusionary and paternalising 
force, we need to be aware that it is nevertheless an ideal with normative value and it is 
necessarily indispensable in ideal global citizenship conceptualisations.  
It is worth emphasizing that this thesis does not regard introduction of history and mother-
tongue instruction to be the ultimate embodiments of ideal cosmopolitan citizenship. Rather 
the thesis highlights how a marginalization of these sources of concreteness adversely 
undermines concrete human equality in cosmopolitan citizenship. While only integrating the 
two in cosmopolitan citizenship endeavours does not translate into achieving ideal global 
citizenship, the thesis contends that an ideal cosmopolitan citizenship ought to necessarily 
include such concreteness sources as satisfaction of human equality conditions. 
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Having established the normativity of nationality, the next chapter makes a critical evaluation 
of strong cosmopolitanism. The chapter shows how inextricably dependent on each other the 
two ideals are. Ultimately, decoupling them undermines human equality. 
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Chapter 3:  
Cosmopolitanism 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter is a critical examination of strong cosmopolitanism. The first argument I 
advance is that ideal cosmopolitanism constitutes in achieving unity in moral action between 
the particular and universal opposites without sacrificing one for the other. In other words, 
each of the two is distinctive, incomparable and inseparable from the other. The historical 
origins of the ideology of cosmopolitanism were informed by this dual nature of human 
existence and moral duties.  
The second argument is that the demand for impartiality towards all relationships of 
belonging that the universalism of human equality of strong cosmopolitanism places on an 
individual is informed by a neo-Kantian atomistic conception of human nature, human 
freedom and the human condition. In so doing, it does not leave any room for alternative 
conceptions of the universalism of human equality that are morally valid, although they are 
not ultimately reducible to exclusive respect for human agency only as the foundational 
moral determinant. In other words, there are other morally valid perspectives of universalism 
of human equality that simultaneously value both individual agency and relational belonging 
in a mutually sustaining manner. Given the necessity and uniqueness of both values, the 
question of conflict between individual interest and the common good and the universal and 
the particular does not arise.  
The third argument is that as a response to global inequalities, the demand of strong 
cosmopolitanism that we assume impartiality towards all relationships and global inequalities 
is a wrong prescription due to a misdiagnosis of the root causes of global inequality. The 
prescription of the unqualified priority of duties of impartiality is a result of undermining the 
principle of responsibility, which is paramount in apportioning moral duties. As such, I argue 
that extinguishing national attachments would by far fail to resolve modern global challenges. 
This is because other than nationality, the major sources of global injustices are traceable to 
the iniquitous global structure that drives modern global interconnectedness. The prevailing 
global interconnectedness from which strong cosmopolitanism draws inspiration is neither 
value-neutral nor itself impartial in its distribution of burdens and benefits.  
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Ultimately, the chapter calls for a re-conceptualisation of universalism in global citizenship. 
A dialogical universalism that inherently recognises difference as being partly definitive of 
being must inform the conception of equality of the concrete human beings of the world.  
3.2. Understanding cosmopolitanism 
Although there are different formulations of cosmopolitanism, there are still some common 
principles that bind much of it together. Cosmopolitanism generally rests on the common 
premise that the individual human being is the ultimate unit of moral concern and, as such, is 
“owed equal concern and respect” (Wiens, 2017: 95). This being the case, humans have 
entitlements that place obligations on the wider humanity unrestricted by any other form of 
differentiation such as national boundaries (Tan, 2004; Helliwell & Hindess, 2015). Put 
differently, cosmopolitanism holds that because the individual is the ultimate unit of moral 
concern, there are binding moral duties of justice that demand impartiality in fulfilling them. 
Therefore, even strangers outside one’s nation, whom one may not encounter, have legitimate 
moral entitlements on one that should not be restricted by any other sort of boundaries. It is 
rooted in the ideal of human equality. Cosmopolitanism is therefore meant to realise all 
human beings’ equality of freedom, entitlements and obligations beyond the local boundaries 
of the nation, which for so long have been the indisputable host and delineator of social 
justice and its distributive schemes (Tan, 2004: 1).  
However, the question that subjects cosmopolitanism to perennial debate is: What constitutes 
cosmopolitan duties? In other words, what is the breadth and scope of cosmopolitan duties 
and entitlements (Tan, 2004: 6)? Answers to these questions have a bearing on 
conceptualisations of citizenship and education for democratic citizenship. There are many 
variations of cosmopolitanism based on the nature of responses given to such questions. 
Nevertheless, the dominant characterisation of cosmopolitanism is based on what should be 
the relationship between the core cosmopolitan values of universalism and impartiality on the 
one hand, and particularistic relational commitments that individuals have and which also 
generate unique moral obligations on the other hand (Tan, 2004; Armstrong, 2009). With 
respect to nationality, the question is about whether national boundaries should confine the 
scope of distributive justice (Armstrong, 2009). This also determines the type of citizenship 
policy and ultimately the nature of education for democratic citizenship offered to learners 
through the national curriculum. 
This dissertation focuses on a dominant cosmopolitanism that essentially holds that the 
universalism of human equality demands equal concern for all humanity, as constituting 
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primary moral duties, thereby necessarily extinguishing any moral relevance of national 
duties. In other words, the cosmopolitan principle of equal moral concern for all humanity of 
the world, outlaws the normativity of particularistic patriotic duties co-nationals have to each 
other, besides cosmopolitan ones. To fulfil such universal and impartial duties, one must 
override any duties of partiality one may have that emanate from any special attachments 
from particularistic relationships (especially national) in which one may find oneself 
(Habermas, 1994, 2001; Nili, 2015; Arneson, 2016). For this position, national affinities, 
although of value to individuals, have no moral value to restrict distributive duties, because 
the nation is arbitrary, morally speaking: The (dis)advantages of being under a nation’s 
distributive scheme that later determines one’s opportunities and chances in life are not a 
result of one’s choices (Nussbaum, 2002a; Habermas, 2003; Nili, 2015). It is a result of an 
accident of birth. This model of cosmopolitanism, which I henceforth refer to as “strong 
cosmopolitanism” (Miller, 2007: 43), is further motivated by the states of both global 
interconnectedness and global inequalities. For this position, due to the level of global 
interconnection, an act (of poverty, trade, the environment, insecurity and epidemic) in one 
part of the world affects humanity as an actual single global community (Tan, 2004; Pogge, 
2008; Schumann, 2016). The ensuing glaring global inequalities have overwhelmed national 
sovereignty, which ostensibly now functions as a barrier in addressing such inequalities and 
does not have moral significance (Beitz, 2001; Habermas, 2001; Caney, 2005). Global 
inequalities global poverty as well as voluntary and forced migration due to global conflict 
have, in the interest of equal moral concern, inspired cosmopolitans to normatively dismiss 
nationality in determining the duties and justice entitlements of individuals (Habermas, 2001; 
Caney, 2015). This is because nationality is understood to be a cause of conflict and must 
hence be extinguished. 
The following sections explore and later examine the different justifications offered for 
strong cosmopolitanism. It is later shown that other than advancing human equality, strong 
cosmopolitanism in essence undermines and violates this core ideal whose principles are also 
realisable by other perspectives other than that which prioritise individual agency. By being 
grounded in an essentialist conception of human nature, strong cosmopolitanism violates the 
necessity that human equality must consider an individual’s or community’s concrete 
otherness (Benhabib, 2011) most of which sources are anchored by the nation. 
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3.2.1.  Strong cosmopolitanism 
Strong cosmopolitanism demands that because duties of justice transcend national 
boundaries, national belonging has no moral worth (Habermas, 2001; Nussbaum, 2002a; 
Arneson, 2016). Such cosmopolitanism requires detachment from one’s local cultural 
affinities and does not expect that citizenship should be based on, among others, a common 
national identity. Instead, in education, it is about citizens and would-be-citizens on their own 
terms and convenience “learning from and about, others” without active support for locality 
in schools (Rundell, 2016: 120). Such positions hold that one needs not highly regard, 
maintain and reproduce the cultural inheritance of one’s locality (Costa, 2016: 1005). This, as 
strong cosmopolitanism holds, is because to have a fulfilling life, one should not necessarily 
value one’s inherited culture and national membership in the constitution of one’s identity. 
Rather, what one needs is an open-endedness attitude, readying one to explore some other 
ways of being besides that of one’s homeland (Costa, 2016: 1011). 
Strong cosmopolitanism denies the assigning of moral value to any group relationships and 
reduces any value they have to being merely extrinsic (Arneson, 2016). While acknowledging 
the affection that exists between family and friends as based on acquaintanceship, strong 
cosmopolitanism however holds that such an acquaintanceship does not apply to national 
communities where one has ties to unanimous compatriots. For this position, the individual 
who lacks family and friendship ties is really deprived of important human goods. However, 
the same cannot be said of individuals who lack national and clan ties (Arneson, 2016: 558). 
From the perspective of strong cosmopolitanism, the versions of cosmopolitanism that 
acknowledge both patriotic obligations to co-nationals and more substantive duties to all 
human beings of the world are deficient. Strong cosmopolitanism does not tolerate the idea of 
duties towards national partiality (Nili, 2015: 249). It nevertheless regards as only morally 
permissible (but not morally necessary) the commitments one has to one’s particularistic 
relationships (Bader, 2005; Arneson, 2016). Therefore, the different duties of beneficence 
one owes all human beings do not include the duties arising from voluntary associations one 
can have, such as duty to compatriots. As such, Arneson (2016: 559–560) challenges any 
inclusion of national belonging in formulations of cosmopolitanism, holding that they are not 
different from racism justifications: 
After all, a morally sophisticated racist does not hold that her race has special merit or worth, 
but rather that it is morally important for members of each race to stand by their own and 
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give priority to advancing the interests of their group even at cost to others. This morally 
sophisticated racism is still racism and still morally offensive. 
For Arneson (2016: 562), “there are norms internal to social practices including friendship 
that are distinct from moral norms”. As such, he holds that a good friend is partial to his or 
her friend. However, for Arneson (2016: 562), since friendship commitments are grounded in 
social norms and not necessarily moral norms, the partial commitments of friendship are 
incomparable with and by implication inferior to the commitments of moral impartiality. The 
position that a good friend must be partial to his or her friends pertains to norms of friendship 
that fall under the umbrella of mere norms of social practices that are however distinct from 
moral norms (Arneson, 2016: 562). 
Strong cosmopolitanism contends that there are many more other complex relationships in 
which one is embedded besides nationality that have special commitments and contribute 
towards identity constitution. Adherents question how one determines which special 
relationships have special moral duties, and even if some have, the question of when they 
should compete with general duties originating from equal concern for wider humanity still 
persists (Bader, 2005: 86). The proponents argue that justification of special duties (such as 
national duties) should not lie in their permissibility but rather in their moral necessity 
(Bader, 2005: 86). Therefore, special attachments of nationality are permissible morally, yet 
they remain not morally necessary in terms of the weight of the duties they generate. 
Callan (2006) claims that although parents (representative of special relationships that ground 
partiality duties) are free to love their children as they would (as a form of particular 
attachments), we would be right in calling their love misplaced if they make unconditional 
defences for their children’s evil acts. This failure is about not loving well what is worth 
loving, and hence “[t]he fatal error of those who revere a quasi-deified nation is not their love 
of country but their idolatrous disregard of the proper reverence for individual human lives 
both within and outside the nation” (Callan, 2006: 531). 
Callan (2006: 531) contends that a loss of truthful perception leads to misplaced love, not just 
because the object of love is not real and only misperceived, but also because it is a fantasy 
unworthy of one’s loving. To such, pertains patriotism that disregards global egalitarianism 
(Callan, 2006: 531). National identity has no moral value because any nation evokes a wide 
range of traits through its policies and character that cause members to make diverse 
evaluative judgements about their love (and sometimes hate) for the nation in different 
proportions (Callan, 2006: 539). 
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Although not all, some strong cosmopolitans argue that cosmopolitanism should necessarily 
lead to the establishment of a world state. For Nili (2015), a global sovereign is necessary for 
the cosmopolitan ideal to be valid and realisable. Nili (2015: 245) opposes the objection 
against cosmopolitanism that holds that a world state would undermine and endanger the 
inherently valuable cultural pluralism of the world that is hosted and preserved by the current 
national system. Nili (2015: 245) holds that a global state would be favourable, because 
unlike under the prevailing multiple states system, under the then global political community 
the arbitrariness of birth will not determine people’s life chances, as is currently the case, and 
national belonging will be a purely individual preference. There will be equality of 
opportunity for all people of the world (Nili, 2015: 245). 
In response to the liberal nationalist position that the global sphere lacks the solidarity that is 
necessary for distributive cooperation, Nili (2015: 248) holds that among citizens, it is shared 
political institutions that develop mutual feelings and ‘bonds of civic friendship’. Adherents 
of this perspective hold that the sense of justice on which liberalism flourishes does not 
necessarily depend on national solidarity, although national solidarity helped in its origins 
(Habermas, 1994: 27). Rather, it is living under the influences of procedural justice that 
generates this sense (Habermas, 2003: 73–74; Nili, 2015: 248). According to Habermas 
(1994: 27), the modern state and nationality have only a “historically contingent connection”, 
but not a conceptual one. A liberal world state will enable realisation of sentiments of 
solidarity that make it possible for democratic societies to cohere and pull together 
(Habermas, 1994: 32; Nili, 2015: 245). Therefore, for this position, the most relevant interest 
for human beings are political principles that will enable a democratic community that will 
ultimately guarantee individual flourishing (Habermas, 2001: 73–74). 
Strong cosmopolitanism demands that when we act, we must acknowledge the equal worth of 
all humanity in the world and that as such, the commitments arising from our collective 
affiliations must be secondary to cosmopolitan ideals (Nussbaum, 2002a: 8&14; Nielsen, 
2005: 274). Our foremost allegiance should be to the worldwide human moral community 
and not to a particular government whose basis of inclusion and exclusion is the morally 
arbitrary element of nationality (Nielsen, 2005: 274–275). For Huber (2016: 678), the fact 
that states have moral authority to make laws and make these laws binding for a particular 
territorial jurisdiction as exercise of political authority within that jurisdiction effectively 
means that they need to provide normative justification to those non-members whose 
situation is altered by not being members of that state. 
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It can be drawn that strong cosmopolitans basically looks at actual duties human beings have 
to one another as being reducible to either a universalist nature or a particularistic one. 
Universal duties are regarded as the highest moral duties consistent with equal human 
concern. Particular duties, on the other hand, are weaker in their moral compulsion and 
relevance. It is on this basis that strong cosmopolitans further proceed to dismiss any moral 
worth of nationality. With respect to global justice, their position entails that there must be an 
egalitarian global distributive scheme that is neither characterised nor limited by national 
identities (Nili, 2015). In relation to citizenship, it entails that there be fewer constraints on 
border controls, with some demanding their abolition (Habermas, 2001; Nili, 2015; Huber, 
2016). The bearing of strong cosmopolitanism on education systems is that learners should 
now be understood as global (not national) citizens and that as such, nation-specific content 
and skills in their curriculum must be nuanced and toned down (Brighouse, 2003; Schumann, 
2016). Learners must rather be prepared for a global citizenship, with duties to wider 
humanity being paramount over and above any other morally permissible yet unnecessary 
local commitments (Nussbaum, 2002a; Brighouse, 2003; Costa, 2016: 1005; Rundell, 2016). 
National belonging in education for democratic citizenship is in this light regarded as morally 
inferior and an obstacle in the realisation of cosmopolitan justice. 
It should be made clear that the nationality this dissertation defends is deliberative. It is open 
to the engagement and inclusion of others. It acknowledges human equality and the 
concreteness of others (Benhabib, 2011). It is neither closed nor narrow nor prejudiced. 
Rather, it is dialogic and dynamic. Any other interested human being is welcome to become 
part of it. It is broadening and not shrinking in its scope. A community founded on morally 
insignificant elements such as race cannot be accessible and inviting in this regard. The 
nationality being defended is not assimilationist, as this would amount to compelling any 
would-be-member to embrace and conform to its way of life as constituting the good life. 
At the same time, it is worth acknowledging that most of the aspects of the nation are in some 
way, although not always, traceable to the history, culture and heritage of the community. 
However, as Kymlicka (2002a) holds, the culture attributed to nationality as defended here is 
not thick, but thin, and is capacious for individual goals and aspirations. In the following 
sections I examine the latent deficiencies underlying strong cosmopolitanism. 
3.3. The duality heritage of cosmopolitanism 
The critique of strong cosmopolitanism in the following sections essentially targets the strong 
cosmopolitan claim that duties of impartiality have overriding moral worth and that they are 
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incompatible with any other particularistic duties one may have. Although the universality of 
the moral norms of human equality and equal moral concern (on which strong 
cosmopolitanism is rooted) are indisputable (Ingram, 2016: 67), cosmopolitanism should not 
necessarily be understood as a morally superior ideal that is in competition with and (always) 
excludes legitimate particularism. 
Since its origin, cosmopolitanism has distinguished dualistically (in both the Judeo-Christian 
and philosophical traditions) between a higher city that is ideal and universal and a lower city 
that is particular, with each having unique worth (Papastephanou, 2015: 24; Alexander, 2016: 
171). Originally, cosmopolitanism was a duality: This city, the near, the particular, was 
distinguished from another higher city, the distant and universal (Alexander, 2016: 171). 
Modern strong cosmopolitanism, however, extinguishes this duality by imposing only one 
ideal. Ultimately, the human being is seen only dynamically and not statically as well 
(Alexander, 2016: 173). Originally, the individual was morally speaking compelled to adhere 
to the compatible demands and limits of each of the aspects of the dualism: the experienced 
and (not versus) the metaphysical. However, today cosmopolitanism has excluded one 
constituent of the duality (the local) and only ascribes moral value to the universal 
(Alexander, 2016: 173). 
Strong cosmopolitanism in its quest to establish a monist understanding of human equality 
takes the major risk of annihilating the dualism valued in the heritage of cosmopolitanism 
that is still necessary and relevant today. The problem is summed in the question: Is ‘the city’ 
of strong cosmopolitanism “the only city, or one city of the two” (Alexander, 2016: 172)? 
Both cosmopolitanism and patriotism are in the strictest sense boundary discourses that ought 
to be complementary rather than antagonistic. Patriotism is a legitimate consideration of the 
“concrete claims to justice” of “a specific collectivity”, whereas cosmopolitanism is about 
enlarging “one’s specific ethical-political demands and just claims” (Papastephanou, 2015: 
139). As such, cosmopolitanism and patriotism ought to be understood as “mutual 
correctives”, where each also bridles the other from attaining forms that are morally 
repugnant (Papastephanou, 2015: 139). They are not oppositional, but are “mutual 
counterdiscourses”, because each exposes the excesses or deficiencies of the other 
(Papastephanou, 2015: 139). 
The individual human being existing in the actual world has both particular and universal 
interests and obligations, each category with an own uniqueness. However, for Alexander 
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(2016: 173), the fundamental challenge posed by strong cosmopolitanism is that it 
surreptitiously deviates from the postulation of its foundational heritage that recognised two 
compatible modes or worlds of being and belonging (e.g. the material and the spiritual, the 
near and the distant, the particular and the universal). According to Alexander (2016), strong 
cosmopolitanism later claimed that there is only the universal that trumps down and overrides 
the legitimate moral worth of the particular. Therefore, in this sense, the universal in the 
strictest sense of the duality is particular, because the universal has displaced everything that 
necessarily fell under the particular and has taken the stead of the particular (Alexander, 
2016: 174). Now the universal is just like any of the numerous other separate particulars. 
Simultaneously, the universal is alleged to include all the “other particulars within itself” 
(Alexander, 2016: 174). What this implies is that although an individual needs both the 
universal and the particular, strong cosmopolitanism will give one only the universal and the 
universal instead of the particular and the universal. No wonder Alexander (2016: 174) calls 
this a fundamental contradiction inherent in strong cosmopolitanism. 
Cosmopolitanism must be dualistic. The danger of reducing cosmopolitanism to only one 
way of life, or attempting to value only one constituent of the duality (i.e. the universal or the 
particular) comparatively, ultimately results in a contradiction of the very notion of 
cosmopolitanism. Both the particular and the universal must be understood as having unique 
and incomparable worth, such that none can substitute the other. This position is different 
from and against the tokenism by some cosmopolitans (such as Nussbaum (2002a)) who 
bestow mere instrumental or secondary value to the particular, in contrast to the universal.  
It is erroneous to denigrate nationality by apportioning to it blame for the failure to realise 
justice for the suffering humankind of the globe, who are entitled to help from every other 
person of the world undifferentiated by national boundaries. Many of the people of the world 
are “necessarily situated in particular webs of belonging, with access to particular others but 
not to humanity in general” and this being the case, the abstractness and neutrality of strong 
cosmopolitanism are meaningless to actual human beings (Calhoun, 2008: 443). 
What ails strong cosmopolitanism is its fundamental absolutism and transcendence that 
compel acting and viewing the world “from above”, yet the cure to this ailment lies in 
looking at the world and acting “from below” (Ingram, 2016: 73). Therefore, 
cosmopolitanism must be understood not as a precast mould to which all must conform, as 
this is tantamount to domineering (Ingram, 2016: 73). Such a dominating attribute of 
universalism, for Ingram (2016), owes its heritage and foundations to the spread of 
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Christianity, later the ‘civilisation’ of imperialism and in contemporary times, modernity. 
Instead, he argues that cosmopolitanism is supposed to be modelled as “a process and 
practice of contestation” aimed at confronting “domination and its false universals” (Ingram, 
2016: 73). 
Strong cosmopolitanism dismissal of local belonging, although it appears unobjectionable, 
tends to promote only a particular perspective that is different from the local and usually not 
always relatable and imaginable to the many. Arguably, it is mostly a privilege of only the 
elite at the top (Ingram, 2016: 70). Transcendent universalism is therefore not a neutral ideal 
and ironically it has an inherent bias. Such a perspective of strong cosmopolitanism is 
associated with those with global experiences, mostly those in globalised metropolitan 
communities (Ingram, 2016: 70). Transcendent cosmopolitanism is a perspective that largely 
serves the interests of global elites (Ingram, 2016). There does exist correlation between 
adopting the globalist perspective of universalism and the global elites’ interests, prejudices 
and general good (Papastephanou, 2015). However, the pervasiveness of the enabling tools 
for cosmopolitan imagination in developing nations is starkly different from the West. 
That all human beings across the world have equal moral worth is indisputable. It is worth 
acknowledging, however, that the breadth and scope of global interconnection experiences 
greatly vary across the people of the world. Experiencing the immensity of this 
interconnection is largely determined by accessing some privileges such as technology, 
global education and global travel (Calhoun, 2008: 443). It is even prudent to distinguish 
between being affected or being on the receiving end of global interconnectedness on the one 
hand, from being an active free participant in choosing how to benefit from the treasure of 
global interconnectedness on the other hand. The former is characterised by passivity. The 
majority of people in developing nations fall in the category of passive recipients not availed 
with the privilege of having alternatives and choices about what their life should be like in a 
global order, as they are deprived of enabling educational, economic and technological 
amenities. 
What this shows is that the capacity to imagine oneself ‘from above’ as a citizen of the world 
is not evenly distributed across the people of the world (Calhoun, 2008: 434). What this 
further implies is that the value assigned to local attachments varies between active global 
participants and passive ones. This is partly influenced by the fact that other interests of those 
with ability to criss-cross the world can better be served in a borderless world, where 
nationality acts as a barrier. This seeks to underscore the fact that it is the privileged of the 
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world, owing to their advantaged capacities, who have a wide range of interests across 
different national boundaries. This enables them to easily imagine a nationless world. 
However, such an imagination arising from privilege is not accessible to many others who 
still find value in national interests. As shall later be argued, coincidentally the majority of 
the developed nations have an atomistic conception of the individual. The same, arguably, 
cannot be generalised about most parts of the developing world, such as Malawi. Therefore, it 
is not simply a matter of elites, but of elites with a particular perspective of human nature. 
Claiming that global interconnectedness, largely an initiative by elites who shape and 
monopolise its opportunities, has brought humanity together should not make us ignore the 
rate of the unevenly distributed opportunities mostly accessible by possession of foreign 
language (English) (Calhoun, 2008: 444–445), wealth and education, which enable 
acquisition of a cosmopolitan perspective of cultural neutrality (Papastephanou, 2015). Most 
people of the world experience such interconnectedness, but not in proportions that would 
warrant denying the more actual embeddedness of the people. This neither suggests that they 
should be tied to their particularistic contexts only, nor does it entail that they are bereft of 
(universal) commitments that transcend local affinities and boundaries. Rather, although they 
lack the privileges of modern global interconnectedness, they nevertheless have and do 
encounter otherness in their locality and are able to recognise both local and cross-border 
duties and that each domain has unique duties (Calhoun, 2008: 434). 
The human nature conception of ideal cosmopolitanism must concede that “humanity is more 
complex” and “irreducible to a duality” of the particular versus the universal because being 
human implies being “distinctively individual or particular” (Lu, 2000: 257). As such, in 
ideal cosmopolitanism, human beings ought to be understood as “one and many things” (Lu, 
2000: 257). An absolutist hierarchical conception of cosmopolitanism carries with it the 
inevitable danger of undermining the complex distinctiveness of individuals and societies 
because the cosmopolitanism reduces the diverse and contrasting sources of the self across 
the world into a single one. Undermining humanity lies in both denying that the other is also 
like you, a human being, and disregarding the different “roots that embed [him or her] in a 
particular but common set of human relationships, producing an unaccommodated humanity 
deprived of names, nationality, citizenship, religion, ethnicity … ethical convictions, 
political, economic or social position” (Lu, 2000: 258). Cosmopolitanism must therefore 
acknowledge both the common worth of all human beings and their belonging to particular 
contexts that vary across human societies (Calhoun, 2008: 445). 
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For most people of the world, their local and particular ways of life are not mere imperfect 
and debased forms towards an aspired life of impartiality. Rather, they are actual and 
significant modes through which ordinary people keep attempting to make meaning of life 
and find and occupy their place in the interconnected world they attempt to alter for their 
well-being as much as it alters them for their benefit too (Calhoun, 2008: 441). 
People are capable of having multiple, mutual and at times even conflicting identities. As 
such, the cosmopolitan ought not to displace the local with the universal. Instead, there must 
be vernacularisation of the universal (Benhabib, 2011: 89)  under which the universal must be 
contested in a process of local meaning-making. What this means is that in global people’s 
meaning-rich local embeddedness there should be an interaction between the ‘known’ and the 
‘unknown’ other brought in by global interconnection. Neither of the two is complete and 
self-sufficient. Actually, moderation of each to prevent excessive obsession is possible only 
through the co-existence with and flourishing of the other. It is only after the ‘universal’ has 
undergone the democratic iterations that it becomes both a local concept, that is yet at the 
same time a universal one (Benhabib, 2011). 
3.3.1.  The community and liberalism 
Strong cosmopolitanism is grounded in a neo-Kantian conception of equality. Relationships 
and the moral value of their subsequent duties are determined only on the basis of individual 
autonomy and impartiality towards all human relationships. One should, however, be 
cognisant that there are other different and valid formulations of equality whose 
considerations are not founded solely on atomism. Some foundations of universalism value 
both the autonomy of the individual and other moral ideals without necessarily compromising 
the agency capacity of the self-determining person.  
Before looking at alternative perspectives of the conceptualisation of human nature and 
equality, it is worth noting that in the liberal conception of equality, the community also has 
moral value. In the liberal society, there are different levels of belonging that generate 
obligations. Belonging to communities is unique in its own right. For Etzioni (2014), 
although individual human beings have an exclusive entitlement of rights, they nevertheless 
often act in consideration of collective interests. Social bonds function as a major and unique 
source of social order, also called “soft control” (Etzioni, 2014: 48). Social order refers to the 
constraints that acting on one’s preferences requires (Etzioni, 2014: 48). As such, one cannot 
prioritise individual autonomy only by excluding and discarding relationships anchoring the 
social order, as one will not manage to attain the desired autonomy. Although non-coercive, 
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which is quite unlike the formal coercion for political cooperation by the state, soft control 
tends to have more voluntary regulative and restraining power over human conduct 
(Kymlicka, 2002a: 293; Coetzee, 2003: 324). It is necessary in that it is the regulative 
framework in one’s making and acting on preferences (MacIntyre, 2002: 62; Coetzee, 2003: 
324; Taylor, 2003: 33). Therefore, autonomy and social order ought to go together: One 
cannot maximise one only without losing the other; ultimately losing both (Etzioni, 2006: 
76). For Meyers (2005: 38), exercising autonomy does not entail that one be outlandish. 
Rather, through the interpersonal relationships of culture, “people express their values, needs, 
interests, and so forth in fashioning their relationships” and “act autonomously in maintaining 
these ties” (Meyers, 2005: 38). For Meyers (2005: 38), culture does not only transmit 
doctrines. It imparts skills that help the individual to obtain either social approval or tolerance 
or both, in one’s personal projects. 
Balancing between individual rights and responsibilities varies across societies, as it depends 
on historical and cultural experiences (Etzioni, 2014: 246). This does not mean that the 
individual must be at the mercy of his or her particular community. Yet, at the same time, 
individuals’ rights are only realisable after certain responsibilities have been fulfilled in 
relation to the other members of the community. It is not something that is universal for all 
human beings across the world. Through socialisation in families, community and other 
voluntary associations such as religious institutions, individuals get to freely embrace some 
of society’s values (MacIntyre, 2002; Taylor, 2003; Etzioni, 2014). These voluntary 
associations ensure some soft or informal controls upon which the state and all other forms of 
public life build to establish democracy but the state and public life cannot generate on their 
own (MacIntyre, 2002: 107; Held, 2006: 81). The virtues of mutual respect, reasonable and 
fair deliberation and restraint from violating certain norms so as not to lose face before one’s 
significant others and community are not generated by the state or democracy (Kymlicka, 
1997: 6; MacIntyre, 2002: 107). The virtues develop in voluntary associations of the home, 
religious centres, school cultures and neighbourhood life, among others (Kymlicka, 1997: 6). 
These are largely derived from the locale’s history, shared culture, shared territory and 
language – embodied in the nationality. Yet ultimately, individuals freely make their own 
preferences in the context of the social approbation and reasonable censure of their 
communities (Etzioni, 2014: 48). 
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3.4. Is neo-Kantianism the only universalism? 
A major challenge of, strong cosmopolitanism is that it promotes one of many other 
philosophical perspectives about human nature and the universal norm of human equality 
deriving from the human nature conception. Strong cosmopolitanism is largely grounded in 
an individual-centric perspective of equality and conception of the self. As a result, the 
exclusive atomistic conception of the self outlaws relational aspects of the self that 
distinctively mould actual “people’s way of being in the world” (Lehman, 2002: 433). The 
exclusiveness of the neo-Kantian transcendent self that informs strong cosmopolitan 
impartiality, is incompatible with alternative conceptualisations of human nature that place 
normativity on relational being without necessarily undermining individual freedom. 
Although human identities in a community are not homogeneous and as such do not 
uniformly display their group’s or locale’s ascription, there still exist certain idiosyncratic 
features that are “salient in a locale” not common elsewhere, thereby remarkably 
differentiating one locality from the rest (Metz, 2015: 1176). To hold that certain values are 
identifiable with a particular community does not necessarily entail that other societies and 
communities elsewhere do not have instances where such values are demonstrated. Rather, 
the distinction lies in that in the society identified with the values, the values underlie much 
of the life of the society: their commerce, ethics, politics, education, conceptions of health 
and healthcare provision and general way of life (Miller, 1995: 164; Ramose, 2004: 149; 
Metz, 2015: 1176). 
The liberal conception of equality prizes properties that are internal to the human being, such 
as individual agency and rationality (Metz, 2015: 1178). However, one may argue that the 
universalism grounded in duties and entitlements only is one of other available formulations 
of universalism of the ideal of human equality. There are other philosophical perspectives 
that conceptualise human equality in a different mode other than through the prism of 
prioritisation of individual autonomy only. Human equality and human dignity in Afro-
communitarian thought, for instance, largely constitute not in the exercise of individual 
autonomy alone. Rather, in as much as it values individual autonomy, it also includes 
considerations of how one should relate with the humanity in others in the community (Metz, 
2015). 
The concept of ubuntu shapes African thought about human nature, human dignity and 
equality. Ubuntu refers to an “interconnectedness-towards-wholeness” of humanness (Krog, 
2008: 355). It is pivoted on the virtues of “altruism, solidarity, sharing and caring … respect, 
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reciprocity, hospitality, and connectedness” (Ngcoya, 2015: 253). It is about an awareness of 
the necessity of “compassion, justice, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity in the 
interest of building, maintaining and strengthening the community” and its relationships 
(Letseka, 2012: 54). For this perspective, human beings can only (and actually do) actualise 
themselves in partnership with others, and not in isolation. Individual human flourishing is 
realised in common with others. On this account, autonomy is not dismissed, yet it is not the 
sole determinant normative value, as is the case in individual-centric formulations. 
Through an analysis of the proceedings during the hearings of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Oelofsen (2015) gleaned fundamental differences in how a 
moral act such as forgiveness is conceived between African thought that is largely influenced 
by ubuntu and individual-centric ethics. In other words, the differences originated from 
different conceptions of human nature of the two philosophical traditions. Oelofsen (2015: 
372) holds that surviving victims and relations of tortured and murdered anti-apartheid 
activists during the apartheid regime had their personhood compromised and distorted by the 
atrocities served by the perpetrators. However, further to such disturbing and damaging 
violent acts, after attainment of political freedom, Oelofsen (2015: 372) holds that the 
victimised parties had their personhood diminished by the coexistence in society with the 
perpetrators whose humanity too remained impaired. In part, this is because the perpetrators 
were not fully human, as they lost their humanity through committing the dehumanising acts 
(Oelofsen, 2015: 372). In this way, both the victims and the perpetrators’ humanity was 
damaged such that after the tragic experiences, they both required restoration to their 
dignified states (Oko Elechi, Morris & Schauer, 2010: 74; Oelofsen, 2015: 373). The 
victimised parties cannot manage to live in a society that is not ‘fully human’, as one cannot 
trust it unless it is repaired and corrected (Oelofsen, 2015). Only after everybody’s humanity 
is repaired would wholeness be attained. The goal of justice is not only restricted to serve the 
individual’s retributive and restorative entitlements (Oelofsen, 2015: 372). It is also about 
restoring harmony and wholeness of humanity as embedded in social relationships (Oko 
Elechi et al., 2010: 74). According to ubuntu ethics, one’s meaningful existence is achieved 
in a context of the fullness of that which is around one, in both a physical and a metaphysical 
sense (Oelofsen, 2015: 371). This being the case, forgiveness and reconciliation are necessary 
in ubuntu ethics, in order to achieve wholeness of the community (Oelofsen, 2015: 373).  
For Oelofsen (2015: 372), in the individual-centric conception of human nature, forgiveness 
and reconciliation are ideals  that are at the discretion of the victimised moral agent. The 
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injured individual may out of self-interest perform forgiveness if and when it has therapeutic 
utility. In contrast, Oelofsen (2015: 372) argues that in the communalistic conception of the 
individual, forgiveness is necessitated by both individual and communal interests in almost 
equal complementary measures. Therefore, for Oelofsen (2015: 373), in the ubuntu 
communalistic perspective, the goal of forgiveness is not merely to restore the political 
harmony that existed prior to the victimisation; rather, it aims at grounding relationships in 
human equality without necessarily demanding a continuing of the relationship as it was prior 
to the harm. Understood in this sense, when the circle of forgiveness is completed (by the 
transformation of the perpetrators’ taking of responsibility and sincere expression of 
remorse), both the perpetrators and victims can have whole humanity (in the normative sense) 
restored (Oko Elechi et al., 2010; Oelofsen, 2015). As Oelofsen (2015: 374) holds, 
“forgiveness is not meant to, nor can it, provide closure for the victim(s). It is, instead, the 
beginning of the journey towards humanisation”. 
The Afro-communitarian forgiveness perspective is by its nature bilateral and perpetrators are 
expected to not only pay reparations, but also to ensure that they get to a realisation of the 
moral unacceptability of their actions, take responsibility and later transform themselves in 
tandem with communal wholeness (Oelofsen, 2015: 374). The condition for wholeness of 
Afro-communitarianism is that the perpetrators, now accepted back into the moral society, 
must respect both humanity and the relevant conditions for the realisation of other people’s 
flourishing (Oelofsen, 2015: 374). What is outstanding here is that in as much as the 
victimised legitimately seek retributive justice, which is emphasised in the atomistic 
perspective of the individual, in ubuntu thought, what is also necessary beyond serving the 
individual interest, is the state of humanity and wholeness in the community that is affected 
by an act of injustice against an individual. In other words, beyond one’s self-interest, of 
primary concern too is the wholeness of the community that has been violated by the 
perpetrators’ horrible act. This must be repaired. That is why despite retributive justice 
entitlements, the perpetrators as fellow members of the community need to re-align 
themselves with the community’s humanness. Besides making the offenders be held 
accountable for their misdeeds, they must also be re-integrated into the world of human 
interconnectedness by among others ensuring that relationships are restored to harmony (Oko 
Elechi et al., 2010: 74).  
What one gleans is that in ubuntu ethics individual flourishing is not detached from the 
harmony and wholeness of the community. An unjust act violates individual integrity and 
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also the harmony and wholeness of the community necessary for individual flourishing. The 
ubuntu principle of harmony entails that violating the humanness in one set of relationships 
between two individuals affects the well-being of the entire community. Thus, what is at 
stake are not only the victim’s interests, but also the wholeness of the community. Repairing 
the relationship between the victim and victimised is a moral necessity for the individuals and 
community too. However, forgiveness is not necessarily in lieu of restoration. 
What is observable is that ubuntu ethics, unlike individual-centric ethics, does not restrict the 
ideal of human dignity to exclusively reside in the “rational and regulative ideals for 
freedom” (Ngcoya, 2015: 255). Furthermore, ubuntu personhood, unlike in Eurocentric 
philosophy, is not a detached abstract or intrinsic ideal one is born with. Rather, “it is 
achieved and is subject to degrees of one’s fulfilment of obligations to the self, the 
household, and community” (Ngcoya, 2015: 255). Ubuntu ethics is therefore motivated by 
ideals of care thus recognising the normativity of certain aspects of human nature for which 
the other dominant ethical approaches of deontology (the root of strong cosmopolitanism) 
and consequentialism fail to adequately account for (Pettersen, 2011: 52). This is so because 
ethics of care is grounded in “relational ontology”, depicting the individual as being 
“mutually interconnected, vulnerable and dependent, often in asymmetric ways” (Pettersen, 
2011: 52).  
The ubuntu worldview regards relationships among human beings as constitutive and 
formative and not as merely instrumental or as a good that is subject to one’s preferences 
(Ngcoya, 2015: 255). For Ngcoya (2015: 255), what this entails is that a peculiar and 
particular set of social relationships is necessary for human flourishing and as such, members 
of the community have a duty to preserve, sustain and nourish those relationships (Ngcoya, 
2015: 255). This is unlike the neo-Kantian perspective, where the individual human being is 
autonomous and hence can flourish independent of relationships with others. The value of 
social goods under the Kantian perspective is discretionary to the individual and only serves 
extrinsic purposes. 
One can thus far hold that there are different perspectives of personhood besides the neo-
Kantian and that we ought not to necessarily and summarily undermine the normative value 
of certain goods, such as communal relationships. It is therefore dangerous and at times 
tantamount to domination to reduce the value of all particular relationships as having 
secondary value to an alleged superior universal norm. It is due to this awareness that Ngcoya 
(2015: 259) advocates for “emancipatory cosmopolitanism”, which seeks to liberate strong 
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cosmopolitanism from its neo-Kantian and Eurocentric bias and its trapping legalistic 
procedures. The Kantian deontological conception of the human person and conditions for 
individual flourishing are radically opposed to those of ubuntu, which has an immense moral 
regard for social relationships. It is worth emphasising, as notes Ngcoya (2015: 260), that 
highlighting such alternative perspectives is not meant to either summarily dismiss Kantian-
anchored cosmopolitanism  or to promote an indigenous one while proofing it with immunity 
from external critique. It is also not about presenting ubuntu as self-sufficiently insulated 
from the insights of other perspectives. Rather, the aim is that we acknowledge that there are 
alternative conceptions of personhood consistent with human equality and freedom that need 
to be acknowledged in cosmopolitan theorisation without expecting the conceptions to 
communicate in “idioms and concepts that we are already familiar with – in isomorphic 
phrases of equivalence” (Ngcoya, 2015: 260). 
One can therefore hold that single-handedly, the atomistic and essentialist perspectives of 
strong cosmopolitanism cannot adequately establish terms for equal human concern across 
the world without necessarily undermining alternative normatively valid perspectives about 
human nature that realise human equality under different social structures. The strong 
cosmopolitan position is deficient and not fully compatible with perspectives of human nature 
and equality that have a collectivist foundation. Strong cosmopolitanism only prioritises and 
elevates the individualistic conception of human nature over and above alternative others. 
The failure of strong cosmopolitanism to recognise that such essentialism of universalism in 
principle amounts to undue displacement of one conception of human nature and substituting 
it with another alternative that is not fully identifiable with other peoples of the world who 
ought to embrace it, amounts to domination. Such an anomaly, however, can be avoided if we 
have a formulation of cosmopolitanism that while acknowledging the primacy of human 
equality and human agency, also concedes that it is hard, if not impossible, to deny moral 
value to some significant relationships with others. In other words, the transcendent self 
ought not to be the exclusive prototype of the individual in the conceptualisation of global 
citizenship. 
The evolution and subsequent spread of neo-Kantian strong cosmopolitan universalism have 
not been as impartial and without bias as paraded. Therefore, it should not be advanced as the 
sole and ultimate standard upon which all other perspectives must be assessed and improved 
(Ramose, 2004). According to Ramose (2004: 140), colonial conquests had an adverse 
impact on the sustenance and development of African philosophy. Ramose (2004) attributes 
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this to the fact that colonialists and their civilising mission operated from a perspective that 
the indigenous people needed civilisation and that they did not have any epistemology, let 
alone a philosophy, or that where any semblance of such seemed to exist, it was inferior by 
their standard.  
The effects of such an encounter are still manifest today. Most African higher institutions of 
learning do not have a well-developed African philosophy, let alone an African philosophy of 
education (Ramose, 2004: 155–156). For instance, Metz (2015: 1176) observes that there are 
some outstanding idiosyncrasies in the aims of education in either African or neo-Kantian 
ethical thought. Given its atomistic perspective informed by Kantian autonomy, education for 
Eurocentric approaches aims at developing skills that emphasise individual agency: 
competition, individual attainment, self-realisation and independence in creating one’s good 
life (Metz, 2015: 1178). On the other hand, traditional African thought (that was stifled by 
colonialism) emphasized collective values such as acquiring knowledge and skills to facilitate 
playing one’s role in the community towards one’s independence as well as improving and 
sustaining the wholeness and well-being of humanity as embodied in the community (Metz, 
2015: 1179).  
All this shows that apart from the neo-Kantian conception of human nature and universalism, 
other alternative and morally valid formulations of human nature do exist and are not 
exclusively shaped by the ideal of individual agency alone. Formulations of universalism of 
human equality that ensure compatibility between individual autonomy and relational 
commitments are neither a logical absurdity, nor are they inferior to a formulation that prizes 
individual agency alone. 
3.4.1. On the credibility of other philosophies 
A possible challenge against the position of alternative philosophical perspectives would be 
that most of the developing nations with their peculiar cultures distinct from Western values 
have no fully developed philosophy or indigenous thought system. As such, they have no 
fully-fledged objective philosophical structures and procedures for tackling particular moral 
problems and that ultimately, the emphasized alleged richness of such cultures is in principle 
reactionary and tantamount to mere romanticism (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004; Matolino & 
Kwindingwi, 2013) 
Such a position, however, ignores the fact that the development of African thought and 
indeed of others in most developing nations had been either disrupted or made nearly 
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impossible by the effects of colonial imperialism (Metz, 2015; Ngcoya, 2015). These 
domineering forces actively ensured that the local indigenous ways did not thrive alongside 
the ‘civilised’. The indigenous was categorised as subjective, trivialised and stripped of any 
moral and/or intellectual worth. This suffocated efforts of developing these perspectives. The 
fact that today such perspectives may contain imperfections, moral and logical 
inconsistencies and sometimes contradictions does not necessarily warrant their dismissal. In 
reality, such a dismissal only makes sense when one employs Eurocentric standards as the 
benchmark for determining and assigning worth and relevance. Furthermore, such an 
erroneous approach conveniently disregards the fact that there always exist imperfect and 
contradicting positions in any philosophy, even in the now-refined Western philosophy. 
Therefore, every philosophy is a product of deliberate sustained revision and improvement. 
Such an improvement usually spans over a long period of intellectual critique and refinement. 
Even if some forms of African ethnophilosophy may not conform to the rational 
categorisation of Western philosophy, it still qualifies for participating in any dialogue, 
because meaningful dialogue should not exclude others from participation on account of the 
otherness of the nature of their views or mode of articulation (Waghid, 2004: 60). 
Despite the self being conceived as free, Jordaan (2011: 2380) also argues that throughout the 
history of Western philosophy, the self is characterised as vulnerable. Besides natural threats 
of disasters and disease, the growing interconnectedness of the world since ancient times has 
made the self vulnerable to the other the self has encountered or is yet to encounter (Jordaan, 
2011). As such, the approach of Western philosophy has historically been that the strange and 
the other “must be reduced to intelligible terms, categorized, and arranged and contained in a 
larger totality” (Jordaan, 2011: 2380). This reductionism and categorisation have led to 
stripping off of the other’s peculiarities in the quest of conforming them to the predetermined 
rigid conceptualisation that is Eurocentric. The ultimate consequence, Jordaan (2011) argues, 
has been that there has been no meaningful attention to exploring and understanding what 
defines and motivates the other; what makes the other complete. This is due to the fact that 
interest has been only on those dimensions of the other that are deemed intelligible and fitting 
into the Western paradigms of understanding human nature reality. For Jordaan (2011: 2381) 
the otherness of the other is ignored and its individuality in essence violated by denying it 
recognition on account of its failure to fit in the prescribed framework of social order. 
However, the other has a uniqueness that is irreducible to the dominant Western categories 
(Jordaan, 2011: 2381). Therefore, the fact that the neo-Kantian perspective dominates 
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philosophical discourse does not accord it exclusivist pre-eminence over all the others that 
are not as dominant and developed. 
The exclusiveness of neo-Kantian and Eurocentric conceptions of human nature that firstly 
emerged through colonial imperialism still inhere and inform the global order today that in 
turn accelerates and perpetuates the exclusiveness of otherness (Pieterse, 2006: 1252). 
Globally, Eurocentric perspectives and epistemology also underlie education discourse and 
practice, as education worldwide is ‘forced’ to conform to the core values of the “rational 
egoist” conception of the self as being primarily profit-driven (Papastephanou, 2015: 147). 
Thus today, education is shaped by competition-associated terms of the rational egoistic 
conception of selfhood such as choice, self-interest, competition and attainment, which are 
moulding education thought and practice today (Ramose, 2010: 297; Papastephanou, 2015: 
148). 
It is instructive that we be mindful of how the dominance and exclusiveness of such a thought 
system ultimately tramples down the just entitlements of different communities across the 
world. Despite the other celebrated opportunities it avails to people, globalisation (inhered by 
neo-Kantianism) has the potential of obstructing and undermining development of other 
alternative thought systems such as ubuntu. Globalisation is arguably a replication of 
neoliberalism and is largely shaped by Eurocentrism (Ramose, 2004; Pieterse, 2006). The 
lack of African philosophy development should in part be looked at through such prisms. 
This is not to squarely blame external forces as being solely responsible for the lack of 
development of African thought. There is much African culpability in the lack of 
development of African thought in post-colonial Africa. Much of this is owed to poor 
governance characterised by permanent political and economic instability (Moyo, 2009). 
Poor governance has largely resulted in escalating near-institutionalised levels of corruption 
in Africa (Moyo, 2009). Obviously, this has adversely affected the financing and support for 
education and research in African thought. 
It is necessary that African nations have their own philosophy of education that inscribes and 
develops indigenous people’s philosophy (Ramose, 2004: 139). Just like with any other 
people’s philosophy or approaches to understanding reality and the human condition, there 
are always aspects that are universalisable and some which are particular to the context. 
However, a people’s motivation for developing their particular philosophy is largely their 
social and cultural situatedness. Despite the universality of Western moral and 
epistemological ideals, it should not elude one that the motivation for developing and 
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perpetuating a particular perspective by those born and raised in such contexts is that the 
philosophy helps them better understand their context and world. However, there are both 
universalisable elements in any people’s outlook and some that are not. Even for those that 
are universalisable, it is worth recognising that they are not the sole way of understanding 
reality, their universalisability notwithstanding. 
The evolution of moral norms largely hinges on the people’s historical experiences. The 
evolution and subsequent achievement of certain ethical regimes such as human rights, as 
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are primarily motivated by 
“pragmatism rather than principle” (Ramose, 2004: 152). For Ramose (2004: 152), such 
ethical regimes are a concrete universality that is moulded in the particular social and 
historical contextuality of the people, and it is essentially an actualisation of the wider general 
abstract universalism. It is on this basis that for Ramose (2004: 152), as a principle, abstract 
universality is more general than particularistic concrete universalism, which is an 
appropriation or vernacularisation of the universal ideal. 
What one sees is that as a general principle, abstract universalism of human equality is the 
foundation of all different valid concrete relationships that adhere to certain conditions of the 
universalism. This position concedes the distinctiveness and incompatibility of human 
relationships one may have. However, distinct as such relationships could be, they are all 
grounded in abstract human equality. However, this does not outlaw the possibility of a 
conflict of duties arising between two sets of relationships in the domain of concrete 
universalism despite such sets of relationships being grounded in abstract universalism. In 
resolving such conflict of duties of relationships, however, we need not appeal to the abstract 
principle itself that legitimately anchors the conflicting duties and relationships. There 
obviously are other moral principles that have been violated to result into the conflict. It is 
therefore worth noting that particularistic commitments people have to each other, are 
grounded in and are a concretisation of abstract universalism of human equality. In other 
words it is normatively legitimate to have particularistic commitments on the one hand, and 
have duties to wider humanity also originating from the principle of human equality. Non-
observance of other moral principles however, may result in a conflict of duties. Such conflict 
cannot be resolved by demanding impartiality over all relationships. Failure to comply with 
other moral principles such as the principle of responsibility, may result in conflict of duties 
between two sets of relationships despite both being grounded in the more general abstract 
universalism principle of human equality. The general abstract principle of equality does not 
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necessarily elevate one concrete universal derived from it over another. Concrete universality 
(Ramose, 2004: 152) is a dimension in which abstract universalism is realised in such a way 
that it is the moral standard for determining normativity of a people’s conduct, yet it achieves 
this by adapting to the people’s peculiarity. This shows that abstract universal principles can 
be actualized differently, across societies without necessarily undermining the fundamental 
ideals anchoring the principles at the abstract level. Furthermore, we cannot have an 
essentialist position about the normative value of relational being for all people of the world 
as being normatively subjective as individual-centric ethics does. 
The implicit imposition of strong cosmopolitanism of an exclusive transcendent self is 
therefore problematic. It is worth acknowledging that there exist alternative and morally valid 
conceptions of human nature that simultaneously in similar measures accord moral value to 
both individual agency and a sense of responsibility towards the community as an 
actualisation of abstract universalism. Being human is neither only an essence, nor merely 
abstract, nor is it restricted to individual agency (Benhabib, 2011: 68). For example, although 
there are ambivalent positions in African ethnophilosophy, there still exists a dominant 
perspective about how human beings and nature relate. In one dominant particular African 
conception of the individual, for instance, the individual and the non-human animals are 
connected (Breugel, 2001; Taringa, 2006). There is no detachment between the human being 
and the non-human animals as well as the entire nature and ecosystem (Le Grange, 2012: 
334; Oviawe, 2016: 5). The origin of some of these positions is that ancestors embody the 
non-human life. Identification with nature as a link with the spiritual ancestral world has been 
quite pervasive in African thought, as is entailed by the fact that individual human beings or 
their clans have names of animals, mountains and forests and the like (Mbiti, 1977; Taringa, 
2006). The point here is that individual human beings are not separate from their environment 
that constitutes both human as well as non-human animals’ community. It is not something 
they have to go out and conquer as is the case in the anthropocentric approach to 
environmental ethics is (Oviawe, 2016: 5). Human beings are participants in nature. They are 
mindful of the vitality of nature as being an extension of their community – a community of 
ancestors. 
Mystical as such perspectives appear, they nevertheless have a unique perspective about 
environmentalism and togetherness with the other. They contain unique opportunities and 
challenges in developing African traditional thought so that it coexists as an independent, 
alternative or complementary source of knowledge (A-Magid, 2011).  
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The universalism of human equality that prizes individual autonomy and agency may not be 
fully compatible with such perspectives of being one with one another and with nature. It is 
therefore necessary to acknowledge that individual human beings across the world are 
embedded in societies with different perspectives of looking at the same truth, such as that of 
human equality. This neither valorises all indigenous perspectives, neither does it demonise 
the treasures of Western liberalism. Rather, the goal is to show that no one formulation of 
normative ideals such as equality is sufficient and fitting for all humanity across the globe. At 
the same time, whatever contextual perspective different societies of the world may have is 
not exempt from critique, as the potential of it being insulated from criticism and used as a 
tool for internal oppression of the weak and vulnerable within it is always high. 
Human beings as concrete beings embedded in their historic, linguistic and territorial 
contexts criticise and revise, but still retain and use their collective ways of life as substance 
that constitutes their personal identities, giving them idiosyncratic perspectives. Their 
embeddedness, being the site of the sources of their care (MacIntyre, 2002), influences the 
perspectives through which to actualise such ideals as equality. Despite the moral principle of 
human equality being universal, it is erroneous to conclude that all societies across the world 
actualise it in the same form. It is equally erroneous to assign a moral value to all human 
communities across the globe, in relation to the individual. Such reductionism may be 
consistent with some selected perspectives, but not always with others that are still 
nevertheless morally valid. 
A criticism may be levelled: National embeddedness is merely a means of proofing internal 
injustices from legitimate external criticism and condemnation. It is one of the means where 
the powerful few in preservation of their narrow interests sustain the marginalisation and 
oppression of the rest of the population by appealing to cultural uniqueness. How does a 
community-tolerant cosmopolitanism address national excesses that warrant condemnation 
and where need be intervention on the globe? 
What is being defended in this dissertation is not an essentialist and romanticised form of 
nationalism that is not reflective. Rather, it is one that must itself give way to incessant and 
unclosed critical debate regarding its constitution (Hansen, 2011: 1). Such a conception of 
nationality mindful of the abuses that are meted out in the name of local solidarity or 
patriotism demands as a prerequisite that the nations themselves provide for individual 
communicative freedom (Benhabib, 2011: 69). Given that within a nation the substance of 
patriotism is always contentious, it is therefore necessary that the form of nationality a nation 
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assumes must be contestatory. It must always be open to debate. The normative defence for 
community should not be mistaken for an endorsement of all particular national practices for 
every national group, including unconsented coercion over members, particularly minorities 
and the vulnerable. This dissertation calls for ideal national communities that would better 
satisfy the ideal of cosmopolitanism, maintaining their loyalty to both the local and the 
fundamental norm of human equality (Hansen, 2011: 1). What this implies is that there ought 
to be explicit conditions for a nation group to be regarded as ensuring communicative 
freedom of its members that cannot be substituted or varied under any circumstances 
(Benhabib, 2011). Since  communicative freedom is non-negotiable, the ideal national 
community must provide room and procedures for collective will-formation to be as free and 
as deliberative as can be (Benhabib, 2011: 89).  
3.5. The misdiagnosis and wrong prescription of strong cosmopolitanism 
The strong cosmopolitan demand of impartiality over particularistic  commitments is 
motivated by global inequalities (Tan, 2004: 5). Nationality is regarded as an impediment to 
treating humanity of the world with common concern to achieve human equality. For strong 
cosmopolitanism, national particularity commitments have no moral worth and are hence 
inferior to the equality demand of common concern (Habermas, 2001; Nili, 2015). Human 
communities across the world must therefore under the compulsion of human equality, de-
emphasize and extinguish normativity assigned to nationality (Nussbaum, 2002a; Nielsen, 
2005). This section however argues that commitment to the cosmopolitan principle of equal 
concern does not necessarily render national commitments normatively invalid. Particularistic 
commitments do not inherently undermine duties of impartiality. The section therefore argues 
that the disqualification of nationality as being inhibitive of human equality’s common 
concern is premised on an erroneous assumption about the context and root causes of global 
inequalities. Reducing the problem of global inequality to a conflict between particular and 
universal commitments is being simplistic about the actual forces behind global inequalities, 
which if unaddressed will still perpetuate inequalities, even in a post-nation context. 
It is necessary to properly establish the causes of global inequalities and injustices, or else we 
make a wrong prescription for the problem that ultimately aggravates the problem (Miller, 
2007: 111). Much of the world’s inequality problems are due to unjust global institutions in 
global trade, global politics, and global environments that are ultimately driven by capitalist 
profit (Singer, 2002; Pillay, 2004; Glenn, 2008; Pogge, 2008). 
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Arguably, as previously hinted, global inequality is at the centre of the motivation for 
cosmopolitanism as global justice (Lu, 2000; Beitz, 2001; Singer, 2002; Pogge, 2011; Caney, 
2015). Abolition of national boundaries is not sought for as an end in itself. Rather, it is 
demanded as a means of attaining economic, political, gender (Padhee, 2015) as well as 
environmental justice globally. Resolving global poverty would result in most of these 
inequalities being resolved, because global poverty is at the heart of most prevailing global 
inequalities. 
For the strong cosmopolitan position, global redistribution is the most morally relevant mode 
of resolving global poverty. Therefore, the cosmopolitanism demands that national 
distributive schemes should be replaced by an egalitarian global distributive scheme 
(Gilabert, 2004; Caney, 2005; Brown, 2008), as nationality is deemed as a morally arbitrary 
factor restricting distribution. The ultimate goal for this is that all humanity of the earth must 
be under one global distributive scheme. Therefore, all global citizens will have distributive 
justice duties to one another in conformity with the impartiality of strong cosmopolitanism.  
But how should we normatively understand world poverty and global inequalities? Is global 
inequality a matter of an absent global egalitarian distribution? Is it caused or perpetuated by 
national boundaries? Without answers to such questions, apportioning of moral blame and 
responsibility becomes a problem. The generality of the notion of the universality of human 
equality should not necessarily entail moral emptiness of other particular relationships. The 
two cannot be put in a hierarchy, as ideally both relationships, (one’s duties to all humanity 
and duties from one’s particularistic relationships), are rooted in a framework of human 
equality. Ideally, all relationships one has with both unencountered strangers and close 
associates are founded on and underlined by the ideal of equality. My partiality relationships 
are based on the fundamental ideal of equality. I initially regard my wife as an equal human 
being. Upon this equality basis, we develop and sustain special duties pertaining to a more 
intimate relationship. Ideally, when I treat her differently from how I treat all other humanity, 
I do so in the context of human equality. This entails that when confronted with (global) 
inequalities, appealing to the very foundational principle of human equality that anchors two 
sets duties originating from two morally valid but distinct types of relationships cannot help 
resolve the problem of obligations and entitlements leading up to the inequalities. Possibly 
the problem of the conflict is due to certain other principles such as moral responsibility. 
It is worth emphasising that the universalist equality norm is foundational and is the basic 
principle that determines moral acceptability of all actions and relationships, whether with 
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one’s own children, spouse, clan, community, nation or world. It constitutes the regulative 
framework for exercising different duties. When does one violate it? When one actively 
excludes and undermines the worth of others out of motivations meant to undermine the 
generality of human equality such as race, ethnicity, gender and religion; when others 
legitimately expect equal consideration from one. This occurs when in establishing or 
maintaining one’s relationships, one explicitly or implicitly negates the tenet of the equality 
principle. For instance, this would occur if I hold that my special relationship with others is 
based on the fact that either my race is superior or that we ‘freely choose’ to stay away from 
interacting with individuals of another race. A related scenario would be when I say that 
because I have legitimately earned my money, I, being the sole determinant of how to spend 
it, have chosen not to buy a loaf of bread for a near-death starving stranger whose last chance 
of survival is the encounter with me. Instead, I choose to buy flowers for my wife. The 
motivations for my actions are negating the generality of the universality of equality. For 
instance, one would hold that human equality places on me the obligation to save any fellow 
human being who is in a humanitarian crisis when I have the capacity of doing so and when 
there is no possibility of anyone else with direct responsibility ever coming to the aid of the 
victim. 
On the other hand, not all inequalities that exist alongside with commitments of special 
relationships require deference or defaulting of the commitments such special relationships 
generate (Miller, 2007: 52–55). Suppose while going to buy a toy for my daughter, I find a 
girl of her age I have never met, shivering in the bitter cold of winter. I cancel satisfying my 
daughter’s pleasure from toys I was to buy her. I use the money to buy her stranger shivering 
age-mate winter clothing. Such an action is consistent with the universal and impartial norm 
of equality. This is because equality stipulates (intuitively) a certain minimum threshold of 
subsistence below which no human being should fall (Miller, 2007: 53). However, suppose a 
few days later, my daughter sees a set of winter clothing branded with her favourite book 
character on sale. She requests me to buy them for her despite still having adequate winter 
clothes, only for the sake of her favourite book character. Suppose on my way to buy it I meet 
the girl for whom I bought winter clothes and learn that she has only the clothes I bought her 
for winter, which of course are keeping her warm effectively. I do not violate the universal 
principle of equality and impartiality if this time I proceed and buy for my daughter a 
luxurious extra set of winter clothing while I do not do so for her stranger friend, neither is 
such an act an implicit negation of the principle of impartiality. This is because I have 
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secured the minimum threshold for a humane life (Rawls, 2002: 106–110) for the stranger 
girl. In other words, my partiality is compatible with duties of impartiality, and is also 
consistent with the universalism of human equality. The inequality that now exists between 
my daughter and her stranger friend has a different foundation. It is different from the 
inequality that would have existed had I gone ahead to buy my daughter a toy while her 
stranger friend faced the prospect of freezing to death: a humanitarian crisis (Rawls, 2002: 
109).  
The inequality that exists beyond my meeting the stranger’s humanitarian need (of prevention 
of her freezing to death) can now, after I assist her, be interrogated as to what created it: Is it 
orphanhood or destitution due to a broken home? Upon probing it thoroughly, we would then 
be able to determine who defaulted duty, compromising the little girl’s welfare. Is it parents 
or community leaders? The ultimate task would be to establish whose duty it is now to take 
care of the girl so that she does not again fall below the minimum conditions for a dignified 
human life (Rawls, 2002: 117; Miller, 2007: 86–90). If I decide to adopt her so that I equally 
and always impartially treat her like my daughter, it will largely be under the principle of 
generosity because of how the uniqueness of her situation has touched me personally. My 
choice for adoption would in no way be under the compulsion of the principle of impartiality, 
for this would mean that I adopt every other child I encounter who is in that situation.  
When it is incumbent upon you to equally provide goods and you default this duty towards H 
due to serving P beyond what P deserves, you are depriving H from accessing an entitled 
good just because you want maximise P’s access to it. In this case, you make P have an undue 
advantage in accessing the good. But how should we correct the situation? Your special 
commitment to P in and of itself is not problematic normatively. However, your scheming 
against H in order that P has much more from you than what you owe him in the context of 
other people’s (such as H’s) legitimate entitlements from you is wrong. What is problematic 
is your favouritism (not P’s entitlements in themselves) in ensuring undue access to the goods 
by one party at the expense of another. The problem has everything to do with your non-
adherence to the terms of accessing the goods, and nothing to do with the acceptability of the 
goods or of each’s legitimate entitlements on you. By implication, human equality does not 
mean I establish equal value relationships with each of the world. This will undermine the 
equality of human agency.  
Ultimately, the inequalities resulting from globalisation today are a result of the violation of 
certain duties (that are ideally compatible with and also rooted in equality). Global inequality 
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is a result of inappropriate motivations on the part of national agents. The inequality is not 
necessarily the ostensible normative unacceptability of the targeted patriotic relationships. 
Following this principle, one can be morally faulted for not fulfilling certain duties deriving 
from special commitments one has, even if one claims one defaulted on the grounds of 
commitments to wider humanity (Bowden, 2003: 354; Pettersen, 2011: 59). 
What all this reinforces is that the individual should be understood as having different 
domains of duties with at least minimal conditions of when to perform them or default them 
for the other. Although these domains interact with one another they are distinct and 
incomparable (Calhoun, 2008: 439). Understood this way, there would be no basis for rigid 
absolute dismissal of special relationships or attachments as lacking normative value. The 
domains do not relate with one another in a competitive hierarchy of moral superiority or 
inferiority. Rather, each is necessary as it pertains to the actuality of human nature, which 
cannot be reduced completely to either the ‘objective impartial’ or the ‘subjective 
particularistic’ (Pettersen, 2011: 62). 
We cannot simply put all human relationships in a rigid hierarchy on which to prioritise some 
and strip others of moral relevance. When we establish who is responsible for an immoral 
global outcome, we will apportion due moral blame and duties over environmental pollution, 
lack of democracy, collective national choices, and so forth. The question of what is owed to 
another is not determined merely by disparity, because responsibility plays a crucial role in 
making such determinations (Miller, 2007: 108). There are nevertheless some minimum 
obligations a human being or collectives unconditionally owe the worse-off for them not to 
fall below a certain minimum threshold (Rawls, 2002: 37). 
The ideal cosmopolitan norm about the equality of moral worth of human beings entails that 
if it is equally unacceptable for person A to suffer to extent Y, then the same obtains for any 
other person irrespective of the community he or she hails from or his or her race or socio-
economic status (Miller, 2002: 81). However, such an acceptable fundamental equality claim 
does not on its own apportion responsibility and duty as to what particular agents should do 
about the harm (Miller, 2002: 81). There is a need to establish a valid link between our 
generally uncontroversial moral assessment that the situation of inequality is not acceptable 
on the one hand, and the justification for assignment of moral duties to remove the 
inequalities on the other hand (Miller, 2002: 81). For Miller (2002), strong cosmopolitanism 
fails to account for the gap between the premise that all human beings are equal and the 
conclusion that therefore, all human beings all over the world, undifferentiated by nationality, 
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have equal distributive duties to one another (Miller, 2002: 81). Strong cosmopolitanism 
overlooks the crucial necessity of initially establishing causation so as to apportion blame and 
responsibility. According to Miller (2002: 81–82), there are three distinct (but possibly 
interacting) moral principles about globality from which strong cosmopolitanism 
surreptitiously derives its conclusion of stringent duties of impartiality towards all humanity:  
• All people have equal moral worth and entitlements.  
• Global inequalities are not acceptable.  
• Some subject is responsible for causing the inequalities, in other words, we must 
identify the agent responsible for the inequalities and consequently put the 
responsibility of fixing the inequalities on the subject (with the exception of 
humanitarian crises that are binding on all humanity).  
Strong cosmopolitanism therefore surreptitiously comes up with a conclusion that in light of 
these principles, human impartiality demands that we dismiss all particularistic duties in the 
interest of transcendence of equal moral worth (Miller, 2002: 82). In the process, all national 
commitments are unduly rendered morally arbitrary. 
Leaping into a worldwide distribution of equal duties without initially establishing 
responsibility will inevitably lead to an erroneous prescription. Such a prescription 
undermines aspects of particularistic relationships. It reflects failure to appreciate the 
elements behind the problem of global inequality. For example, a strong cosmopolitan 
position implies that there must be some form of global distributive justice which necessarily 
depend on an ostensible normative arbitrariness of nationality (Gilabert, 2004; Brown, 2008; 
Caney, 2015; Nili, 2015). However, it is worth bearing in mind that different societies have 
different shapes of distributive schemes owing to their traditions and ways of life. Among 
other factors, public policy is significantly shaped by the community’s shared beliefs and 
culture (Rawls, 2002: 117; Kukathas, 2006: 8; Miller, 2007: 126). The pension system, 
population policies, judicial system and tax regimes, of a nation for instance, shape its 
distributive structure (of opportunities and burdens) (Rao & Walton, 2004; Sen, 2004; Kahan 
& Braman, 2006). It should be made clear that claiming that a society’s shared culture 
actively and uniquely contributes towards shaping different social institutions does not imply 
that there are no other unique and significant factors that shape them (Miller, 2007: 126). 
Instead, it is an acknowledgement that shared history and culture are among the key factors 
that influence such institutions, but not the only necessary ones (Sen, 2004). 
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If the entire world were to have one global distributive structure, such a structure would 
presuppose that there is a common understanding of what we should collectively value, 
prioritise and contribute towards through our tax system for example. It is difficult if not 
impossible to realise such a global distributive structure that is insensitive to people’s 
national embeddedness. Impartial public institutions in democracies are reasonably shaped by 
the national aspirations of the nation community. Public policy legislation about the same 
good varies between two national democracies. In principle, national aspirations cannot be 
divorced from public policy. Take the case of healthcare: In some parts of the world, 
healthcare is regarded as a private matter (Kymlicka, 2002a: 342). It is something that every 
individual must endeavour to pay for whenever one needs it. Yet in some parts of the world, 
this is not the case. Such differences should not just be reduced to differences of mere 
implementation of a mode of distributing healthcare, in other words as a mere administrative 
matter. Instead, it is in part rooted in social evaluative judgements of the concerned nations 
(Kymlicka, 2002a: 255; Miller, 2007: 7). Since nations collectively express their aspirations 
and collectively decide (Miller, 1995: 24) such public policies reveal differences of values 
among nations. Existence and or nature of social welfare programs, pension schemes, 
industrial law and educational policies about nature and content of school curriculums are 
dependent on the collective preferences of a nation. 
It is reasonable to hold that a people’s shared philosophical perspectives underlying their 
shared life have significant influence on the nature of their social distributive schemes 
(Rawls, 2002: 117). For instance, in societies that are collectivist in orientation, sickness, 
death and suffering are expected to be borne by the entire community irrespective of one’s 
perceived or actual self-sufficiency (Metz & Gaie, 2010: 279). Given the interconnectedness 
of community, the suffering of one individual is felt and is expected to be shared and 
alleviated by everybody in any minimal way possible. This is why, for example, in much of 
Malawi, visiting the sick and attending funerals in one’s community are binding 
responsibilities on a free agent. Even attending the funeral of someone in one’s 
neighbourhood whom one barely encountered, let alone knew, is an expected voluntary act of 
solidarity. 
I encountered the distinctiveness of such perspectives. At the place of worship in a 
‘cosmopolitan’ city with so many different nationalities, a fellow worshiper was recuperating 
after she had suddenly fallen gravely ill. Two things happened. Firstly, when making a public 
announcement to the group, we were only informed that our colleague was sick and that 
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when they get permission they would inform us what she was suffering from. Later on, the 
consent was sought and we were informed of the particular ailment. Most members of 
Malawi origin later on were amazed that consent regarding what someone was suffering from 
had to be formally sought before the colleagues were informed. Secondly, we were informed 
that only selected individuals representing our group could visit the patient recovering at 
home. We were actively advised not to visit the patient at home individually and out of our 
volition. The constraints were not necessarily a matter of medical advice other than cultural 
or traditional. 
Barely a month later, a Malawian member was admitted to hospital. There were messages 
sent to the Malawians’ association living in that city about the admission to hospital and 
subsequent discharge. More importantly, there was a plea that each of us was supposed to try 
as much as possible to pay him a visit at home as he was recovering. 
The point is not to show which perspective is flawed or better than the other. Rather, it is to 
appreciate that different societies have different and valid perspectives about human nature 
and the human condition. Distributive structures and public policy that people have, are not 
value-neutral besides in principle serving common ends across the world. A people’s 
situatedness inspires the shape and content of their distributive structures. As such, a global 
egalitarian distribution or a world state that necessarily extinguishes global people’s 
nationality in principle would undermine the host of the sources of concreteness of the 
people. Given that the ethics of strong cosmopolitanism is inhered by Eurocentric partiality, 
strong cosmopolitanism impartiality would ultimately be domineering, as it would inevitably 
prioritise one perspective of being human over another, effectively unduly annihilating the 
others. 
3.5.1. An unjust global order and inequalities 
The global order that drives global interconnectedness is mal-structured and is the source of 
the major causes of global inequalities (Pogge, 2007: 319). This order “comprises treaty- and 
convention-based norms regulating territorial sovereignty, security and trade, some property 
rights, human rights, and the environment” (Risse, 2011: 3). The Bretton Woods institutions, 
namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), jointly “with more powerful states … shape the [global] economic 
order” (Risse, 2011: 3). The prevailing global order greatly influences both individuals’ and 
nations’ access to basic needs and goods (Tan, 2006: 328) because it is no longer voluntary, 
but coercive. However, the operations of the global order are characterised by inherent biases 
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disadvantaging developing nations (Singer, 2002), while benefiting developed nations 
(Oxfam, 2002) as the operations of the global order “undermine basic moral concepts such as 
justice, dignity, and fairness” (Kapeller, Schütz & Tamesberger, 2016: 320). While calling 
for free trade and outlawing protectionism in much of the developing nations, the situation is 
different in the developed nations that host most multinational corporations (Oxfam, 2002: 5). 
The perils of a polluted environment are being borne by developing nations that scarcely 
pollute it (Singer, 2002). Therefore, most major global inequalities are substantially traceable 
to the twisted global order that is also reasonably influenced by economic interests of 
developed nations (Oxfam, 2002; Young, 2006).  
For Pieterse (2006: 1248), the human interconnectedness we are experiencing today feeds on 
financial and corporate globalisation that have outpaced political and social globalisation. 
Therefore, the forces of the perceived interconnection are largely based on economic interests 
and advantages mostly few developed nations. The profoundness of global 
interconnectedness, however, is differently experienced and appreciated, depending on how 
one relates with the available opportunities and privileges the global order is generating. 
However, as argued earlier, the fact that national interests of developed nations are at the 
centre of the skewed global order that generates inequalities, does not necessarily entail the 
inherent unacceptability of nationality. The problem of global inequalities is a problem due to 
abusing nationality than it is about the inherence of evil in nationality (Papastephanou, 2013a: 
22). As the next chapter will show an ethics of absolute impartiality over nationality in 
education is counter-productive for developing nations.  
Meaningful cosmopolitanism is one which is emancipatory and particularly one that contests 
the nature and motivations of the interconnectedness of the prevailing globalisation in its 
corporate, political and social forms (Pieterse, 2006: 1248). The prevailing global order has 
asymmetrical flows of influences among the world’s cultures. In general, the developed 
nations’ cultures (where each of the developed nations intentionally manages to preserve its 
interests and culture) (Singer, 2002) influence much of the way of life for the global South 
through art, music, sports, technology and trade. The global South is on the receiving end of 
global influences inhered by Northern values (Pogge, 2007: 326). Were this about mutual 
influence and exchange, it would actually be worth commending. Unfortunately, the flow is 
largely asymmetrical: with the South constantly on the receiving end, making no substantial 
contribution to North-influenced globalisation (Pogge, 2007: 326; Papastephanou, 2015).  
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Currently, despite the existence of a promising potential for more meaningful global 
cooperation in the face of global challenges, it is only the United Nations’ Security Council – 
comprising the richest five developed member nations of the United States, Britain, France, 
China and Russia (Tharoor, 2011) – (who are themselves representatives of fellow developed 
nations) who are permanent members with veto power. In effect, they determine the fate of 
global politics and global peace on the subjective terms of only their national interests 
(Farrall, 2008: 930). The solution to such underrepresentation of the interests of the peoples 
of the world does not lie in extinguishing national belonging. This would in principle 
exacerbate the marginalisation of the situated people of the world that however have no 
voice. Rather, the solution ought to include  restructuring, if not overhauling, the way such 
global institutions distribute power and privileges among the nations of the world in deciding 
the direction of global affairs (Kagwanja, 2008: 38). It is by ensuring meaningful inclusion 
that all the nations of the world are adequately represented with due weight accorded to their 
voices and concerns in determining global affairs. The ideal reform global institutions such as 
the United Nations need, is not one where representation of the world’s interests should be 
insensitive to nationality where transcendent non-situated impartial representatives from 
across the globe participate in making global decisions. Such a nation-neutral global order 
would be even more elientating.  
As shown in the previous chapter, the historical, cultural, linguistic, and territorial 
situatedness of the people of the world is not an impotent accident of birth. Such elements are 
what give individual and collectives concreteness, their being human. Their lives flourish and 
have meaning in the context of attachment to their nations although the people can freely 
move across the world. For instance, Coetzee (2003: 324), holds that in much of Africa a 
shared local language of a national community ultimately personifies the community’s 
peculiar modes of experiencing life. It is a common vehicle through which the speakers 
express the significance of their collective historical events. In the end, it is not just a mere 
value-neutral means for communicating “or for identifying the contents of actions – rather 
language itself is content, a value-laden reference for communal loyalties and animosities” 
(Coetzee, 2003: 328). The significance of historical events and shared ideas are not ideally 
communicable in any other language (Coetzee, 2003: 324). As such, dissolving national 
identities which host a people’s communicative languages in global citizenship would 
ultimately disadvantage most people of the world. 
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The human context for actual people embedded in different geographical and cultural 
contexts of the world is one characterised by struggles (Calhoun, 2008: 441; Ingram, 2016: 
76). The social, political and economic ideals actual suffering people actualise and keep 
refining are responses to actual and particular imbalances in their socio-political conditions. 
In other words, the universal is intelligible in relation to their particular situationality. 
The prevailing global interconnectedness largely thrives “at the cost of vast international 
stability and rising worldwide social inequality” (Pieterse, 2006: 1249). After imperialism 
and colonialism, nation-states could no longer easily get into other nations’ borders to 
advance their interests (Pieterse, 2006: 1250). Instead, multinational corporations greatly 
supported by nations took up this task and also accelerated the development and utilisation of 
information technologies (Pieterse, 2006: 1250). We need not conflate global economic 
interconnectedness with a political global community that would actualise cosmopolitan 
duties. If at all such a single global political community were to exist, it would necessarily 
have to have commonalities. Such a community cannot thrive meaningfully whilst detached 
from the concreteness of a people’s language, history and territoriality among others. 
According to Pieterse (2006: 1250), neoliberalism’s market “deregulation, liberalization, 
privatization, the WTO [World Trade Organization] and the intellectual property rights 
regime” are aimed at overcoming all national boundary obstacles so as to ensure the thriving 
of a free enterprise. It is instructive to bear in mind that global interconnectedness is largely 
facilitated by global capitalism (Calhoun, 2008: 434). Although global interconnectedness 
makes imagination of cosmopolitan duties possible, we need not be unmindful of the profit 
motivations of the global order, whose exploitative effects on humanity are effectively 
curtailed by the nation-state. He further holds that to achieve this end, corporate 
cosmopolitanism requires a global economic regime that circumvents barriers particular 
communities and nations put in place. What is often ignored is that such national boundaries 
have been serving as a mechanism for protecting the human dignity and interests of 
defenceless national members rendered vulnerable by an unbridled capitalism that would 
thrive in a borderless setting (Pieterse, 2006: 1250). National borders acting in the interest of 
vulnerable members for instance, restrict free and rapid capital mobility and the existence of 
tax havens. Since neoliberalism is also in principle about the “‘economisation’ of non-
economic spheres and practices” (Pais & Costa, 2017: 4), the nation-state is the only active 
defender of the elements and aspects of the people’s lives that may be preyed upon by 
neoliberalism. Preserving that which is valuable for a particular people from economisation 
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cannot be achieved under an impartiality that regards the people of the world as transcendent 
selves only. Regrettably, the flourishing of most multinational corporations largely depends 
on establishing themselves in national governments with very weak legal instruments 
regulating corporations’ practices (Pieterse, 2006: 1250). 
Capitalist cosmopolitanism is aimed at maximising profits and growing its global market base 
(Pieterse, 2006: 1252). Although it brings change in the world, mostly its more beneficial 
changes exclude the majority of the world (Calhoun, 2008: 434). It is worth noting that for 
the efficiency and effectiveness of capitalist cosmopolitanism to be realised, the “economic, 
political, military, social and cultural forces” it rides on must necessarily spread across 
national boundaries (Pieterse, 2006: 1252). 
Although strong cosmopolitanism holds that it is advancing impartial ideals, its norms are 
rooted in a theoretical and historical continuity of neo-liberalism and eurocentrism (Pieterse, 
2006: 1252; Pais & Costa, 2017: 4). As such, declaring it as an abstract impartial norm 
unattached to its historical context of origin is to rationalise its inherent motivation (Pieterse, 
2006: 1252). There is therefore need for “emancipatory cosmopolitanism”, which entails 
“engaging alternative cosmovisions beyond Eurocentrism” (Pieterse, 2006: 1255). This is 
because each culture has its unique modes of interpreting reality, such as conceptions of 
hospitality, respect for human dignity, human flourishing and how to realise human equality 
(Pieterse, 2006: 1255). 
It should be highlighted that this dissertation is not absolving African nation-states from 
responsibility over their failure to emerge as equal competitors in the global economic arena. 
They are culpable in so many ways and degrees. Yet this does not dismiss the forcefulness of 
global systems and institutions in obstructing their progress. Furthermore, the globalization 
critique is not tantamount to calls to outlaw globalisation and instead replace it with 
reactionary romanticised and essentialist patriotism. Rather, what we need in modern 
citizenship is the sense of awareness that we are simultaneously existing in particular 
localised contexts with unique interests and in an interconnected world with all humanity to 
whom we owe legitimate moral entitlements and obligations. The two domains are not 
opposites, but “positions combined in complicated ways” (Wallerstein, 2002: 124) with 
unique incomparable normative value. 
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3.6. Strong cosmopolitanism and emotional motivation 
People’s adoption of strong cosmopolitan impartiality as an intellectual moral position does 
not and has not however necessarily translated into active practices at the individual or 
national levels where individuals act and compel their governments to act in tandem with the 
strong cosmopolitan positions they accept (Long, 2009; Jordaan, 2011). According to Long 
(2009: 321–322), there is a deficiency in motivation that would ensure that people do not 
only accept the intellectual justifications and duties of strong cosmopolitanism, but that more 
importantly, people are equally driven to act accordingly. 
For Long (2009: 328), the cosmopolitan position that the universal moral imperative of 
human equality is in conflict with and must overcome sentimental ties of partiality, has a 
strong justification force as a normative ideal. Long (2009: 325), however, holds that such an 
intellectually sound ideal is not realised by individual and state agents because of a lack of 
motivational (sentimental) force to invoke appropriate action. For Long (2009: 329), such a 
lack of sentimental motivation is not a weakness of the (strong) cosmopolitan thesis. Rather, 
it is because cosmopolitanism theorists only develop intellectual motivations whilst ignoring 
cultivation of sentimental motivations for people to act. As a result, Long (2009: 330) argues 
that cosmopolitan arguments must also be concerned with further developing the “extent and 
nature of our attachments to others”, particularly those sentiments that have moral 
significance to justify and motivate moral action. The emotional motivation, Long (2009) 
holds, is what drives a human being to practically act on the intellectual moral positions he or 
she finds valid and compelling. In his defence for strong cosmopolitanism, Long (2009: 331) 
argues that besides being an intellectually forceful norm, it nevertheless needs to employ an 
equally forceful sentimental appeal to generate the force that propels people into acting on 
their intellectual belief of impartiality and equal concern for all the people of the world. 
Strong cosmopolitanism, for Long (2009: 329), must therefore also commit itself to 
establishing means of developing emotional attachment with all the people of the world 
beyond the nation. Such a sentimental cosmopolitanism would result in changes in our local 
attachments, as it is more radical than a duty-oriented cosmopolitanism (Long, 2009: 336).  
Long’s (2009) emphasis that there must be interaction between moral and emotional 
motivations to achieve moral action in cosmopolitanism is sound. The claim that the 
deficiency of sentimental motivation in strong cosmopolitan arguments is responsible for 
inaction of both individuals and states, towards fulfilment of strong cosmopolitan demands is 
also plausible. However, other than seeking to ‘construct’ sentimental solidarity with all the 
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people of the world everywhere, as Long (2009) argues, we ought to ensure that the 
sentiment is attached to a particular responsibility and/or duty individuals and nations have 
due to their performing certain actions and/or lack of performance of certain actions in the 
global order. In other words, cosmopolitan sentiment would inevitably follow whenever 
global justice responsibilities are clearly established be based on either fulfilment or violation 
of the duties of non-maleficence and beneficence we owe the other.  
The major drawback with attempts of developing worldwide sentiments of solidarity that will 
equally distribute duties of justice across the world’s individuals is that in all likelihood no 
sense of solidarity will have been cultivated in the end. Just how does one configure in 
practical terms what one owes all humanity in the world and how to fulfil those obligations? 
Holding that everyone has equal duties that override all other duties to all the people of the 
world without delineating the context and conditions when responsibility for such duties 
arises robs life of its meaning (through special relationships) and undermines individual 
agency. The human agency to act on global injustices will be motivated by establishment of 
direct or indirect responsibility by the agent. Agency should not be motivated by need or 
inequality as though the inequalities are natural and not a result of human action. In such a 
life of categorical self-sacrifice bereft of identifying individual responsibility as motivation 
for action, “[d]edicating oneself to others can be a way of dehumanizing oneself” (Pettersen, 
2011: 59). You cannot develop emotional motivation where particular responsibility for 
action has not been established. In the course of developing such responsibility we will 
realise that there are distinct spheres of relationships, particular and universal ones. Therefore 
cosmopolitan duties will not necessarily demand stripping particular relationships of 
normativity. Rather, it will be about what duties to the whole humanity one has and 
establishing whether they have been performed. This ought not to demand extinguishing 
particular relationships. 
The lack of sentimental motivation in strong cosmopolitanism arguments can also be 
attributed to the fact that strong cosmopolitanism itself, necessarily dismisses the normative 
relevance of human affectivity in political cooperation. Ironically strong cosmopolitanism 
intends to construct sentimental attachment whilst marginalising the nationality host of such 
attachments: shared language, common culture, history, and geographical territoriality.  
Furthermore, some cosmopolitan demands cannot be appreciated by having only global 
transcendent selves unless one has the privilege of viewing life from the concerned embodied 
concrete individuals’ perspectives. It may be hard for a native speaker of English (a global 
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language of trade and science) to perceive teaching and learning in the vernacular as being 
central to understanding oneself and the world in the modern era. Out of utilitarian and 
pragmatic considerations, such a person would not adequately see the normative value some 
indigenous communities in the globalised world would find in demanding that their history 
and their languages be granted due recognition too, just like with the dominant global history 
and languages. It is only after one recognises the diversity of sources of the concreteness for 
the people of the world in non-essentialist terms that one would appreciate the normative 
value of such demands that originate from situatedness. 
Cultivating a sustained emotional attachment with all people of the world is nearly 
impossible. The most appropriate way of addressing the deficiency of sentimental motivation 
in cosmopolitanism is to identify, recognise and stipulate what duties a nation owes outsiders. 
This could be based on such grounds as past encounters that generated restitution duties 
(Collste, 2010; Papastephanou, 2013a), national responsibility in the manipulation of global 
institutions, contributions towards global pollution, roles in global political destabilisation 
and global trade. In other words, ideal cosmopolitan attachments are better served when the 
general requirements of global interconnectedness demand of all national communities to 
mutually respect and engage with one another besides having duties of humanitarian 
assistance (Rawls, 2002; Miller, 2007). Given this background, performance of cosmopolitan 
duties ought not necessarily dismiss the relevance and normativity of particularistic 
commitments such as national ones. 
3.6.1.  Is nationality a source of injustice? 
A possible challenge may be mounted against the position of this dissertation that active 
recognition of nationality must go together with cosmopolitan conceptualisations: Is 
nationality not the evil we must uproot in the context of prevailing xenophobic exclusion, 
such as of some nationalities from entering the United States (Goodheart, 2018) as well as 
violent xenophobic attacks on immigrants in South Africa (Hopstock & Nicola, 2011), both 
of which are traceable to national belonging? 
It is worth acknowledging that advancing a position that calls for relevance of nationality in 
cosmopolitanism should not be conflated with a substitutionary approach where the nation 
takes over the roles and relevance of cosmopolitan ideals. The levelled criticism rightly 
acknowledges the historical fact that national belonging can be pursued by individuals or 
states in its absolute and segregative forms to advance narrow positions that exclude others 
on account of their nationality, race or religion. As this dissertation emphasizes, such 
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patriotism is morally unacceptable. Equally, unequivocally morally unjustifiable are the 
inhumane acts largely perpetrated on innocent undocumented immigrants in South Africa. 
With respect to the xenophobic attacks in South Africa, there are different factors which the 
perpetrators put forth to justify their inhuman acts. The general motivation for such attacks is 
the perception that many jobs in South Africa are occupied by immigrants at the expense of 
the nationals (Hopstock & Nicola, 2011: 123). What is evident in such sentiments is the 
prevalence of global forces. In general, South Africa has been the sole African destination, 
with a number of pull factors on the continent given the failings of political and economic 
systems in most African nations (Hopstock & Nicola, 2011: 122). Most African economies 
have been underperforming and, given the easier mobility among nations, inevitably more 
people migrate to South Africa, whose economy is generally better off on the African 
continent (Wotela & Letsiri, 2015; Tella, 2016). On the other hand, in South Africa, 
migration is advantageous for corporations, small-scale business firms and even middle-class 
domestic workers’ employers who benefit from the undocumented migrants’ cheap labour, as 
it maximises profits (Preiss, 2014). However, such labour is cheap because of the invisibility, 
before the protecting state institutions, of the undocumented migrant workers who as a 
consequence cannot stand up to claim their due industrial rights and certain minimum 
working conditions on account of the legality of their residence status (Wotela & Letsiri, 
2015: 105). In short, migrant workers are more attractive to only profit-oriented employers 
than (and at the expense of) local workers who demand better employment practices. In the 
end, a misdirected resentment towards the immigrants and not the state develops, which 
unfortunately leads to violence (Hopstock & Nicola, 2011: 123). 
It is therefore evident that resolving the challenge of immigration into South Africa cannot be 
unilaterally achieved by the nation of South Africa. It is both a moral and a pragmatic 
necessity that the political and economic situation in the southern Africa region be fixed: a 
moral duty incumbent upon all regional nations. The immigration challenge attests to the 
position being advanced in this dissertation that the challenges of the modern world cannot be 
resolved by a cosmopolitan perspective that is inimical to national belonging. At the same 
time, the modern challenges cannot be properly and morally addressed by the old-time and 
internal-looking type of nationality only. Instead, what we need is a blend of both 
cosmopolitan and national interests, not merely as means for ensuring desirable outcomes, 
but also as values that have peculiar worth in themselves. 
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Besides South Africa being a pull nation to the disillusioned youths of Africa, it is 
noteworthy that most of the nations from which most of the immigrants originate have failed 
miserably in both political and economic governance, leading to great frustration of their 
largely youthful populations and leaving them with the resort of migrating to South Africa in 
pursuit of a comparatively much better life despite the difficulty of the conditions associated 
with being an undocumented immigrant (Hopstock & Nicola, 2011; Wotela & Letsiri, 2015; 
Unemployment is creating economic migrants, 2017). Such a case shows that nationality on 
its own is insufficient to resolve the challenges of the human condition today.  
Much of Africa has abused the idea of national sovereignty leading to crumbling of 
economies that were once thriving due to unaccountability and abuse of power. Zimbabwe is 
a case that easily comes to mind. South Africa and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) member nations have on defining occasions looked away with 
indifference and hence have been in material collaboration in the deliberate corrosion of 
democracy by rubberstamping fraudulent Zimbabwean elections (Hopstock & Nicola, 2011: 
126). In other words, SADC was indifferent when the right to have rights (Benhabib, 2011: 
69) or communicative freedom of Zimbabwe citizens was being violated. In the end, the 
avoidable collapse of the Zimbabwean economy has resulted in huge emigration to South 
Africa. In Malawi, economic mismanagement and rampant corrupt practices among the 
nation’s leadership have led to rocketing unemployment rates and disaffection, driving youths 
to migrate to South Africa, despite facing the simmering threat of xenophobic violence there 
(Chitsulo, 2017: 4; Unemployment is creating economic migrants, 2017: 4). Such tendencies 
involuntarily push youths out of their countries for a better life elsewhere.  
What it all means is that the happenings in one sovereign nation sooner or later spill over into 
another. This ideally demands that certain political reforms need to take place in continental 
regions, demanded by nations who are likely affected and sometimes overwhelmed by 
runaway immigration of people from neighbouring nations. It is morally necessary that 
regional institutions such as the SADC or even the continental African Union must have 
enforceable shared trade, legal and political frameworks ideal for human flourishing that will 
ultimately benefit and boost each member nation’s economic and political prospects. It is sad 
to realise that African solidarity only emerges when one member nation is demanded to 
account for certain actual manmade humanitarian disasters before global institutions, such as 
the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictment of Kenyan and Sudanese leadership 
(Kayange, 2013: 22). On other equally crucial matters, there is lukewarm response from 
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Africa. When the migration crisis over the Mediterranean Sea reached unprecedented 
proportions, there was an emergency summit of the leaders of the European Union (EU) 
member states, Europe being the destination for the ill-fated migrants (Migrant Crisis: more 
drown as EU leaders meet, 2015). However, no equivalent or even low-level meeting was 
ever conducted by the African Union, whose people were the ones perishing without dignity 
on the sea fleeing from Africa. Modern challenges are cross-border and place a moral as well 
as pragmatic demand that there be peer-review mechanisms among regional nations for 
economic development and sound political governance. It is therefore on this basis that one 
can conclude that the problems relating to migration today are double-edged and require a 
double-edged sword of both nationality and cosmopolitanism to confront them. 
A likely counterargument to ideal cosmopolitanism that coexists with the local as a matter of 
moral necessity would be that the community consideration is problematic in that it pitches 
the community’s values against the rights of the individual, thereby giving primacy to the 
community over individual liberty. The counterargument would claim that however, the 
value of the community must pertain to cultural taste and not morality and hence it must 
pertain to one’s private choice making (Famakinwa, 2010: 155). 
Criticisms of the community such as the foregoing, themselves emanate from a problematic 
position: They look at the community through the foundational prism of atomism (which is 
only one of alternative perspectives for conceptualising human nature and freedom) to 
evaluate the worth of community interest against atomism itself. Despite its role in enabling 
care and support for autonomy, the community is still marginalised as subjective and unfit for 
moral conceptualisation of citizenship. 
Furthermore, such criticisms are based on an inaccurate understanding of the common good. 
The assumption one gets from such criticisms of the common good is that it is inherited, 
static and incontestable. Yet the ideal community being defended here is one whose shape 
and content are determined by the members and always subject to re-examination. This 
incessant re-examination is not merely a means towards achieving one end (of realising a 
desired community), but it is also a guarantee of safeguarding individual liberties from the 
preying of a bounded community. In this way, “the communal structure cannot foreclose the 
meaningfulness and reality of the quality of self-assertiveness” (Gyekye, 2003: 359).  
Critics would further dismiss defence for communalistic approaches on the basis that 
although communal solidarity is based on shared values, communities are marked by 
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conflicts of goals and values (Famakinwa, 2010: 159). However, other than being evidence of 
the communal thesis trumping individual and other forms of freedom, this criticism is instead 
a demonstration that collective values co-exist with individual or other projects at a micro 
level in the community. This is why ideally in the community common values are cherished, 
preserved, challenged and revised by members of the community to ensure that they are 
incorporative and compatible with the numerous projects that may possibly be pursued in the 
community (Meyers, 2005). In other words, defence for nationality does not entail 
homogeneous conception of nationality. 
Assessing the value of the community in terms of its standing to individual autonomy is very 
reductionist of the capacity to make choices. The individual’s development of the capacity for 
autonomy greatly benefits from the disproportional care that he or she gets from providers in 
the community. They give it in a supererogatory manner (MacIntyre, 2002: 101). Ultimately, 
although one is at liberty to make choices about one’s life freely, one’s freedom is 
contextualised in the expectations of significant others as well as what one owes society, not 
necessarily the caregivers who provided it to one (MacIntyre, 2002; Taylor, 2003). It is 
equally erroneous to restrict individual choice-making as residing only in rational 
considerations of entitlement and obligation. As Benhabib (1992: 161) observes, 
individuation is not dependent on the rational capacity of agency alone, as this pertains to the 
generalised other moral standpoint only, which does not tell us anything about concreteness. 
However, understanding individuals as concrete beings requires that we also consider their 
affective and emotional constitution, for it is what gives them peculiarity (Benhabib, 1992: 
159). This is why the care that individuals receive from their local units anchored in their 
community is necessary in individual identity constitution, although it is not the exclusive 
element.  
Even when one has the capacity of making choices that exclude caregivers’ interests, their 
interests are determinant in moderating one’s personal projects, showing that one’s autonomy 
is so tied to the others (Taylor, 2003: 33). The others are part of one’s choice making. One is 
not detached from them. These institutions of care help us realise our autonomy because the 
self, besides rational will, has relational will and power (Meyers, 2005: 33). One cannot 
reciprocate the care that givers availed to one; one must reciprocate to others (MacIntyre, 
2002: 101). The strong cosmopolitan idea of transcendent selves gives a false sense of being 
human where the ostensibly impartial abstract human beings are so impersonal that they do 
not owe other members of their society provision and reciprocation of care. The concept of 
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the transcendent self readily embraces and builds on the given capacity for choice-making the 
individual has, yet vehemently refuses to acknowledge the normativity of the institutions that 
enable attainment of the autonomous capacity. 
3.7. Necessity of a dialogic cosmopolitanism in citizenship 
In the light of the equally morally weighty ideals of cosmopolitan values and national 
belonging, it is necessary to advance a dialogical cosmopolitanism in citizenship 
conceptualisation (Benhabib, 2011: 76). Under this model of cosmopolitanism, other than 
superimposing one universal ideal on the many diverse cultural perspectives of the world, 
there should be mutual and at times multipolar understandings of how to conceptualise 
human equality where norms and values are contested and deliberated to bring out an all-
encompassing cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitanism must be one that builds on differences 
and not commonalities only (Benhabib, 1992: 153). Such an approach does not have an 
established form or content. 
An appropriate cosmopolitanism is one which must be sensitive to concrete (and not only 
general) otherness (Benhabib, 2011) and must as such be contestatory (Ingram, 2016: 74). 
Contestatory cosmopolitanism aims at challenging forms of “exclusion, domination, 
exploitation, and marginalization” by its victims (Ingram, 2016: 74). This implies activation 
and recognition of the victims’ way of life, their perspectives and their concreteness. As a 
result, through particular contexts, those marginalised by transcendent strong cosmopolitan 
essentialism will negate the implied negations of the cosmopolitanism in order to discover 
how to concretely express universalism (Ingram, 2016: 74). Cosmopolitanism must therefore 
be about re-appropriation and re-articulation of universalism. 
Contestatory cosmopolitanism, according to Ingram (2016: 76), prescribes neither our duties 
nor institutional reforms we must adopt. Instead, a contestatory cosmopolitanism provides a 
general moral orientation, highlighting “the dilemmas and contradictions likely to arise in 
politics, while nevertheless providing a normative and political basis on which to choose 
sides, assess strategies and rough out compromises in particular situations” (Ingram, 2016: 
76). Therefore, the respects in which particularised people advance universal values 
contextually vary depending on the particular struggle that necessitates it. The universal must 
be expressed in the local because the local always has a dimension of the universal (Ingram, 
2016: 77).  
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A dialogical universalism does not regard difference as an obstacle to establishing equality 
because it is cognisant that difference is what gives individuation to the concrete, and not just 
generalised other (Benhabib, 1992: 159). As such, any moral theorisation that excludes 
difference but dwells on commonality only effectively undermines the core of the 
concreteness of the other’s being. Equality, as Benhabib (1992: 165–168) holds, must start 
from that which makes me so other, as our commonalities by themselves without our 
differences will miserably fail in pinning down that which makes me me. This being the case, 
otherness can only be comprehended when it is actively engaged in a free dialogue where we 
learn, and not assume or project, what defines the other: the other self-defines him- or herself 
(Benhabib, 1992: 168). I may not always understand the prism through which people look at 
reality. I should not endorse others’ outlooks only after I have been fully persuaded by the 
standards of their outlook (Paulsen, 2011). Rather, when I understand how others perceive the 
world, even without fully comprehending why they value that particular perspective, I will 
respect and support them. Such cosmopolitanism depends on allowing and creating space for 
the other to bring forward for normative consideration that which makes him or her other, and 
a concrete being. In cosmopolitanism citizenship configuration, essentialist 
conceptualisations of nationality are outrightly inimical to such endeavours. 
It is imperative that I ensure that differences must constitute why I respect others and how 
they too respect me as an equal (although different) being whose equality lies in our 
respecting each’s capacity to freely choose what makes each of us ourselves. This is why 
universalism is neither a rigid essence nor an attribute of human nature (Pettersen, 2011: 55), 
but rather a result of discourse (Benhabib, 2011: 67).  
The necessity of a dialogic universalism is more urgent in the current state of globalisation. 
Globalisation is largely being driven by global systems that are thriving on legal frameworks 
that (due to weakening of state sovereignty) severely lack representation and will of the 
people they affect (Benhabib, 2011: 104). Largely, such laws are driven by capitalist interests 
of multinational corporations (Sen, 2004; Pieterse, 2006; Calhoun, 2008; Papastephanou, 
2015) and are bereft of the key fundamentals for the rule of law, such as transparency and 
consistency in application (Benhabib, 2011). The prevailing global interconnectedness, 
despite its other benefits, largely satiates global capitalism (Cheah, 2006: 492). 
This is why education for citizenship for transcendent global selves that is not sensitive to 
local considerations risks undermining the otherness of those cultures of the world whose 
languages are not languages of science and trade. In an absence of deliberation where each 
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nation or culture is not regarded as an equal other and is deprived of economic muscle, strong 
cosmopolitanism will only collude in the annihilation of the other in the name of an alleged 
impartiality that itself inheres bias. 
The realities of national members’ concrete otherness across the world, human equality and 
global interconnectedness necessitate democratic iterations (Benhabib, 2011: 89) at the global 
level. Democratic iterations refer to processes whereby principles behind universal right and 
duty claims are contextualised after undergoing public deliberation (Benhabib, 2011: 129). 
Universalist claims are contested and ultimately vernacularised, thereby according them 
legitimacy (Benhabib, 2011: 89). Such contestation and ultimate vernacularisation ensure that 
the universal conforms to the local frameworks of meaning making (Ingram, 2016: 77). 
Global democratic iterations would demand that education for democratic citizenship should 
not be about being passive recipients of other people’s perspectives about universalism and 
equality. Rather, the iterations are about making sense of the global in the embedded context 
of the local. To grasp the obligations one has to the world’s humanity, one need not discard 
one’s concrete otherness as embodied in national belonging. Failure to recognise the concrete 
otherness of the other is the flipside of denying them individuation, which in other words is 
denying them human equality. 
Universalism that is deliberative entails acknowledging the concreteness of one’s otherness 
as well as that of the other (Benhabib, 1992). It is not about extinguishing differences. For 
some time, developed nations of the West have sneered at their own national being in 
domestic democratic discourse and summarily dismissed it as a vice incompatible with 
equality (Brodie, 2004: 328). They have operated from the transcendent selves paradigm. 
Racist and segregative right-wing ideologies have emerged because right wing parties are the 
only ones that have filled the void created by mainstream parties staying away from 
acknowledging the national concreteness of oneself and of the other in global economic 
integration for instance. Strong cosmopolitanism dismisses national belonging as morally 
empty (Habermas, 2001) and instead it only demands a one-size-fits-all basis of 
commonality. 
The increasing weakening capacity for nation-states to reasonably assert and protect national 
members’ interests against the forces of economic globalisation and financial institutions’ 
devastating over-drive for profit guised in the free trade of neo-liberalism, whilst also 
acknowledging integration left a space now occupied and abused by right-wing ideologies. 
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The widely bemoaned EU democratic deficit in binding EU legislation affecting trade, for 
example, alienated the interests of embedded selves in Europe (Chryssochoou, Stavridis & 
Tsinisizelis, 1998; Yalçin, 2014). On the other hand, some needless global wars, in the name 
of the demand of impartiality for individual liberty, have backfired with refugee migration. 
Despite the universal aspiration for civil liberties for all, including in the Middle East, it was 
unnecessary to militarily impose a regime change in the hope that this would yield freedom, 
without understanding the otherness of the would-be beneficiaries, despite their outstanding 
need for freedom – what it would take for them to realise the freedom they obviously need. It 
goes beyond regime change. Mostly, it is about ensuring change of attitudes in government 
and civil society leaders who in pursuit of their self-serving interests supress inclusion and 
open collective will-formation and prevent critical citizenship in the name of preserving 
religious or cultural integrity (Waghid & Davids, 2014: 344). To realise change in such 
contexts, military force would cause further damage rather than good.  
The idea of a global communicative discourse among the peoples of the world suggests that 
there should be no pre-set conditions in public education, for example, of the content and 
knowledge that satisfy cosmopolitan ideals (Benhabib, 2011). Cosmopolitanism does not 
reside in a neutrality over one’s historical and social embeddedness. Different human 
communities have encountered otherness differently and responded differently. There has 
been no uniform response to such encounters so as to summarily dismiss the worth of 
nationality as being toxic to the ideal of equality. The challenges emerging from such 
encounters are equally uniquely different.  
Dialogic universalism, unlike mainstream strong cosmopolitanism, is not ‘legislative’ and as 
such does not aspire to establish the ‘ideal’ response to moral and political problems and later 
prescribe human nature conceptions that are only some of many other valid moral 
perspectives as the only standard in global economic, political and legal institutions (Ingram, 
2016). Most people in Africa and Malawi are far removed from influencing and directing the 
global order. Their metaphysical outlooks and epistemologies are regrettably not only being 
challenged, but being systematically undermined and involuntarily discarded. However, 
although there is almost no voluntariness in participating in the coercive global scheme, the 
distribution of its burdens and opportunities unevenly varies across nations (Barry & 
Valentini, 2009: 495; Bozac, 2012). Not all nations have the ability to influence and the 
economic, political, legal, academic and cultural textures of globalisation. This is in part due 
to the weak economic condition of developing nation-states that ultimately affects their 
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citizens’ life chances and access to opportunities (Glenn, 2008). Ultimately, education 
policies most African nations pursue are not authentic. They are only default positions of 
convenience in relation to the dominant cultural influences and outlooks in globalisation 
discourse. Ultimately, Malawi like most developing nations is being systematically 
compelled by the prevailing global structure to choose either just get along and conform to 
globalist demands or feebly demand that global systems transform and embrace their 
perspectives. 
Citizenship today must be a co-existence of cosmopolitanism and a critical patriotism; one 
that combines domestic justice realised through local frameworks, that nevertheless has 
appropriate regard for the moral entitlements and interests of other human beings with whom 
we share the world. Such a patriotism is not only inward-looking, but also outward-oriented, 
conscious of the ramifications of its collective decisions on the world’s other human beings 
and nations (Hansen, 2011: 1; Papastephanou, 2015: 190; Schumann, 2016: 270). Such a 
patriotism is not only compatible with but also mutually reinforces cosmopolitan ideals. The 
inward-looking should not be a form of tokenism, but a matter of moral necessity.  
We need a new understanding of cosmopolitan duties today. This new understanding should 
be based on the idea that our primary duties in global cooperation are duties of non-
malfeasance: not to cause harm to humanity. But how do nations and individuals determine 
what will not harm the other? If we do not depart from conceiving our obligations to the other 
based only on our common humanity, we will be stuck at the not-so-meaningful generalised 
other perspective of equality. International relations and individual relationships with others 
will be about everything else except what defines them: their concreteness and individuality.  
All this implies that duties of non-maleficence towards individuals or nations are possible 
only if there is dialogue where the other self-defines himself or herself (Benhabib, 2011) and 
not leaving the definition of what makes the other other to derive from mere conjecture. 
Therefore, if nations and individuals are to refrain from causing harm to the other, they must 
initially have a very clear understanding of others through their self-definition. This will 
allow for recognition of both the generality and concreteness of being individuals and 
collectives in the world. 
Our duties of beneficence to the people of the world should be determined on a case-by-case 
basis because the normativity of such duties depends on the context under which inequalities 
have emerged, and not just on the general human equality principle or on the mere existence 
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of inequalities. Such duties are contextualised in responsibility (Miller, 2007). Therefore, the 
first global justice duty a nation has is not to participate in causing inequities in global order. 
The weakening of state sovereignty is not tantamount to the weakening of nation belonging. 
Therefore, people will still exist in collectives primarily in the form of nation-states. This is 
because, as shown in Chapter 2, states may lose their power and become part of new 
federated suprastates. Despite such transformations, nationality, owing to its linguistic, 
cultural, historical and territorial value will always remain a point for political solidarity, as 
nationality has been for centuries (Papastephanou, 2015: 33). National solidarity can be 
utilised for efficient economic and political re-organisation.  
In addition, in a world without nation-states, individuals organised based on the features of 
the nation as their common interests, will still advance these common national interests as 
worthy of political recognition and preservation. Nationality will therefore always manifest 
itself as both a political means and a political end across the world and hence 
cosmopolitanism cannot afford to exclude it. Nationality will still as a matter of necessity be 
the default basis for human organisation in different geo-political units of the world that 
would still prevail even in a post-nation-state era (Bowden, 2003: 356). What has changed 
and weakened due to globalisation is the sovereignty of nation-states and not national 
belonging, which is ancient and enduring as it is constitutive of being. Other than being mere 
global citizens, we should be globally minded citizens, aware that (economic, political and 
environmental) decisions made from one part of the world have an effect on the condition of 
others’ way of life (Bowden, 2003: 359; Hansen, 2011: 103), hence we need to act with care. 
3.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that cosmopolitanism is by nature and origin a duality. The particular 
and universal opposites are complementary constituents with incomparable and indispensable 
value. By indicting national belonging and its associated particular relationships, strong 
cosmopolitanism commits a hasty normative generalisation. It is instructive to bear in mind 
that the paraded strong cosmopolitan exclusivity of human equality as only residing in a 
detached atomistic self is not a comprehensive account of all possible and existing ethically 
valid perspectives of human nature. Alternative perspectives of human nature exist that 
without necessarily undermining personhood, inextricably value both individual agency and 
relational obligations. Therefore, there is compatibility and symbiosis between human 
flourishing and community belonging.  
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Despite being driven by the good intention of addressing global inequalities and injustices, 
strong cosmopolitanism fails to comprehend the root causes of global inequalities. The heart 
of global interconnectedness is ultimately pumped by unbridled capitalist interests (Oxfam, 
2002; Kapeller et al., 2016) that also influence skewed international relations between 
developed and developing nations. Therefore, the iniquitous outcomes of the prevailing 
global structure cannot cease even if national boundaries are deactivated globally. If 
anything, the iniquitous outcomes would only escalate. 
Only a universalism of human equality that takes difference, other than commonality, as its 
crucial starting point of reflection is relevant and morally compatible with other diverse yet 
valid ethical perspectives of the world. At a global level, such a universalism engages the 
other’s concreteness and not just generality (Benhabib, 2011). The diverse other of the world 
and their respective valuation of community should not be forced to fit in and conform to the 
mould of neo-Kantianism.  
Having established the possibility of having a universalism of human equality, and hence a 
subsequent citizenship conception that depends on mutual interaction between the nation’s 
local and the cosmopolitan, the next chapter aims to show how such a cosmopolitanism ought 
to relate with education, to achieve ideal education for cosmopolitan citizenship. 
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Chapter 4:  
Education, citizenship and equality 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter argues that it is normatively necessary that education for democratic and 
cosmopolitan citizenship actively include relevant and tolerable aspects of nationality. Such 
aspects include teaching and learning of national history and relevant use of the mother 
tongue in instruction. The chapter achieves this by firstly contending that the general and 
arguably fundamental educational aim of developing authentic beings in learners does not 
inherently require, as a precondition, the exclusion of community or patriotic considerations. 
Members in a nation-state share a foundational fate rooted in common and contestable 
elements of nationality.  
Secondly, the chapter contends that exclusion of patriotism in education for cosmopolitan 
citizenship ill-serves the normatively valid entitlements of people in developing nations. This 
is because what is usually paraded as impersonal (strong) cosmopolitan education is not in 
essence neutral, despite its dominance. Instead, it has some inherent particularistic 
perspectives. Such education for citizenship furthermore dismisses as non-objective and 
excludes for normative consideration any other valid epistemological perspectives on the 
mere basis of their otherness. As such, a strong cosmopolitanism-inspired global citizenship 
that is exclusively oriented towards universalism and global impartiality risks amounting to 
passive coercive demands to assimilate into the dominant mainstream. By de-politicising 
nationality, strong cosmopolitan citizenship hides and entrenches global inequalities that are 
based on the subjugation of weak nations’ histories, languages and cultures through an 
ostensible impartiality of global equality. In this respect, education for democratic citizenship 
of strong cosmopolitanism has adverse implications for the educational justice entitlements of 
people in developing nations of Africa, such as Malawi, unlike in developed nations. 
Lastly, the chapter argues that global interconnectedness, which is what validates the 
necessity of (strong) cosmopolitan citizenship education, is not necessarily in the interest of 
the just entitlements of the peoples of the world, particularly those in economically weak 
nations. Rather, capitalist tendencies have in principle hijacked the education discipline 
worldwide, pushing to the peripheral major concerns of justice in education 
conceptualisation, planning and implementation. Merely taking the interconnectedness as a 
given and hence the motivation for education for global citizenship without initially 
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demanding re-structuring of the interconnectedness as a moral necessity, unproblematises 
global interconnection. The consequent education for democratic citizenship founded on the 
prevailing global interconnectedness colludes in perpetuating the iniquities of global 
capitalism. The ultimate position of this chapter therefore is that contrary to the common 
narrative, patriotism today is very crucial, not only in ensuring global justice, but also in that 
in its absence, global interconnectedness will continue producing iniquitous outcomes. 
4.2. Authenticity and education 
The perennial question regarding the aim of education always draws diverse responses. 
However, arguably, most positions about the goal of education include or are ultimately 
reducible to the necessity for education to facilitate the learner’s achievement of authenticity 
(Dewey, 2004; Freire, 2014). In other words, there is arguably general consensus about 
authenticity constituting the core aims of education. 
Authenticity is the flipside of freedom (Sarid, 2015: 477). It is achieved when the subject is 
free from coercion, indoctrination and arbitrary restraints, among other things (Sarid, 2015: 
477). The authentic subject must act freely, independent of the external influences he or she 
has not consented to. Therefore, independence and autonomy are crucial (although not 
exclusive, as shown in the previous chapter) in the project of authenticity. The two are some 
of the necessary conditions, although not the only ones. 
Education for authenticity ensures the school does not produce individuals loyal and 
conforming to society’s perspectives (Dewey, 2004). It is therefore necessary that both as a 
means and an end of the educating process, a critical consciousness be developed in learners 
to enable them to question and uncover defective perspectives and knowledge that are 
nevertheless driving their society. Ultimately, they should be able to reconstruct society by 
becoming the authentic individuals they have critically and reasonably reflected upon. 
Given these conditions for the realisation of an authentic self, the role of the community or 
lack of it has come to the fore in designing an ideal education for the authentic self. With 
respect to the development of citizenship, in much of political and education theorisation, the 
community is regarded as a barrier to authenticity and hence needs to be overcome 
(Brighouse, 2003; Nili, 2015; Peters, 2015). The community is regarded as intrinsically 
suspicious, if not already condemned as a tool for coercion, suppression and restraint in 
efforts of achieving authenticity. By and large, aspects of the desired critical citizenship 
usually embrace only very thin inconsequential elements of the community. The community 
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is therefore understood as a ‘necessary evil’ whenever concessions of its role and relevance 
are made. 
However, with respect to education, we cannot fully and naively abstract what freedom 
actually entails for all people everywhere (Freire, 2014: 81). It is instructive to always bear in 
mind that both education theory and education practice need not be entirely abstract from and 
independent of social and cultural situatedness (Freire, 2014: 81). Education for freedom in 
part entails an alignment with the concrete needs and aspirations of individuals in relation to 
their particular community, and the needs are themselves in part shaped by their community’s 
uniqueness (Waghid, 2004; Freire, 2014). This, however, does not imply that education 
should be aimed at reproducing society. 
Universal positions that revere individualism as constituting an independent transcendent self 
that is identical to any other self in the world and is insensitive to the considerations of its 
context, are not valid (Papastephanou, 2003: 397). The invalidity is based on the argument 
that “if education by definition concerns processes of shaping subjectivity via community or 
forming communities via free and insular subjectivities”, then the ideals of individualism and 
community as goals of education are not antagonistic, but complementary (Papastephanou, 
2003: 399). This is because separatist commitment to individualism only “favours the private 
sphere of life and is egocentric”, while on the other hand, an exclusive focus on community 
considerations only “can be too integrative and unreflective” (Papastephanou, 2003: 399). 
The liberal conception of education aims at enabling the individual to realise freedom from 
external and internal constraints originating from “ignorance, prejudice, or unfamiliarity with 
possible ways of life and sources of satisfaction or commitment” (Jonathan, 1997: 183). 
These constraints are usually regarded as embodied in the society and its shared ideals. At the 
same time, however, liberalism should duly balance between its neutralism over community 
interests on the one hand and retaining social practice which liberalism itself expects to be 
deregulated as the requirement of the adherence to the neutralist norm on the other hand 
(Jonathan, 1997: 182). Although neutralist liberalism requires that the public sphere be 
characterised by proceduralist values only, realisation of the liberal ideals has however been 
dependent on “the public provision of a social practice which cannot – either logically or 
empirically – itself instantiate neutrality” (Jonathan, 1997: 184). Therefore, the possibility of 
the autonomous individual is in essence premised on the presupposed prior existence of 
society. 
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Emphasis on autonomy in liberal education neither has to entail nor demand that we be 
“indifferent to the understandings, tastes and values of the next generation” of citizens, who 
are now learners, so long as the education we are giving them develops a preference-making 
capacity in them (Jonathan, 1997: 188). Rather, the fostering of autonomy should be based on 
the belief that the education learners receive offers them a “range of worthwhile options” as 
available and accessible in their particular community and that these options are not imposed 
on them, but offered, hence “they will freely choose what is worthwhile” (Jonathan, 
1997: 188). This is not tantamount to indoctrination, socialisation, reproduction of society or 
suffocation of achievement of individual emancipation and evolution of society (Jonathan, 
1997: 188). Aspirations for achieving individual autonomy do not necessarily reside in 
negative duties only with respect to the role of the community towards the individual’s 
freedom project. Rather, they also reside in positive obligations with substantive social 
commitments (Jonathan, 1997: 188–189; Sarid, 2015: 478). 
The most pivotal thing here is the worthwhileness of the options that are offered by society to 
learners to accept, reject or revise. Similarly, parents do not in the name of autonomy let their 
children make every choice the children wish to make and the parents only accept and respect 
it (Jonathan, 1997: 188; MacIntyre, 2002: 93). There is a broad range of worthwhile options 
which the chooser can deliberate on, modify and recreate, but within a range of substantive 
ethical liberalism. 
Ethical liberalism, unlike neutralism, embraces the fact that in the normative interests of both 
society and individual, outcomes of education need not be characterised with indifference 
about the value and values of the community, and that offering learners certain worthwhile 
options is acceptable in so far as the learners freely choose them (Jonathan, 1997: 189). In 
other words, there are certain refined and contested worthwhile options society provides and 
must provide to learners to choose from, revise or reject as authentic selves. It is impossible 
for the autonomous self to in principle achieve authenticity by oneself from a clean slate 
(Sarid, 2015: 481). Therefore, the limitation of neutralism is that it implies that “worthwhile 
social options” from which the autonomous individual chooses will inevitably and 
mysteriously derive from the “aggregate preferences of autonomous individuals” (Jonathan, 
1997: 189). The expectation that citizens in the state should share and preserve only the 
society founded on the procedural institutions of democracy through which each is 
guaranteed of achieving authenticity without dependence on a fellow citizen is therefore 
flawed. 
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The worthwhile options that constitute fodder for the realisation of the authentic individual 
are partly rooted in society’s cooperation (Taylor, 2003: 33). It is hence necessary that in 
education, society’s “substantive judgements of value” be deliberatively contested and 
“publicly instantiated and continually revised” (Jonathan, 1997: 189). The problem with 
democratic citizenship formulations whose nature is essentially civic or constitutional 
(unrooted in the community’s peculiarities) is that its conception of human nature is one that 
depoliticises the social and communal values and ideals that cohere and give idiosyncrasy to 
a community. Such education furthermore decouples and compartmentalises the communal 
and the political (Habermas, 2001: 73–74). Its civic patriot then prefers the constitutional 
only, over commonly shared substance that nevertheless is the matter that enables and 
necessitates the cherished civic or constitutional patriotism. For concrete people, value of a 
civic or political culture of democracy is hardly an end in itself. The value is a means of 
rearranging what as a community of shared fate they all share or do not share. Valuing a 
political culture is about how to or not to structure society’s distribution scheme that is deeply 
rooted in the shared and contested values of the community whose tool for incessant 
contestation is constitutionalism. 
Constitutional or civic patriotism therefore runs the risk of treating a very efficient tool for 
realisation of justice as an end in itself. Concrete people in concrete democracies need 
constitutionalism as a means of determining how their welfare system must be structured, 
which past injustices need avoidance and who needs compensation or affirmative action 
based on the nation’s history. Their concrete needs further include how minorities are being 
excluded from the structures of society, what constitutes shared history and culture, what is 
worth public expenditure to preserve and how to support maintenance of the local language in 
the light of threatening global challenges. This is the context in which concrete human beings 
in concrete societies sharing concrete values and history understand constitutionalism. 
Meaningful education should draw from the philosophy of its people’s context of lived 
experiences (Waghid, 2004: 57). The educating process is a human action that necessarily 
involves the people’s cooperation in their quest to achieve the individual ‘good life’ as they 
seek to establish shared ways of interacting with and deriving meaning from the socio-
cultural environment they commonly share (Waghid, 2004: 56). Given the social 
embeddedness of education and freedom, the idea of educating for a disembodied, impersonal 
non-national being that only maximises self-interest while being detached from substantial 
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social obligations is in principle not possible, and in practice ruins the ideals of both freedom 
and meaningful education. 
While eagerly guarding against reproduction of social mores and structures, still, the school 
should provide learners with a critical analysis of the fundamental features of the wider 
society based on its practices, history and shared values, while confronting and later sieving 
out unacceptable elements of the wider environment. In the interest of authenticity, it is the 
role of the school to accord every learner with an opportunity “to escape from the limitations 
of the social group in which he was born” (Dewey, 2004: 22). The school environment must 
“eliminate, so far as possible, the unworthy features of the existing environment from 
influence upon mental habitudes” (Dewey, 2004: 22). 
Educating for individual independence need not imply that interdependence, which 
presupposes community interests, is a vice nor that it is expendable in the autonomy project 
(Winch, 1996: 40). In other words, is sustained by independence is sustained by 
interdependence. Endeavours of ensuring freedom in the world that regard subjectivity in 
contrast with universalisable objectivity as antithetical to realisation of universalism are both 
simplistic and a negation of the reality of human nature, as the two exist in mutual interaction 
(Freire, 2014: 50). 
What a learner learns in school must not be detached from “the existential experience of the 
[learners]” where “words are emptied of their concreteness and become a hollow, alienated, 
and alienating verbosity” (Freire, 2014: 71). The authenticity, empathy and critical thinking 
aims of education imply freedom of the subject, among other things. In other words, their 
realisation is preconditioned on a subject who is free. It is erroneous to conflate such a free 
subject with one that is detached from his or her situatedness. In any case, the contrary is 
what holds, as argues Freire (2014: 81): 
Education as the practice of freedom – as opposed to education as the practice of 
domination – denies that man is abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached to the 
world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality apart from people. Authentic 
reflection considers neither abstract man nor the world without people, but people in their 
relations with the world. In these relations consciousness and world are simultaneous: 
consciousness neither precedes the world nor follows it. 
A quest for developing authentic, autonomous and critical citizens by treating the sources of 
the citizens’ concreteness (local language, history, shared culture and common territory) as 
inherently suspect and inimical to the freedom project is flawed. Through a community’s 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
145 
non-reciprocal relationships in its institutions of care, for instance, an individual is accorded 
with a wide range of normatively valid options he or she may accept, reject or revise 
(MacIntyre, 2002: 91). Despite the potentiality and actuality of the anti-freedom tendencies of 
socialisation, it is equally valid that the different modes of legitimate non-political restraints 
society exacts over the individual enhance his or her range of preferences or what to consider 
or not in preference making (Kymlicka, 2002a; Etzioni, 2014).  
The worthwhile preferences with which the individual engages can never exist outside the 
ambit of the community. Without its existence, they are just not possible. Therefore, in as 
much as we need global-conscious citizens, with an awareness of universal duties and rights 
transcending the local, this should never be achieved at the expense of the local sources of 
concreteness. Education for democratic citizenship should therefore not afford to discard 
substantive local or national considerations in the name of a cosmopolitan citizenship 
development. The local and the nation need not be merely included. They are necessary for 
realisation of a just citizenship. 
4.2.1. Individual, local and global democracy  
The scope of civic education includes the implicit foundational aim of propagation of 
democracy through structures and practices that host, preserve and perpetuate values of 
democracy. The nation-state is one of such structures that has the capacity to facilitate 
political organisation and sustain political order, which are catalysts for democracy 
(Weinstein, 2004). Perpetuation of democratic values is largely dependent on this political 
order. Once the democratic project takes off and flourishes, the political order as well as its 
foundation (the nation) assume a very passive background role. However, their passivity does 
not imply their dispensability. 
As democracy advances the tenets of equality, the primacy of the right to individual self-
determination, freedom of movement and association to relate with the world’s people, there 
is strong temptation to undermine the bedrock of the political solidarity that hosts democracy 
in the state. There is neglect of the fundamental that the reality of the coherent political 
community on which the democratic state builds is made possible by such cohering elements 
as a shared geographical territory and a common language – aspects of nationality (Miller, 
1995: 164). The relevance and necessity of such elements are not restricted only to the 
founding or origin of the (nation-state’s) democratic atmosphere that is catalytic of individual 
autonomy as Habermas (1994: 23) holds. What is often ignored is that for the members, their 
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particular democratic project must continue together through and for their language (out of all 
the world’s languages) of agency. It must continue in this particular territory (Miller, 1995: 
24) to which they have unique attachment, unlike any other territory of the world. Therefore, 
in as much as a citizen needs freedom to become whatever his or her imagined self prefers, he 
or she is also simultaneously and implicitly obliged to ensure propagation of the nation 
bedrock that hosts and makes possible individual freedom.  
It is in the interest of autonomous individuals that their language be actively maintained and 
sustained. The language is how the individual expresses himself or herself. The language is 
also the medium through which I project myself onto others with whom I interact and share 
social space. No wonder agency and linguistic communication are inextricably linked: “I can 
anticipate being part of a social space in which others recognise me as an initiator of certain 
deeds and the speaker of certain words for which I must be able to provide an account” 
(Benhabib, 2011: 68). In communication for agency, there is therefore an implicit centrality 
of common language as well as of a localised community or society, territoriality, common 
culture and history as hallmarks of nations.  
People want democracy not as an end in itself, but as a means for arranging their society. 
However, such a community of diverse independent personalities nevertheless has shared 
political and social values that ought to underlie its education theory and practice (Higgs, 
2012: 38). The community’s shared culture and practices give meaning, purpose and context 
for individual flourishing and it must be safeguarded from assimilationist forces (Fernandez 
& Sundstrom, 2011: 371) of neutral universalism. Philosophy and education must “contribute 
effectively towards the amelioration of the human condition, the lived and existing human 
condition” (Higgs, 2012: 43). What this means is that education must directly connect with, if 
not be inspired by, the situatedness of the people: their language, their history, their systems, 
and of course their universal humanness they share with the wider humanity of the world. 
In democratic citizenship education, the critical thinking that must be promoted should not 
merely be about informal logic, but one that depends on the contextual criteria originating 
from one’s experiences (Weinstein, 2004: 243). Over and above logic, critical thinking has a 
social nature, and hence has “elements of caring thinking and creative thinking as well” in the 
creation of its “communicative tools” (Weinstein, 2004: 243). The critical thinking occurs in 
a context of relations of care; for some contexts such as most African societies such 
obligations of care are owed not only to significant others, but even to members of the wider 
community (Cornell & Muvangua, 2012: 3). The community in this regard is valued not just 
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because of the collective’s sake, but because it anchors and provides the sources of care to the 
individual. This is not to suggest that it is equally valued by every member. 
The goal for critical thinking is not merely to cultivate an intellectual capacity for maximising 
one’s self-interests. Rather, it is to develop a disposition for action in learners (Weinstein, 
2004: 243–244). This is a disposition for them to act on realities, imbalances and injustices 
that twist the outcomes of their particular social cooperation that also affects them. Expecting 
them to acquire skills that will simply universally apply to challenges or conflicts they will 
encounter some other time with some other person in the world is to negate and be naïve 
about the contextuality of education that draws from people’s lived experiences. The 
community (not necessarily the state) of which the learner is a member has issues that require 
confronting and rearranging. This has nothing to do with advancing aspects of democracy as 
ends in themselves (e.g. pursuing constitutionalism). While aspects of democracy in society 
provide the individual with the framework for achieving freedom, the community provides 
the substance for self-actualisation. In the quest of achieving an authentic citizen, critical 
thinking in education for democratic citizenship should not regard all human thought and 
action as exclusively and essentially only logical and never emotional – this would 
undermine the complexity of human nature (Weinstein, 2004: 245). It is such ill-conceived 
conceptions of human nature that further necessarily require detachment and independence 
from others, claiming this inhibits individual freedom. 
In national citizenship, pursuit for the authentic self that is necessarily detached from the 
community has inspired citizenship conceptualisation. At the global level, strong 
cosmopolitan citizenship depoliticises nationality, regarding it as deficient of any moral 
import in understanding human equality. The nation is perceived as arbitrarily restricting 
what ought to be a worldwide scope of distribution of the entitlements and duties accruing 
from the universality of human equality (Nili, 2015; Arneson, 2016). The global citizen is 
urged to overcome the ostensible parochialism of national boundaries to realise his or her full 
freedom as well as prevent the ‘arbitrary’ exclusion and failure to service the interests of 
outsiders. It is in this vein that education for democratic (global) citizenship of the strong 
cosmopolitan orientation systematically de-emphasises aspects of nationality, so as to realise 
a global citizen. 
Recognition of nationality at the global sphere is in the interest of global democracy. The 
prospects of a global democracy necessarily build on and ought to build on prevailing 
national democracies. In global democracy, apart from the relevance of nationality as an 
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efficient structure upon which global peoples are organised, national democracies also have 
normative justifications. The people under a world democracy are geographically, 
historically, linguistically and culturally situated. These elements of their situatedness do not 
only enable democratic cooperation. Equally important, they make the democracy meaningful 
and relatable to the people. Not only should the democracy use such elements as instruments, 
but it should also aim at preserving and perpetuating these hosts of the sources for concrete 
collective life. Such elements give the community as well as the individual otherness and 
concreteness. 
It is necessary that the school has an active role in perpetuating the democratic order both 
globally and locally. Globally, the meaningfulness of democracy is significantly tied to the 
nation. However, the passive bedrock role of nationality should not be taken for granted and 
as less fundamental. More crucially, we should not ignore the particularism dimension of 
democracies that resides in nationality. 
As we endeavour to conceptualise global citizenship, such particularism necessitates 
deliberate and contestable acknowledgement of nationalities in democratic citizenship 
education to retain people’s concreteness and meaningfulness of democracy. Global 
democracy is incapable of fulfilling these roles without making recourse to people’s 
nationality. A particular democratic nation has a territory and a history. It has specific 
elements of injustice or oppression that need to be guarded against, as they have a very high 
likelihood of recurring. How injustice and oppression manifest in one society is different 
from any other. The injustice and oppression are also shaped by peculiar socio-cultural and 
historical contexts that also constitute members’ meaning-making structures (Gay, 2000: 77) 
and/or identity constitution. Although undergird by the same democratic ideals, why and how 
such ideals are translated and realised in this society differ from another. The value of such 
ideals therefore does not lie in themselves, but in concert with how they refine and better our 
community. Their value is tied to the actual lived experiences and history of the members of 
the society. Therefore, ironically, the abstract universal ideals of democracy are only 
concretised in a community’s particularism. A community’s education for democratic 
citizenship must therefore reflect this. 
4.3. Citizenship and shared fate 
This section argues that even in the light of global interconnectedness and where individuals 
have different commitments outside the national community, and besides the fact of the 
weakening of state sovereignty, education for democratic citizenship that contains aspects of 
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national solidarity is defensible and worth promoting. I argue, using Ben-Porath’s (2012) idea 
of citizenship as shared fate, that global interconnectedness in principle necessitates that 
aspects of national belonging be actively included in citizenship conceptualisation. In as 
much as citizens are a collective of individuals who share different politics-based institutions 
and systems (DesRoches, 2016), what anchors and sustains such institutions and systems is 
the national fate. The possibility and sustenance of the other schemes of cooperation in the 
state are indebted to the solidarity founded on shared nationality. 
In any nation state, citizens share two general interrelated and interdependent forms of 
solidarity. They share common political institutions that shape and run their polity. These 
include laws, democratic systems, institutions and processes, a constitution and a commonly 
shared economic or distributive scheme (Rawls, 2002; Ben-Porath, 2012). They also share 
aspects of their nationality as in a common language, history, territory and shared culture 
(Miller, 2007: 27; Ben-Porath, 2012: 381). Contrary to positions of other thinkers (Habermas, 
2001; Nili, 2015), these forms of solidarity have unique value and mutually reinforce and 
regulate one another. None is self-sufficient so as to dispense with the other. 
The idea of citizenship as shared fate, according to Ben-Porath (2012: 381), refers to different 
manifestations of civic and political life citizens commonly share or identify with, embodied 
in different institutions and systems. These encompass democratic governance institutions 
such as representative agencies in central and local governments, laws and the constitution. It 
also includes … 
… historical understandings of the nation, including contested dimensions and struggles over 
interpretation languages and forms of expression, including contestations over desirable 
forms of communication in the public sphere; understandings of national ethos, symbols, 
myths and values, and even views about issues such as typical national traits and aspirations 
(Ben-Porath, 2012: 381). 
Citizenship as shared fate is therefore duo-faced, with solidarity and multiplicity dimensions 
(DesRoches, 2016: 539). It acknowledges the historical and social ties members share as 
being central in the establishment and sustenance of their political project (Ben & Woll, 
2012: 381). This conception of citizenship acknowledges the diversity and at times 
contrasting nature of individual or subgroup commitments and values that exist inside the 
community. Therefore, citizenship as shared fate is not grounded only in the common 
dimension of nationality members collectively share. Rather, it is also about incessant 
engagement of the members in a dialogue where some aspects of membership are contested 
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such that some are accepted or rejected and others left for ongoing deliberation (Ben-Porath, 
2012: 382). 
Citizenship as shared fate values both procedural democratic ideals and national belonging as 
mutually reinforcing and regulative elements in their nation state’s project without displacing 
one for the other. Citizenship is a shared fate, because despite the inevitable variations in 
levels of commitment among members to their political project, they are all ultimately 
affected by it in a number of ways (Ben-Porath, 2012: 385). 
What is remarkable about citizenship as shared fate is that it is not insensitive to the people’s 
historical, cultural and social situatedness. Instead, it “acknowledges and promotes visions of 
shared histories, struggles, institutions, languages, and value commitments” (Ben-Porath, 
2012: 385). It has both “responsive and aspirational components” (Ben-Porath, 2012: 386). 
Thus, it responds to the attachments arising from the shared territory, language, history, 
culture and traditions. These underlie the form of the community’s civil society. The civil 
society is about voluntary associations of a society demanding retention, reformation or 
transformation of some of their common life. Although usually the civil society realises its 
aspirations through political means, it also achieves some of its aspirations through non-
political means (Kymlicka, 2002a: 298). These nevertheless also shape the political life. 
Citizenship understood as shared fate is not only backward-looking, but also forward-
looking, therefore aspirational (Ben-Porath, 2012: 385). It seeks to cultivate skills and 
attitudes that will ensure a sense of belonging for each of the members who has other 
uncommon values and commitments apart from the shared national one without expecting 
them to assimilate. It is therefore “rooted both in the present, with its social realities, and in 
the future vision of what society might be like for the next generation” (Ben-Porath, 2012: 
386). 
According to Ide (2009), the Japanese nation, for instance, has been having an enduring 
debate about the substance of patriotic education. At the centre of the contention is the 
interpretation of human suffering and Japan’s role in committed war crimes during the 
Second World War, whether the war crimes should be understood as such or that in the grand 
scheme of things they amount to unintended outcomes of Japan’s ostensible defence for 
noble ideals then (Ide, 2009: 449). For opponents of ‘sanitization’ of Japan’s war crimes role 
in the war in school history, these crimes should not be concealed but should represent the 
horrors of war to ultimately buttress the moral supremacy of a peaceful and democratic 
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constitutional culture over national patriotism (Ide, 2009). On the other side of the debate are 
the defenders of the teaching of Japanese virtue as underlying ostensibly often ignored 
Japanese motivations actions during the war, arguing that such virtuous motivations are not 
considered and studied in Japanese history owing to its overemphasis on war crimes (Ide, 
2009: 449). Given the fundamentalist nature of either side, Ide (2009: 449) holds that she 
agrees with neither position. 
Ide’s (2009: 449) position is that the debate only shows the immense influence of 
Eurocentrism on Japanese traditions and especially educational values since the late 19th 
century when Japan had been following pacifist ideologies and not competitiveness (with 
other nations) it later embraced. Ide (2009: 449) therefore contends that both sides of the 
debate are so fixated on the Second World War only, which for her is not fully representative 
of ideal Japanese values prior to their being ‘compromised’ through hybridisation with 
Eurocentric values. To face the future, Ide (2009) holds that without necessarily promoting 
indoctrination, Japan’s patriotic education should be about Japanese ideals that have been 
resilient prior and after the war, although they are marginalised by politics-generated 
conceptions of patriotism (Ide, 2009: 450). Put differently, Ide’s (2009: 450) position is that 
both sides of the debate need to reconceptualise what ideal patriotism is, as currently both 
sides’ conception of the ideal is rooted in obedience (which further entails transcendence of 
either civic patriotism or sanitised history) and authority (which entails supremacy of 
constitutionalism over sanitised history or vice versa) (Ide, 2009: 451). For her there are 
enduring Japanese traditions that exist independent of the recent war politics that nevertheless 
shaped Japanese politics in general prior to the dominance of Eurocentric values (Ide, 2009: 
451). This reinforces the point that citizens indeed share a national fate beyond political 
solidarity and that the constitution of such a fate must necessarily be open to incessant 
contestation. Schools, however, should provide spaces for deliberating, contesting and 
reconstituting the shared fate.  
It is an obvious fact that so much has changed at the advent of globalisation. National 
sovereignty has been greatly weakened and uncoupled from the nation-state (Hutchinson, 
2000: 654). Most thinkers have drawn conclusions about the fate of the nation due to the 
weakening of the nation-state. Most of such conclusions, however, are based on erroneously 
extending the nature and extent of the weakening of state sovereignty as being almost exactly 
applicable to the nation. The nation however, is a much older community than the state and 
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furthermore, national attachments are still enduring and relevant despite global 
interconnection (Barrow, 2005: 129; Papastephanou, 2015: 166). 
It is undeniable that due to the changes arising from global migration and connectedness, 
which result in a myriad of individual interests, identities and loyalties transcending the 
nation-state, what constitutes the nation for a community of free members can no more be 
“stable and bound” (Ben-Porath, 2012: 382), but is necessarily under continuous re-
interpretation. It is therefore necessary that our response to the modern world should neither 
be reactionary, thereby stuck in a romanticised past national solidarity that is impervious to 
reform. However, conversely, our adjusting to the realities of an interconnected world and its 
associated duties should not be conceived as necessitating people’s detachment from the 
concreteness of their embeddedness that accords them group as well as individual peculiarity. 
The weakening of state sovereignty does not amount to dissolution of enduring national 
interests that were particularly and exclusively met by the state (Hutchinson, 2000: 654). The 
obligation to serve certain national interests will always remain outstanding despite the 
relocation of sovereignty from the nation-state. 
Ross (2007: 297) holds that essentially, citizenship is about establishing rights and that such 
rights are now uncoupled from the nation-state as supranational institutions and communities 
such as the European Union and European Union Courts, which supersede national legal 
institutions, now ground these rights. For Ross (2007: 297), national citizenship has been the 
vehicle for realisation of rights and identity, hence the strong link between these ideals and 
the nation. Today, however, identity and rights have “become increasingly complex and 
contested” and viable citizenship should no longer be based on local attachments, as people 
now participate in different societies outside the nation (Ross, 2007: 299). This being the 
case, only a rights-based citizenship model must be embraced as the ideal citizenship for a 
globalised world (Ross, 2007: 299) and education for citizenship must assume such a 
globalist form that transcends ostensibly morally arbitrary national boundaries. 
It is worth noting that the necessity of such rights cannot be divorced from the people’s lived 
experiences in their locality. Human rights are not an absolute end in themselves. In any case, 
they presuppose interaction and cooperation for social action. The cooperation largely takes 
place, among others, in the institutions of the civil society. The nature of and terms of the 
cooperation are never universal across all humanity. What should constitute the range of 
goods to be demanded from the state by citizens, scope of the role of the state over the market 
and tax regimes are instances of how peculiarities of a society mould the concretisation (not 
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relativism) of different rights. This is why the purpose of learning for democratic citizenship 
should not just be for the learners to merely accumulate knowledge about the universality of 
rights. 
Education for democratic citizenship must aim at equipping learners with principles and skills 
with which they should be able to construct and reconstruct knowledge of the experiences 
they are living now, not some imaginary ones they will experience beyond their borders. It is 
noteworthy that there are certain unique prerequisites for learner’s knowledge construction 
and independence that are assumed as given or are not acknowledged in theorisations of a 
just global citizenship. However, indispensable as such prerequisites are, they ultimately 
reside in national solidarity. For instance, the language of instruction in which learners would 
construct their knowledge about different phenomena has a national rootedness. 
If all peoples find value from literature and art with whose language and content they 
identify, then the gradual displacement of their local language by a global one that cannot 
effectively and efficiently communicate a people’s culture is a concern about equality and 
fairness. The history of a people and their common way of life contribute towards the 
meaningfulness of the individuals’ lives as well as their democratic education. The historical 
situatedness gives vividness to the discourse of human rights conceived not as mere abstract 
realities learners will later encounter in life. The lived experiences pf the people and learners 
in their particular geographical and historical contexts are full of struggles which such rights 
discourses are employed to address (Gay & Howard, 2000: 13). 
The relevance of shared nationality and history is more than traditions, practices and holidays 
(Nieto, 2008: 128). Shared nationality through history and common culture largely anchor 
social and political relationships under which members bound by a common territory and 
language (Nieto, 2008: 129) share frameworks of cooperation in which individual projects 
are both possible and meaningful. The values are under a constant process of revision and the 
members, through their relationships and encounters, create and share worldviews which they 
also continually transform (Nieto, 2008: 129). All people have a culture, as the social and 
political relationships through which an individual participates in the world is informed by 
the elements of culture such as language, history and shared territory, ultimately having a 
bearing on one’s values and how one looks at the world (Nieto, 2008: 128). Culture is a 
product of people’s experiences (Nieto, 2008: 137). Therefore, a nation’s political or 
economic encounters as victims or perpetrators of atrocities and injustice, how they 
collectively rallied to overcome the oppression and how they collectively resolved to account 
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for the suffered injustices as they endeavour to move onto the future are all shaped by and 
result in concrete national values peculiar to their historical, geographical and political 
situatedness. 
Shared nationality in education for democracy should be preserved not just because it is a 
default ‘given’. Rather, it is because it hosts tools that significantly constitute the perspectives 
and frameworks through which the autonomous individual encounters the world and 
processes experiences. It is part of the currency for meaning-making to individuals, hence it 
must necessarily be taken into consideration in political and education discourses. Such a 
consideration should occur while subjecting cultural frameworks to incessant questioning and 
revision, as they obviously contain impurities. There hence just cannot be a disconnect 
between the rights approach and belonging to the nation locality. 
In the context of globalisation, one can therefore hold that despite the world’s 
interconnectedness, the learner still has situated experiences. Global interconnectedness 
cannot be dismissed as having no consequences in people’s lives. We should however desist 
from valorising such interconnection as being equal to, if not replacing, local belongingness 
and its incomparable significance to the individual. Despite globalisation affording us 
different tools to see, feel and imagine, what is happening beyond my locale, the frameworks 
in which I process such experiences are largely attributable to the elements of my locale’s 
way of life. Human beings just cannot be free-floating, unattached, disembodied and 
transcendent rational selves. 
In the global context, a shared fate cosmopolitan citizenship orientation would not prefer 
escapism (from the peculiarity of the other) to engaging the concreteness of nations’ 
otherness in any formulations of equality and global citizenship. A shared fate 
cosmopolitanism would instead confront and embrace sources of concreteness as crucial for 
both the meaningfulness and fairness of global universalism. The more we depoliticise and 
neutralise aspects of nationality in (education for) citizenship, the more we risk 
compromising people’s relevant and meaningful opportunities and modes of being that are 
available to them in situated contexts. This is because they will be expected to assimilate into 
the mainstream dominant out of practical necessity other than free choice. 
Education for democratic citizenship that focuses on rights and individual autonomy only 
results in the privatisation of “political interest, a loss of faith in public action and a 
decreasing interest in the significance for individuals of the wider social framework” 
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(Jonathan, 1997: 204). Such instrumentisation of the social environment and its relationships 
in essence denies and negates the concreteness of the world’s communities and individuals. 
Their relationships and community are not only of extrinsic value. 
What all this means, therefore, is that citizenship as shared fate must necessarily persist in the 
context of globalisation. Conceptions of global citizenship must actively and sufficiently 
embrace both solidarity and multiplicity aspects of being. The conceptions should not only 
emphasise that the individual now has multiple ties in the interconnected world, but also that 
the individuals with increasing multiple ties have special ties traceable to the nation. This is 
because despite their innumerable differences, national members share ties among themselves 
that make political cooperation possible (Miller, 1995: 41). This political cooperation (a fate 
in its own right) is ultimately rooted in the linguistic, historical, territorial and common 
cultural fates (Miller, 1995: 41) upon which they order their social actions as well as self-
actualisation. A global citizenship conception that erases and excludes national belonging 
cannot manage to single-handedly replicate the ability of nationality to ground and sustain 
democracy, justice and freedom. In shared fate citizenship, “[t]he nation is often the backdrop 
rather than the topic of these contexts (in other words, these are often activities that are not 
explicitly political), but they are enabled and limited by national borders” (Ben-Porath, 2012: 
386). 
The nation therefore has some peculiarity, which, however, should not be reduced into a 
deified object, but rather regarded as something that is foundational for democratic diversity. 
Because shared fate citizenship promotes solidarity and diversity, it is necessary that its 
education should be “context-responsive and address the specific realms in which children 
and families live, as well as specific diversities within the nation” (Ben-Porath, 2012: 387). It 
is not merely about learning abstract conceptions of equality or reciprocity; there must be 
adequate space for confronting the local experiences in the spirit of shared fate citizenship. 
In Malawi, for instance, citizenship as shared fate entails not running away from the local 
tensions of resolving national language debates and constitution of national history. It is in 
confronting the actual, the near, that such a citizenship could be realised. It is in confronting 
the inherent inequalities, bias and prejudices latent in subjugation of local languages the 
learner uses only at home but never in the school that such attitudes can be cultivated. It is in 
continuously scrutinising and reinterpreting the national history that has shaped the civil 
society as well as challenge political systems and tendencies that a shared fate citizenship 
could be realised. 
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4.3.1. Relevance of nationality in modern citizenship  
A question might arise as to why, out of all the commitments individuals freely make on 
account of their preferences, national belonging is to be valued to an extent of necessitating 
its inclusion in the conceptualisation of citizenship. What of people who have weaker 
affinities to the nation or those who do not value it altogether? 
The nation affects all members in a number of ways. Although affinity to the nation varies 
among members, some of whom have even stronger affinities to some subgroups within the 
nation, still the nation has potential to and does affect the members in significant ways. 
Nationality is generally the host for diverse individuals’ “shared interests, needs, and 
preferences” that make possible political action and political expression for both the 
individual and the collective through social practice (Ben-Porath, 2012: 389). 
Some would argue that citizenship is about sharing multiple fates (in plural, not Ben Poreth’s 
singular form), largely informed by power, hence as one of the numerous fates, national 
belonging has very insignificant moral weight (DesRoches, 2016: 545). For such proponents, 
such a citizenship recognises that almost in the entirety of our lives and in our society almost 
all our identities and differences are constructed by power and nationality has no special 
relevance (DesRoches, 2016: 545). This being the case, democracy is not something which 
we may choose depending on convenience to either get into or out of. This is because 
democracy is in constant occurrence in every context and is not static, but continuously 
happening (DesRoches, 2016: 545). 
This position is compelling in that irrespective of the intensity of one’s attachment to the 
nation, politics does undergird all the domains of one’s existence. However, we need to bear 
in mind that the political power that shapes almost every facet of the life of the citizen in the 
nation is not value-neutral. The relevance, scope and nature of the power is largely 
attributable to the shared cultural experiences and outlooks of a society. This is why the 
further allusion that a citizenship of fates should be based only on “an allegiance to the 
principles of freedom and equality” (DesRoches, 2016: 544) is problematic, as has been 
shown in the previous section. 
A similar problematic position is advanced by Merry (2009: 393), who argues for a critical 
patriotism against loyal patriotism (one is unsure why Merry (2009) picks the most extreme 
and generally unacceptable form of patriotism), claiming that “given the trappings of loyal 
patriotism, it might seem desirable to advocate a kind of ‘world citizenship’, an allegiance as 
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it were not to one national context but to the wider human community”. For such positions, 
depoliticisation of nationality is necessary in order to reduce nationality to a mere private 
good, ostensibly to avoid nurturing populism that may result in the majority suppressing 
individual liberty (Vázquez-Arroyo, 2008: 145). 
Similarly, Gorski (2012) is dismissive of education for citizenship practices that are sensitive 
to learners’ cultural backgrounds as a means of achieving educational equity in the school in 
multicultural societies. For Gorski (2012), culture is just a dimension of an individual’s 
numerous and complex identities and as such no fundamental predictions can be made about 
an individual based on his or her cultural identity. Doing so, Gorski (2012: 223) argues, 
amounts to stereotyping and essentialism, that “there is a single and constituent true nature 
shared among large groups of people” and as such we cannot be able to grasp who the learner 
actually is. For Gorski (2012: 224), cultural proficiency and competence are insufficient if 
not incapable of ensuring a just power distribution, which he attributes to be the major cause 
of inequality, and emphasising culture weakens emphasis on justice. For such perspectives, a 
shared national identity is not necessary to ground democratic citizenship whose education 
should not be about allegiance to certain commitments such as patriotism, because it soon 
becomes a basis for excluding those whose ideas and behaviour are deemed as departing from 
the standard of patriotic citizenship (Williams, 2003:208). 
Possibilities of patriotism being abused are replete in history and cannot be denied. However, 
this does not establish inherent unacceptability of patriotism, particularly in its tolerant and 
democratic forms. If, among others, patriotism constitutes in preservation of inclusive forms 
of national belonging, heritage and ways of life, it is difficult to establish how it may be 
deemed unacceptable. 
Furthermore, if in the global citizenship education recognising aspects of patriotism include 
use and maintenance of national language(s), the relevance of shared national history and 
shared territory that evokes a myriad of different and usually unique levels of emotional 
attachment to a particular nation among members than to any other land, then it becomes hard 
to imagine how patriotism can be perceived as a social construct or a mere tool for others’ 
exclusion. In the pervasiveness of global interconnectedness, we need neither conflate nor 
synonymise the nation with the nation-state. The nation is prior to the state, such that loss of 
state sovereignty does not necessarily extinguish it (Hutchinson, 2000: 654). People who 
share national membership also share certain common ways of life, no matter how minimally 
(Miller, 1995: 41).  
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Besides national belonging being of varying value to the people, their shared language is a 
means through which they share common modes of meaning-making. It is very easy for 
individuals in nation-states that are monolingual and whose languages have a very strong 
international presence as languages of science and scholarship, to tend to think that they have 
no national sentiments (Nieto, 2008: 136). However, were the situation otherwise and the 
people were expected to juggle between a mother tongue at home and an exclusively official 
and foreign language in the school and official domains, the complexities in navigating the 
two linguistic and national worlds would become vivid. The reality of the value of one’s 
cultural belonging becomes starkly glaring. Such tendencies result in competition and undue 
compromising of the identity and cultural self-expression embedded in the language of the 
community.  
In arguing for the uncoupling of citizenship from the nation-state, Williams (2003: 209) holds 
that “most of our current understandings of citizenship are based on the historic convergence 
of boundaries of citizenship (territorial, cultural/national/linguistic, institutional, and moral) 
that are now pulling apart”. But are these sites (not essentially boundaries) of citizenship 
pulling apart? They may not all be, once we are mindful of the enduring distinction between 
the nation and the nation-state. State sovereignty is indisputably in rapid decline. The same 
cannot be said to be the case with nationality, whose rate of change is much lower than that 
of the state and does not entail a decline (Hutchinson, 2000: 654). Furthermore, if the 
citizenship boundaries are pulling apart at all, in what manner or pattern are they pulling 
apart? If we are to closely observe the manner and implications of the said pulling apart now 
occurring, our response would actually be the opposite: Other than annihilation of nationality, 
we would call for its protection in its tolerable forms. Take language, for instance.  
The manner in which linguistic changes are occurring in the world today is lopsided. The 
dominant languages of the developed nations dominate and are indeed ‘pulling apart’ (with 
pun intended) all other national languages that cannot match the economic and political 
dominance of the developed nations. As to whether the causes behind this linguistic 
domination is justified or not, that is a different question altogether. Suffice to say, though, 
that one of the causes of such domination is the neoliberalism drive that is compelling all 
political and social institutions to be arranged based on free market fundamentalism (Giroux, 
2005: 210). The ultimate implication of neoliberalism is that all nations must sacrifice some 
of the uncommodified aspects of their collective ways of life in which they find meaning, out 
of economic prudence (Giroux, 2005: 210). 
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4.3.2. Patriotism and inclusion 
Opponents of patriotism advance an alternative citizenship as shared fate without any 
particularistic content, one where one’s fate is tied to that of others on a different common 
platform (Habermas, 2001; Williams, 2003; Merry, 2009; Gorski, 2012; Nili, 2015). They 
argue that the only meaningful fate citizens share does not depend on common national 
culture, but more importantly on “institutional [and] material linkages”, among other things 
(Williams, 2003: 230). But how can this be without a shared language and deliberate 
collective commitment to maintain it? How can this be without referencing to shared 
territory? How can this be without a shared political and social history they have all 
experienced and of which they are in a way products? Such impartial and neutral positions 
seek to develop a detached citizenship that only shares universal attributes across nations and 
the world. It is denying people’s concreteness, which they must instead regard as a stumbling 
block. This is perilous. 
This reductionism of how human beings are situated needs to be avoided. We cannot 
conclude that all human beings have the same comprehensive value of their territory, for 
example. However, it is even more problematic to understand human beings as having no 
sense of placed-ness, therefore devoid of an attachment to their place of development and 
habitation. Natives who have alternative places to which to relocate with similar political and 
economic structures as those in their home country do not, however, do so in dire times of 
crisis and hardship out of this sense of attachment. Migrants who volitionally move to one 
nation for resettlement embrace that place as part of their belonging, though not necessarily 
substituting the value of their initial homeland. National belonging is accommodative of 
either dual citizenship or multi-citizenship. 
Opponents of nationality call for a critical patriotism that is not characteristically patriotic, 
ostensibly because a critical patriotism advocates tolerance in contrast to national patriotism. 
Apparently, in contrast to national patriotism, “the critical patriot will embrace what is 
wonderful about one’s homeland on the understanding that its ideals extend to all citizens 
irrespective of one’s colour … creed or political affiliation” (Merry, 2009: 379) (my 
emphasis). The critical patriot “will consider the welfare of those outside of one’s borders 
and understand one’s role as citizen in ways not confined by national borders or geopolitical 
expediency” (Merry, 2009: 379). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
160 
In as much as critical patriotism is expected to be all-inclusive and welcoming of any would-
be member irrespective of arbitrary factors such as race, creed or gender, we need not equate 
such tolerance with value neutrality. Political systems and institutions are shaped by 
linguistic, historical, territorial and cultural experiences, and the political is supposed to 
respond to contestations and reconstructions based on such experiences. We also need not to 
regard any national affinities particular to a place and people as inherently morally 
reprehensible. Aspersions of a patriotism associated with the nation are a distortion, because 
an “uncritical patriotic sentiment” is not “inherent in the notion” of patriotism qua patriotism 
(Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). 
One wonders how patriotic at all such critical patriotism oriented towards the civic life only 
is. Its regard for the value of the common national heritage is one of mere tokenism and is not 
only indifferent to but actively bolsters a detachment from and a denial of a people’s 
rootedness. Citizens being advocated for by this brand of critical patriotism are by 
implication expected to be patriotic to all democratic communities in the world, regarding 
every place of the earth as having equal affective value to them like any other. Ultimately, 
this is a negation of what patriotism essentially ought to be. Critical patriotism should invite 
us to a reflective and responsible celebration of that which makes us us, without attaching a 
sense of unjustifiable guilt to any such inclusive celebration of one’s heritage (White, 1996: 
328; Hansen, 2011). 
Furthermore, it is erroneous to allege, as does Gorski (2012: 224), that in education for 
citizenship emphasising culture de-emphasises justice, ostensibly because the foundational 
inequalities that matter for learners are rooted in power imbalances and remain untouched by 
emphasis on learners’ culture or nationality in the school. In both a multicultural society and 
a globalised world, education for democratic citizenship perspective that fails to attach 
sensitivity to the force of cultural background assumes that the routines and practices in the 
local school are themselves devoid of cultural import. However, a dominant culture, 
dominant in number of members or economic power or both, shapes the school culture and 
the wider society outside the school (Yosso, 2005; Nieto, 2008; Ladson-Billings, 2014). 
One’s fitting into the school as well as in official roles outside the school is heavily biased 
and at times prejudiced towards one getting into the mainstream culture first. By calling for 
allegiance to democratic ideals only and claiming that injustice resides in power distribution 
only in the multicultural and global community, such versions of critical patriotism overlook 
the fact that although in some way inequalities are traceable to power inequalities, such 
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power inequalities are themselves established in the privileging of one culture or nationality 
over others. 
If I am not proficient in the dominant language of the community, my achievement in school 
will be adversely affected. Outside the school, in the wider society, with such a proficiency I 
will likely encounter subtle prejudice from employers (if they lack multicultural awareness). 
My background, betrayed by my language non-proficiency, will instigate attitudes of 
unsuitability, as they will interpret my non-proficiency as a likely shortage of certain 
knowledge and skills regarding the dominant culture that may be deemed necessary for 
effective and efficient performance in a particular job. Conversely, my non-proficiency may 
consciously or unconsciously direct the prospective employer’s attention to prevailing biases 
and prejudices against the ethnic group associated with my accent or dominant language 
skills. Therefore, contrary to claims of critical patriotism, it is necessary that today people 
living in multicultural societies as well as in the modern interconnected globe should be 
aware of the otherness of the other as not constituting a barrier. It is necessary that nationality 
that hosts the other’s history, language and culture be included and not excluded in modern 
education for democratic citizenship configurations to avoid subtle marginalisation of the 
other. 
Unmoderated hypersensitivity to cultural or national identification of learners may indeed 
obscure the actual identity of learners and has the risk of promoting stereotypes, as Gorski 
(2012: 223) observes. However, it is worth noting that sensitivity to learners’ culture is not 
the only means of ensuring equity, although in the global world and multicultural society, a 
lack of such sensitivity hosts some profound inequalities. Despite its aforementioned 
limitations, sensitivity to cultural and linguistic diversity captures much of the sources of 
marginalisation learners as individuals would experience in a school that is obviously 
dominated by a given language and culture that could be both explicitly and subtly expressed. 
Conversely, education that fails to attach sensitivity to the force of cultural background 
assumes that the routines and practices in the multicultural school and global world are 
culture- and value-free. However, as shall be later argued in subsequent sections (5.4. and 
5.5.), the dominant culture of the school setup requires one to first get into the mainstream 
culture if one is to attain academic achievement. 
The discourse of patriotism needs to be saved from both (uncritical) nationalism and anti-
nationalism currents currently prevailing (Papastephanou, 2013a: 23). Patriotism that has an 
attachment to the nation “has been incriminated for lack of resistance to public policies and 
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for blind commitment to the country’s interest, right or wrong” and is usually associated with 
lack of criticality (Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). Only constitutional patriotism is usually 
regarded as the only acceptable form of patriotism (Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). However, the 
anti-national patriotism conception of citizenship chooses to ignore the political solidarity 
mobilisation value of nationality, such as its indispensable utility in inspiring movements 
aimed at achieving independence from  colonial oppression (Papastephanou, 2013a: 23). 
Therefore, with respect to the state and democracy, the nation is not a mere “reactive 
principle”, but rather the very principle that coheres and drives movements aimed at restoring 
both justice and the state in aftermaths of different threats and catastrophes (Hutchinson, 
2000: 653). Patriotism is therefore “an important regulatory principle of contemporary 
politics, concerned with questions of the moral content and boundaries of a collectivity over 
which power is exercised, rather than of power, per se” (Hutchinson, 2000: 653). 
The nation and the state are distinct, but they have been collaborating. The collaboration the 
nation has with the political (encompassing the economic, legal, environmental) locally is 
now being extended to the globe. This is in such a way that the agents of globalisation are 
also in part being informed by and serving national interests (Hutchinson, 2000: 667). 
Despite globalisation being a multilateral process, its context is one of inequalities among 
nations, politically and economically, and most of the economically weaker nation states are 
under the deep influence of developed nations that shape globalisation structures (Barrow, 
2005: 129). Therefore, globalisation today is not about an eclipse of the nation as is the case 
with the state, but rather essentially about the nation aligning its interests with agents of 
globalisation (Barrow, 2005: 129). 
The ‘nationalisation’ of globalisation by powerful nations is evident in much of Africa and 
Malawi. The extinguishing of national belonging in citizenship conceptualisation, achieved 
through the use of English as the only exclusive medium of instruction in the school for 
instance, and the removal of national History from the curriculum temptingly seem as an 
inconsequential. The justification of such ‘inevitable’ acts is not in principles that are 
normative. Rather, it is grounded in principles of efficient organisation of global integration 
(Akteruzzaman & Islam, 2017: 195). The ‘necessary and inevitable’ convenience of global 
integration strip the removal of mother-tongue instruction and local history from the 
curriculum of normativity rendering such a removal as merely a matter of the pragmatism of 
global integration convenience. People in economically weaker nations such as Malawi will, 
due to strong cosmopolitan citizenship preconditions, have their linguistic as well as 
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historical heritage that constitute their meaning-making frameworks systematically displaced 
and done away with (Kamwendo, 2010). Inevitably, the death of nationality, as the goal of 
the strong cosmopolitanism project, will coerce them to become something, that which 
embeds the cosmopolitan and global way of life. We should, however, not lose cognisance 
that so long as emphasising nationality enables them be and freely become in a globalised 
world without coercion, then in principle, there is an obligation to preserve nationality. In as 
far as extinguishing of nationality will make them not to be and to become only by embracing 
the universal, which is also in other respects a ‘particular other’, such becoming is passively 
imposed and amounts to domination (Pettit, 1997: 52), hence needs to be prevented. 
A critic would argue that recognition of national groups’ cultures even with their validation 
tag of the right to exit is unfavourable to the group’s marginalised, such as women, girls and 
minorities. Such a recognition, so would continue the critic, will only serve to perpetrate 
oppression that occurs in cultural groups that will be insulated from public critique (Okin, 
2003: 325). This is because the nature of the structures of oppression within cultural 
institutions is usually so intricate that the oppressed women are far much less likely restrained 
from exercising the right to exit even when they so wish (Okin, 2003: 325). It should, 
however, be noted that the national culture being defended here is not synonymous with 
closed ethnic or religious cultures that are not subject to critique, fairness and inclusion. 
Rather, this is defence for citizenship whose configuration has adequate consideration to local 
or national elements the people freely share in contrast to extinguishing such elements in the 
spirit of (strong) cosmopolitanism. It is thin, not thick, nationality (Kymlicka, 2002a) and it is 
open to incessant contestation and does not compromise on communicative freedom of the 
individual as one of the individual’s most foundational rights (Benhabib, 2011: 129). 
Therefore, preservation of patriotism or national belonging does not entail exclusion of non-
native members. It need not be ethnically exclusionist in nature. Despite having some 
emotive value, a shared culture whose origins and foundations are undeniably ethnic is and 
indeed must be accommodative and open to others to join.  
In addition, it is necessary to include aspects of the nation’s historical and linguistic heritage 
in the school curriculum other than being neutral about them. The patriotism being defended 
here does not merely aim at preservation and continuity of inheritances of national history 
and languages to be passed on to the next generation. Rather, such a form of patriotic 
citizenship contests and reinterprets the history so that the next generation of citizens 
independently draw meaning and value from the history (Ben-Porath, 2012). The learners 
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themselves as critical beings are also active participants in this reinterpretation. Therefore, the 
content of the nation’s history as well as its interpretation are subject to incessant 
contestation. 
Since reciprocity is very central in democratic citizenship (Kymlicka, 2002a: 225), patriotic 
citizenship demands much more than civic learning about governance and its systems. It goes 
further demanding that individuals acquire as much knowledge as possible about the other, 
whether locally or globally, and how to engage with them at both the political and the civil 
society levels (Ben-Porath, 2012). Therefore, besides cultivating solidarity, the school and the 
state alike must also have a commitment to ensuring respect for the well-being and 
flourishing of those with other loyalties and identities apart from the national ones (Ben-
Porath, 2012: 383). 
It is apparent that inclusion of nationality in citizenship neither excludes otherness nor does it 
push down on everybody solidarity values at the expense of individual freedom. What 
happens when other members join in? Firstly, such a shared nation culture is capacious 
(Kymlicka, 2002a: 245) and accommodative of other aspects of being. It does not require 
assimilation. Secondly, the incessant contestation of what should constitute patriotic is aimed 
at ultimately including its minority cultures in the constitution of the patriotic project. In the 
end, the narrative of the nation will be a product of liberally hybridised experiences and 
stories. It will neither be clinging on to the romanticised old past before others migrated in, 
nor will it be assimilationist or detached from the people’s actual and lived experiences: their 
otherness and their concreteness. Furthermore, the multiplicity of its national composition 
will not entail neutrality, for that does not adequately serve anyone in the project. Just as civic 
solidarity requires that individuals and groups confront, review and reform aspects of their 
being to align with democratic tolerance while still retaining individuality, hence making 
political cooperation possible, so too with national patriotism. 
Those who join a community, in as much as they may likely have other loyalties elsewhere, 
should be reasonably expected to embrace sharable aspects of their new fate, such as learning 
its language, now as a member among those sharing a common fate. This will enhance not 
only new members’ (political) participation in the community of shared fate; more 
importantly, it will accord the new members the opportunity and ability to help determine the 
direction of the community in sync with their otherwise minority interests (Kymlicka, 2002b: 
26). It is therefore necessary that the substance of patriotism must always check against 
exclusion and marginalisation of minorities. This is why, for instance, it should accommodate 
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duo or multi-nationality (Macedo, 2003: 420) among its members. This is because “nations 
are Janus-faced”, looking into an ancient past on the one hand while mobilising members to 
achieve “collective autonomy and progress” on the other hand (Hutchinson, 2000: 651).  
Most nations are not culturally homogenous. They are characterised by differences 
manifested in contestations in the nature and content of their “symbolic and political 
projects” (Hutchinson, 2000: 654). Rival positions within a nation show differences in social 
visions regarding historical, linguistic, social, economic and political relationships within and 
outside the group (Hutchinson, 2000: 662). Such competing social visions result in debates 
about and from which the nation’s common heritage is established through drawing from 
each side of the debate without necessarily aiming to have one unanimous definition of 
national heritage (Hutchinson, 2000: 664). This shows that contrary to critics, patriotism is 
not synonymous with overt assimilation. 
Ideal patriotism is both reactive and active in its character (Papastephanou, 2011: 222). It is 
reactive when it is the rallying point for solidarity against threats to the collectivity 
(Papastephanou, 2011: 221), including internal injustices and inequalities. Further, it must be 
active “in opening ever-new paths to justice: if you love a collectivity, you critically approach 
its dominant values and combat its exclusions, its narrowness and its nationalisms” 
(Papastephanou, 2011: 221). There is no intrinsic hostility and oppression in national 
belongingness. As objects that are perpetually developing and evolving, cultures are not a 
threat to political stabilisation and individual liberty within the nation or across the globe. 
There must be incessant dialogue among subjectivities to ensure that there is no oppression of 
any subjectivity. An absence of dialogue among members as to what constitutes patriotism or 
nationality merely serves the narrow interests of those with unevenly distributed privileges to 
preserve unfair imbalances that advantage them within the community (Freire, 2014: 179). 
Put differently: 
Dialogical cultural action [aims] at surmounting the antagonistic contradictions of the social 
structure, thereby achieving the liberation of human beings. Anti-dialogical cultural action, 
on the other hand, aims at mythicizing such contradictions, thereby hoping to avoid (or 
hinder insofar as possible) the radical transformation of reality. (Freire, 2014: 179) 
Nation-states are the centre for the preservation, sustenance and development of nationality in 
both developed and developing nations (Kuvaldin & Ryabov, 1999: 127). Other than for 
economic or democratic procedural interests, secessionist movements in even developed 
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democratic nation-states are motivated by and aim at perpetuating the most tolerable forms of 
their nation by invoking the right to national self-determination (Kuvaldin & Ryabov, 1999: 
127; Kymlicka, 2002a: 252).  The same is the case for developing nations whose cultures 
(contested as they always are and should be) face an annihilation through the extinguishing of 
their active recognition in strong cosmopolitan citizenship configuration. The means for 
retaining their linguistic, historical as well as national identity in education are under threat 
through the exclusion of national considerations in education for democratic citizenship. 
Patriotism is therefore still necessary for its normative value as well as its role in sustenance 
of local democracy. The following section seeks to argue for the defensibility and necessity 
of patriotism in configurations of global citizenship. 
4.3.3. Patriotism and global citizenship 
Education for democratic citizenship that is largely oriented towards a civic rather than 
national patriotism ignores the necessity of learning about the nation’s particularism. This 
ultimately undermines the necessity of certain crucial aspects of nationality, usually taken for 
granted by global citizenship and yet indispensable in the achievement of both civic and 
global citizenship. 
Patriotism has two complementary dimensions: the inward and the outward (Papastephanou, 
2013b). The inward has the national community as its central locus, dealing with social 
visions about “improving its laws, regulating citizens’ actions, coordinating diverse 
expectations of social groups within the state, and fulfilling political promises within the 
community” (Papastephanou, 2013b: 170). The outward-looking dimension of patriotism 
“faces toward what is located outside the national community yet is entangled with it in one 
way or other” (Papastephanou, 2013b: 170). Patriotism necessarily has these two faces 
because “as a particularist collective ethos, ideal and virtue, [patriotism] concerns both 
belonging in a collectivity and differentiation from other collectivities” (Papastephanou, 
2013b: 171). 
With respect to internal patriotism, it is not possible to have a meaningful and sustainable 
education for democratic citizenship that is detached from the community’s history as well as 
linguistic heritage. If selection of content for a curriculum does not involve interrogating the 
community’s history and relations with other nations, then knowledge about democratic 
ideals will be passive and merely informative, incapable of invoking appropriate action. What 
ideals to include and emphasise in a curriculum ought to be informed by both local and 
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emerging experiences. Cosmopolitan citizenship is supposed to be understood as a “double-
stranded tradition: universality plus difference” (Appiah, 2008: 92). Practically, the different 
local comes first.  
Although democratic ideals and values are universal, the USA, for instance, perennially 
characterised by effects of the heritage of systematic racial inequality, might obviously be 
expected to emphasise interrogation of its concrete history through the democratic values of 
tolerance and inclusion. The situation would be different for another country, such as 
Norway, which has neither had such a type of history nor is having such pervasive effects 
prevailing strongly today. The point here is that we cannot avoid to include a nation’s history 
in education for democratic citizenship, as it is what gives context and meaning to the 
otherwise passive and abstract principles of civic patriotism. The reason why nation X must 
necessarily emphasise one democratic value over another is due to its ambivalent histories 
that are not only past experiences but whose structures and effects are still active, forming 
and malforming present life. Such politics can neither be comprehended nor corrected 
without making recourse to the particularism of their histories. 
In the global sphere, exclusion of national history in education for democratic citizenship 
ignores how the nation has been and continues to be a perpetrator of injustice towards other 
nations around the world (Papastephanou, 2013b). A global citizenship formulation that is 
antagonistic to patriotism is incapable of precisely identifying, confronting and addressing 
prevalent global inequalities. Most of such inequalities have a national taproot, with some 
being an enduring result of national encounters that led to historical injustices such as 
colonialism, military conquests and neglect of moral global duty. By focusing only on 
procedural justice, civic patriotism implicitly unproblematises the prevailing implications of 
such encounters and absolves the current and next generations of responsibility where any 
exists. Worse still, it fails to equip the responsible nation’s citizens and the world at large 
with an awareness of how to stop the repetition and perpetuation of the mistakes of the past, 
some of which are still prevailing in mutated forms. 
Contrary to the common refrain of inherent evil, outward patriotism, because of its active 
recognition of the dominant shared idiosyncrasies of the nation, is not only compatible with 
cosmopolitanism, but more importantly it is its indispensable collaborator (Papastephanou, 
2013b: 173). As shown earlier, nationality precedes the state and can possibly outlive it. This 
is because due to the loss of the nation-state’s sovereignty following globalisation, national 
interest has subtly aligned itself with agents of globalisation. Not only has nationality 
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survived, but it also now informs the operation of agents of global political power 
(Hutchinson, 2000). Today, through their economic, military and scientific advantages, 
‘strong’ nations actively and/or passively produce global inequalities through their deeds or 
misdeeds.  
Unless there is recognition of other nations outside, who are impacted by such powerful 
nations’ actions, assuming responsibility becomes difficult, if not impossible. This is so 
because nation-neutral global citizenship lacks the capacity to consider the concreteness of 
other global nations’ otherness because it acknowledges commonality only among nations. 
Therefore, only the generality of otherness, not its concreteness, guides relations with nations 
of the world. Such commonality-only terms of engagement ignore profound difference and its 
meaningful value to the other. The range of what is in all people’s interests is quite 
contestable and should neither be taken for granted nor always generalised. Therefore, 
defence for nationality lies beyond its internal optics where it is essentially about the social 
visions members share and contestably rally behind together in the nation (Papastephanou, 
2013a: 24). It is crucial for ethical international relations. 
The outward dimension of patriotism ensures that the “quality and value of the community’s 
conduct in the world” is not exclusively determined solely by standards set and endorsed by 
itself without relevant external considerations (Papastephanou, 2013a: 27). Rather, in acting, 
the nation must in fair measure consider the evaluative standards, different as they may be, of 
other nations likely to be affected by its action. The recognition of there being other nations 
in the world, and not just similar people like us, but other than us, will call for caution, 
empathy and reasonableness. Contrary to popular claims, outward patriotism is therefore 
“less ethnocentric and self-absorbed” (Papastephanou, 2013a: 27) than inward patriotism, 
which encompasses civic patriotism. Outward patriotism is sensitive to concrete otherness 
outside the nation-state. The fundamental precondition for nations to ensure mutual concern 
and respect when acting globally is grounded in the recognition of the otherness of the global 
nations. Seen this way, there is no longer a binary opposition between patriotism and 
cosmopolitanism. An ethical conceptualisation of cosmopolitan citizenship therefore feeds on 
recognition of nationality across the globe. 
Patriotism’s outward-looking dimension is very crucial in the modern interconnected, diverse 
world that is also characterised by inequalities. The nation’s relevance is not only with 
respect to how its members share common ways of life on which common political 
institutions are established. Rather, in the global arena, when relating with an other nation, 
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with unfavourable social economic conditions, with insignificant influence in global science 
(with its attendant global linguistic medium), technology, economy, politics and security, we 
will be mindful of the potential and actuality of national domination over others with a 
weaker status. 
As earlier highlighted, the nation predates the state. Economic, political and legal institutions 
agglutinate on aspects of nationality to capture the shared interests and shared meaning-
making frameworks of collective agency. Now that some of the roles of the state are 
delegated to or taken over by global forces and institutions, it necessarily justifies why 
collective national interests have not been left behind alone. Because nationality substantially 
gives meaning to political and economic systems, nationality cannot be and should not be left 
behind, stuck in the now impotent nation-state. Global cooperation is and should be 
responsive to national interests. However, the consequent challenge in the prevailing global 
order is that some nations’ interests may dominate, some may tend to exclude others, while 
some simply may not have the economic and political tenacity to affirm themselves and 
hence preserve their mediums and frameworks of meaning making. The challenge, therefore, 
is to conceptualise an ideal globalisation where diverse cultures are equitably represented and 
sustained in the global arena. At the global level, it is only through such a recognition of 
nationality that subtle forms of national domination that persist and are embedded in both 
cosmopolitan universalism and globalising forces will be identified and addressed. Global 
citizenship critically considered in this way will neither lead to exclusion, nor will it lead to 
domination. 
In the case of a developed nation, at the global sphere, the major limitation common to both 
inward and civic patriotism is that each implies and thrives on indifference to the unfair 
global outcomes of the agency of the collective that though inspired by national interest 
nevertheless dominate and shape global structures (Papastephanou, 2013a: 27). It is therefore 
necessary that inward patriotism should not be absolute in content and radically unconditional 
in its demands to such an extent that the patriotic interests are pursued at the expense of 
global justice obligations (Papastephanou, 2013a: 27). 
Furthermore, constitutional or civic patriotism in the interest of global citizenship also has the 
potential of extolling a particular form of political processes and interactions as the most 
superior in relation to many other equally valid forms (Papastephanou, 2013a: 28). This is 
because patriotism has with it an element of possession of something (it could be culture, 
practices, language, etc.), only that in this case the object of possession will be “the civic 
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systems and procedures” that will not only be appropriated, but also accorded a form of 
supremacy, demanding that any other forms (now deemed inferior) be improved. 
Constitutional patriotism therefore has the potential to commit the very excesses it allegedly 
seeks to guard against from nationalism (Papastephanou, 2013a: 28). Civic patriotism can 
therefore still degenerate into love, not of the heritage of ethnic origin or common political 
consciousness, but rather of traits that places or communities have and which everyone who 
comes in must exude (Papastephanou, 2013a: 28). All this shows that civic patriotism is not a 
guaranteed insulation from excesses of bad patriotism associated with bad nationalism. 
All in all, citizenship in the globalised world cannot dismiss inward and outward patriotism 
existing simultaneously. The demand of strong cosmopolitanism of depoliticising national 
belonging and promotion of civic patriotism in education for democratic citizenship commits 
two normative errors. Firstly, extinguishing nationality eliminates the bedrock host of sources 
of concreteness for peoples of the world whose concreteness cannot be generalised as being 
equal across the globe. This only serves to entrench and perpetuate global inequalities. 
Secondly, extinguishing of nationality disadvantages those in economically weak nations 
whose linguistic, social, cultural and historical languages are not part of the global language. 
4.4. Education and cultural responsiveness 
Contexts for human existence are inevitably and unconsciously culturally marked. As such, 
both formal and informal school curricula as well as textbooks embed traits and influences of 
the mainstream culture (Gay & Howard, 2000; Nieto, 2000: 184), hence educators need to be 
sensitive to potential and actual subtle cultural domination (García & Guerra, 2004: 162). As 
long as education concedes that there must be no chasm between teaching and learning 
experiences in the school and the learner’s lived experiences at home, we tacitly endorse the 
inclusion of culture in the school. In other words, it is necessary that the school connects with 
learners’ cultural experiences for the education to be relevant and meaningful to them. The 
school is therefore inevitably a cultured institution. The question therefore should be about 
the nature, breadth and scope of the school’s cultural marked-ness in relation to its learners. It 
should also be about how cultural responsiveness of the school should not trump individual 
liberty and indeed the individuality of the learners. 
We cannot decouple culture from education. Defence for a culturally responsive education 
and schools is based on the normative relevance of culture to the individual’s being as well as 
that of society. Culture “provides the tools to pursue the search for meaning and to convey 
our understanding to others” (Gay, 2000: 77). Against this background, there is mutual 
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dependence between culture and communication. Communication is itself the lifeline for 
meaningful teaching and learning (Gay, 2000: 77). Cognisant that education should never be 
detached from learners’ lived experiences (Waghid, 2004), there is therefore no way we can 
isolate culture and education from constantly interacting with and influencing each other. 
Language as an object of culture and indispensable medium for communication to achieve 
teaching and learning captures this interdependence more vividly. Learners’ linguistic ability 
and communication style in relation to the mainstream and school culture have a great 
influence as either a barrier or an advantage in effective learning as well as academic 
achievement (Gay, 2000: 78). Where a learner’s proficiency in the school language is weaker, 
and if his or her cultural communication style is somewhat different from that of the school, 
the learner will, despite knowing enough or much, fail to communicate with the teachers 
(Gay, 2000: 78). Learners from ‘minority’ backgrounds whose mother tongues and school 
languages radically differ from that of school, are therefore more disadvantaged. This is 
unlike privileged learners who come to school with bigger cultural capital in the form of 
possession of the standard language as their natural language, which they effortlessly 
acquired in the home (Nieto, 2008: 136). 
Language is a mechanism through which people usually cipher, analyse, classify into 
categories and ultimately interpret experiences (Gay, 2000: 80). Therefore, language is not 
merely a neutral mechanical instrument for relaying information. It is also a people’s shared 
way of experiencing and expressing the world (Coetzee, 2003: 208). This is why crucial 
accompaniments and contexts for language such as “[d]iscourse logic and dynamics, 
delivery, styles, social functions, role expectations, norms of interaction, and non-verbal 
features”, among other things, are as important as the communication dimension of linguistic 
structure (Gay, 2000: 79). Such aspects and contexts of language and communication are 
defined by and dependent on culture. What is noteworthy is that I do not autonomously 
generate these aspects of communication accompanying language and neither do I 
autonomously give meaning to the contexts of language use. I obtain them in dialogue with 
others (Taylor, 2003). I share them in common with others. I may revise them or improve 
them, but they remain a crucial aspect of my projection and expression of myself onto others 
(Benhabib, 2011). 
All this means that besides its structure, language embodies other culturally shaped modes of 
communication. These include how and when the language is employed, other non-linguistic 
aspects and behaviours that may or not be used in sync with the language. Such dimensions 
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of communication are largely grounded in the culture in which one participates. Their value 
is anchored in shared systems and structures of meaning-making and how to relay it. 
Therefore, shared language encompasses the people’s loyalties and animosities (Coetzee, 
2003: 324). Ultimately, it is through meanings derived from such aspects of communication 
that one establishes whether the interlocutor is “caring, sharing, loving, teaching, or learning” 
(Gay, 2000: 80). Given all this, whenever there is diversity of cultural background between 
the teacher and learners, it is necessary that there be “shared communicative frames of 
reference, procedural protocols, rules of etiquette, and discourse systems” (Gay, 2000: 81). 
Given the necessity of schools’ responsiveness to culture, it is imperative that the school 
ensures that it is in synchronisation with learners’ culture both in the content of the 
curriculum and in pedagogical experiences. Communication, which is the epicentre of 
teaching and learning, is itself shaped by the interlocutors’ culture, whether they concede that 
they have one or not (Gay & Howard, 2000: 10; Nieto, 2008). How learners and teachers of 
different cultural backgrounds talk, think, listen, disagree and engage in a conversation 
equally differs largely due to their cultural orientation (Gay & Howard, 2000: 10). Different 
ethnic groups have particular concrete forms of such notions as “protest, power, politics, 
change, and the struggle for social justice” (Gay & Howard, 2000: 13; Nieto, 2008). What is 
usually ignored is that in most contexts, these ideals are linked to and indeed shaped by the 
community’s cultural or philosophical understanding of human nature. Prevalently the 
Eurocentric one dominates in education theory and practice (Andreotti, 2011a: 385; Abdi, 
2015: 15).  
Self-expression and justice, for instance, are largely understood in the sense of the primacy of 
individual interests only. However, there is variation in how one communicates one’s 
opposing opinions and how non-negotiable ideals are actualised across communities. How a 
child protests the authority of a teacher is expected to be in the context of mutual respect, not 
as an abstract norm, but as respect between an adult and a youth is understood in their 
society. The learner’s self-expression and demand for justice will have to consider among 
others, shared conceptions of respect and politeness that are themselves cleared of any 
potential for suppression. This, it must be emphasised, is not synonymous with preserving 
unjust power imbalances. Rather, it is about cultivating fitting forms of protest that will both 
empower the learner and challenge the teacher’s injustice as well as maintain (in a reflective 
manner) shared collective ideals that cohere the community. 
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This variation is, in reasonable measure, with respect to the community’s models of 
communication and self-expression that are informed by culture. For some cultures, justice 
and protest may not just be about the interests of the individual only, but must occur in 
tandem with or consideration of certain collective interests (Oko Elechi et al., 2010: 74; 
Metz, 2015). This is not to insinuate that the individual always suffers or should be forced to 
compromise his or her legitimate interests for the sake of community solidarity. Rather, it is 
to highlight that for concrete communities, protest and demands for justice exist in a 
framework of consonant interaction with other collective interests. In as much as individual 
liberty is a non-negotiable fundamental ideal, its realisation does not necessarily require 
structures that are characteristically individual-centric. Therefore, it is possible for some 
human communities to value both individual freedom and collective values without either 
contradicting or compromising any. The attainment of both should not be hindered by a false 
dilemma of either one or the other, for each has incomparable worth. 
Due to variations in shared interests and values across different communities, actualisation of 
even fundamental and universally recognised educational goals reasonably and necessarily 
varies too. For instance, in some communities’ school setups, pedagogical approaches that 
involve teamwork are likely to effectively and meaningfully involve most of the learners in 
relative comparison with doing the same task individually (Venter, 2004; Metz, 2015). As 
such, educational planning and implementation must also be largely motivated by a 
synchronisation with the community’s shared values that anchor both the society and 
education systems so that there should be no disparity between the home and the school 
(Venter, 2004: 158). 
In summary, the necessity that the school should synchronise with learners’ prior (home) 
experiences cannot be over-emphasised in education discourse. Its implication, however, is 
that by ensuring such a connection, the school in principle welcomes culture into its domains. 
In any case, naturally, the school, being a microcosm of the wider society, is expected to be 
characterised by the cultures of the learners and teachers as they associate not as learners, but 
as members of the wider society who now happen to be in the school.  
It is hence normatively imperative that the school and home (with its culture) interact, if at all 
the education is to be meaningful. At the same time, we must always ensure that home 
cultures are not displaced from the school either by a dominant culture or in the name of 
universalism that is itself laden with aspects of particularism. This is where mother tongue 
instruction, where feasible, and learning of one’s community and nation’s history become 
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very crucial. Education for democratic citizenship that displaces national history and mother 
tongue instruction effectively severs this connection. This renders the education morally 
problematic. The following section discusses how strong cosmopolitan citizenship education 
embodies this normative problem.  
4.5. Cosmopolitan citizenship education in developing nations: 
Assimilationist? 
Societies usually have disproportionate inequalities. Such inequalities manifest in the school 
with unfair consequences to learners whose social class, mother tongue, ethnic background, 
race and gender substantially differ from the mainstream (Nieto, 2000: 181). In much of 
education theory, curriculum design and content as well as school practices, educationists’ 
treatment of diversity has generally been assimilationist. This is so in that if a learner is to 
attain academic excellence, very rarely is the learner’s cultural otherness, which crucially 
informs his or communication frameworks, regarded as a vital resource, not a barrier, in the 
teaching and learning processes (Nieto, 2000: 183). The school’s epistemological orientation 
that is normatively and pragmatically inseparable from culture is unfortunately characterised 
by “hegemonic domination” by a mainstream culture only (Delgado Bernal, 1998: 556). 
In contexts where learners’ cultural background is trumped down by expecting them to 
disregard their cultural situatedness and assimilate into society’s dominant mainstream 
culture that also undergirds the school’s culture, minority background learners achieve 
academic success usually at the cost of their “cultural and psychosocial well-being” (Ladson-
Billings, 1995: 475). In education that is not responsive to the cultural situatedness of the 
learners, “the goal of education becomes how to ‘fit’ students constructed as ‘other’ by virtue 
of their race, ethnicity, language, or social class into a hierarchical structure that is defined as 
a meritocracy”, ultimately perpetuating inequities (Ladson-Billings, 1995: 467). Culturally 
relevant education, however, must ensure “criteria of academic success, cultural competence, 
and critical consciousness” in the learners (Ladson-Billings, 1995: 477). 
Those from developed nations and mostly individualistic backgrounds usually retort that they 
have no culture and are not influenced by any. They hold that their institutions are shaped and 
characterised by objective scientific principles. However, such claims overlook the social, 
economic and political power their culture has acquired, “as the officially sanctioned and 
high-status culture, it just is” (Nieto, 2008: 130). The culture subtly and deeply embeds the 
economic and political institutions of society: “tastes, values, languages, or dialects” of the 
group with the greatest power tend to have higher social privilege and dominate (Nieto, 2008: 
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135). Although an individual from such a context of prestigious international influence and 
dominance may have certain ‘neutral’ positions regarding society’s culture, it does not 
necessarily negate the existence and influence of the cultural context in which the neutral 
principles thrive. In other words, the universalism and efficiency of the neutral principles (in 
achieving a non-oppressive and inclusive society) do not as a matter of necessity deny the 
existence of and dependence on local culture. 
Given this background, approaches of strong cosmopolitanism citizenship education face the 
following challenge: How do you determine the form and content of the neutral and non-
neutral that will be compatible with the perspectives of all the people of the world? Usually, 
in both curriculum design and implementation through school practices, “what is taught, how 
it is taught, who is taught, and whose fault it is when what is taught is not learned are often 
manifestations of what is considered the legitimate body of knowledge” (Delgado Bernal, 
1998: 556). Thus, the curriculum and school practice are in essence determined by principles 
that are grounded in the dominant culture, which effectively downgrades the ostensible purity 
status of the knowledge and practices that are paraded as impartial. Success in the school is 
therefore not only an epistemological matter, but also one of “power, ethics, politics, and 
survival” (Delgado Bernal, 1998: 556).  
Education for democratic citizenship that is rooted in orientations of strong cosmopolitanism 
is insensitive to this reality, as it advances a ‘universal’ non-contextualised conception of 
citizenship. However, such a universalism has inherent cultured dimensions that may not be 
universalisable, hence the necessity for context responsiveness. It is hence imperative that we 
re-evaluate what values should be included and excluded in the quest of establishing the 
essentials for a globally-aware citizen. Epistemology, being about the nature, status and 
acquisition of knowledge, need not be understood as wholly essentialist and hence as entirely 
incontestable. Rather, a critical epistemology located in a people’s worldview must question 
the now dominant positivist universality orientation of knowledge of eurocentrism, especially 
its “objective truth versus subjective emotion” assertions (Delgado Bernal, 1998: 560). The 
epistemological positivist orientation has spread into the other disciplines, including in the 
human sciences, where inquiry for ultimate knowledge is modelled on natural scientific 
inquiry, implying that the process of knowing human nature is objective and grounded in 
establishing predictable and manipulable principles shaping their behaviour (Code, 2012: 88). 
Mainstream epistemology that shapes and informs different disciplines today generally 
recognises and venerates only what it regards as objective knowledge, which must be value-
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neutral and independent of context, and must “transcend the particularities of experience to 
achieve purity” (Code, 2012: 88). For this dominant knowledge model, subjectivity is not part 
of pure knowledge (Code, 2012: 88). Objective knowledge is ostensibly accorded purity 
because it  is governed by “the norms of formal sameness”, which necessarily exclude 
“practical and experiential differences” in order to achieve homogeneity accessible only by a 
“disinterested and dislocated view from nowhere” (Code, 2012: 88). 
What is however often crucially ignored is that in the history of Western philosophy, the 
rationality and objectivity core ideals of mainstream epistemology have been built on the 
suppression of properties and experiences that prejudice against other experiences, such as 
those associated with femininity and the underclasses on the social status hierarchy (Code, 
2012: 91). Such attributes as “emotion, connection, practicality, sensitivity, idiosyncrasy” and 
so forth are regarded as inhibitive to acquisition of pure knowledge and their exclusion is part 
of the normative conduct in epistemic inquiry (Code, 2012: 91). This implies that … 
… ideal objectivity is a tacit generalization from the subjectivity of quite a small social 
group, albeit a group that has the power, security, and prestige to believe that its experiences 
and normative ideals hold generally across the social order, thus producing a group of like-
minded practitioners (“we”) and dismissing “others” as deviant, aberrant (“they”). These 
groupings are generated more as a by-product of systematically ignoring concrete 
experiences, of working with an idealized conception of experience “in general,” to speak, 
than as a conscious and intentional practice of reifying experiences that are specifically theirs 
(Code, 2012: 91–92). 
According to Code (2012: 91–92), in essence, the ideology of objectivity is simply one of 
other knowledge perspectives that are appealing to and better advance the interests of one 
group of society (powerful white men) out of many other groups of the society. Its summary 
dismissal of experience and otherness is largely based on group interests other than purity of 
knowledge. There is therefore now necessity for “case-by-case analysis and critique of the 
sources out of which claims to objectivity and neutrality are made” (Code, 2012: 92). 
Objectivity fails to meet its own cardinal term of consistence, as its own conclusions about 
the nature of experiences that constitute knowledge are prejudicially and exclusively selected, 
hence objectivity is inherently (though unintentionally) designed to be inconsistent with all 
the (other) otherwise valid knowledge there is. This, for Code (2012: 92), necessitates caution 
before accepting the “theoretical hegemony” claims of objectivity. We need to take 
subjectivity into account before accepting ‘objective’ claims, because the veracity of such 
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knowledge is preconditioned on the inherent exclusion of other legitimate sources of 
knowledge. For Code (2012), such claims may also in principle conceal essentially subjective 
experiences that are institutionalised as pure and objective. 
Even for the legitimately objective knowledge with universally applicable criteria for 
evidence, the characteristics and contexts of the knowledge constructors matter, and this 
ranges from their motivation for inquiry, emotional attachment and their cultural and 
historical influences to their social class (Code, 2012: 92). Such subjectivity considerations 
may not alter the provability and veracity of the objective knowledge claims. However, they 
are crucial in debates about the worth of such claims. The worth of such claims has bearings 
on such issues as how to establish credibility, how knowledge and power relate, the nature of 
the knowledge and procedures for its acquisition, and also has bearings on “the place of 
knowledge in ethical and aesthetic judgments” (Code, 2012: 93). Knowledge generation and 
its hierarchical positioning in terms of alleged relevance and veracity are therefore neither 
neutral, nor objective, nor disinterested endeavours. 
Western societies are largely shaped by “liberal-utilitarian moral values”, among other 
values, and their intellectual orientation is largely influenced by “empirical-positivist values” 
(Code, 2012: 93). In collaboration, these two shape the “epistemic and moral-political ideals 
that govern inquiry in technological, capitalist, free-enterprise western societies” (Code, 
2012: 93). This is why even in public discourse, claims that are drawn from a scientific model 
of inquiry are given the highest credibility by the wider public (Code, 2012: 93). 
Furthermore, such claims are effectively used as a basis of discrediting any other subjective 
and non-conforming accounts (Code, 2012: 93; Nyamnjoh, 2012: 131). It is erroneous to 
conclude that every human society across the world should have its economic, technological, 
political and educational institutions modelled on positivist values only. Even worse is the 
measuring up of all communities of the world to an ostensibly positivist and individual-
centric evaluation standard to establish the compatibility of their experiences with human 
dignity and universalism of human equality. 
A global citizenship based on the positivist model of knowledge strips nations’ otherness of 
its meaningful value to their constituent individuals or communities. By excluding the 
diversity of the other and embracing only the commonality of human beings, it recognises 
only one form of being an individual in the world that must be applicable to all people. The 
ultimate result, ironically, is that it is those that do not fit into this positivist model that need 
to adjust, and not the model itself, whose veracity and superiority in determining matters 
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regarding human nature and the human condition are ostensibly unparalleled and absolutely 
final. 
The claim that all human interests, aspirations, values and emotions can be understood in 
some objective, universal disinterested way is wrong (Nyamnjoh, 2012). Education for 
democratic citizenship that only concentrates on and emphasises universal norms and ideals, 
necessarily precluding local (national) norms and ideals, falls prey to such positivist scientific 
hegemony about human nature. Despite that the ostensibly universal and neutral, strong 
cosmopolitan citizenship education is laden with particularistic perspectives and values, its 
hegemony exacerbates the marginalisation of the concreteness and otherness of those local 
experiences that the universal discourse deems subjective. From a global perspective, 
depoliticisation and privatisation of culture in education, in the name of culture’s subjectivity, 
is not an initiative in favour of objectivity. Objective global citizenship must not only 
tolerate, but also embrace as a crucial part of its project the subjectivity of nationality. 
The dichotomy between the universal objective and the particular subjectivities is a false one. 
Positivist facts are always compatible with subjective values and both need to be subjected to 
critical debate. Therefore, the idea of the neutrality over national subjectivity in formulations 
of cosmopolitan citizenship is neither always nor the sole universal way of grounding a 
citizenship responsive to global equality. We need to consider subjectivity as well in 
knowledge claims and not only objectivity, which is exclusive of others, because “the ideal 
objectivity of the universal knower” is so limited and never universal in all epistemic 
inquiries (Code, 2012: 97). Endeavours of ensuring individual freedom in the world that 
regard subjectivity in contrast with universalisable objectivity as antithetical to its realisation 
are both simplistic and a negation of the reality of human nature, as the two exist in mutual 
interaction (Freire, 2014: 50). 
Because people do not “exist apart from the world, apart from reality”, meaningful and 
liberating education must always start from the perspective of “men and women in the ‘here 
and now’, which constitutes the situation within which they are submerged, from which they 
emerge, and in which they intervene” (Freire, 2014: 85). This is because … 
… [p]eople, as beings “in a situation,” find themselves rooted in temporal-spatial conditions 
which mark them and which they also mark. They will tend to reflect on their own 
“situationality” to the extent that they are challenged by it to act upon it. Human beings are 
because they are in a situation. And they will be more the more they not only critically 
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reflect upon their existence but critically act upon it (Freire, 2014: 109) (emphasis in 
original). 
Similarly, the universal and objective pronouncements of strong cosmopolitan citizenship and 
their alleged truth power may potentially serve to alienate and disempower people in other 
parts of the world, while empowering some as well as perpetuating their dominance. Strong 
cosmopolitan citizenship achieves this through advancing Eurocentric perspectives embedded 
in the curriculum content where for instance, such content actively suggests that political 
recognition of the local and cultural are unconditionally incompatible with cosmopolitan 
impartiality and universalism. In other words, ultimately, perspectives holding that among the 
absolute preconditions for cosmopolitan citizenship is depoliticisation and privatisation of the 
national and the local are assimilationist. 
There is therefore a need for a “culturally relevant pedagogy” in education for global 
citizenship under which the learners in nations without dominance in the global sphere should 
always be “repositioned into a place of normativity” where they become “subjects” other than 
mere objects in the teaching and learning experiences (Ladson-Billings, 2014: 76). A 
cosmopolitan citizenship that depoliticises nationality aspects in the curriculum and school 
practices only coerces learners to assimilate into the mainstream ostensibly culture-neutral 
universalism. 
4.5.1. Global citizenship and pluralism 
A nation-neutral cosmopolitan education creates a needless conflict between the ideals of 
equality and pluralism, presenting the valuable ideals as being in conflict unless pluralism is 
privatised. Equality entails impartiality in the distribution of relevant obligations and 
entitlements. Pluralism presupposes distinctiveness and concreteness of the other. 
Depoliticisation of the nation in strong cosmopolitan citizenship education as a condition for 
achieving equality undermines the worth of pluralism and otherness on the global sphere. It is 
erroneous to assume that achieving equality in the global sphere implies being neutral about 
particular peculiarities embodied in nationality among the diverse people of the world. A 
major consequence of this in the global context is that one fails to meaningfully account for 
injustices being suffered by marginalised and minority people around the globe. This is a 
result of the tendency of viewing all people of the world in general terms of commonality that 
disregard the relevance of other bases of inequality unique to the minorities (Delgado Bernal, 
1998: 558). 
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According to Delgado Bernal (1998: 558), mainstream feminism in the USA, for instance, 
stands to be criticised as being inadequate to confront the injustices faced by Chicana women. 
This is because Chicana women have significantly different and fewer structures of 
opportunity in contrast not only with Chicana men (not to mention white men), but even with 
white women, who also seek liberation from patriarchy  (Delgado Bernal, 1998: 560). This, 
she holds, is because mainstream feminism understands discrimination suffered by all women 
only in the general terms of gender inequality, yet there are racial and socio-economic 
dimensions to Chicana women’s inequality that exacerbate it (Delgado Bernal, 1998: 560). 
Therefore, in its equality and universalism endeavours, strong cosmopolitanism citizenship 
education is similarly problematic for its lack of response and opposition to concreteness and 
ultimately to the otherness of the other. It summarily ascribes negative value to otherness and 
difference. Such perspectives of liberalism as well as universalism perceive the sources of 
concreteness and otherness traceable to linguistic, cultural, territorial and historical 
dimensions of learners’ identities as barriers to flourishing global democratic co-existence. 
They are erroneously conceived as sources of conflict to be done away with. 
Unless education is responsive to people’s situatedness, it runs the risk of just co-opting the 
‘appropriate and relevant’ of the marginalised others’ culture into the mainstream. Ideally, 
however, the cultural and historic concreteness of the marginalised other learner must be the 
subject of education theorisation and practice in the quest of ensuring educational justice 
(Yosso, 2005: 82). Societies and national communities that have for so long been 
marginalised should not just be expected to respond to changes taking place in the global 
world as mere objects in a globalising process whose response to such changes should be of 
mere conforming integration (Freire, 2014: 33). Their experiences must be part of the core 
agenda of the education processes and experiences. 
Given the adverse implications of the exclusion of the concreteness of nationality in 
education for global citizenship that has a strong cosmopolitan orientation, it is evident that 
the neutrality commitment of the education greatly compromises of the education goal to 
achieve global justice. The neutrality and impartiality of such an education are the only 
apparent and ironically inimical to the realisation of justice to the situated peoples of the 
world. Such an education only serves to integrate into the mainstream. It fails to achieve 
equality and freedom because of its failure to be sensitive and responsive to learners’ national 
situatedness, in the case of education for cosmopolitan citizenship.  
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But how compatible would education as freedom be, with the demand of nationality-
responsive education given the contestability of culture? The culture being defended here is 
an anchor against the threats of global homogenisation to a nation. The contents of national 
culture are constantly up for contestation by its members and may not be permanently fixed. 
However, it may be something that is contestably representative of their lived experiences. 
Such a culture will result from and lead to freedom, because the culture is not imposed, 
closed and static. It is contested and can never be ignored or dispensed with, such as is the 
case with a shared language. Unless the cultural paradigms of the local are preserved through 
nationality, the people will lose their perspectives and be compelled to adopt one non-
volitionally. 
A mainstream culture pervades (citizenship) education for democracy both at the global and 
national levels, even in those curricula and school practices touted as culturally neutral 
(Nieto, 2000: 183; García & Guerra, 2004: 162; Yosso, 2005: 74). Most school textbooks are 
directly or indirectly the products of the control and influence of a given cultural group 
whose “subjective experiences and interpretations of reality are presented as [the sole] 
objective truth” (Gay, 2000: 113). The perspectives of such textbooks are usually about a 
unitary conception of reason, emphasising commonalities while being very silent on diversity 
and difference (Gay, 2000: 113). In the mainstream, resistance to embrace other resurgent 
perspectives is due to “a near-universal disdain for an account or ‘story’ that deviates too 
much from one upon which we have been relying to construct and order our social world” 
and this perpetuates “imperial scholarship” (Delgado, 1992: 1372). 
Owing to the subtlety of convenience of domination, it is not uncommon for such mainstream 
dominating education not to be identified as what it is, even by the dominated (Freire, 2014: 
45). Similarly, in strong cosmopolitan citizenship, there is an ostensible ‘necessity’ in the 
name of global convenience, for there to be neutrality over national history and culture so as 
to achieve universalism-conscious global citizens, unattached to and unrestricted by the 
ostensible arbitrariness of nationality. Adoption of educational reforms driven by the 
demands of global integration such as letting go of one’s mother-tongue in instruction is an 
instance of such. 
Following Freire (2014: 47–49), one can however argue that acceptance and tolerance of the 
domination of the structure of the prevailing global order occur because we regard it as 
deterministic. Despite such domination, weaker nations resign to it in the name of the 
costliness and risks involved in rearranging the global order to generate equality. 
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Alternatively, those under the domination of such an order must as a matter of necessity 
recognise the reality of their being dominated not as a sealed fate they are helpless about. 
Rather, it is a limitation they can and need to overcome, albeit at a cost. Any education for 
global citizenship that in the name of equality systematically extinguishes the normative 
value of pluralism among the people of the world concretised through their nationality, by 
depoliticising and privatising it, is grounded in a false dilemma between equality and 
pluralism. Again, each has incomparable value. 
In summary, by extinguishing the concreteness of the people of the world, embodied in 
nationality, strong cosmopolitanism education for democratic citizenship prioritises a 
conception of equality that undermines the moral relevance of pluralism and its concomitant 
situatedness. This effectively hides particular forms of injustice and inequalities, suffered on 
account of and in terms of national situatedness. The ultimate result of this is that such 
inequalities can never come to the fore to be addressed in so far as at the global sphere 
nationality has been depoliticised and relegated to the private sphere. 
4.6. Strong cosmopolitan citizenship and the neoliberal influence 
The reality of global interconnectedness underlies motivation for the arguments for 
(education for) global citizenship, as the possibility of such a citizenship is in direct 
proportion with increased connectivity. There are many agents driving this 
interconnectedness. The most outstanding and influential one, though, is economic in nature, 
and it has moral implications that should neither be left unconsidered nor taken for granted 
(Calhoun, 2008: 434). This section argues that strong cosmopolitanism-oriented education for 
democratic citizenship takes as given and unproblematic the global interconnectedness that is 
the primary motivation for a worldwide citizenship. In so doing, strong cosmopolitan 
education for citizenship ignores the domination tendencies subtly inherent in the celebrated 
global connectedness. 
The objective of strong cosmopolitanism is to achieve equality in terms of obligations and 
entitlements of (global) justice (Tan, 2004). Its aspiration is that all human beings across the 
world universally and equally share the duties and benefits of justice without being hindered 
by the arbitrariness of nationality. The indictment of nationality in justice conceptualisation is 
owed to the prevailing global interconnectedness. That we can today learn of the manmade or 
natural calamity, global poverty and global environmental crisis facing non-compatriot others 
awakens the sense of global justice and compels us to act through numerous avenues global 
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interconnectedness avails (Miller, 2007: 2). Therefore, global interconnectedness makes vivid 
human interaction and the universality of being human. 
The idea of a global citizenship also gets its inspiration from this interconnectedness. In any 
case, the shift in emphasis from social to global justice is indebted to this interconnectedness. 
However, careful attention has not been given to the nature and normative implications of 
this interconnection prior to embracing it as the basis for global citizenship. By dismissing 
nationality, strong cosmopolitanism exacerbates implications of this unattended to 
interconnectedness.  
Around the world today, fundamental education aims, such as promoting self-realisation and 
cultivation of democratic values, are in escalating conflict with the dominance of market 
values driven by the demand of neoliberalism, where education is aimed at training 
prospective workers for jobs in the global economy and its industries (Giroux, 2005: 209). 
Therefore, the education goals of ensuring self-actualization, human emancipation and social 
justice have largely been hijacked by the neoliberal agenda (Giroux, 2005: 209; Divala, 
2016). Gradually, education is to a lesser degree emphasising creation of a just society than it 
is emphasizing on a narrow and economic conception of authenticity  (Pais & Costa, 2017: 
10). 
The logic of “free market fundamentalism” is not only driving economics and politics 
globally, but now also embeds and reproduces in all social relationships ultimately mirroring 
attributes of its characteristic profit-centeredness and supplier–customer conception of all 
relationships (Giroux, 2005: 210). The market has in the modern globalised world become 
the organising principle for the social, political and economic relationships and structures of 
society, ultimately posing serious threats to “democracy, public goods, the welfare state, and 
non-commodified values” (Giroux, 2005: 210). The market now even drives the education 
agenda (Divala, 2016). 
We should question globalising tendencies advanced through universalism, particularly with 
respect to the necessity of global homogeneity for global citizenship. It should be possible to 
have an interconnected world that respects human rights (as well as human cultures) without 
demanding neutrality over nationality as a precondition for universalism. Without falling into 
conspiracy traps, it is indeed evident that neoliberalism has become the motivating principle 
in politics, economics as well as education globally. For neoliberalism, national boundaries 
inhibit the realisation of a universalism that is not essentially moral, but facilitates 
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achievement of efficient profiting that hinges on free movement of human labour and capital 
across borders (Pieterse, 2006: 1250). This has resulted in the labelling of national boundaries 
as an obstacle that curtails free mobility of both individuals and capital across borders 
(Pieterse, 2006: 1250). However, such barriers to such profit-oriented free movement of 
people and capital in a way significantly serves the defensible normatively grounded role of 
protecting the weak and vulnerable from the ravages of unbridled global capitalism (Pieterse, 
2006: 1250). 
Neoliberalism builds on the universal need and right for economic sufficiency, which is a 
manifestation of as well as a condition for individual freedom. However, the substance 
constituting this right and its prioritisation are far from being universal across societies and 
are perennially contentious even within one society. The local and the particular are, before 
neoliberalism, barriers to the progress of corporate and individual economic interests . 
National boundaries are inhibitive. It is in the interest of corporate aspirations that the whole 
world not only become easily accessible, but that the whole idea of being rooted and 
grounded hence accountable and committed to this particular national community and its 
unique interests effectively be overridden by profit-making optimisation (Pieterse, 2006: 
1250). What stands out is that this is a universalism that is based only on deification of the 
individual’s economic interests, as an epitome of individual freedom. The implications of 
such an autonomous interest-maximising economic self on other normative aspects of being 
are ignored or consigned secondary value. With respect to education, the major interest of 
global capitalist tendencies is that the whole world should become a pool of available labour 
resource that also shares the same language skills (Ramose, 2010: 293). Prioritisation of 
economic interests in education planning now largely serves the interests of (global) 
capitalism and it is usually at the expense of other pertinent, concrete needs of the situated 
people. 
In developing nations, the economic regime of neoliberalism is imposing its market-based 
values through powerful global financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and 
the WTO to enforce, among other things, free market and structural adjustment policies 
(Pieterse, 2006: 1250). Such policies are motivated by financial efficiency and profit at the 
cost of the fabric of state welfarism (Giroux, 2005: 211). Nations’ aspirations, interests and 
ideologies have to adapt to the market ideals of neoliberalism, or else they lose their place in 
the global world (Giroux, 2005: 210; Pais & Costa, 2017: 4). 
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Just like in much of the world today, in most developing nations, palatability with the 
capitalist considerations of neoliberalism is at the heart of reforms and agenda setting in the 
education discipline. Certain valuable aspects of society that have no commodified value yet 
require more public financing from national governments are relegated to secondary 
importance (Nyamnjoh, 2012; Divala, 2016). Sustaining them is usually perceived as, and 
indeed is, costly to the nation’s economic aspirations of integrating into and becoming 
competitive in the global economic order. In that category fall national considerations in 
developing nations. The direct influence of the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank have 
demanded structural adjustment programmes in sub-Saharan Africa nation-states, which 
translated into huge cuts in public spending (e.g. education and health), privatisation of state 
enterprises and market liberalisation (Kennedy, 1999: 444). 
The nation-state is therefore to make the morally costly decision of whether to maintain its 
public service expenditure on its authentic interests or to adopt externally recommended 
economic-utilitarian structural reforms that demand cuts to national museums, public health, 
welfarism, education and so forth. Should education be availed at a reasonable subsidised fee, 
or should it be privatised? What should be the form and substance of such an education that is 
neoliberalism-compliant? Such are some of the vexing questions with which developing 
nations have to grapple. In general, answering such questions demands that all aspects of 
public life should initially be converted into financial efficiency terms. Such terms have 
surreptitiously become definitive of all worthiness. Governments now regard as financially 
burdensome expenditures aimed at supporting and sustaining national cultures, education, 
health systems, literature and museums. The curriculum is expected to largely concentrate on 
skills on demand at the market that is itself global and ‘universal’. Neoliberalism highly 
values neutral non-localised education, just as its global market regards the nation as a barrier 
to free trade. The global market needs global citizens, not national ones. 
Besides an absence of interference and mastery over the self, freedom also constitutes in an 
absence of mastery by others, in other words non-domination (Pettit, 1997: 22). Non-
domination is not just an intermediate between the ideals of non-interference and self-
mastery, but also an alternative condition of freedom: It is also an ideal of freedom (Pettit, 
1997: 27). Someone dominates another, to the extent that “they have the capacity to interfere, 
on an arbitrary basis, and in certain choices that the other is in a position to make” (Pettit, 
1997: 52). However, not all interference is tantamount to domination, so long as the 
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interfered freely chooses the interfering agent to interfere for mutual benefit or that of the 
interfered. 
One enjoys non-interference when one avoids coercion (Pettit, 1997: 24). For the interference 
to be non-domination, the interference need not be practised arbitrarily by an agent. Rather, it 
must be something one fully permits and is on one’s terms (Pettit, 1997: 24). For the non-
interference world to be a non-domination one, its non-interference by arbitrary powers must 
be “by virtue of [weak nations] being secured against the powerful” (Pettit, 1997: 24). This is 
how the differences in global relations and distribution need to be understood. Most nations, 
including those in Africa, are free from interference, but yet not free from neoliberal 
domination. Although there is little interference in developing nations across the globe, still 
more different forms of domination prevail. Most developing nations have no capacity to 
counteract the domineering force of neoliberalism. This reflects in their choice of curriculum 
content, medium of instruction and related aspects (Higgs, 2012: 52).  
The compromise over mother tongue instruction is far from being a free choice. It is largely 
determined by neoliberal domination. Acquiring the official and international languages of 
commerce and science becomes a major pursuit even when it violates linguistic and 
educational justice. The taking away of space for exploring, probing, contesting, re-
interpreting and making new, more meaningful belonging attachments to one’s nation, by 
removal of learning national history in the school, to embrace a neutral universalism that 
devalues such attachments, is a form of passively succumbing to the domination of 
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism quests for an accessible and detached employee, ready for 
deployment from and to every part of the world to which global capitalism extends. What one 
gleans from neoliberalism is that one can realise oneself only when one is in terms with the 
interests of the powerful. This is the domination of neoliberalism. 
Advancing a universal neutral justice in the current global setup without firstly uprooting 
injustice, inherent in global interconnectedness structures, and disadvantaging those in 
weaker nations ill-serves equality. Neoliberal global and state institutions side-line and 
silence the voice of people in developing nations, as they cannot actively participate in affairs 
that directly concern them (Bohman, 2015: 521). 
Neoliberalism that is powering global interconnectedness is producing unjust outcomes to 
most developing nations in that it is undermining what is concrete about a people by 
assigning it little or no worth based on the financial efficiency benchmark of neoliberalism. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
187 
Catching up for competitive integration into the globe interconnectedness costs compromises 
on linguistic justice and any other financially inefficient, though normatively necessary, 
public expenditure.  
Global interconnectedness does not give the non-situated and impersonal global citizen for 
which strong cosmopolitan citizenship aspires, the capacity to transcend borders only. By 
participating in the global interconnection, the citizen also inherits its unjust and undeserved 
prioritisation of economic interests over other incomparable moral ideals across nations.  
Such criticism of global interconnectedness does not however outlaw all globalisation, for 
there indeed is also much benefit from it. However, in most cases, globalising forces that 
thrive on systematic devaluation of national boundaries and hence overcome any form of 
accountability and fair representation of the affected people’s interests, stand to be 
condemned. Self-generating globalisation (Benhabib, 2011: 104) that puts the affected as 
mere objects on the receiving end and never as subjects of the interconnection needs to be put 
right before we build on it a scheme of moral duties. Strong cosmopolitan citizenship 
education needs to re-examine the moral acceptability of the interconnectedness before 
standing on it to make calls that demand nationality annihilation, which risks serving only 
narrow other than justice interests. Just like strong cosmopolitanism, what is problematic with 
this interconnectedness is that it is based on an essentialist conception of human nature as 
always prioritising self-economic interests. 
Global justice can be ensured only when a situated people’s interests, values and shared ways 
of life are given due acknowledgement and consideration. This involves acknowledging 
otherness in its concrete forms. Knowing the concreteness of the other only results after 
engagement through dialogue. For the communicative discourse to be fair, everyone must 
introduce themselves and articulate their otherness and concreteness all by themselves, 
without being projected by another (Benhabib, 1992: 165). The same principle applies to all 
forms of representation. Globally, this entails acknowledging national otherness as 
concretised in nationality. In the global context, concreteness of nations’ otherness is 
grounded in their rationality and generally articulated through their language and histories. 
These should not be ignored, displaced or rendered incompatible with universalism. 
Non-domination in democratic societies of the world is realised only when a member of the 
democratic scheme has an ability to avoid “having its terms set by the other members, and 
thus having potentially, if not actually, a minimum of normative and political control over 
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one’s statuses” (Bohman, 2015: 532). Side-lining and silencing the other’s otherness 
therefore obstructs the realisation of non-domination, as political and normative control over 
one’s statuses is ceded to others (Bohman, 2015: 523). This is the case in the global arena 
when one considers the influence of neoliberalism in setting the educational agenda that 
largely undermines the value of developing and maintaining national language, history, 
shared ways of life, local art and literature.  
Once we examine the context that nurtures global interconnectedness, which renders strong 
cosmopolitanism vivid and meaningful, we cannot fail to notice the neoliberalism force that 
is embedded in such an education for cosmopolitan citizenship. Because of its aggressive 
universalism, neoliberalism dislodges and devalues other moral interests of people around the 
world by explicitly and subtly denouncing boundaries as inherently bad and borderless-ness 
as inherently liberating. It is on this premise that global interconnectedness is mistakenly 
accepted and embraced as given. The denigration of nationality inherited by strong 
cosmopolitanism is problematic once we examine the impetus of global interconnection. At 
the national level, policies of global economic institutions such as the WTO and the World 
Bank are no longer economic in nature, but political, as their implementation puts restrictions 
on the form and content of political policies nations may pursue (Brinkman & Brinkman, 
2008: 430). 
A potential criticism to the defence for a consideration of national concreteness in 
conceptualisations of global citizenship would be that such an approach promotes moral 
relativism. As such, it is difficult, if not impossible, to hold accountable cultures of the world, 
as there would no longer be standard universal benchmarks for moral evaluation. The critic 
would further protest that politicising nationality in education for democratic citizenship will 
serve to implicitly endorse and perpetuate inequities embedded in national culture.  
It is worth bearing in mind that the position being advanced here defends and is compatible 
with universalism. Other than promoting moral relativism, this position only recognises that 
what is relative across human communities are concrete actualisations of universally binding 
moral ideals. There is no single way of realising them (Peters, 2015: 1131). This does not in 
any way entail tolerance of inequalities and injustices embedded in national cultures. The 
inward dimension of patriotism (Papastephanou, 2013a) is specifically meant to counteract 
such within the nation-state. 
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The global interconnectedness celebrated and that propels the necessity of realisation of 
strong cosmopolitanism global citizenship education is normatively contaminated by the 
excesses of neoliberalism. Global citizenship based on such a framework is bound to not only 
be unjust to the marginalised legitimate interests of people of the world; it is also iniquitous. 
4.7. Conclusion 
The educational aim of achieving the authentic self ought not to be understood as being 
exclusive to aspects of shared collective life. The autonomous self needs access to a range of 
given worthwhile options to meaningfully exercise its autonomy. The community provides 
these. Education must therefore include aspects of collective life as it aspires to produce 
critical citizens.  
Despite the diversity and autonomously embraced values of the good life, citizens in 
democratic societies commonly share a fate grounded in aspects of their nationality. Their 
common language, geographical territory, common history and shared culture underpin their 
collective way of life and interactions. Although mostly unrecognised, taken for granted 
hence at times undermined, nationality is a profound part of the foundation of meaningful 
democracy and greatly contributes to sustaining it. Any alternative global rearrangement in so 
far as it depoliticises nationality cannot replicate the unique solidarity role towards 
democracy and justice that nationality performs. Extinguishing nationality in global 
citizenship conceptualisation ultimately suffocates and renders impossible the realisation of 
global justice. Therefore, in the modern interconnected world, nationality is in essence an 
indispensable precondition for a just global democracy. 
By depoliticising nationality at the global level, strong cosmopolitan citizenship education 
collapses the last bulwark that protects the peoples of the world from educational and global 
injustice. Such ostensibly impartial education for democratic citizenship is essentially laden 
with biases and subjectivity. Through its insistence on neutrality over aspects of nationality in 
the interest of impartiality ideals, strong cosmopolitan education for democratic citizenship 
ultimately compels people in economically weak nations to assimilate into the mainstream 
epistemological perspectives.  
Education for (global) citizenship that recognises nationality acknowledges the diversity that 
hosts and expresses the concreteness of the otherness of the people of the world. Education 
for global citizenship education that recognises nationality is cognisant of the worth and 
meaningfulness of the people’s otherness whose value is as incomparable and indispensable 
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as the general commonality of their humanity. In other words, the localness of the otherness 
constitutes frames for meaning-making through which universal ideals are actualised and 
appropriated through vernacularisation (Benhabib, 2011: 89) (debate and deliberation as to 
how the abstract universal should be realised in a particular social context). Unless education 
for democratic and cosmopolitan citizenship duly recognises the normativity of nationality, 
the endeavours of the education will merely be coercive and assimilationist. It is in this vein 
that education for democratic citizenship informed by such cosmopolitanism is potentially 
harmful to the educational and global justice entitlements of those in developing nations such 
as Malawi. This, ironically, is contrary to the central theses of strong cosmopolitanism that it 
promotes equality and justice globally. The next chapter concretely presents the way in which 
the Malawian education for citizenship scenario best captures this irony. 
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Chapter 5:  
Nationality and cosmopolitanism in Malawian citizenship and 
education 
5.1. Introduction 
Having established the ideal relationship among cosmopolitanism, education and nationality 
in education for democratic citizenship, this chapter examines the nature and role of 
nationality and cosmopolitanism in Malawian primary school education for citizenship during 
the political epochs of the colonial era (1891–1964), the independence era (1964–1994) and 
the democratic era (1994–present). I argue that colonial era citizenship was characteristic of 
an essentialising, binary and paternalistic form of cosmopolitanism advanced through 
colonial education as well as the exploitative practice of colonialism itself. Colonialism and 
its education theory and practice advanced a subaltern conception of the native as 
intellectually and morally inferior, hence in need of transformation. In most respects, the 
natives, on the other hand, demonstrated practices that are consistent with a deliberative, 
unlike an essentialist, strong cosmopolitanism, through their embracing of values and 
practices introduced by Eurocentrism without necessarily having to discard their native 
concreteness. Furthermore, during this era, nationality played a crucial liberating role as both 
an embodiment of the people’s concreteness, which they were struggling to redeem from 
colonial hegemony, and national concreteness was also the political vehicle for mobilising 
resistance solidarity. 
In this chapter I further posit that however, promotion of a bounded and uncritical patriotism 
under a purported pursuit of national unity characterised the subsequent 30-year 
independence period. Tendencies of cosmopolitanism were systematically supressed. 
However, the general otherness standpoint of cosmopolitan universalism significantly 
contributed towards demolition of the one-party tyranny through different forms of 
international sanctions and pressure against the one-party dictatorship.  
I further contend that in the democratic period, Malawi’s education for democratic citizenship 
is essentially strong cosmopolitan in its orientation and only makes largely tokenistic 
inclusions of national particularism without due regard for the normative value of nationality. 
This, I argue, is due to a lack of political will coupled with the hegemonic pressure of 
neoliberalism. Ultimately, the ostensible impartiality and purported anti-essentialist nature of 
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Malawian education for democratic citizenship inspired by strong cosmopolitanism, 
marginalises the concrete and epistemic otherness of the Malawian local in education and 
global citizenship.  
Facing the future, the chapter contends that Malawian education for democratic (and global) 
citizenship must affirm and embrace the tolerable aspects of nationality that have normative 
weight, while simultaneously promoting visions of moral duties whose scope transcends 
nation-boundedness. The argument is that such an education for citizenship is necessary in 
that it will be consistent with and respect human diversity across the globe. As such, the 
chapter argues for a cosmopolitanism whose universalism is grounded in Seyla Benhabib’s 
(2011) difference-originating deliberative universalism in order to accord due value to the 
otherness that constitutes global diversity. 
5.2. Colonial education and citizenship (1891–1964) 
Modern education in Malawi was introduced by European Christian missionaries. The first 
Scottish explorer and missionary, David Livingstone, visited Malawi in 1858 (Pike, 
1968: 70). Early missionary pioneers’ aim for education was primarily to both proselyte and 
introduce commerce in order to curb slave trade, which was flourishing during the mid-19th 
century (Pike, 1968: 71; Pachai, 1973: 71). Introduction of schools in areas where Christian 
missionaries did not settle in, such as in the southeastern part of Malawi, was motivated by 
the need to effectively engage in trade with Arab traders (Rafael, 1980: 36–41).  
The first school in Malawi was started by missionaries at Cape Maclear in 1875 (Pachai, 
1973: 169). The learning mainly aimed at numeracy and literacy in order to study the Bible 
better and other home and trade crafts such as carpentry, needlework and bricklaying (Pachai, 
1973: 169). Most missionaries’ attitudes towards natives and their way of life were generally 
denigrating. Some were against the idea of having Africans engaged in teaching in schools as 
well as evangelising, on account that the native is incapable of performing ‘civilising’ 
endeavours (Pachai, 1973: 90–91). On the other hand, some other missionaries, although they 
were in a minority, believed that Christianity and difference are compatible, and therefore 
they localised education and religion as much as possible (Pachai, 1973: 91). 
British colonial government was established in Malawi in 1891, 30 years after missionary 
education had started (Murray, 1932: 47). Colonialism brought white settlers and colonial 
administrators. Subsequently, there was a need for education for their children. Together with 
Asian settlers and workers of the colonial administration, they demanded separate schools for 
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their children (Pachai, 1973: 178). Demand for more systematic education in colonial Malawi 
was motivated by reasons ranging from racist ones (such as that settlers, colonial 
administrators and Asians wanted their children to learn in separate schools) to religious 
ones, where chiefs in Islam-dominated areas demanded education that was Islamic and not 
Christian in nature (Pachai, 1973: 178–179). In subsequent years, the natives expressed their 
need for government to provide quality education worth for employment, effective 
participation and communication in tribal communities as well as for capacity for self-
reliance of the Nyasaland (pre-independence name for Malawi) community to cut 
dependence on colonialists (Pachai, 1973: 180). 
Despite its establishment in 1891, the colonial government only formally (although not 
substantively) took control of education in 1926, 35 years after colonial government 
establishment and 51 years since missionaries’ education had started (Hauya, 1997: 2). As a 
consequence, there was synonymy between Christianity and educational aims and contexts, 
such that Christianity in effect became the prerequisite for enrolment into some schools 
(Hauya, 1997: 2).  
Colonial education aimed at developing individual character grounded in religion (Banda, 
1982: 63). Because of church control and influence in education, indigenous traditional 
culture and its expressions such as music and dance were systematically undermined and 
excluded, with only Western culture and music being taught and valorised in schools 
(Chanunkha, 2005: 2–12). Such detachment of the local led to low school attendance, as there 
was alienation of learners’ traditional ways of life from the school experiences (Banda, 1982: 
67). Harmless traditional practices that were acceptable to the learner were considered 
unacceptable and intolerable in the school domain (Banda, 1982: 67). While being mindful of 
the school’s ability to overcome mere reproduction of the unexamined society, it is 
noteworthy that the conflict between education and the community was not entirely about 
universal knowledge and defective cultural practices, but also one between British culture 
and African culture. In as much as there are certain foundational universal principles of right 
and wrong, it is worth noting that the moral education in schools was also largely about the 
missionaries employing their own standards to evaluate the unfamiliar traditional ways of life 
for native Africans. 
The impact of colonial education and missionary education was such that most educated 
Malawians (most of whom later became elites) associated being educated with having a 
denigrating attitude towards indigenous culture and knowledge (Chanunkha, 2005: 2–13). 
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Interestingly, such contempt for the local still persisted in Malawi through the 30-year-old 
post-independence period, and it is noteworthy that this attitude survived even until the 
democratic era that commenced in 1993. Government’s 20-year development plan in 1998 
observed as follows:  
Malawians have low self-esteem. They have no confidence in local products and in their 
culture. The challenge is to restore self-confidence and pride in being Malawian. Malawians 
must be able to identify themselves with their country, their cultural heritage and their 
indigenous products. Malawians must also be assertive and confident and be free from 
servitude and low self-esteem (Malawi National Economic Council, 1998: 35). 
Among other strategies to combat this challenge was to develop a national cultural policy 
(Malawi National Economic Council, 1998: 35). 
Despite the active marginalisation of the local by educators, the curriculum content of 
colonial education was alienating as well (Banda, 1982: 90). During my literature survey, I 
did not find much literature on the colonial primary school curriculum and its specific 
citizenship content. Colonial secondary education curriculum, however, best reflects such 
alienation of Malawian learners from the education process. For instance, the secondary 
school curriculum offered the following subjects: Mathematics, History, English Literature 
and Language, Geography, General Science, Chichewa, Religious Education and Latin 
(Banda, 1982: 90). There was very little of Africa and completely nothing about Malawi in 
the History content (Banda, 1982: 90). As Banda (1982: 90) further notes, Geography content 
was exclusively about the British Isles and the Commonwealth. On the other hand, English 
literature required an almost impossible imagination from the learners about Britishness 
(Banda, 1982: 90). Although studying classical Latin had been a prestigious and strategic 
endeavour in the West, its relevance in Malawi and Africa was not given. In Mathematics, 
concepts and experiences were captured in non-African frames, for instance involving train 
travels and British towns in the learning of speed and time, thereby rendering it difficult for 
Africans to imagine such experiences (Banda, 1982: 92). Given that this was during the 
pioneering era of education in Malawi, one may understand that there was no developed 
content tailored for Africa and that as such, education just had to start from somewhere. One 
cannot, however, excuse modern independent Africa for maintaining and promoting such 
revocable Eurocentric tendencies that alienate the local as prevailing strong cosmopolitanism 
tendencies do reflect.  
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When the colonial government took over active provision of education that had been under 
the control of the missionaries, their objective was to ‘civilise’ the natives to embrace 
Western values. The goal of the colonial government, as stated in the 1911–1912 Annual 
Report for the Nyasaland Protectorate, was that through its local affairs council, the new 
generations emerging after colonial establishment would find … 
… themselves without the restraining influences to which their parents were accustomed, [as 
the young] have of recent years evinced an inclination to emancipate themselves from the 
disciplinary responsibilities of village life and obedience to authority and to adopt habits 
prejudicial to native family life (Annual Report on the Protectorate for 1912–1913, cited in 
Murray, 1932: 129). 
African ways of life and traditions were therefore regarded as “barbaric and less perfect” by 
Western standards during colonialism (Chanunkha, 2005: 2–11). Colonialism regarded 
natives’ life and perspectives as being incompatible with the emancipating ideals of modern 
government and society. Indigenous life was a barrier to be overcome. The ideal citizen was 
therefore one that was detached from the incompatible values of local life. 
Reverend John Chilembwe was a local indigenous missionary, mentored by a Western 
missionary whose approach actively demanded African liberation as part and parcel of the 
evangelisation project (Phiri, 2004: 171). Chilembwe’s mentor missionary had been running 
his evangelising work on the basis of the interrelation among spirituality, politics and 
economic freedom (Phiri, 2004: 151). Chilembwe, the mentee, therefore promoted 
industrialisation among his people in his missionary work (Phiri, 2004: 171). In the schools 
run by Chilembwe’s church, they were openly challenging European racial superiority and 
land appropriation from natives as being inconsistent with central tenets of the Christian faith  
that all people are equal before God (McCracken, 2012: 135). His schools, due to the radical 
and revolutionary nature of their curricula, were resented and systematically suppressed by 
European settlers, missionaries as well as the colonial government (White, 1987: 130–131; 
Phiri, 2004: 264–265). He was to later spearhead the first (and only armed) resistance against 
colonialism, which, though unsuccessful, inspired subsequent successful movements 
(McCracken, 2012: 214–215).  
In his struggle against colonialism and racism and affirmation of native values, Chilembwe 
did not discard the Christian faith (an alien and non-native European religion). In fact, he 
believed in Africans acquiring Western education, which achieves the social, industrial and 
economic development his people clearly lacked and ought to have had (Phiri, 2004: 171). 
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Therefore, Western education was his indispensable value and medium for emancipation. For 
Chilembwe, the new global religion, western education and the local fodder for the politics of 
national freedom were inextricably bound (McCracken, 2012: 141). In his schools’ 
‘curriculum’ (then intermingled with sermonising, for the two then were inseparable) he 
sought to develop a consciousness not grounded in and aimed at returning to a pristine tribal 
past that had its own deficiencies, but to founding an independent and free national future 
(McCracken, 2012: 127–128). 
5.2.1. The build-up of colonial resistance 
When colonial rule was established, there was no intention of actively including Africans 
such as chiefs in the influential structures of government. The colonialists had no confidence 
in African leadership despite persuasion attempts by some missionaries whose engagement 
with natives was both much older and deeper (Pachai, 1973). As such, colonialists, right from 
the beginning, started establishing the authority of government through military force through 
an army of few hundreds from India (Pachai, 1973: 181). The rule was from the onset 
characteristically based on martial law (Pachai, 1973: 181). 
The colonial administration employed English law, which was made supreme to traditional 
law, as the latter was regarded as ineffectual and irrelevant for human progress (Pachai, 1973: 
182). Therefore, two distinct worldviews were in competition. With differences in conception 
of human nature and social structure between the British and African perspectives, further 
trouble was obviously inevitable. For instance, there were stark differences in 
conceptualisations of land appropriation and ownership, human labour and communal 
responsibilities between the British and local legal systems (White, 1987: 89). 
In 1915, the 24-year-old colonial rule faced an insurrection. A number of grievances had been 
raised for redress (Pachai, 1973: 214). They were ignored, as the colonialists undermined the 
capacity of the local Africans rebelling (Pachai, 1973: 214–215; Phiri, 2004: 261). 
The uprising was mainly inspired by three injustices. Firstly, Reverend John Chilembwe, the 
native missionary who spearheaded the uprising, was being severely restrained by the 
colonial government from opening more schools whose Afro-conscious and liberating 
curriculum was critical of colonial injustices (Phiri, 2004: 262–265). Secondly, land 
appropriation by the colonial settlers effectively dispossessed locals of land and made them 
provide labour on the new settler owners’ estates as a form of rent payment (Phiri, 2004: 265; 
McCracken, 2012: 145).  
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Besides these outstanding two grievances, the third cause that ultimately triggered the 
uprising was the recruitment of locals under Britain’s King’s African Rifles (KAR) to fight 
the Germans in the northern part of Malawi, Somalia, Ghana and Mauritius during the First 
World War (McCracken, 2012: 154). Thousands of Malawians served in the First World War 
as soldiers, porters and carriers of military supplies. As the war took its toll, recruitment in 
the empire’s military service now became coercive and villages were being raided to 
forcefully recruit male adults into the army (McCracken, 2012: 151–152). Chilembwe 
severely condemned the unjustifiability of poor Africans dying in a ‘world’ war in which they 
had no stakes and which would serve to benefit only the rich coloniser (Pachai, 1973: 216).  
The insurrection, however, was ill planned and ill coordinated. It was almost immediately 
repressed by the colonial forces. Chilembwe, the leader, was killed in one of the battles. 
However, this gave further impetus to the momentum for resistance (Mtewa, 1977: 242). 
Years after successful repression of the uprising, the first political organisations established 
by natives, called Native Associations, emerged (Pachai, 1973: 225). They were based at 
district and provincial levels. Among others, their aims were to inform the colonial 
government of the African public’s opinion as well as to “keep the Africans informed of the 
laws introduced by the government and thus to assist them understand the objects of such 
laws” and to organise meetings that deliberated on the issues of “general or special interest” 
to Africans (Pachai, 1973: 225).  
5.2.2. Cosmopolitanism and nationality in the colonial era 
What one would glean from the colonial situation is that the idea of citizenship (subjects to 
the British king in colonial Malawi) involved two worlds: the colonial world and the local 
world. Laws and institutions of the political society were carved in British values and 
imported for the Africans to embrace, and not to question, adjust and blend with their local 
situatedness. It was a matter of shedding off the local lived and meaningful experiences and 
adopting a ‘modern’ global progressive arrangement of society. Coexistence of values was 
out of the question owing to the ostensible incompatibility of the two cultural worlds.  
It is instructive to always be mindful that globalisation has not started with modern-day 
interconnectedness that is owed to technological and scientific advances. The processes of 
trade before colonialism (Rafael, 1980: 36–37), explorers, missionaries and foreign settlers in 
Malawi were all activities of globalisation where distinct races encountered and engaged the 
other. Understood this way, colonialism was therefore a framework of cosmopolitanism, on 
the part of the coloniser albeit a morally bankrupt one.  
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In the late 19th Century there had been a heavy Portuguese, Arab, German and British 
presence in Central Africa, largely for trade as well as expansion of colonies to amass natural 
resources, territory and subjects (Rafael, 1980: 36–41). There was therefore globalisation as 
diverse cultures encountered and engaged with one another, although it was largely 
characterised by conquest and unjust land appropriation, rather than by mutual respect that 
translates into an exchange of ideas (such as through trade and education) that is dignifying 
and all-empowering.  
Morally speaking, the nature of the globalisation was largely iniquitous with respect to the 
interests that drove it. This is deduced from the fact that natives welcomed and cooperated 
with the European and Arab others characteristically without hostility. The welcome was 
premised on the natives’ expectation that trade and cooperation were to define their common 
relationships rather than domination. As depicted by other anti-colonial strugglers, much of 
traditional African society did not own land privately (Mandela, 1995: 22; Achebe, 2006: 
134). In general, land was for sharing based on need, such that when European settlers came, 
Africans freely shared their land (Mandela, 1995: 22). They usually shared it freely because 
they understood it as a fundamental resource every human being needs, not as a mere object 
for mere self-aggrandisement (Mandela, 1995: 22; Achebe, 2006: 134).  
One can argue that the natives’ sharing and concessions of the need to learn and borrow ideas 
from the other through trade and missionary exchange of ideas that are arguably reflected 
through natives’ welcoming of the other, represent an enactment of ideal cosmopolitanism. 
The welcoming and adoption of some of the other’s values do not entail inherent and absolute 
deficiency of the natives’ perspectives. Recognition of value in the other’s culture 
presupposes respect for otherness; not only of the other, but of oneself too. It entails an 
engagement based on mutual respect. It is in this vein that one concedes of the positive 
transformation that missionary education and the benefits of certain selected aspects of 
colonialism introduced to Malawi, such as education and an end to slave trade (Rafael, 1980).  
It must be emphasised, as earlier highlighted, that claiming that colonialism was a morally 
unacceptable experience does not disregard other advantages that came along with 
missionaries and colonial government, especially education and modern health amenities. 
Natives greatly benefitted from these modern developments and were welcoming of them. 
Indigenous missionaries and native educated elites encouraged their people to get the 
education brought by the missionaries to improve and empower themselves and ultimately 
the condition of the African people (Pachai, 1973: 232; Phiri, 2004: 131). Such positive 
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outcomes cannot however, compensate nor mitigate the general dehumanisation of 
colonialism. In the normative sense, the violence and dehumanisation of colonialism were 
rooted in its rational–irrational binary conception of human nature and all reality. The major 
limitation of such an essentialist dichotomous perspective lies in its failure to recognise 
alternative perspectives about aspects of human nature in non-generalised forms. Rather than 
recognise and engage with otherness, the colonial commitment was to force all otherness to 
conform to its objective–subjective dualistic categories, failing which any such difference 
should be suppressed through ostensible civilising efforts. 
What was very problematic of colonialism was its denigration of the natives’ human being-
ness, their dignity and the systematic and sustained degrading, inhumane treatment natives 
suffered. The failure to recognise and acknowledge the concreteness of the natives without 
disparaging it with physical and epistemic violence was gravely problematic. Demanding 
recognition and respect for the other’s otherness does not suggest ethical relativism. It does 
not entail that there are no foundational moral truths, hence moral critique of one culture by a 
person from another is impossible. On the contrary, while acknowledging the generality of 
human equality based on sameness, getting to comprehend the other is not and ought not be 
based on projections and assumptions based on fixed categories, but on non-paternalistic 
engagement, deliberation and communication (Benhabib, 1992: 167). One can conveniently 
deduce that the colonial perspective was consistent with postulations of strong 
cosmopolitanism in its essentialist conceptualisation and categorisation of human nature and 
of the moral worthiness of the aspects of social relations for all the people of the world.  
It is remarkable that what birthed the anti-colonial struggle was not the mere fact that the 
Western other race, the other religion, the other perspective had come and become part of the 
natives’ community. Rather, it was the denigration of the people’s concreteness by 
colonialism that awakened the compulsion in natives to assert themselves and their ways of 
life. It is noteworthy that the struggle was not conceived in reactionary and romanticised 
terms of a return to the past and a summary condemnation of everything the European other 
had introduced (Mtewa, 1977: 241–242). In any case, natives had embraced so much from 
the West and were introducing appropriate changes and relevant reforms to their society. 
They valued the transformation resulting from trade, missionary education and provision of 
modern health services brought by globalisation (Pachai, 1973: 232; Phiri, 2004: 247–250). 
Yet, they also understood the resilient value of their ways of life such as in land ownership 
laws, which were trumped down by colonial law.  
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Political leaders who mobilised people against colonial domination both during the 
Chilembwe uprising and the subsequent successful political party-based movements in the 
early 1960s acknowledged certain merits and benefits that missionary education and colonial 
administration brought. It is almost apparent that they protested against racial and colonial 
injustices, and were not in any way demanding a return to a pristine past before they came in 
contact with the other. For instance, Chilembwe the anti-colonialism native church leader 
urged his people to be educated and to be smartly dressed by wearing European-fashioned 
clothes, and was himself mostly dressed in fancy modern European fashions (McCracken, 
2012: 135). He at the same time preached racial equality and condemned colonial 
exploitation (Pachai, 1973: 222).  
Chilembwe, the native missionary and uprising leader, did not discard Christianity, but both 
understood and propagated it as a medium for ensuring racial, social and global justice. He 
therefore embodied the vernacularisation of global ideals (Benhabib, 2011: 89), where the 
global or universal is domesticated in local frames of meaning-making and communication. 
When universalist ideals undergo vernacularisation, absolutist summary outlawing of cultural 
situatedness as inherently problematic becomes hollow and needless. It was difficult, if not 
impossible, for the colonial framework that was largely consistent with strong 
cosmopolitanism to realise that the African way of life is compatible with and can adapt 
conventional education. Only a cosmopolitanism whose universalism is deliberative and not 
essentialist can achieve this.  
Resistance against colonialism in Malawi was inspired by not only common moral 
repudiation of colonialism, but also by nationality. Nationality was not just a rallying point 
for solidarity against colonialism. Rather, it gave meaning to the nature and scope of colonial 
injustices. In the development of the anti-colonialism movement, in the late 1950s, it was 
necessary that the African interests and aspirations be coalesced under one common rallying 
point, and nationality was the backdrop (McCracken, 2012: 366). It was not just for 
instrumentalist purposes; rather, it was because the injustices people were suffering were 
concretised and reducible to denigration of their values, customs and laws about property 
(land ownership, for instance), depossession of their land and territory, suppression of their 
way of being in the world (McCracken, 2012: 135–136) and general alienation from political 
processes that affected them but would not have them involved on account of their lack of 
English language proficiency and other related Western skills.  
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Claiming that nationality played a crucial role in the struggle neither entails that there is one 
homogeneous nation group in Malawi, nor does it entail cultural boundedness. There were a 
number of nation groups, in the strictest sense of word, in Malawi prior to and during 
colonialism who had much in common, such as language. However, missionaries across the 
country had only one medium of instruction even before the colonial government established 
any control of education (Pachai, 1973: 169; McCracken, 2012: 404). Therefore, in the 
general sense, Malawi was a nation, although in the strictest sense it likely was a composite 
of nations that had strong commonalities. Such a ‘multination’ understood that colonial 
independence was in the interest of each constituent national group. Historically, confronting 
the domination of colonialism has effectively utilised national consciousness both as the 
central motivation and as the means for achieving the aspirations of liberty and equality 
(Papastephanou, 2013a: 23).  
In the build-up to political independence in the 1960s, a nationalist movement was built and 
led by a deified leader Kamuzu Banda, who in 1960 was made the party’s life president. 
Raving up the nationalist movement was unfortunately done at the expense of tender intra-
party democratic  and multiparty politics (McCracken, 2012: 374). After the 1961 elections 
that saw the attainment of self-government (where Africans voted for the first time) under a 
new ‘inclusive’ colonial constitution, no other multiparty election was to take place even after 
independence (1964) until 1993, when the dictatorship was confronted and voted out 
(McCracken, 2012: 378). 
However, the problem with such nationalist movements, not as moral ideals but as solidarity 
vehicles for achieving moral ideals in a political struggle, is that they tend to deify traditions, 
practices, history and the personality of the leader. Malawian history is no exception. The 
leader, Kamuzu Banda, was deliberately deified as the messiah for the nation (Pachai, 1973; 
McCracken, 2012). For a context where communication across the nation for mass 
engagement was so challenging, coupled with very low standards of education, 
pragmatically, achieving national independence was prioritised over developing a critical 
mass (McCracken, 2012: 410). Unfortunately, to achieve their goals, the political leaders 
adopted a cultural essentialism posture. Such posture that necessitated prioritisation of a 
bounded nationalism, however, conceals other distinct layers of injustices within the nation 
based on class, power, gender, ethnic group, and so forth, which the people experiencing 
them wanted addressed, although only after completing the struggle. 
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National liberation ought not to be regarded as the ultimate end for the quest of freedom. In 
the Malawian scenario, the assumption was that developing a critical mass as well as 
embracing pluralism and democratic practices within natives’ political movements after 
independence would, in the pre-liberation period, likely compromise the success of the 
liberation (McCracken, 2012: 374). The idea was to pend intra-party dissent and democratic 
practice until after independence. This proved to be too fantastic and far removed from the 
reality of power.  
Predictably, there was a cabinet crisis, just two months after independence, when other senior 
leaders who now expected to be treated as colleagues by Banda the leader, with whom they 
now expected to be deliberating and debating issues, had their contrary opinions construed as 
rebellion and insubordination by Banda (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010: 412). It ended with all 
of them becoming real dissidents, with some of them staging failed military insurrections 
against the tyranny (McCracken, 2012: 429–438). Those not killed in military revolts fled 
into exile, even before the nation clocked one year of independence. What this shows is that 
as national movements develop, they should simultaneously develop structures tolerant of 
intra-nation freedom. The discourse of intra-nation freedom should never be postponed or 
withheld, unless it is for the sake of achieving more guaranteed greater freedom, restricting 
liberty for liberty itself (Rawls, 1999: 214). 
Developments towards a homogenising twisted nationalism in Malawi nevertheless started to 
emerge during the anti-colonialism struggle. In as early as the penultimate year to 
independence, members of religious organisations, especially Jehovah’s Witnesses and the 
Providence Industrial Mission, whose beliefs discouraged active citizenship such as voting, 
faced systematic persecution, including murder from the dominant national party 
(McCracken, 2012: 419). 
All in all, with respect to cosmopolitanism and nationality in the colonial era, one can 
generally conclude that the natives’ tolerance and embracing of certain aspects of the colonial 
other demonstrated sound discursive cosmopolitanism (Benhabib, 1992: 165). The colonial 
cosmopolitanism grounded in essentialism was morally problematic. On the other hand, the 
national movement against colonialism embodied and concretised the moral struggle against 
colonialism. However, its inability to look inward (Papastephanou, 2013a: 27) and tolerate 
internal critique engendered paternalism. 
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5.3. Post-independence citizenship and education (1964–1994) 
Malawi attained political independence in 1964. As stated earlier, two months afterwards 
there was a cabinet crisis, where most senior ministers who were also founding members of 
the majority ruling party challenged (then prime minister) Kamuzu Banda’s dictatorial 
leadership style, delayed Africanisation of the public service and generally unilateral 
determination of strategic public and foreign policy, which was characterised by lack of 
consultation and intolerance for dissent (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010: 410; McCracken, 2012: 
429). This culminated in a huge fallout as seven senior ministers resigned, subsequently 
leading to two separate unsuccessful military struggles mounted by two of the expelled 
cabinet ministers, with the rest fleeing into exile (McCracken, 2012: 429).  
The most profound and lasting outcome of the cabinet crisis was in the aftermath responses. 
A legitimacy deficit was apparent in the ruling party. Public confidence in the government 
was compromised and the state had to assert control. On the other hand was pressure to prove 
to colonialists and all, that Africans had capacity for viable self-government (McCracken, 
2012: 434). In response to all this, the one-party regime resorted to trumping up a form of 
patriotism that was incompatible with dissent. All associates of the ‘rebels’ were removed 
from positions of leadership. Loyalty to party leadership was what mattered (McCracken, 
2012: 451).  
The Banda regime employed coercion to maintain its power grip. There were detentions 
without trial of perceived dissidents and the separation between party and public policy was 
dissolved among others leading to compulsory buying of party membership cards without 
which one could not gain access to hospitals, schools, markets or public transport (Chirambo, 
2009: 78). Banda’s nationalism also appropriated cultural artefacts such as traditional dances 
that were performed for him as well as paternalistic cultural titles, for example nkhoswe ya 
Amayi (mentor and guardian for women), Ngwazi (indomitable conqueror), Father and 
Founder of the Malawi Nation, Messiah and Destroyer of the Federation (Kendall, 2007: 286; 
Chirambo, 2009: 78).  
Kamuzu Banda exploited these titles in order to develop a culturally “intimate and fraternal 
relationship with the people” (Chirambo, 2009: 78). The goal was that despite the legitimacy 
deficit and dismal governance performance, the people should be compelled to regard the 
regime as defenders and heroes of culture (Chirambo, 2009: 81). Citizenship under Banda’s 
rule was embodied in a loyalty to the personality of the presidency (Kendall, 2007: 286). The 
leadership particularly was regarded as all-knowing and the best articulator of the people’s 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
204 
aspirations, who lacked the wisdom and sophistication to determine what is in their best 
interest.  
Furthermore, there was absolutely no academic freedom at any level of learning (Ihonvbere, 
1997: 225; Nkhata, 2012: 189). Banda actively and deliberately suffocated all opportunities 
for democratic growth right after independence, as he established a one-party state with him 
as its constitutionally declared life president (Ihonvbere, 1997: 226). The life president had to 
approve parliamentary candidates and would dismiss cabinet and parliament at his own will 
(Ihonvbere, 1997: 225). The one-party regime emphasised and inculcated in both learners and 
citizens its anti-colonialism nationalistic ideology, summed up in what it called the “four 
cornerstones”, namely “unity, loyalty, obedience, and discipline” (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 
2010: 412). The Malawi Young Pioneers, a paramilitary wing of the one-party regime, had 
instructors in every secondary school who exclusively taught unflinching observance of these 
nationalistic cornerstones (Banda, 1982: 96). Schools therefore produced passive, loyal and 
uncritical citizenship. There was systematic, brutal, usually fatal suppression of dissent, both 
at the grassroots and at leadership levels. Detention without trial, lack of separation of party 
and state affairs, rampant disappearance of critics and harassment of religious organisations 
whose beliefs were deemed against the state prevailed (O’Malley, 2000). 
The independent Malawian primary education system was at conception in the independence 
era understood to have two main functions, namely developing the individual and developing 
the society, on the understanding that the individual interest and the community are not in 
conflict, but that each presupposes the other (Reyes, 1973: 17). The stated aims of the 
primary school curriculum were intended to provide learners with occupational skills and to 
achieve literacy so as to, among other things, take pride in their local cultural heritage as 
embodied in local institutions (Hauya, 1997: 11). Ironically, however, even a pass in 
Chichewa the national language was not and has never been a pre-requisite for the award of 
any certificate in the three national examinations. An uncritical patriotism synonymous with 
loyalty, not to collective ideals but to the personality of Banda and his one-party regime, 
dominated all education levels. 
The primary education curriculum during the Banda era was meant to create submissive and 
passive citizens trained to prioritise obedience and loyalty over inquiry (Kendall, 2007: 286). 
Education policy was informed by the resolutions of the annual conference of the one-party 
regime as well as the president’s own directives, and all these revolved around achieving 
unity, loyalty, obedience and discipline (Hauya, 1997: 10–11). After the cabinet crisis of 
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1964, the nation’s authorised history was re-written with a heavy and over-exaggerated bias 
towards Kamuzu Banda as the sole messiah and hero who singlehandedly fought colonialists 
(McCracken, 2012: 451). The twisted history was based on errors and never included 
accounts of the roles of other struggle leaders who founded the party nor of the pivotal 
cabinet crisis. Banda’s leadership was based on a twisted conception of nationalism that 
thrived on inaccuracies and lack of academic freedom for free research and inquiry (Nkhata, 
2012: 189).  
The regime’s disdain for criticality only increased as years progressed. In 1963, in order to 
expand access to secondary school education in Malawi, government opened doors to 179 
American Peace Corps volunteer teachers who constituted almost half the secondary school 
teachers’ population (McCracken, 2012: 401). Unlike British teachers, the American 
volunteer teachers had a disdain of colonialism, its prejudices and its imposed social distance 
from native colleagues and learners (McCracken, 2012: 401). Their liberal approach to 
teaching and learning that was likely to produce inquisitive and freely inquiring learners was 
of serious concern to government, which was concerned with losing its hegemony over the 
people, and as such the Peace Corps volunteers were banned and expelled from Malawi in 
1971, seven years after independence (McCracken, 2012: 402). The political establishment 
was intolerant of any education that would facilitate independent thinking.  
The political suppression of dissent and inculcation of passive citizenship were occurring in a 
context of very thin distribution of critical education among the population. Most citizens 
were disempowered to actively and meaningfully engage in the political discourse beyond 
demanding political independence. Having a nationalistic citizenship education that 
characteristically countered criticality in the learners for 30 years created a citizenry that 
largely has an erroneous conceptualisation of the ideal relations between leaders and electors 
(Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010: 418). The attitude of helplessness and the belief that the leaders 
know best for the people still endure and are variously perpetuated in democratic Malawi 
today (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010: 417). This is the legacy of the dictatorship.  
In 1966, the primary education curriculum was revised to correct the colonial errors (Hauya, 
1997: 11). This resulted in the expansion of the subject content for Geography, History and 
Civics subjects. Regrettably, because this development occurred just two years after the 
cabinet crisis, the content, especially for History and Civics, was biased and twisted and was 
tantamount to indoctrination (Mtumbuka, 1998: 109–110). Further opportunistic and 
tokenistic educational reforms were made to ‘restore pride in indigenous culture’, although 
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they were informed by partisan interests (Chanunkha, 2005: 2–29). Up to the present for 
instance, indigenous music is still not studied in the University of Malawi, Malawi’s oldest 
and biggest public university (Chanunkha, 2005: 2–27).  
5.3.1. Abuse of nationality and the cosmopolitan correction 
The sense of nationality that was crucial for colonial struggle in Malawi was, in the 
subsequent independence era, twisted by the dictatorship to achieve a false and self-serving 
sense of national unity. Ideal nationality ought to be inward-looking (Papastephanou, 2013a: 
170), regarding the internal distribution of social goods within the nation’s political 
community (Rawls, 1999: 6). It must also be outward-looking in relation to other collectives 
so as to assume duties and demand benefits due to it as a collective agent in the global arena 
(Papastephanou, 2013a). 
The problem with the Malawian situation was that when time for the nation’s internal probing 
and inner appraisal was due, the probing was stopped violently. The consequence was a 
warped nationality that commanded only unquestioning loyalty in order to maintain a 
dubitable sense of unity and stability. All this notwithstanding does not make nationality 
inherently evil in citizenship conceptualisations, more especially in global citizenship 
(Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). For 30 years, possibly in hysterical response to the cabinet 
crisis, Malawi’s nation building was regrettably based on self-serving values for Banda and 
his one-party regime so as to fasten their grip on unchecked power (Mtumbuka, 1998: 309). 
Constitutionalism was alien to nation building and instead it was Banda’s four cornerstones 
of unity, loyalty, discipline and obedience that prevailed (Mtumbuka, 1998). 
As repeatedly emphasised, this dissertation does not fall into the dichotomous trap of 
extolling either nationality or cosmopolitanism. Rather, it argues that each has unique and 
incomparable normative worth. More importantly, the two ideals are mutually reinforcing 
and correcting (Papastephanou, 2015). The Malawian political experience reflects a neglect 
of this ideal mutually regulating relationship. The relevance of cosmopolitan ideals to the 
human condition in the midst of the Banda dictatorship is better captured by the role of 
external forces in pressuring for respect for human dignity and rights between the late 1980s 
and when the one party collapsed in 1993. International actors have variously contributed to 
democratic consolidation in Africa and Malawi, helping in ending one-party rule, largely 
through economic sanctions. The withdrawal of foreign aid by Western donors (who 
supported 40% of government’s annual national budget), especially the United Kingdom in 
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1993, due to bad governance and human rights violations forced the one-party regime to 
make concessions for democracy (Ihonvbere, 1997: 226).  
The question of other states and non-state actors intervening in the affairs of another nation 
on the basis of state violation of fundamental human rights usually draws controversy. The 
controversy ranges from whether it is acceptable to intervene, to when and how to intervene 
if permissible. This dissertation does not focus on addressing these questions. However, as 
Benhabib (2011: 62) holds, the most fundamental human right every individual has is the 
“right to have rights”. This right entails respect for the agency of individuals: their 
communicative freedom (Benhabib, 2011: 62). Usually, political elites who thrive on 
paternalising and repressive regimes appeal to culture or religious uniqueness of their society, 
claiming that it is only those familiar with their culture who may participate in the discourse 
on the acceptability of their regimes. This is said in a background where the society members 
who expected to participate in the society’s collective will-formation are systematically 
disempowered and repressed and perpetually coerced to conform to the state (Waghid & 
Davids, 2014). Such appeals to national sovereignty or culture are merely opportunistic.  
The systematic oppression of dissent and freedom by the one party dictatorship in Malawi 
would not have been successfully challenged by Malawians single-handedly. By every 
standard, one would argue that the people of Malawi were denied the right to have rights 
through the systematic suppression of alternative voices that effectively denied the realisation 
of communicative freedom. Such tendencies undermine the generality of humanness 
irrespective of culture or nationality differentiation. There may be disagreements as to what 
should constitute the full schedule of rights people around the world should have. However, 
violation of the communicative freedom of human beings anywhere in the world irrespective 
of circumstances is inherently unacceptable. 
Therefore, the international community’s exertion of pressure on Malawi through aid 
withdrawal and other related sanctions is consistent with a deliberative universalism for 
which this dissertation is arguing. In other words, such interventions are justified by the 
general otherness standpoint of communicative universalism. Every systematic act by the 
state or any agent that takes away a person’s right to have rights, in other words 
communicative freedom, is normatively illegitimate and demands all possible interventions 
so long as the interventions also guarantee preservation of the victims’ life and general 
stability of their social environment. This dispels the challenge that a deliberative 
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cosmopolitanism entails moral relativism and frustrates humanitarian intervention and 
condemnation of human rights repression. 
5.3.2. Language policy 
At independence in 1964, Malawi had three official languages: English, Chichewa and 
Tumbuka (Hauya, 1997: 12; Moto, 1999: 63). However, the single party’s declaration in 
1968, four years after independence, making Chichewa the national language, further attests 
to the twisted nationalism that was being pursued (Matiki, 2003: 158). Chichewa was to be 
used in mass communication and as medium of instruction in the first four years of primary 
school education at the expense of other major provincial languages such as Tumbuka in the 
north and Yao in the south (Moyo, 2003: 128). Instead of developing a due multination 
nationality, Banda pursued a nationality biased towards his own tribe, elevating it to the 
national level (Moto, 1999: 64).  
The nationality which Banda built was a concealment of power consolidation and 
centralisation only self-serving his ulterior motives. It fell short of any minimal standards of 
critical patriotism. Such national discourse that is exclusionary, repressive, narrow and 
devoid of criticality is not nationality qua nationality, but selfish interests in forced garbs of 
patriotism. Banda had no commitment to developing a transparent, inclusive, deliberative 
patriotism that would accommodate contestations. His endeavours towards patriotism were 
dubious and inconsistent with the very ideal of patriotism. 
Ironically, this is seen in contradictory policies the regime took: Chichewa the national 
language was not used in parliament and prospective members had to prove English 
proficiency (Moto, 1999: 66). Furthermore, despite being imposed as the national language, 
there were no institutionalisation and systematic development of Chichewa, as evidenced by 
the lack of a Chichewa dictionary despite there being a government Chichewa Board, which 
never formally added new vocabulary into the lexicon as its minimum mandate expected of it 
(Moto, 1999: 66). Worse still, Banda himself always addressed mass rallies and national 
addresses in English with a vernacular interpreter (Moto, 1999: 67). A pass in English at 
every national certificate examination was included as (and still is) a prerequisite for 
awarding of a certificate. With national language, on the other hand, this was not the case 
even today. It is evident that there was glaring failure on the part of Malawian leadership to 
make meaningful attempts towards educational decolonisation, free of undue Eurocentrism. 
Therefore, it is important to take note that the weak status and perpetuation of the denigration 
of native languages across much of Africa as official languages (Kamwendo, 2010) are not 
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owed to colonialism alone. Much of post-colonial Africa has been ignoring the active 
development of local languages as languages of science, trade and official communication, 
and instead retained the colonial languages as official languages while they had the 
opportunity to make a radical shift, albeit gradually (Moyo, 2003: 130). There is therefore 
glaring African culpability in the prevailing Eurocentric linguistic hegemony across Africa. 
Denying functional roles to the other dominant native languages and compelling their native 
speakers to learn in a second local language and later a foreign official language was 
marginalising. This is because it affects the “conceptual and cognitive development of 
learners” (Moyo, 2003: 128). Speakers of such marginalised languages lose the socio-
economic and political relevance of their languages (Moyo, 2003: 129) under which they can 
effectively self-actualise. 
Post-independence Malawi, in its quest for national unity, unfortunately had a very erroneous 
conception of nationality informed by non-national motivations. There was linguistic, social, 
cultural and political engineering to achieve a coercive integration of all cultures. The result 
was arbitrary marginalisation of other indigenous languages in Malawi since independence in 
the name of a morally feeble nation-building project. After re-introduction of political 
pluralism in 1993, there have been only a tokenistic recognition and elevation of indigenous 
languages in Malawi with little or no functional value (Moyo, 2002: 270). 
The nationality pursued was homogenising and convenient for authoritarianism. It was 
incompatible and inherently antagonistic with the characteristic internal diversity and 
differences of the nation. Just like the prevalent form of strong cosmopolitan citizenship, 
difference and diversity that characterised the cabinet crisis were to be muted as elements that 
are inimical to the national solidarity project. Little did it occur to the political leadership that 
national solidarity, which once motivated the political anti-colonial movement, was 
meaningful only in the context of its prospects to enable the individual to flourish and have 
his or her aspirations actualised in the subsequent political units realised in the framework of 
nationality. 
5.3.3. Ubuntu and citizenship in Malawi 
Despite the characteristic corruption of local life and of citizenship, one of the aspects of 
community life the one-party regime attempted to put to proper use in its citizenship 
configuration in education systems was the idea of collective or communal work. All 
students, from primary school through to university, together with their communities 
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annually participated in community work for one week of the school calendar, called the 
Youth Week (Banda, 1982: 112). This approach to citizenship is congruent with the then 
dominant traditional Malawian value of thangata (literally ‘caring for’) in pre-colonial times, 
where members of a village would go out on a particular day and help cultivate one of their 
member’s fields, sometimes rotating until each one’s field is cultivated (White, 1987: 89). 
However, colonialists and settler farmers abused the system by forcing natives to provide 
compulsory labour (as a form of rent payment) on settler farms, leaving them without any 
time to attend to their own fields (White, 1987: 89).  
More significant is that the original pre-colonial thangata system, whose collectivism 
principles informed the Youth Week projects, was consistent with the tenets of ubuntu: 
collective responsibility, care, empathy, togetherness and interconnectedness (Mkabela, 2014; 
Ngcoya, 2015). Under the Youth Week, students from primary school through to university 
worked on common roads, erected simple bridges across local streams, erected bus shelters 
and even constructed teacher houses and classrooms, among other tasks (Banda, 1982: 112; 
Nyondo, 2012). The net value of this aspect of citizenship was that it engendered senses of 
collectivism, ownership, responsibility and togetherness in learners. This was consistent with 
ubuntu values that characterise much of Malawi (Mtumbuka, 1998). This was one of the very 
rare things people in the democratic era decry to have been abolished in 1994 in the re-
democratisation hysteria, as it was then deemed repressive and coercive of people to provide 
services that ostensibly the state failed to deliver to the people (Nyondo, 2012; Phiri, 2016).  
It is apparent that during the time, there was symmetry between the Youth Week practice and 
the people’s lived experiences that were anchored in ubuntu values. It is equally apparent that 
the individual-centric conception of (strong cosmopolitan) citizenship embraced after 
democratisation that summarily dismissed enacted aspects of collectivism was incongruent 
with the people’s lived experiences and situatedness. The concept of ubuntu, for instance, 
entails a unique understanding of human dignity and identity, not as constituting in only 
individual self-realisation, but as being “achieved through mutualism, empathy, generosity, 
and community commitment” (Swanson, 2015: 35). These ideals were and have been at odds 
with the adopted exclusively individual-centric frameworks that carried promises of 
democratic liberation. It is only after relative stabilisation of democracy that the deficit 
caused by the absence of ubuntu values would be felt and calls for the Youth Week 
restoration have emerged (Nyondo, 2012; Phiri, 2016).  
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5.4. Education for citizenship in the pluralism era (1994 to present) 
After internal and external resistance against the atrocities of the one-party state, Malawians 
voted for the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1993. In 1994, the one-party tyranny 
was replaced by a democratically elected government following a general election, starting a 
new journey towards democracy after 30 years of autocratic rule. Almost every political and 
state institution required reforms to shed off elements of the 30-year dictatorship.  
In primary education, a number of reforms were almost immediately implemented with 
differing degrees of success in conceptualisation as well as output. Chichewa, the language 
that the one-party regime unilaterally imposed as the medium of instruction for the first four 
primary school years, was dropped as the sole medium of instruction. Instead, teachers would 
use the dominant local language in the area (Malawi has about four regionally-based 
dominant languages in the three administrative regions) (Moyo, 2001: 146). It is also during 
this period that the twisted, heavily biased Malawi History, Civics and Geography subjects 
were removed from the curriculum (UNESCO, 1994: 9; Hauya, 1997: 22). All three were 
replaced by one encompassing subject, Social Studies (Ministry of Education, 2005). The 
political dimension of Social Studies is essentially about neutral principles of democracy 
discussed with reference to their manifestation in Malawi and regional and global arenas.  
The policy requiring the use of mother-tongue language in instruction for the first four years 
of primary education was haphazardly introduced without any articulated commitments of 
developing indigenous languages to employ them for instruction in schools (Matiki, 2006; 
Chiuye & Moyo, 2008). The policy changes had largely been merely tokenistic and 
superficial. Ultimately, these feeble attempts could not inspire confidence among the public, 
which had an entrenched denigration of the local languages in public domains owing to 
colonialism and the one-party’s regime tacit neo-colonial orientations (Matiki, 2003; 
Kamwendo, 2010).  
As a consequence, in plural Malawi, most people still find literacy in English as being more 
rewarding than proficiency in the mother tongue (Matiki, 2006: 251). The neoliberal order 
has exacerbated the situation. It is against this background that in 2013, the language of 
instruction was changed again, making English the medium of instruction for all Malawi 
education (Malawi Government, 2013, sec. 78(1); Masina, 2014). Convenience to integrate 
into the neoliberal frameworks anchoring education locally and globally sacrifices cultural 
competence. What is largely impeding the development of local languages is a lack of 
political will that is necessary to standardise and develop terminologies for the hitherto 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
212 
marginalised languages (Chiuye & Moyo, 2008: 138) and assign them meaningful functional 
roles. 
Furthermore, the one-party regime had also abused the role of certain dominant cultural 
norms such as discipline. Most Malawian cultures have had forms of initiation, which 
essentially mark adulthood. Despite the differences in forms and content of the initiation 
ceremonies across cultures, their objective remains generally one: to develop an individual 
who is well acquainted with his or her responsibility to society and family as major 
considerations in his or her pursuit of self-determination endeavours (Ott, 1998: 61–62). No 
wonder even after democratisation, certain forms of school practice steeped in tradition were 
defended by both teachers and their community. For instance, parents were concerned with 
the threats excessively individual-centric democratic reforms were posing to learners with 
respect to enduring discipline practices (excluding corporal punishment) as well as how the 
schools should retain social marks of politeness and respect for elders tolerable in their 
communities but actively discouraged by the new democratic order (Kendall, 2007: 294). 
Placing such expectations on the school, at face value, usually attracts criticisms of 
paternalism and social reproduction, where the school is accused of reproducing society 
despite the society having some oppressive properties.  
However, as has been highlighted before, such absolutist summary dismissal of the value of 
traditional ways is problematic and risks undermining the concreteness and otherness of the 
local. Such a dismissal is based on a particular conception of human nature: the human being 
as primarily individual-centric who needs collective solidarity only for extrinsic purposes. In 
such an individual-centric conception of the autonomous individual and autonomy-oriented 
education, teachers are expected to detach themselves from any other roles they have in 
society and must impartially and impersonally facilitate only critical development in learners.  
However, in a characteristically communalistic society, it would be reasonable to expect the 
teacher to be multifaceted and must wisely wear different hats in the school. The teacher is as 
much a facilitator of the impersonal pursuit of knowledge as he or she is expected to guide, 
advise, correct and inspire learners on matters unrelated to the teachers’ subject domain. As 
the popular communalism-grounded African dictum holds, ‘It takes a village to raise a child’, 
and not just parents. It is in this sense, that most parents in Africa expect teachers to be more 
than teachers only. They expect teachers to assume parents’ role in their absence. Dismissing 
all such approaches from an individual-centric perspective of fear of paternalism would be 
missing the whole point. While one concedes that there are real possibilities of such positions 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
213 
degenerating into paternalism that in itself is insufficient to condemn the approach, because 
there is no moral approach that is in itself immune to degenerating into a moral crisis. It is not 
in the scope of this dissertation to establish how the teacher can avoid being paternalistic 
towards the learner in such a context. 
Respect for elders is characteristic of most African societies (Mbiti, 1977; Chidammodzi, 
1999). Tasks expected of learners and youths, such as helping with teachers’ load or helping 
elderly people in their community, cannot be summarily categorised as absolutely 
paternalistic. In a way, they are traditional modes of teaching of respect, care and 
responsibility. In any case, it is only prudent that the school should refine rather than dismiss 
a thriving social order. However, respecting elders entails neither that all elders are wise nor 
that non-elders are inferior in insight, wisdom and criticality. Rather, it is based on the idea 
that as a reasonable munthu (one full of humanness) who is characteristically reflective, 
critical, considerate and caring, the elderly individual is a personification of the moral law 
and “the repository (or archive) of empirical evidence necessary for empirical [moral] 
problems” (Chidammodzi, 1999: 101). In other words, such a one is expected to be wise, 
where wisdom is regarded as a virtue.  
Just like the Aristotelean virtue is acquired through habituation, practice and experience, it is 
generally reasonable to expect an elderly munthu person to have richer and meaningful 
insight into human character and conduct. On the account of his or her age, the ideal elderly 
person is well situated to guide on what injures or betters the individual and community. In 
any case, even though his or her experience may not always and necessarily encourage 
breaking ranks with the social establishment and common tradition, it nevertheless better 
prepares the free individual who seeks to revise or ignore the community’s perspectives in 
considering what to anticipate in the exercise of his or her self-determination. It is therefore 
erroneous to view such aspects of local life as incompatible with freedom and citizenship and 
exclude them, as is currently the case in Malawi. 
Rather than building nationalism based on inclusion and deliberation that ultimately serves 
the interests of the people, democratic Malawi has generally made opportunistic and 
exclusivist pursuits of nationality. Most African and Malawian leaders rarely win elections 
based on issues, but usually win through controversially managed elections, with almost 
every election result being contested in court because of alleged electoral fraud (Chirambo, 
2009: 79). With this recurrent legitimacy deficit, the leaders usually resort to political 
populism to reinforce their usually fickle legitimacy (Chirambo, 2009: 79). President Bingu 
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wa Mutharika (from 2004 to 2012) formed the Mulhakho wa Alomwe (association for the 
Lomwe tribe), sustained by President Peter Mutharika (from 2014 to present), while President 
Joyce Banda (2012–2013) attempted to form the Chiwanja cha Ayao (forum for Yao people), 
where the presidents serve as patrons of cultural conservation groups of their tribes 
(Nyasatimes, 2013; Muheya, 2016). Although not illegal, it is nevertheless unethical to have 
a head of state in a multi-ethnic nation assuming the position of patron for his or her ethnic 
group, which is only one of many. 
A potential critic would claim that efforts of active inclusion of the nation in citizenship 
education would run the risk of generating into cultural populism. However, it is very 
difficult for cultural populism to flourish as it did in the one-party era. This is because 
democracy entails competition of different ideas and interests. People of the same ethnic 
group now have competing, if not contrasting, socio-economic interests and political loyalties 
(Chirambo, 2009: 90). When people are armed with freedom and information, they get to 
realise their entitlements and what political leaders owe them in relation to the people’s 
concrete needs. Populism alone in the face of state corruption and economic hardship cannot 
sustain a fragile legitimacy. This is why in Malawi in 2011, people fiercely demonstrated 
against Bingu wa Mutharika’s regime across the whole country, weakening his grip on power 
until his death of natural causes in 2012 despite his populist mobilisation.  
Furthermore, democratic pluralism founded on the right to have rights (Benhabib, 2011: 62) 
is the effective moderator against populist nationalism. As Chirambo (2009: 92) argues, so 
long as there is devolution of power and vibrant local government where the people are as 
much as possible fully equipped to manage their own affairs and hold leadership accountable 
locally without the frustrating bottlenecks of bureaucracy, it is hard to imagine the emergence 
of populism. Therefore, the people would not be paying homage to some executive politician, 
but will fully direct their local affairs locally. More importantly, the type of patriotism being 
defended here is not one that is tantamount to indoctrination. It is one whose fundamental 
attributes are inclusivity and criticality.  
5.4.1. Strong cosmopolitanism dominance and nationality underutilisation 
This section shows that multiparty and plural Malawi, owing to the abuse of nationality by 
the dictatorship, makes an unexamined summary dismissal of everything local so as to 
embrace the ‘modern’ strong cosmopolitan currency of strong cosmopolitan human equality 
and individual freedom. The section shows that besides the rhetoric and superficial attempts 
of localising citizenship and democracy, there is generally a disproportionately immense 
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influence of strong cosmopolitanism, at least in as far as disregard, neglect and denigration of 
the local national are concerned. 
Language and citizenship have always been interacting in political thought (Guilherme, 
2007: 72). Among others, language generally serves two purposes: a medium of 
communication and a carrier of perspectives or culture (Wa Thiong’o, 1987: 13). Although 
one may communicate and be linguistically competent in one language, there has to be a 
simultaneous cultural competence behind the language in order to achieve more meaningful 
self-expression (Wa Thiong’o, 1987).  
According to Wa Thiong’o (1987: 13), one can communicate in say a second language, but 
fail to adequately express oneself, according to the socio-cultural frame of thought of one’s 
first language. This position is corroborated by Matiki’s (2003) research among Malawian 
members of parliament who are compelled to transact in English only, a language in which 
most have little proficiency, not to mention that it is spoken as a home language by less than 
1% of the population (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 1998), yet 75% understand 
Chichewa, the local language. What was observed was that on emotive and controversy-
rousing topics, most members not holding the floor would make background interjections in 
the vernacular language, and not in English (Matiki, 2003: 195).  
Because languages have a cultural dimension, there is usually a form of alienation when one 
employs (particularly) a foreign language. This alienation involves “an active (or passive) 
distancing of oneself from the reality around; and an active (passive) identification with that 
which is most external to one’s environment” (Wa Thiong’o, 1987: 28). 
In the wider democratic Malawi, merely embracing the conventional structures of democracy 
and governance is inadequate. Largely, there is a disconnect between the political elites and 
the majority of the population at the grassroots levels, who are linguistically marginalised. 
The majority cannot have a first-hand interpretation of parliamentary proceedings that are in 
English. As a result, the interests and concerns of political elites are incongruent with those of 
the local communities on the ground (Gaynor, 2010: 812). Therefore, rather than developing 
citizenship, there is development of clientelism (Gaynor, 2010: 812).  
Language policies that are congruent with the local context would help to make the scenario 
meaningful and just, for example if indigenous languages are used in parliament. While we 
have to concede that the unexplained underdevelopment of African languages over the years 
renders them difficult to utilise in scientific and economic discourses, there is much in local 
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councils, national parliament, education, and so forth that can be communicated in the 
vernacular. It is odd that state of the nation address and parliamentary debate are strictly in 
English, a foreign language used by 0.2% of the population as a home language (National 
Statistics Office of Malawi, 1998: 33)  that alienates the majority of the population whose 
literacy level is at 64% (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 2008: 14).  
Exclusion of indigenous languages and alternatively maintaining colonial languages as 
languages of instruction in early primary school, as the official language used for the 
judiciary and legislature, adversely affects democracy, as linguistic impediments create 
distance between democratic institutions and the people (Matiki, 2003: 134). In Malawi, 
statutory laws are written in English, a home language for less than 1% of the population 
(National Statistics Office of Malawi, 1998), and this inhibits the development of a 
constitutional culture (Matiki, 2003: 134). 
The underdevelopment and displacement of vernacular languages coupled with the prestige 
of English compels the pushing out of vernacular languages from the school domain. The 
urgency and necessity to acquire the most prestigious language compel schools to impose 
sanctions on learners’ use of mother tongues. A similar phenomenon also occurs in other 
African nations, such as Kenya (Bunyi, 2005: 133).  
I encountered such experiences during my teaching period at a public boarding secondary 
school in Malawi between the years 2005 and 2012. One outstanding incident was when the 
whole teaching area of the school campus (cafeteria, classrooms, staff rooms and 
administration area) was declared an English-speaking zone by the school management as a 
way of enhancing learners’ acquisition of English. After introduction of the policy, English 
teachers complained during a staff meeting that science teachers were frequently overheard 
by fellow teachers teaching in the vernacular as they attempted to explain concepts. In 
response, science teachers protested that the code-switching guarantees learners’ 
understanding of scientific concepts, most of which seem alien to the learners. Again, a 
similar phenomenon is also reported to be prevalent in Kenyan public schools (Bunyi, 2005: 
133).  
These attitudes towards the otherness of vernacular languages as being incompatible with the 
objective, in selection of content, pedagogy and general formality, in essence downgrades the 
value of local languages to a subaltern level. The assumption is that vernacular languages are 
unfit for the school and official domains. Not only do such tendencies boldly mark out a 
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boundary between the familiar local and the unfamiliar ‘alien’ of the school, but they also 
convey attitudes of denigration and inferiority of the local through which the learners have 
developed and concretise themselves as individuals. Not only do they feel the compulsion to 
acquire the prestigious language, but they simultaneously interpret that achieving such a feat 
necessarily excludes and at worst denigrates the local and the vernacular. Such undervaluing 
of the local may therefore not necessarily be restricted to local languages alone, but may 
extend to valuing of local art, local literature, local traditions and local architecture, among 
other things (Chanunkha, 2005: 2–11). The production and appreciation of local literature, for 
instance, have remarkably depreciated in Malawi (Kamwendo, 1998). There is no standard 
orthography for all the other languages, except Chichewa, whose corpus remains 
underdeveloped (Kamwendo, 1998: 35). There are hardly any novels in the other indigenous 
languages (Kamwendo, 1998: 34; Moyo, 2001: 143). 
In South Africa, a Language in Education Policy was introduced in 1997, aimed at achieving 
political, economic and social transformation from the legacy of apartheid and to address its 
injustices and iniquitous heritage (Probyn, 2005: 155). This policy paved the way for the 
employment of the nine, now constitutionally official and previously marginalised, 
indigenous languages in schools (Probyn, 2005: 155). However, such provisions have not 
effectively contributed towards “boosting the role of indigenous languages in public affairs” 
(Probyn, 2005: 155). Instead, rather than flourish, what has gained dominance is the use of 
English, a mother tongue for 9% of the nation’s population (Probyn, 2005: 155). Therefore, 
the official status accorded to the indigenous languages appears to be only symbolic, and for 
the more pertinent climbing the social ladder, English as the dominant global language is the 
key language (Probyn, 2005: 155). 
In South Africa, approximately 80% of primary school learners are in township or rural 
schools, which are relatively disadvantaged (Probyn, 2005). The instruction in such schools 
in the early three years is in English, yet the learners have very narrow opportunities to 
encounter and acquire English outside the classroom (Probyn, 2005: 158). What appears to be 
the case is that the legal restrictions that the apartheid regime established in the access of 
quality educational opportunities have mutated into an economic form and hence still persist 
despite the achievement of political equality.  
As Probyn (2005: 162) further observes, in South Africa, few of the formerly segregatory 
privileged schools that are now multiracial are committed to multilingual instruction, apart 
from teaching African languages as subjects and offering instruction in English for African 
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learners when the school’s main language is Afrikaans (Probyn, 2005: 162). Terminology 
development and planning for teaching and learning from primary school through to tertiary 
level in South Africa, just like in Malawi and much of Africa, are constrained partly by 
resource availability, and largely by a lack of political will (Moto, 1999; Probyn, 2005: 165; 
Chiuye & Moyo, 2008). The situation is exacerbated by increasing and prevailing neocolonial 
perceptions about English as the ideal language of education and the dominance of English in 
the global economic and technological orders (Probyn, 2005: 165). This undermines efforts 
of correcting cultural imbalances and injustices (Probyn, 2005: 166; Kamwendo, 2010). It is 
imperative to always bear in mind that the use of English in teaching and learning around the 
world is both critical and not without normative consequence. This is because English is 
Janus-faced: “it is the language of imperialism, consumerism, marketing, Hollywood, 
multinationals, war and oppression as well as of opportunity, science, social movements, 
peace processes [and] human rights” (Guilherme, 2007: 74). 
Upon achieving independence, Malawi was expected to decontaminate their education from 
colonial imperialism. However, before the nation even started critically undertaking this 
endeavour, globalisation with its embedded subtle forms of neo-imperialism had emerged 
(Paulsen, 2011). The economic convenience of using English regrettably exclusively tramples 
down the normativity embedded in cultural self-expression. 
One can glean that attitudes and the fate of indigenous languages in Malawi are under the 
hands of two forces: the oddly reluctant African political elite and the influence (on the elite) 
of neoliberalism. There is, however, so much affirmative action African governments can 
perform to assert and uplift indigenous languages, not only for symbolic cultural purposes, 
but also to accord them meaningful functional roles to stop the marginalisation of the larger 
section of their populations. Such efforts can also be contributions towards other efforts of 
resisting neoliberalism. Unless African leaders and scholars take initiative against 
neoliberalism, they in principle are in material cooperation with its advancement. 
Neoliberalism may be deeply entrenched in modern life, but it is not an invincible law of 
nature. It is important to take note that politically decolonised independent African nations 
such as Malawi did not have unproblematic linguistic diversity. Malawi, like such other 
nations, was also fraught with the challenge of linguistic pluralism and choice in public 
policy (Moyo, 2003). The challenge to forge an open and just national unity just as it lurked 
after independence still persists even today. Therefore, problems of linguistic and cultural 
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iniquities are both social and global justice matters (Moyo, 2002; Matiki, 2006; Guilherme, 
2007).  
After independence, frightened by diversity, which they erroneously conceived as a source 
for trouble and something to be done away with, Malawi’s one-party regime imposed one 
language across the entire nation, thereby being a dominant local language threatening other 
majority and ‘minority’ local languages alike. After overcoming one-party tyranny, the 
democratic era, rather than meaningfully confronting and addressing linguistic injustices, 
instead had escaped addressing the real challenge of linguistic diversity by employing the use 
of English as a “symbolic instrument for claiming democracy [and] economic justice” 
(Guilherme, 2007: 78) in the quest of achieving global economic integration. It is necessary 
to bear in mind that such global integration is hegemonic, where some ideologies are just 
arbitrarily subordinated to others, and that in the categorising narratives of local–global, some 
voices are muted and some absent, while others are permanently discounted (Guilherme, 
2007: 78). 
5.5. The cost of the enduring deficit of nationality in citizenship 
This section argues that throughout the colonial, independent and the current democratic eras, 
the marginalisation of the local is still prevailing in different modes. Unless such tendencies 
are actively and purposively confronted, the prevailing unity of strong cosmopolitanism and 
its enabling neoliberalism vehicle will continue alienating the people of Malawi. This section 
shows that attempts of adjusting to (or assimilating into) the mainstream and its attendant 
global languages and neutering of nationality as a matter of global convenience far from 
correcting iniquities serve only to entrench them in the ‘new’ world, where languages and 
national history are stripped off of their situatedness import. 
Language is both a communication and a cultural medium. For some cultures, 
communication is achieved by the surface meanings of words, whereas for some, and mostly 
in Africa, communication involves deciphering the embedded meaning beyond what 
someone says (Brett, Behfar & Kern, 2006). Age, social relations, proverbs and so forth may 
at times constitute the tools required to decipher meaning. In an African context, a foreign 
language such as English, for example, may not have the capacity to embed the cultural 
meaning of expressions. In Achebe’s Things fall apart the white colonial governor reflects 
this idea when he claims that natives’ communication is usually winding and not straight to 
the point (Achebe, 2006: 183). The fact that such cultural frameworks are not freely chosen 
by an autonomous individual does not deprive them of moral worth. Recognising them as 
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frameworks of communication for a people is neither being essentialist or homogeneous, nor 
undermining individual autonomy. In fact, they are frameworks through which an individual 
achieves autonomy and articulates his or her individuation. 
Free self-determining individuals are embedded in social, cultural and geographic contexts. 
They are not therefore only members of the all-embracing human race, but are also crucially 
products of particular cultures. The cultures may not be absolute or homogeneous and are 
mostly hybridised through interacting with others such as Westernism (Kishindo, 2001: 5). 
As such, if democratic values have to be respected in the actualisation and operation of 
democratic institutions, we must seriously consider recognition of the worth of local 
situatedness in the translation of democratic ideals into reality. Most African nations are 
attempting endeavours to engender the rule of law in their young democracies. However, 
little do they consider the role of indigenous language in achieving democratic justice in 
terms of the law. The realisation of democratic values in the legal domain in Malawi must of 
necessity confront the question of the interrelationship among language, society and 
democracy (Kishindo, 2001: 5). The law, although espousing universal ideals, is informed by 
varying “cognitive categories, norms, and values” peculiar to a community, language or 
nation (Kishindo, 2001: 5). 
African communities have enduring conceptions, systems and institutions of justice, such as 
customary law (Mwaungulu, 2006: 270), which are neither inept nor perfect, but need 
blending, revising, and so forth. Under the new constitution from the one-party regime, in a 
rather hasty and politically motivated move, traditional community courts were abolished 
(Chimombo, 1999: 54). This took away the opportunity for a more lively embodiment of both 
traditional and local aspirations and values in the law. This is because timely and efficient 
access to justice in the conventional legal system is for the average Malawian expensive due 
to legal costs accompanying the procedures (Chimombo, 1999: 54). Furthermore, the legal 
system and procedures are largely anglicised, hence not ‘accessible’ by everyone, thereby 
alienating the majority because of the employment of foreign language as medium of 
communication (Chimombo, 1999: 54). 
It is cardinal to be cognisant that the way in which to uphold the same universal democratic 
ideals varies across cultures. As such, locality and its mediums are not morally insignificant. 
For instance, Kishindo (2001) draws attention to the fact that natives under colonial law saw 
a huge discrepancy between how they and colonial law conceived the magnitude of the 
offence of adultery. In much of the Malawian natives’ law, adultery was tantamount to a 
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serious criminal act and not a civil one, as European law conceived it (Kishindo, 2001: 6). 
The Western perspective considers it to be up to the individuals involved in the offence to 
determine any grievance, if any at all arise. On the other hand, the African perspective found 
adultery to undermine the dignity of the cheated partner as well as the values that hold society 
together, such as commitment, responsibility and mutual trust. No wonder they regarded 
committing such an offence as kupasula mudzi (breaking social cohesion) (Kishindo, 
2001: 5). From all this, one can ultimately glean that differences in cultures among nations 
substantially determine the aspect, scope and breadth of human relationships that should be 
subject to formal legal processes (Kishindo, 2001: 20). In other words, in moral reflection 
particularity and concrete otherness are not normatively anomalous. Linguistic concreteness 
too cannot be fully substituted by any other ‘universal’ language. 
It is necessary that in Malawi, and much of Africa, local languages be accorded more space in 
domains that closely affect people, such as in education, parliament, courts, public 
communication, and so forth. Referring to the South African context, Swanepoel (2013: 23) 
concedes that replacing the role of English in education, “the courts and general public 
communication” as the lingua franca, although it is “not the first language of the 
overwhelming majority of the population”, may not be easy or simple (Swanepoel, 2013: 23). 
This is so in that it could be achieved at the expense of other disruptions, which at times 
individuals and communities may not be ready to undertake (Swanepoel, 2013: 23).  
Africa, however, still has an obligation to develop and empower its languages “in all high-
status public, scientific technological and educational functions” (Swanepoel, 2013: 23) to 
have its voice adequately represented, not merely interpreted, entailed or projected through 
the dominant prototype frames of communication and academic thought expression. This 
way, Africa will have meaningful participation in the global space. Multinational business 
firms, for example, encounter the relationship that exists between culture and language. In 
their contexts, they frequently confront the often ignored reality that communication is much 
more than deciphering the lexical meaning of words. Communication in some cultures, for 
instance Western culture, is mostly direct and as explicit as can be (Brett et al., 2006). While 
interacting with persons with non-Western cultural backgrounds, business firm managers of a 
Western background discover that their addressees tied the meaning of words to a context or 
the relationship with the interlocutor. As such their (non-Western) employees express 
(dis)agreement over a position not with a bold ‘yes’ or ‘no’ but rather determining their 
position depends on the interlocutor making inferences from the hints the employees give in 
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their non-straight-forward responses (Brett et al., 2006). Sometimes people would say ‘yes’, 
only to mean that they are closely listening to your position and not necessarily that they are 
in agreement with you (Brett et al., 2006). 
The legacy of colonialism for African education is that it alienated learners from their 
communities, largely by employing a language (both literally and figuratively) not 
identifiable with the community and its interests, but with those of the colonisers (Masemula, 
2015: 176). The most outstanding legacy of such an education was the reinforcing of the 
perspective that the local, the indigenous, the African way of life is inferior and the European 
one superior (Masemula, 2015: 176). 
In the post-colonial era, African leaders, universities and scholars have not critically 
scrutinised the inherited Eurocentric paradigms and epistemological frameworks in their 
academic practice, but have only reproduced them. This is partly manifested through the 
retention of European languages in education while simultaneously and exclusively side-
lining the development of indigenous languages as worthwhile tools for education and critical 
public deliberation (Masemula, 2015: 176). 
Efforts of supporting indigenous languages in the light of the convenience of dominant global 
languages should not be regarded as futile on the grounds that, as a critic would contend, 
local communities around the globe will domesticate and localise global languages to express 
their concreteness. Such a position stems from a wrong conception of what the problem of 
linguistic under-representation in the global arena entails. It is simplistic to assume that a 
global linguistic hegemony is a solution to equality other than a concealment of the 
inequalities. The recognition and making visible of linguistic under-representation reveals the 
current hitherto unconsidered deeply seated imbalances that highlight the need for achieving 
linguistic, educational, social and global justice for ‘minority’ communities whose interests 
are marginalised within different institutions and discourses (Canagarajah, 2005: 195). In 
other words, such linguistic complexities manifest enduring problems of justice. Escaping 
such complexities by hiding behind adopting neutral and ‘non-culture-affiliated’ dominant 
languages does not succeed in taking away the injustices. In other words, deproblematising 
linguistic-cultural aspirations deproblematises unattended to social and global justice 
problems.  
The prevailing model of education and education for citizenship in Malawi follows a 
“positivist tradition”, which is based on an assumption that efficient social policies must be 
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grounded in “objective assessments of the needs, processes, and outcomes” of human 
interactions (Canagarajah, 2005: 195). This requires and results in social engineering to 
establish a pre-conceived impartial ideal educational and linguistic model rather than 
developing one that is responsive to the people’s lived experiences (Waghid, 2004; 
Canagarajah, 2005: 195). However, what such an approach ignores is that “considerations of 
language allegiance, sociolinguistic identity, and linguistic attitudes are rarely rational, 
pragmatic, or objective. They are ideological” (Canagarajah, 2005: 195). Therefore, one 
perspective of reality as represented by a global language dominates and displaces another 
represented by a minority indigenous language. 
By demanding equity of representation of situatedness in global citizenship through the role 
of indigenous languages in education and teaching and learning of history, this dissertation is 
not defending an essentialist and reductionist conception of culture or being African in the 
global arena. Rather, the case is that situatedness ought to be essential in cosmopolitan 
education. Furthermore, familiarisation with one’s history and that of the wider world is the 
best posture for understanding one’s as well as humanity’s position and prospects in relation 
to the condition of the world today with respect to justice and injustice. 
In universalist citizenship discourses we need to be mindful of the differences of other groups 
of people who experience “structural exclusion and discrimination” in the public and global 
arenas (Banks, 2013: 110). Unless deliberate attempts are made to hear their marginalised 
voice by attending to their difference, equity cannot be attained (Banks, 2013: 110). In the 
context of universality of certain dimensions of knowledge, such as moral knowledge and 
global interdependence, calling for recognition of African epistemology is not essentially 
about constructing ‘great narratives’ that are purely African in nature, that out-compete other 
dominant narratives in the global world today. Instead, it is and should be about probing and 
reconceptualising the foundational frameworks, relationships and contexts from which 
discourses, including the grand ones, originate in terms that are congruent with and 
responsive to African embeddedness (Cawood, 2015: 359). 
In most African nations, the legacy of colonialism left the challenge of resisting Eurocentric 
linguistic dominance and developing capacity for national autonomy. Before such a project 
even neared completion, globalisation had made porous the borders of nation-states. Through 
multinational corporations, global markets, popular culture and digital technology, 
globalisation has made English the most important language for all communities across the 
world (Canagarajah, 2005: 196). Demanding contextual responsiveness from global 
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citizenship therefore does not imply doing away with English. Rather, it is about a critical use 
of English as a medium of instruction, mindful of its hegemony and suppression of native 
languages. At the same time, it is about deliberately undertaking efforts to uplift and develop 
native languages, as in their current status they simply cannot compete with and challenge the 
privileged domination of English language. 
The linguistic hegemony and nation neutrality embedded in modern education, especially 
education for global citizenship, are aimed at producing in learners citizens who can operate 
effectively anywhere in the world. However, such an education is defective in that it does not 
emphasise the knowledge and skills learners “need to care for and appreciate the places in 
which they grow up, [and] it also fails to provide them with an understanding of what place 
means in the lives of people” (Noddings, 2005: 57). 
It is worth recognising that “homeplaces have both personal and symbolic meaning” 
(Noddings, 2005: 58). Meaningful global citizenship education should actively consider the 
meaningfulness of situatedness to people across the world, and this is satisfied among others 
by the teaching of local history (Noddings, 2005: 65). Placed-ness should be recognised in 
democratic education and should not be annihilated by the commitments of strong 
cosmopolitanism. This is because homeplaces have attached to them past experiences, 
“presence, and influence”: containing a people’s roots and “traces of their prior existence” 
(Noddings, 2005: 58). 
It is erroneous to conclude that a capacity to freely traverse and migrate to any place in the 
world, as afforded by global interconnectedness, and the binding universal duties owed to 
humanity as humanity, necessarily translate into a devaluation of place. Strangely enough, the 
more one moves out of one’s homeplace, the more symbolic and meaningful the place, its 
history and practices become (Wiesel, 1996). 
With respect to global citizenship, it is imperative that the “curriculum should not be pre-
packaged and separate from the interests and needs of students, but instead intimately 
associated with them through genuine problem-solving activities” (Glass, 2000: 277) 
connected with their concrete lived experiences (Waghid, 2004). The reality and experiences 
of the world are too complex to be reducible into either of the absolutist dichotomous 
categories of the objective-versus-subjective. In education and moral theorisation we need not 
conflate between “normative truth elements of paradigms [or] frameworks or discourse [with] 
their a-normative (ideological) distortions” (Cawood, 2015: 358). It is one (normative) thing 
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to endorse the non-negotiability and non-relativism of a foundational universal moral ideal 
such as human equality, and yet another thing (usually ideological) to make absolutist claims 
about particular aspects of human relationships as inherently having no moral worth for all 
the people of the world.  
5.5.1. Globality and marginality of local epistemologies 
A scrutiny of strong cosmopolitanism reveals that its “conceptual as well as practical 
formulations of global citizenship” have a Eurocentric origin and this framework informs and 
sustains how global citizenship education should be conceived and realised (Abdi, 2015: 15). 
A fundamental problem of this humanist and predominant Eurocentric global citizenship 
orientation is that it is “exclusionist in its historical and cultural assumptions, and it certainly 
prioritises epistemic prisms that see almost everything from non-indigenous platforms” 
(Abdi, 2015: 15). 
Much of the discourse of cosmopolitanism citizenship is informed by the Enlightenment 
objective–subjective categories of thought of Eurocentrism that entail that strong impartiality 
best serves all peoples of the world (Swanson, 2015: 28). However, this impartiality character 
in principle and practice serves to hide “difference in power relationships, the cultural 
imperialism, the individualistic orientation and self-interestedness” embedded in global 
citizenship (Swanson, 2015: 28). Much of the prevailing global citizenship education only 
helps to maintain the “structural conditions of inequality while claiming to work towards 
their elimination” (Swanson, 2015: 28). The absolute categories of the objective-versus-
subjective of strong cosmopolitan global citizenship that outlaw the value of aspects of 
nationality in moral consideration imply “knowing on behalf of the Other what is good for 
them” (Swanson, 2015: 31). Such cosmopolitanism has an absolutist position on the worth of 
placed-ness in a given territory, indigenous languages as a form of common culture and 
national history for all the people of the world as being a private and subject matter not 
worthy of constituting the normativity of individuation and collective being. 
Critics of active recognition of aspects of nationality in cosmopolitan citizenship contend, “a 
defense of patriotism is an attack on the Enlightenment” (Kateb, 2006: 4) and – 
You can love particular persons without having to dislike or hate others; but you cannot love 
an abstract entity like a country and not dislike or hate other countries, because countries are, 
from their nature as organizations of and for power, in actual or latent competition (Kateb, 
2006: 9).  
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For such critics, patriotism is not a universal moral ideal, because “a moral principle must be 
conceived as universalist, and ask for consistent application; and it aims at respect for persons 
or individuals, not abstract entities of the imagination” (Kateb, 2006: 9). 
What such strong cosmopolitanism crucially ignores is that ideal cosmopolitanism must as a 
matter of necessity always embed “a sense of self-awareness concerning one’s own 
positionality in the world”, which is represented in the local (Toivanen, 2017: 197). This is 
something that the runaway openness of strong cosmopolitanism strangely advocates against. 
Individual subjects are expected to develop the cosmopolitan capacities of openness and 
embracing diversity with an implicit precondition of deemphasising their own concreteness, 
their being. It is almost as if acknowledging and recognising one’s concreteness is morally 
offensive and illegitimate, while interacting and engaging with other ways of life availed by 
global plurality are moral imperatives. 
The neo-Kantian rational–irrational dichotomy, which dismisses nationality, now shapes and 
drives education, politics and culture globally. It actively and passively prescribes for 
education globally what is ‘universally’ necessary, unnecessary and relevant for all learners. 
Partly, this is why today most African leaders and some scholars and elites unfortunately 
regard global competitiveness as the most paramount goal for Africa (Nkuna, 2013: 70), at 
the expense of developing certain aspects of the local life that contribute towards the people’s 
overall well-being, including cultural well-being. In the prevailing practice, the process of 
developing global competitiveness implies, among other things, tacit neglect and abandon of 
indigenous languages in deference for foreign ones (Nkuna, 2013: 70). It implies neglecting 
the value of one’s national histories. It is therefore incumbent upon Africans themselves, 
more than on anybody else, to develop and elevate the role and capacity of their indigenous 
languages (Nkuna, 2013: 71), epistemologies and histories. Most African people cannot 
access and participate in scientific and technological discourses because of language 
constraints unless they gain proficiency in a foreign language (Nkuna, 2013: 75).  
Before Africa settles for the domestication of English as a global language, on the logic that 
developing its local languages is costly and not worthwhile, it needs to do so only after 
accounting for the fact that the ‘inferior’ and weak status of its languages and their 
underdevelopment were initiated by colonialism and are being sustained by neoliberalism 
(Canagarajah, 2005: 196). The failure of independent Malawi to recognise the value in the 
development and official use of indigenous languages was in a way a manifestation of 
submission to the colonial mindset that prevailed in most of the political leaders of Africa, 
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who had been educated in colonial institutions and regarded as progressive that which is not 
local (Kamwendo, 2010; Nkuna, 2013: 81). Kamuzu Banda, the independence president for 
Malawi for 30 years, never addressed public rallies and meetings in Chichewa, the national 
language and mother tongue, throughout his 30 years’ rule (Moyo, 2002; Kamwendo, 2010). 
There are hardly any pictures of him where he was not dressed in the strictly British formal 
outfit of a three-piece suit (Kamwendo, 2010: 274–275; Nyamnjoh, 2012: 139). It is apparent 
that neocolonialism was entrenched by the very liberation leaders who not only failed to 
develop local knowledge perspectives and local languages, but were at worst actively 
preserving the colonial heritage.  
Banda, the Malawi one-party regime president, built an elite secondary school that admitted 
the nation’s best learners: two selected from each of the nation’s 24 districts. Among other 
subjects, the school taught the classical languages Greek and Latin, but never Chichewa 
(Kamwendo, 2010: 275). Furthermore, the school had a clear  policy of not employing black 
teachers so as to be internationally competitive, a policy that was changed only after Banda’s 
death in 1997 (Kamwendo, 2010: 275; Nyamnjoh, 2012: 139). 
With respect to African epistemology, some contend that it is almost impossible, contentious 
at least, to establish what is purely African. According to this line of thinking – 
[Being] African is no longer understood as being in opposition to the European, but as 
incorporating Europeans, Asians, and the rest of the world … Identity, like culture, is 
delocalised. Place and origin are no longer exclusive markers of identity, even if they still 
play vital roles in many people’s self-reading (Eze, 2014: 238).  
Instead, Eze (2014: 238) argues for “cultural hybridity” as being representative of the African 
identity. Such perspectives are called Afropolitanism (Eze, 2014: 245). 
It is indeed the case that African identity need not be defined in opposition to European ways 
of life. However, calling for cultural hybridity of African perspectives on the understanding 
that the world is now interconnected and that there is no more anything purely Africa 
presupposes a world of cultural equity. However, epistemologically and in terms of power 
relations, there is no parity in terms of global cultures and knowledge production (Nyamnjoh, 
2012: 130). In fact, what is being achieved in bringing different cultures together is 
assimilation, because in most fundamental dimensions of the global life, the African is only 
the affected and hardly the affecting, be it in global education, entertainment, sports, science, 
politics or economy. There is no fair global framework in terms of hybridisation other than 
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supporting the annihilation of African ways of life. Epistemologically speaking, in both 
practice and principle, in the ostensible diverse globalised world, much of Africa only comes 
to pick rather than offer an authentic (although hybridised) alternative of reality and meaning-
making frames. This is why even in the academic discourse of global citizenship, the African 
voice is so faint and largely unnoticed, mostly because it is not availed as it ought to be 
(Parmenter, 2011).  
In a literature mapping survey, Parmenter (2011) searched the WorldCat database for 
academic titles published in English for the period between 1977 and 2009 with the key 
search phrase ‘global citizenship education’. Basing on the location of the authors’ 
institutions of affiliations, it was established that 94% of the academic articles were authored 
by academicians in the developed world: the USA 56%, the United Kingdom 18%, Australia 
6% and Canada 5% (Parmenter, 2011: 368). South Africa, the only major African 
contributor, and India each contributed 1% (Parmenter, 2011: 368). 
What can be generally gleaned from these survey results is that there are power imbalances in 
knowledge production where the narratives from the global North dominate the discourse of 
global citizenship education. The implication of such a situation is that the conceptualisations 
of human nature and human relationships in citizenship that dominate scholarship and shape 
public and global policy are anchored in or at least influenced by the socially, culturally, 
economically and morally situated experiences of the authors. Therefore, global citizenship 
discourse is concentrated by the perspectives of developed nations’ scholars. As such, the 
discourse may not necessarily be global.  
The point is not to blame developed nations for the dominance, because at least in a way one 
would equally hold African scholars and leaders responsible for their absence in participating 
in the discourse. Needless to say, one should be mindful of the structural factors and 
hegemonic tendencies that ‘disqualify’ non-Eurocentric narratives from the discourse 
(Nyamnjoh, 2012: 130). In order to be fitting, the African narratives are expected to 
conceptualise the relationship among the individual, culture, capital and nation-state as 
aspiring immature versions of some Eurocentric conceptualisation prototype (Beck, 2002: 
23). However, how the ideal global citizen should relate with different aspects of the local 
cannot be conceptualised in absolutist terms binding and valid for every community, owing to 
people’s different lived experiences. 
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The perspectives of neutrality over locality in strong cosmopolitan global citizenship 
essentially amount to the lack of confidence Eurocentrism has in difference and otherness as 
constitutive of being and knowledge. As such, the global citizenship project must ask anew as 
to which ideals “are the non-negotiable universals in a global citizenship project” (Andreotti, 
2011a: 393) and by what criterion. Another pertinent question is whether it is impossible and 
problematic to extend the scope of global citizenship from emphasising “individual skills, 
towards a broader understanding of ideology, culture, and political economies” (Andreotti, 
2011a: 393). This way, for practitioners in nations such as Malawi, education will in the quest 
of cultivating global imagination be cognisant of and address the unpleasant side of 
neocolonialism by understanding the “colonialism [of global power] as constitutive of 
modernity rather than derivative from it” (Andreotti, 2011a: 392). They will realise that 
theories of global citizenship education embed assumptions about human nature and well-
being that are in substantial degrees different and at times even contrasting with typical 
Malawian learners’ lived experiences. Therefore, claims in the discipline of education for 
democratic citizenship for local and global democracy can never be adopted at face value by 
ignoring the assumptions of the frameworks for production of such knowledge.  
Malawi and Africa must therefore identify elements and modes that create and sustain 
“subordination and invisibility as well as [Malawi and Africa’s] own complicity with patterns 
of domination” (Andreotti, 2011a: 393). Such procedures should be more about looking for 
and bringing into the global discourse absent voices than looking for traces of imperial 
hegemony (Andreotti, 2011a: 393). Malawian and African educationists need to refrain from 
largely compelling their concrete and peculiar situatedness to adapt to the dominant 
discourse. There should be more effort in seeking to have a fitting epistemic framework that 
is consistent with and addresses the uniqueness of Malawi and Africa (Nyamnjoh, 2012: 
143).  
Against this position, some critics argue that Africanism must constitute in diversity, as 
claims of culture purity can no longer be binding today, and that we are almost by default 
‘cosmopolitans’, as our lives are characterised by music, art, literature and films that come 
from different places of the globe, ultimately exerting different permanent influences on us 
(Eze, 2014: 239). Such positions are accurate, except that they exclude also emphasising that 
such objects of ‘cosmopolitan’ culture rarely originate from certain other parts of the world, 
as the greatest proportion is from the West (McChesney, 2001; Esser, 2016). While the 
African consumer is consuming Hollywood movies, global news and British culture through 
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the BBC, not much would be said about the diversity of sources of entertainment 
consumption by the counterpart of the African consumer in the United Kingdom, for 
example. 
It is indisputable that cosmopolitanism entails an intellectual and cultural openness to the 
experiences of the world’s different people as a mode of achieving meaning in a mutually 
connected world of cultural diversity (Eze, 2014: 239). However, one wonders why this 
awareness or capacity for openness should necessarily imply negation of one’s own culture. 
Conceding that the world is culturally diverse is in principle a concession of not only 
multiplicity, but also cultural distinctiveness. The concession implies a moral obligation for 
one to treat each of the numerous cultures one will encounter in the world with due respect 
and openness. Given this background, it is therefore a logical absurdity that simultaneously 
making active attempts and endeavours to affirm what one’s culture constitutes is strangely 
morally disdained. Strong cosmopolitan orientations regard affirmation of the local as not 
worth undertaking. Instead, one is obliged to be committed to openness only. In principle, 
this is not openness, but annihilation and assimilation. While categorically conceding the 
moral invalidity of cultural purity and its thick conceptions of membership, acknowledging 
that say a particular language requires active support from its nation-state and passive support 
from others in the global order is not being exclusivist, but rather an attempt towards equality 
and equity. 
Strong cosmopolitanism (or its Afropolitanism variation) is claimed to be based on open-
mindedness and embracing of diversity (Eze, 2014: 245). These are noble values and non-
negotiable, except that they are, generally speaking, not distinct to Africa, but for all 
humanity. Such narratives of merely appropriating for Africa what is generally universal for 
all humanity without simultaneously attending to the frameworks for African situatedness 
only escalates Africa’s epistemic subjugation and absence from the global level. Such 
commitments to universalism without working on one’s excluded cultural framework to give 
it its due presence in the global order is ultimately empty and self-defeating. It is never in the 
interest of pluralism and diversity themselves. 
Modernity, which essentially informs the global order, and to which Malawian and African 
education aspire to conform, is essentially a translation of Eurocentrism before which 
arguably all other native histories and systems of value are subaltern (Andreotti, 2011a: 385). 
As a result, in strong cosmopolitanism, non-Eurocentric “epistemologies and ontologies are 
translated into universalised [Eurocentric] epistemological parameters” (Andreotti, 2011a: 
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385). Where and when they do not fit, they are regarded as “inferior, less evolved, primitive, 
erroneous or eccentric ‘culturally tainted’ derivatives” (Andreotti, 2011a: 385). Andreotti 
(2011a: 385) refers to such “subalternisation” as “epistemic violence”. For (Andreotti, 2011a: 
387), even the criticisms of Eurocentrism that do not bring to the centre “questions of 
spatiality and coloniality, fail to challenge … the geopolitics of knowledge” in modern 
scholarship, and such criticisms of Eurocentrism ultimately reproduce epistemic violence. 
Discourses on multiculturalism, inclusion, and global hybridity of the other are mostly not as 
meaningful, largely because they seek to “domesticate otherness”, to make it palatable and fit 
into the frame of Eurocentric universalism (Andreotti, 2011: 388). 
Arguing for this position should not be misconstrued as blame shifting towards the West for 
all of Africa’s calamity and current position of weakness in the global order. It need not elude 
one that post-colonial Africa is as culpable for stagnating and at times retrogressing the 
continent as colonialism was. Rather, this position is about highlighting that the imbalances 
generated by colonialism do not only persist today, but are being sustained by different global 
agents in different global processes. 
5.6. On teaching national history 
In the modern world, through forms of education, global citizenship, the global economy, and 
so forth, many citizens of the world are marginalised (through language and an absence of 
their historicity) to the extent that “marginality appears to be the hidden other of global 
citizenship” (Balarin, 2011: 355). Snubbing a people’s historicity in global citizenship 
education is ostensibly understood as implementing a commitment to impartiality, which is a 
precondition for respecting and achieving the moral ideal of human equality. Ignoring 
individuals’ historicity and reducing their normatively relevant interest to rational self-
interest only and that the worth of their social relationships too is reducible to the promotion 
of self-interest only, obscures rather than deals with the predicament of the human condition 
for most people in Africa (Lalu, 2012: 4). 
Meaningful education for local and democratic citizenship is neither just about getting an 
understanding of ideas of and about democracy, nor is it just about acquiring a democracy 
consciousness. Instead, it must achieve liberation from institutional and structural oppressions 
that restrict the knowledge and means to determine one’s future through development of 
individuals’ capacity to mould their future through their participation “in the production of 
language, knowledge, culture, and history” (Glass, 2000: 280). In other words, it is about 
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engaging a mode of “being-in-the-world that engages real struggles” (Glass, 2000: 280). This 
implies incessant engagement with and critique of one’s national history, among other things. 
Communities are historical in nature and this largely constitutes their shared identities whose 
substance is however incessantly contested.  
[The individual or community’s] identity irrevocably embodies historicity [as] human beings 
are born into a historical, social, and cultural context … that sets the possible horizons of 
identity. Who one is and who one might become is shaped by the specific customs and rules 
of the particular family, language [and so forth] (Glass, 2000: 283).  
Historical experiences shape and constrain individuals as well as society:  
As human beings, we also make the history that is always at the same time making us. 
Situations cannot preordain our existence, nor are they completely subject to be made into 
whatever we individually will. Any particular horizon always contains room to move, and 
situational limits are dynamic and susceptible to transformation through human action 
(Glass, 2000: 283). 
Because human beings are not disembodied and ahistorical, meaningful education, as Abdi 
(2015: 11) observes, must be substantially attached to the “observational prospects and 
possibilities” that “amelioratively impact the lived contexts of concerned populations” (Abdi, 
2015: 11). Therefore, with respect to education for global citizenship, the “contextual 
enhancement of people’s lived realities and expectations of the future” (Abdi, 2015: 11) 
requires active interrogation of how one and one’s formative locale have interacted and 
continue relating with the wider world. 
Despite the often taken-for-granted global interconnectedness, the majority of global citizens 
are marginalised, lacking the capacity and means for mobility (Balarin, 2011: 359). For such 
people, taking away the utility and meaningfulness of their local languages and their local 
history will seal and cement their marginality. The nation-state has been weakened as a 
“mediator of social conflicts and social differences in the context of a neoliberal globalisation 
that generates a very individualised and fragmented imagination of citizenship” (Balarin, 
2011: 361). The danger of having all people of the world conceived in terms of commonality 
that necessarily excludes their history that accords them peculiarity and value of their 
differences is that this will hide structural injustice. Such injustice results from and 
perpetuates the exclusion of the only significant means through which the educationally and 
economically marginalised other would articulate their interests without the hegemonic 
mainstream making a projection about them (Benhabib, 1992: 165).  
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The condition for humanity around the world is in part owed to past historical encounters 
with different others. Even much of the prospects of the present are influenced by factors 
significantly connected to the past, such that meaningful progress is not tenable until the past, 
with its mutating tentacles affecting the present, is confronted. The condition would remain 
the same even upon the realisation of a post-nation world order at any time in the future. In 
order for whatever imagined global structure responsible for distributing burdens and benefits 
to people (a hitherto role of the nation-state) to ensure that people’s concreteness, which is 
both meaningful and a vehicle through which they express themselves, is protected, the new 
order would still have to be responsive to aspects of nationality, such as language and 
historicity, as a moral obligation of justice (Balarin, 2011: 361). Just like there was a 
modernity-and-colonialism composite, so too there now exists in the ostensible 
interconnected world a composite of globalisation-and-marginalisation (Balarin, 2011: 361), 
and exclusion of historicity entrenches the marginalisation. 
Teaching and learning of national history in education for democratic and global citizenship 
need not be depoliticised, because ultimately, the people will be “de-narrativised and de-
historicised” (Balarin, 2011: 362). There will be delinking of their history from their sense of 
being as well as from understanding the nature, origin and scope of their conditions, which 
profoundly affect their becoming. 
In Malawi, the criticality learners would develop through and towards critical national history 
would enable them to challenge local injustices. Globally, it would be a relevant, meaningful 
springboard from which they would further interrogate the nature and justness of 
globalisation and prevailing discourses of cosmopolitan citizenship. Just as ‘the self-evident 
facts’ of national history are not always matters of fact, but of ideological interpretation, so 
too are strong cosmopolitanism and the globalisation upon which it rides. The learners need 
not be presented with cosmopolitanism as being neutral, value-free and devoid of tensions 
and power imbalances. While all human beings are equal, as the central tenet of 
cosmopolitanism holds, it is necessary that learners engage the global practices that subtly 
and passively undermine such a fundamental normative ideal and that real commitment to 
this moral ideal lies beyond the rhetoric of a cosmopolitan citizenship equality rooted in 
human essences and abstract human nature. Rather, it largely lies in confronting the concrete 
structures and frameworks in which the human being exists.  
Confronting such frameworks requires identifying such frameworks in the first place. The 
identification necessarily involves probing the soundness of universality claims of such 
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frameworks. This involves relating the universalist claims to the local condition. It is here 
that national history becomes pertinent. It is through the lens of national history that learners 
get to identify local and international factors that undermine meaningful democratic life. It is 
through the lens of criticality exercised in engaging their history that Malawian learners 
would ultimately discover that some of the local injustices during the independence 
dictatorship are subtly concealed and still effective in the modern democratic era (Kayuni & 
Tambulasi, 2010). It is through criticality achieved through the study of Malawian colonial 
history that they would realise that certain marginalisation that flourished during colonialism 
is today camouflaged in globalisation and its strong cosmopolitan citizenship. 
While cognisant of the documented and potential risks of nationalism and essentialism, in the 
global arena, dreading to identify with certain consistent and tolerable forms of African-ness 
(such as in the teaching and learning of national history) is in principle an expression of 
“surrender and defeat … instead of contributing to the dismantling of [the intolerable] 
associations, and reloading [nationality] with more accurate associations” (Musila, 2016: 
109). Therefore, in education for global citizenship there should be critical examination of 
shared local experiences, unfixed as they could be, about being African. Being cosmopolitan 
should not be preconditioned on dismantling other localised and particularistic experiences.  
Despite the ravages of neoliberalism and the inequalities of global capitalism, the point being 
argued for here is not that all inequalities in Malawi are due to globalisation. Rather, the 
position is that there are structural inequalities among the peoples of the world such that any 
theorisation of cosmopolitanism that either ignores them or suppresses the means (such as 
critical history) through which these injustices can meaningfully be understood and addressed 
is morally incomplete, if not illegitimate. 
The demand that critical national history be included in the curriculum is based on the idea 
that the nation is a crucial ideal that is indispensable in any cosmopolitanism 
conceptualisation. Those who are averse to nationality inclusion and indeed of the role of 
nationality in the modern global world contend that national history promotes indoctrination 
and blind loyalty (Nussbaum, 2002a: 14; Brighouse, 2003: 157; Nielsen, 2005: 274) and 
frustrates criticality. Such positions ignore the fact that “a critical approach has to be rooted 
in students’ lives and background knowledge and stimulate their intellectual curiosity and 
emotional involvement in order to lead them to further their knowledge about alternatives 
found in different cultural frames” (Guilherme, 2007: 78).  
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How will the youths of Malawi develop criticality if not when they are accorded the 
opportunity to interrogate and reconstruct their nation’s history? The national history is in 
this case not just some impotent academic knowledge that instils irrational loyalty to the 
homeland. Rather, by critiquing the history and reconstructing it, they develop a criticality 
that enables them to better reflect on and demand concrete structural changes rather than 
superficial ones. For instance, the challenges that led to the cabinet crisis of 1964, a few 
months into colonial independence, were not part of the History curriculum, as the single 
party then regarded the dissenting by the inner circle of the then dictator president as 
amounting to disloyalty, disunity and indiscipline, hence a treasonous threat to political 
stability (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010). Interestingly, in democratic Malawi, among political 
leaders as well as citizens, the executive is still generally regarded as sacred, unchallengeable 
and all-knowing (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010: 425). Attitudes of intolerance of dissent by 
ruling political leadership and among most citizens are still dominant in Malawi. Through the 
teaching and learning of critical national History in schools, meaningful criticality was 
supposed to originate from an interrogation of the past as well as comparing and contrasting 
it to the present, which is still rife with suffocating traits of oppression (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 
2010: 417). 
A critic would argue that the nation is arbitrarily chosen as the custodian of cultural or 
meaningful ways of life for the people, and hence does not warrant special inclusion in the 
curriculum (Brighouse, 2003; Nili, 2015). Such criticisms recognise being human for all the 
world’s human community in its ‘objective’ commonality terms only. However, restricting 
conception of what fully defines human beings only to the similarities individuals share over-
draws from the commonality of humanity. The world’s people, sharing certain general 
commonalities, nevertheless find their concreteness through their language, traditions, history 
and territory, among other things. They find meaning from such situatedness. Regarding such 
aspects of concreteness as subjective and hence morally arbitrary in discourses of equality 
and justice is to undermine the people’s very uniqueness and humanity. 
In as far as national history is subject to open-ended contestations and re-interpretations, it is 
very necessary as part of an individual and group’s embeddedness. The value is not only in 
recollecting the past, hence promoting cultural boundedness as critics would claim. Rather, 
the value of nationality lies in that it is part of the individual’s embeddedness and that one’s 
being and possibilities of becoming are profoundly affected by one’s history. Besides 
contributing towards one’s identity constitution, critical history is crucial in understanding the 
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fate, prospects and future of a collective as a scheme of cooperation. The case of Malawi 
shows that if critical history was being taught in Malawi after re-democratisation, a sense of 
critical citizenship in the population would today have uprooted the peculiar and persistent 
anti-democratic attitudes that have survived and characterised Malawian politics since 
independence (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010). There is no way these can be uprooted from the 
politics without making meaningful recourse to Malawian history in learning for citizenship. 
If education for democratic citizenship is not merely about accumulating knowledge, but 
enactment, it is imperative that Malawian history be part of education for the democratic 
citizenship curricula.  
5.6.1. African otherness and globality 
An indigenous language is central especially in global citizenship as the most significant 
vehicle that meaningfully and uniquely communicates concrete ideas and experiences among 
a people than any other alternative language would do. As a medium of instruction, it is a 
facilitator for effective and efficient communication that will optimally spur learner interest, 
involvement and criticality (Probyn, 2005: 166). This is so because it ensures a connection 
between the school and learners’ immediate community as one unified world where the two 
domains inform and refine each other, without requiring learners to ignore and shed off, the 
worth of the local (which partly and significantly constitutes their identity) and seek to 
become what they have not experienced and can hardly imagine in order to succeed (Ladson-
Billings, 1995; Gay, 2000).  
In the context of globalisation, the problem of ensuring linguistic and global justice is the 
flipside of addressing the question of depoliticisation of nationality. In general, in most 
marginalised communities of the world, the lingua franca is the language of the nation or 
multination. Global justice and citizenship must therefore concede the worth of aspects of 
nationality. It must start from not only acknowledging, but also encouraging subjugated 
forms of marginalised concreteness as represented by indigenous language and national 
history. 
Proponents of strong cosmopolitanism are motivated by the idea that if the world’s learners 
who are its citizens recognise common humanity only and give their allegiance to universal 
ideals of equality only, and can no more recognise the ‘divisive and othering’ of nationality, 
the world would ideally achieve global peace and global justice (Nielsen, 2005: 274; 
Arneson, 2016: 559). However, as Harris (2003: 50) argues, sharing the same values about 
common humanity only would not necessarily end global inequities, suffering and injustice. 
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This is because the human being has complex needs whose satisfaction would remain 
unaddressed even after such an approach has been taken. Recognising common values would 
not address and stop injustices that are historical or linguistic in nature. It would not address 
conflicts that will arise from people’s different social values. All it would achieve would be 
to hide the actual sources of the injustices (Harris, 2003: 50). 
The problems of strong cosmopolitanism approaches for developing nations such as Malawi 
are contained in positions such as that advanced by Osler and Starkey (2005), who find 
difference as being inimical to realisation of the cosmopolitan equality:  
Cosmopolitan citizenship does not deny the validity and indeed the importance of a national 
perspective; rather, it recognizes universal values as its standard for all contexts, including 
national contexts. It stresses those things that unite human beings rather than what divides 
them (Osler & Starkey, 2005: 21). 
This conscious de-emphasis of difference is what results in hiding the sources of injustice. 
Focusing on similarities alone makes pretentious assumptions about linguistic and cultural 
equity as well as about an absence of hegemony. Given this context, Osler & Starkey’s  
(2005) concessions of the value of nationality are only merely tokenistic. 
Similarly, some thinkers of the Afropolitanism orientation argue that being African should no 
longer be understood in non-African other terms. The ultimate hope is to achieve a future 
where “difference is so superfluous that abject difference, the Other, breaks down entirely” 
(Balakrishnan, 2017: 2). One wonders as to what it is that accords the ‘Afro-’tag to such 
thought that in principle extinguishes African otherness. The orientation of such thought is 
essentially strong cosmopolitanism. The problem with such a perspective is that in principle it 
reduces otherness in African-ness in the global context to neutrality, and ultimately this is 
assimilationist. Furthermore, this aversion of distinctiveness, leading to annihilation of 
difference, is very problematic for Africa. One concedes that there is diversity among 
Africans and that this precludes a thick homogenous and exclusionary conception of what 
being African is. However, it does not dismiss the fact that there are certain perspectives that 
are predominantly African. 
The Afropolitan dictum, “there could never be an African cultural integrity to preserve” 
(Membe, 2007, cited in Balakrishnan, 2017: 7) in a way implies a stance against a 
homogenous being-African but ironically also rejects African otherness. In as far as it invites 
being African to hybridity, to diversity, and that being African is neither static nor stuck in 
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the remote monolithic past nor averse to self-critique, it is a valid proposition. However, in as 
far as it insinuates (which it does) that there should be no attempts to identify something in 
the modern globalised world as being African (for fear of ungrounded perceptions of cultural 
essentialism and hegemony), and that Africans must move on and along with prevailing 
global hybridity (to which they must essentially conform and assimilate), this dictum is not 
only un-liberating, but also endorses the embedded exclusivity of modernity in as far as 
global citizenship is concerned. If we cannot identify the integrity of African languages as the 
languages of instruction or trade in the ‘hybridised’ world, we perpetuate African exclusion.  
If national histories cannot be critiqued as comprehensively as possible and form part of the 
curriculum, one wonders how certain local and global injustices could be identified, 
addressed and avoided. Such failure results from African cultures, epistemologies and ways 
of life scarcely constituting part of the allegedly global ‘hybridised’ culture. There is no 
substantial presence of much that is African in school epistemologies in politics, science, 
trade and technology globally. The demand to de-emphasise Africa’s distinctiveness or 
commonalities (contentious as the may be) does not emancipate and empower the 
marginalised African in the ostensibly neutral global order that is essentially cultured. 
Ultimately, there is no hybridisation, but only a shift from the local to anything non-local. 
Ideal hybridity would expect and require of Africa too to bring something African for the 
hybridisation process of globalisation to be fair and just. 
A neutral world of strong cosmopolitanism that over-emphasises diversity and openness and 
simultaneously mutes recognising and presenting to the world one’s different voice, as 
another of the many other diverse voices, hence worth supporting and maintaining (and not 
necessarily essentialising), is only suitable for those privileged Africans who have the 
capacity to maintain roots in different places of the world and call many places home (Dabiri, 
2016: 105). While the rest of the developed world have their cultural frameworks robust and 
well developed and have the capacity to freely move around the world, “most Africans have 
almost absolute immobility in a contemporary world that works very hard to keep Africans in 
their place on the African continent [and] a major bias against African global mobility 
abounds in African international media” (Dabiri, 2016: 106). Therefore, it is not only the 
majority of African people that are incapable of mobility across the globe; African culture, 
art, literature and epistemology are scantly available for choice and hybridisation at the global 
level, except for mostly tokenistic recognition.  
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However, an ideal cosmopolitan position must be equally committed to difference while it 
emphasises sameness. This will enable the confrontation of Africa’s internal and external 
forces of individual or collective subjugation that thrive on generality (ostensible sameness), 
which in principle effectively marginalises all otherness. The individuality and peculiarity of 
moral subjects’ collectivity that reside in otherness therefore need not be pushed outside the 
discourse of being both African and global. This is because it is not just a random and 
inconsistent attribute of human beings. Rather, it is in the first place a crucial part of being 
human.  
Advancing such a position is not squarely blaming external agents as being solely responsible 
for Africa’s current condition, for as stated earlier, Africans are themselves also culpable for 
presiding over and perpetuating the continent’s condition. Rather, the point is that muting 
difference is tantamount to backstabbing the very heart of cosmopolitanism, which has the 
individual human being as the ultimate unit of moral concern. Ideal cosmopolitanism should 
ensure not only that the African should be open to difference, but that the African too should 
have the right and privilege of being meaningfully different without raising undue 
accusations of essentialism, inhibiting diversity and pluralism, as is usually the case. In this 
context, being committed to difference implies starting with acknowledging, not only 
rhetorically, but as contestatiously as can be and should be, debating and deliberating as to 
what should constitute one’s own otherness before one talks of embracing that of others. 
Ideal cosmopolitanism must allow for “an imagination of alternative ways of life and 
rationalities, which include otherness of the other. It puts the negotiation of contradictory 
cultural experiences into a centre of activities: in the political, economic, scientific and the 
social” (Beck, 2002: 18). It must not extinguish and eliminate contradictions across global 
cultures in regarding them as a problem to be dealt with. Rather, it must approach them as 
manifestations of people’s situatedness and concreteness, which must be respected and 
harnessed. 
The logic of cosmopolitanism ought to be one of “inclusive oppositions” rather than one of 
exclusive oppositions because cosmopolitanism cannot exist without localism (Beck, 
2002: 19). The moral demand for the African to be cosmopolitan and open-minded about 
numerous others from across the world does not negate the necessity to theorise and 
comprehend “the specificities of the experiences of being African and living in Africa” 
(Robbe, 2014: 257). 
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In knowledge consumption in Africa today, people are variously mingling the local and 
foreign in various degrees and for different roles. However, due to the power relationships 
behind the dominant epistemologies, African cultural ideas are generally neither being 
‘exported’ internationally in the same proportion as Africa imports (Robbe, 2014: 268), nor 
are they being imported by the outside world in the same proportion in which Africa is 
importing or having other epistemologies exported to it. 
5.7. Reconfiguring Malawian education for citizenship 
This section argues that reconfiguring education for democratic (and global) citizenship in 
Malawi must start by abandoning the de-ontological ethics paradigms that anchor strong 
cosmopolitanism, rendering the citizenship education absolutist about the sources of value for 
all the people of the world. Doing so would lead to inclusion into the global justice discourse 
of hitherto absent voices. In global justice theorisation, this will also create space for and 
bring to the fore (contestations about) aspects of collective life wherever they have moral 
relevance. Such global theorisation is important because it is cognisant of the power 
imbalances that characterise global interconnectedness. Ultimately, the section suggests that 
Seyla Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) deliberative universalism is much better placed to anchor 
education for global citizenship that is necessarily founded on difference and not only 
rhetorically including it. Global citizenship so conceptualised will ensure that the learner is 
reflectively open to the new and critically loyal to the local  (Hansen, 2011: 1).  
Education in democratic Malawi should, among others, aim at providing opportunities for the 
nation to develop modes of its collective life as part of participating in global pluralism, 
unlike the conformism to Eurocentrism now prevalent in most respects (Guest, 1998: 85). 
Democracy is an enabling means for achieving the ultimate goal of human flourishing and 
welfare (Chidammodzi, 1999: 94). Democracy in Africa should not be a wholesale 
displacement of unharmful African values and practices. Any uncritical adoption of particular 
forms of cosmopolitanism that essentially invalidate African norms and values will leave 
legitimate African interests stuck on the peripherals in addressing global human challenges 
(Chidammodzi, 1999: 97).  
African political leadership and scholarship must dispense with the assumptions that African 
ways of life are inherently alien to democracy. For instance, it is worth recognising that 
African communities and judicial institutions prior to and after colonialism were substantially 
sensitive to the democratic values of tolerance and dissent (Chidammodzi, 1999: 99). Chiefs’ 
councils and courts in resolving conflicting perspectives heavily relied on and accorded 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
241 
paramountcy to deliberation (which was essentially about attempting to consider and 
reconcile competing viewpoints) rather than only relying on majority vote (Chidammodzi, 
1999: 99).  
Like any other system, there were obviously some limitations in the form and extent of such 
democratic tolerance (Chidammodzi, 1999: 99). What is fundamental, though, is that the 
practices and aspirations of the community’s way of life were consistent with democratic 
ideals and practices. The existence of contradictory aspects in the enactment of a particular 
thought system and practices does not disqualify the potentiality of the system to realise 
normative ideals. This is because actualisation of the ideal always requires incessant 
refinement. In any case, democratic Europe had embraced democratic ideals at home, yet 
advanced and maintained, through colonial imperialist agendas worldwide, the employment 
of ideas and practices antithetical to democracy, such as racist attitudes and policies towards 
colonised natives. The United States had embraced democratic ideals while maintaining 
racial discrimination against black people. Apartheid South Africa’s regime operated on 
democratic principles (exclusive to white people only), yet it thrived on systematically 
dehumanising and humiliating non-white races. Therefore, achieving democracy is always an 
ongoing struggle against apparent and concealed contradictions in a particular community’s 
thought system and practices. Instances of apparent or implied contradictions in a society do 
not in themselves mean that the people’s practices are absolutely incompatible with 
democracy.  
What is evident here is that adopting a particular form of democracy or cosmopolitanism in 
order to silence ‘alien’ values in cultures does not guarantee democracy. Different cultures 
have unique conceptualisations and actualisation of the universal ideals of democracy. 
Therefore, democracy ought to be about communities confronting their own structures in 
their own language and reconstructing them to advance human freedom and well-being.  
Other than being restricted to a general otherness conception of human nature, traditional 
African systems of governance “cherished social responsibility, discipline, conversation and 
dialogue, peace, and harmony” (Chidammodzi, 1999: 100), all of which seek and engage 
with an individual’s concreteness. Much of African thought is generally committed to 
seeking “interpretation, expression, understanding, and moral and social harmony, rather than 
being preoccupied with verification, rationalism, prediction, and control” (Swanson, 2015: 
35). No wonder that, prior to colonisation, traditional African education actively placed at the 
centre the needs of the community (Masemula, 2015: 173). Besides self-knowledge, the 
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education also engaged with cultural and environmental knowledge and social issues 
(Masemula, 2015: 173). The capacity to engage with the other on the basis of his or her 
concreteness is a dominant aspiration that ought to have been recognised and developed 
further, rather than being denigrated.  
A major limitation of strong cosmopolitan global citizenship is that it restricts the 
conceptualisation and actualisation of moral universals only to a deontological approach that 
absolutely specifies the objects that have moral worth for all human beings of the world 
irrespective of their situatedness (Peterson, 2012). As repeatedly highlighted in this research, 
it is almost impossible to pre-set for all peoples of the world as to how much value and 
meaning they find in different aspects of nationality. Cosmopolitan citizenship would be 
better served by orientations that are not exclusively deontological, those which can take into 
consideration situatedness. The diversity and peculiarity of global cultures would therefore 
greatly benefit from utilisation of virtue-based perspectives. Such perspectives generally 
entail critical deliberation of the community’s good. They do not merely enforce a pre-set 
schedule of goods with pre-assigned value, despite their being detached from the community, 
as deontological strong cosmopolitanism does.  
Most societies and communities have unique values encapsulated in virtues (Glass, 2000: 
283). The challenge with the deontological perspective towards cosmopolitanism is that it 
must place moral value on all the objects involved in human relationships for all people of the 
world. In global citizenship ethics, strong cosmopolitanism raises the question of what 
criteria will be used in assigning objective value to different practices, conduct, relationships, 
expectations and requirements for all the human communities of the world whose outlooks 
while having similarities and are diverse and contrasting.  
Unlike preoccupation with acts and duties, for some communities, virtues constitute a greater 
deal of what it means to be a moral person (Grönum, 2015: 1). The composition and 
exercising of virtues requires (not exclusively) the fulfilment of some duties as well as 
adopting a certain moral disposition that cannot necessarily be translated into obligations 
(Grönum, 2015: 1). For some communities the concern of what type of person one should be 
is as weighty as what acts are right and what sort of community we should have (Grönum, 
2015: 5). This is much more than performing certain duties. This runs against the absolute 
assignment and deprivation of moral worth to ‘irrational’ aspects of human nature and human 
relationships. This is because, for a virtue perspective, the type of person one should become 
is more fundamental and rich in outreach than the schedule of moral objects that generate the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
243 
individual’s duty. Therefore, if a community has the virtue of care and respect, the most 
important and more meaningful challenge for the member of the community is not 
necessarily to make a count of what objects require and demand respect and what degree of 
respect. Restricting oneself to a strong cosmopolitan deontological approach risks, by 
implication, having a scope in the member’s mind of what objects do not necessarily deserve 
respect.  
A virtue-based approach would instead require of individuals to determine the mode they 
should assume when confronted with anyone in need of respect and care. The focus here is 
not only on who needs the care or respect, it is also on how one should relate with 
whomsoever it is that is in need of such goods. In other words, it is a relational matter that, 
although it embeds criteria of who should be the beneficiary, is much more aimed at higher 
issues of what sort of person the agent should become in relation to a concrete context and 
what capacities to develop in order to provide such care and respect. Therefore, beyond the 
superficiality of conforming to legal or political constraints of deontological duties, a virtue-
based approach esteems self-criticism, as it is largely based on the moral agent imagining 
what better recognises and respects the other’s otherness.  
Other than emphasising and categorising what things are different and hence subjective, the 
implied focus for virtue is how to relate with everything different. A virtue-oriented person, 
who must exercise the virtue of compassion or care will least be obstructed by purely national 
considerations in identifying beneficiaries of the care. Instead, giving care and showing 
compassion may easily spread to whoever is in a material condition that requires care or 
compassion. All this implies that one need not de-emphasise the local in the curriculum to 
grow an awareness in learners of their requirement to treat strangers and outsiders in a 
morally appropriate manner. Through the lens of a virtue-based approach, the local does not 
have an inherent restrictive weight, unlike as conceived by deontological strong 
cosmopolitanism. It is therefore evident that “there is value in conceiving the moral 
relationships between citizens living in different nation-states in terms of the possession of 
certain attributes, capacities and dispositions – virtues – rather than in an abstract, rule-based 
formulation” (Peterson, 2012: 237–239). 
Global citizenship must be about important mind capacities of the agent, such as the “ability 
to make comparisons and contrasts [and consequently] an ability to ‘see’ plurally, … the 
ability to understand that both ‘reality’ and language come in versions, [and] the ability to see 
power relations and understand them systematically” (McIntosh, 2005: 23).  
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The focus, perspective and form of education for global citizenship across the world cannot 
always be uniform. For instance, much of the developed world had an active agency in the 
perpetuation of Western supremacy through colonialism. It is therefore reasonable to expect 
that nations that suffered colonialism must attempt to overcome prevailing subtle forms of 
supremacy of Eurocentrism, among others, through having their citizenship education 
cultivating a critical approach aimed at not mere reproduction of systems, but those that 
confront “conflicts and controversies by incorporating a level of self-critique and critical 
consciousness-raising” (Pashby, 2011: 432).  
On the other hand, in the African context it is reasonable to expect, in addition to the afore-
stated, this critical consciousness to affirm the value of the local ways, languages and modes 
of open, inclusive and critical deliberation. Africa must hybridise the global systems to make 
them local-sensitive. This is because the local is being denigrated even by the natives 
themselves, as they regard the Eurocentric global as the indispensable default to which they 
must adjust with much effort and cost (Malawi National Economic Council, 1998; Matiki, 
2006; Kamwendo, 2010). This position is not calling for a return to the past and isolation of 
national groups into localised islands. Rather, the argument is that the denigrated heritage that 
has a mix of the desirable, valuable and offensive must be scrutinised in the fairest terms 
possible, and while being continuously refined, be accepted alongside the foreign, dominant 
and necessary. 
Just education for global citizenship therefore is one that will acknowledge the absent, admit 
the need to recognise the absent and recognise that the absence of the absent raises questions 
about power relations, and this will ultimately redefine the world of knowledge to be all-
inclusive (McIntosh, 2005: 23). The meaning of global citizenship largely depends on 
“contextually situated assumptions about globalisation, citizenship and education, that 
prompt questions about boundaries, flows, power, relations, belonging, rights, 
responsibilities, otherness, interdependence as well as social reproduction and/or 
contestation” (Andreotti, 2011b: 307). Education for global citizenship must be modelled in 
such a manner that seeks to eliminate the imbalance of the power relations that embed the 
patterns of globalisation (Pashby, 2011: 428). Education for global citizenship may, if not 
well contextualised, entrench rather than transform global inequities that are rooted in power 
imbalances (Pashby, 2011: 428). 
In education, social justice should amount to recognising and removing every form of 
oppression in educational policies and practices (Hytten & Bettez, 2011: 8). Social and global 
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justice are multifaceted: They are about equity in distribution of goods and their access, and 
they are also about recognition, where all cultures are availed for value among the people 
concerned (Hytten & Bettez, 2011: 11). Oppression that is largely characteristic of 
globalisation has historical, conceptual and contextual dimensions (Hytten & Bettez, 2011: 
12). Therefore, the implementation of any moral theory of global citizenship as a conceptual 
tool must also consider the situatedness under which it is to be applied. 
The stance of strong cosmopolitanism against the moral value of aspects of collectivism, in 
principle and practice, embeds and aids neoliberalism, which is ostensibly committed to 
individual freedom. In the name of pursuing individual liberty, in Malawi and much of 
Africa, education has been stripped of its “collectively motivated goal” (Pais & Costa, 
2017: 8) as though the two are incompatible. The individual subject is understood to be an 
“economically self-interested” being who is a “rational optimizer and the best judge of [his 
or] her own interests and needs” (Olssen, Codd & O’Neill, 2004: 138). Achievement of 
individual freedom is pre-conditioned on a particular conception of human nature. Such a 
freedom essentially restricts the positive duties of the state to creating an ideal market 
through enacting and enforcing relevant legal instruments and creating institutions necessary 
for the operation of such a market (Olssen et al., 2004: 136). The goal is to realise an 
individual who is “an enterprising and competitive entrepreneur” and hence ideologically, 
state intervention that is conceived as “collectivist” and therefore inimical to individual 
freedom must be severely fought against (Olssen et al., 2004: 137).  
With the individual thus conceived, the role of the state is mediatory in nature merely to 
ensure the successful operation of market forces. As such, the state should “neither promote 
social justice nor develop public monopolies” for in so doing it goes against the central tenets 
of neoliberal ideology (Olssen et al., 2004: 138). Ultimately, a society’s conception of human 
nature ultimately determines the nature and substance of democracy and “public policy-
making and outcomes” (Olssen et al., 2004: 138). What stands out in this ideology is that 
state support for egalitarianism, for instance, is conceived as an attack on individual self-
actualisation endeavours and self-imposed sacrifice, which are hallmarks of the self-
dependence of the autonomous individual (Olssen et al., 2004: 138).  
Despite its protestations against neoliberalism, as Pais and Costa (2017: 10) argue, strong 
cosmopolitan global citizenship materially cooperates with neoliberalism in its attempt to fix 
and reconcile the “contradictions inhering in the role of schools”, in other words between 
individual liberty (competition) and community solidarity (Pais & Costa, 2017: 10). 
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Therefore, strong cosmopolitan neutrality over difference, despite its commitment to the 
ideals of equality and diversity, in its quest to eliminate the perennial contradiction between 
solidarity and individual actualisation, ultimately reduces citizenship to an “empty container” 
used to extinguish the many differences in meanings that are mutually exclusive (Pais & 
Costa, 2017: 10). In other words, it has a disdain for difference. This is the cost of neutrality 
over nationality. However, it is necessary that in discourses of ideal education for global 
citizenship, the contradictions in education between the individual and solidarity interests 
must be left as they are. They should continuously and contestably be managed at the local 
level. None should trump down the other, and neither should we normatively legislate about 
their value in absolute terms. 
In other words and more importantly, education for global citizenship must emphasise 
“‘dissensus’ in order to support learners in the development of their ability to hold paradoxes 
and not be overwhelmed by complexity, ambiguity, conflict, uncertainty, and difference” 
(Andreotti, 2011a: 395). Contradictions and difference should not be extinguished and 
overcome. They should be left to be constitutive of the concerned situated individuals as well 
as of a meaningful global citizenship. As Andreotti (2011a: 395) argues, this does not 
condone “ethnocentrisms and absolute relativism; essentialism and anti-essentialism; 
dogmatic communitarianism and narcissistic individualism”. Rather, it only points us to the 
worth of incessant contestations about concepts and conceptualisations across different 
human societies in actualisation of universal ideals to ensure respectful and non-paternalistic 
attitudes towards otherness. 
Citizenship is not and need not be conceived as some immutable category that is constructed 
to manifest certain obligatory universal ideals (Staeheli & Hammett, 2010: 671). Rather, it is 
constructed in concert with “political, economic, and social processes that operate within a 
particular geographic and temporal contexts” (Staeheli & Hammett, 2010: 671). The 
promotion of cosmopolitan citizenship that is indifferent to the situatedness and actual 
struggles of the learners and their community and that demonstrates no potential for 
transforming their community is tantamount to indoctrination (Staeheli & Hammett, 2010: 
678). 
According to Andreotti  (2011a: 395), it is imperative that global citizenship engage 
otherness and its epistemologies. While cognisant of “the geopolitics of knowledge 
production”, it must “focus on the development of hyper-self-reflexivity, not as a form of 
hyper-rationality, but as an opening to modes of being not anchored in (allegedly) universal 
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reason” (Andreotti, 2011a: 395). Inclusion and exclusion of what counts as a stable and 
meaningful education and citizenship have been over-dependent on an individual-centric 
(Western) reason. Such reason has for so long, on paternalistic grounds, excluded other 
meaningful forms of being, such as care, feeling, imagination, and so forth. Therefore, valid 
elements that would fall under the ‘rational’ have been unduly excluded (Code, 2012). On the 
other hand, some subjective elements that may not fall under reason and those that are 
collectivist are unfairly dismissed, yet they are meaningful to the people (Code, 2012).  
It is necessary that the substance of education for global citizenship should be left for 
dialogue and deliberation locally. This is because the extent and effects of globalisation vary 
across the world and more importantly among the particularly different cultures of the world. 
The form as well as content of education for global citizenship, although undergirded by the 
same moral principles, is likely to at least vary and utmost contrast among the cultures of the 
world. It is specific people in given contexts who for specific purposes take specific 
perspectives in the discourse of global citizenship education (Parmenter, 2011). For instance, 
much of the literature in the USA on global citizenship education has reference to or was in 
the context of national security (Parmenter, 2011: 372). Without necessarily undermining the 
globality of security with respect to problems of global terrorism, it is also a reality that 
different parts of the world have different levels of urgency with respect to the ranking of 
national security in their citizenship. For some, the most urgent citizenship issues are matters 
of ensuring basic minimum living conditions. Such prioritisation, however, does not discount 
the non-selective global reach of the violence of global terrorism. 
The ideal global citizen should, among other key things, possess such virtues or values that 
Parmenter (2011: 373–375) extracted from research involving 642 university students from 
different parts of the world with questionnaires administered in their native languages: 
human-beingness, engagement, connectedness (with the global other through compassion and 
empathy) and transformation of both oneself and of global institutions. These virtues 
presuppose an acknowledgement of both one’s and the other’s concreteness. This is going 
beyond mere sameness. 
5.7.1. Towards a Benhabibian difference communicative universalism  
The profound limitations of deontological outlooks and the relevance of otherness in the 
world today call for a different conceptualisation of universalism in global citizenship. The 
most ideal framework for conceptualising universalism in global citizenship, as this sub-
section shows, is one based on Seyla Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) communicative universalism. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
248 
Therefore, instead of pre-assigning value to different aspects of human nature, which is in-
exhaustive of human nature and the human condition, universalism must be based on 
deliberation. This is only deliberation that considers as its starting point the differences, 
uniqueness and concretess of the other (Benhabib, 1992: 159). 
However, how do we at the same time demand recognition for a people’s concrete 
situatedness and account for individual freedom without falling into traps of cultural 
essentialism or boundedness? Achieving this balance need not suppress or eliminate 
difference. Rather, as Benhabib (2011: 59–60) argues, achieving this must initially start with 
conceding and recognising that all human beings undifferentiated by culture have one non-
negotiable fundamental right: “the right to have rights”, which demands the moral subject “to 
be recognized by others and to recognize others in turn, as persons entitled to moral respect 
and legally protected rights in a human community” (Benhabib, 2011: 59–60). This right 
presupposes and guarantees the individual’s communicative freedom, in that, for Benhabib 
(2011: 66), rights claims entail that two individuals or more can dialogically exchange 
appropriate justifications as to why they should each respect the demands and entitlements of 
the other so that reciprocally they (do not) act in certain ways in their social cooperation as 
well as in the distribution of benefits and burdens of the community. 
This entails that communicative freedom for each and every individual is more paramount 
than sweeping generalisations about how all human beings of the world should relate with 
and evaluate the meaningfulness of aspects (of nationality) or of collective life. Unlike the 
neo-Kantian roots of strong cosmopolitanism, where validity of moral positions is achieved 
through a thought experiment where one abstracts what a disembodied rational being would 
consider valid, hence universalisable, Benhabib’s (2011: 67) universalism is discursive.  
In neo-Kantianism, human equality entails impartiality and is conceived as central for moral 
reason in that it is meant to best serve the search for an objective and universal “moral point 
of view” that all rational agents would accept (Young, 1990: 100). The objective moral point 
of view is arrived at when a rational agent abstracts … 
… from all the particularities of the circumstances on which moral reason reflects. The 
impartial reasoner is detached: reason abstracts from the particular experiences and histories 
that constitute a situation. The impartial reasoner must also be dispassionate, abstracting 
from feelings, desires, interests, and commitments that he or she may have regarding the 
situation, or that others may have. The impartial reasoner is, finally, a universal reasoner 
(Young, 1990: 100). 
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By adopting a point of view that necessarily excludes concrete situatedness, impartial reason 
only remains with and accepts “a transcendental ‘view from nowhere’ that carries the 
perspective, attributes, character, and interests of no particular subject or set of subjects” 
(Young, 1990: 100). The concept of the transcendental subject represses difference in that “it 
denies the particularity of situations”; it also “seeks to master or eliminate heterogeneity in 
the form of feeling … by expelling desire or affectivity from reason” in order for impartiality 
to achieve its unity (Young, 1990: 100). This is because the concept of the transcendental 
subject expects that we abstract from the “particularity of bodily being, its needs and 
inclinations, and from the feelings that attach to the experienced particularity of things and 
events” (Young, 1990: 100). Ultimately …  
… the ideal of impartiality reduces particularity to unity [by] reducing the plurality of moral 
subjects to one subjectivity. In its requirement of universality, the ideal of impartial reason is 
supposed to represent a point of view that any and all rational subjects can adopt (Young, 
1990: 100). 
The uniting of all particularity and collapsing of human plurality into a single subjectivity has 
the serious implication of absolutely discounting everything deemed particular as not only 
lacking moral worth, but also as of no consequence to the actuality of being human. 
However, this position fails to consider that what constitutes the act of being human are too 
complex to be reduced to either the particular or universal categories. What individuates the 
human being are not the common and abstract impartial elements. The ultimate consequence 
of such positions is that difference, which is a source of a people’s concreteness and 
individuality, is regarded as morally arbitrary and empty. In so doing, this consequently 
undermines the very being of the moral subject, which resides in otherness. A universalism 
constructed on this ethics is hollow and inconclusive in that it makes generalisations about 
individuated particular human beings, which it concedes are such, yet it at the same time 
surreptitiously denies the normative relevance of this very particularity or individuality. It is a 
universalism grounded in selected common aspects of human nature that rejects the core ones 
(differences). It is therefore not a meaningful universalism.  
On the other hand, communicative universalism rests on the acceptability to each of those to 
be affected by an act of the processes of justification through which the validity for reciprocal 
moral claims of entitlements and obligations must dialogically be arrived at (Benhabib, 2011: 
67). To preserve the integrity of and not to be prejudiced about individuality, this approach 
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places the highest value on the nature of the deliberative justificatory processes, rather than 
on precast dichotomies of the universal and particular (Benhabib, 2011: 67).  
Because the universalism is deliberative, there is therefore no threat of sliding into 
perpetuation of individual oppression by appealing to dubious claims of cultural consensus to 
maintain subjugation of disempowered members of a group, as protests against appeals for 
toleration of reasonable aspects of nationality usually charge. The deliberative nature also 
ensures that peoples across the world are not ensnared by radical individualism, which denies 
moral worth to most forms of relational life. All this is regulated by the communicative 
freedom every individual ought to have and through which every consensus should be arrived 
at (Benhabib, 2011: 62). Therefore, the fears of cultural boundedness and essentialism in as 
far as active recognition of meaningful elements of nationality are concerned have no firm 
basis in so far as decisions about content and nature of nationality are transacted in a 
communicative framework.  
At no other time and conditions than in the diverse and unequal global world in which we are 
living is Benhabib’s (2011) communicative universalism so necessary and crucial in 
achieving social and global justice. This is because the dialoguing among individuals who are 
to convince each other about the validity of certain norms, obligations and responsibilities 
(Benhabib, 2011: 67) implies concession of mutual respect, where one not only 
acknowledges one’s agency as a moral being. Rather, what gives meaning to one’s agency is 
the fact that there are others with whom one shares the global and social spaces, who 
recognise one’s ability to initiate certain actions through uttering certain words (Benhabib, 
2011: 68). Therefore, the flipside of one’s agency is respecting the ability of others to 
exercise a similar capacity and their being able to listen to one’s reasons for action and accept 
or reject the reasons based on what individuates them as others. Even though one may 
disagree with what individuates the others, one nevertheless is obliged to respect what 
individuates the other as a basis for the others’ judgements. This is why Benhabib (2011: 68–
69) argues, “embedded agency” and the exercising of “communicative freedom” are one, 
because one must accept the peculiarity, the embeddedness and the otherness of the other as 
one’s basis for either accepting or rejecting one’s justificatory reasons for a particular action 
(Benhabib, 2011: 68–69).  
It is for this reason that under the deliberative paradigm of universalism, the concrete 
otherness of the other is indispensable in seeking to achieve a meaningful and valid 
consensus over a certain action. It is an acknowledgement of the other’s individuation and 
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peculiarity, such that excluding it is to undermine the being, dignity and moral integrity of the 
other. On this account, it is morally erroneous to determine in advance and absolute terms the 
value and meaning of aspects of nationality across the globe as being morally arbitrary. What 
local languages mean to different people of the world is varying and different. We cannot 
reduce languages to mere extrinsic categories for all people of the world as mere vehicles for 
communication. Even to those who allege they have no culture, their languages carry with 
them cultural outlooks and experiences without the people being actively conscious about it, 
because language is a double-edged sword: a medium of culture and a vehicle for 
communication (Wa Thiong’o, 1987).  
Value for collective life in Malawi should neither be understood in essentialist terms nor its 
aspects dismissed as subjective to the democratic global citizenship project. Accountability, 
representation and engagement in Malawi rural areas have been achieved successfully 
through collective communalistic citizenship where members interrogate and engage public 
officials and community leaders (Gaynor, 2010: 815). Certainly, this cannot substitute 
individual citizenship or agency. Yet, on the other hand, such a communalistic approach 
cannot just be understood as a mere efficient alternative to achieving common goods, which 
free members would otherwise have individually achieved with success too. Instead, such a 
communalistic approach is a mode of expressing communalistic interests as well as a unique 
collective dimension of being an individual. Such communalism is an actualisation of (some 
aspects of) universal, international concepts that tend to have an abstract character. The 
success of such models lies in their being congruent with the local lived experiences (Eggen, 
2013: 697). Even more significant is that the language (both literally and metaphorically) for 
doing politics is accessible by the people involved. 
With respect to education for global citizenship, a communicative universalism framework 
ought to necessarily acknowledge and include situatedness. This dissertation consistently 
argues that in the realm of globality, the situatedness largely rests in the aspects of nationality 
of language, territoriality, history and shared culture embedded peoples of the world share in 
their particular contexts. In the interest of comprehending the other’s self-articulated 
otherness to achieve just universalism, meaningful global citizenship must demand utilisation 
of the vernacular language in the school domain. This is because the development of global 
citizenship in learners is not about them adapting and conforming to certain absolute 
essences. Their language best represents who they are and better captures the struggles and 
lived experiences they must alter through education (Staeheli & Hammett, 2010: 678). 
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The individual and his or her entitlements alone have been the centre of the discourse on 
education for democratic citizenship. Mostly, this has been at the cost of neglecting certain 
equally pertinent normative ideals. The idea of citizenship has two implications. It implies the 
rights and entitlements of the individual and their attendant responsibilities. It also implies a 
kind of community of and with other moral subjects (Benhabib, 2011: 68). The two are each 
other’s flipside. In as much as there are universal principles that the individual citizen and the 
other moral subjects with whom he or she is cooperating share, we cannot generalise about 
this community’s unique shared interests, because what makes it a political community is not 
entirely political (Papastephanou, 2015: 186). However, the sense of community is largely 
cultural, linguistic, historical and geographical traits.  
Mother-tongue instruction and the teaching and learning of national history provide learners 
with their concreteness and location in the global world. In the absence of their confronting 
their histories that shape their being in the local and global worlds and hence partly determine 
their future, education for democratic citizenship becomes hollow. Therefore, national history 
and mother-tongue instruction (wherever possible) are indispensable for just global 
citizenship education.  
5.8. Conclusion 
Colonialism alienated nationality in Malawi, but inadvertently and subsequently consolidated 
it. Nationality was the means for rallying all colonial resistance. It served this end because it 
was the embodiment of the people’s concreteness, which was under incessant subjugation by 
colonialism. Colonialism was in principle a translation of the essentialist binary categories of 
rational-versus-irrational. The framework for these categories is related to the one that shapes 
strong cosmopolitanism. The revulsion of diversity during the independence era on the other 
hand resulted in the development of an uncritical nationalism, aversive to difference and 
dissent. The general otherness standpoint of universalism successfully motivated external 
intervention in demanding political reforms, leading to the fall of the tyranny of the one-party 
regime.  
The onset of the democratic era has, however, embraced a strong cosmopolitan form of 
citizenship that basically undermines the local. Neoliberalism that keeps serving as the 
enabler of strong cosmopolitanism is perpetuating the marginalisation of the local. Prevailing 
globality, although it cherishes hybridity, inclusiveness and openness, is deficient and 
marginalising of Malawian otherness. Use of mother-tongue instruction where tenable and 
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teaching of critical history will significantly contribute towards stopping the invisibility of 
African and Malawian epistemologies. 
Malawian education for democratic citizenship should not continue on the deontological 
foundation of strong cosmopolitanism, which is limited and limiting. Benhabib’s  (2011: 68–
69) difference-grounded communicative universalism is best suited for meeting these 
deficiencies, because in moral reflection about citizenship it starts with and from diversity, 
which is definitive of globality. There must be incessant interaction between the universal 
and the particular through the processes of vernacularisation to ensure that the universal does 
not alienate the local and that the local too should not be insulated from external criticism. 
Malawi’s education for democratic and global citizenship must therefore be grounded in a 
difference-rooted deliberative universalism. Only then will it be on the path to achieving 
social and global justice.  
Nationality in the Malawian political history has been a troubling and is now a troubled ideal. 
By and large, it has been conceived as a vice that always undermines moral universalism 
which the globalised world and its citizens urgently need to possess. While acknowledging 
the manmade tragedies based on uncritical nationalism, dismissal of the nation from 
cosmopolitan citizenship conceptualisation is equally morally erroneous. This error is rooted 
in the fact that in strong cosmopolitanism, nationality is usually, if not always, exclusively 
understood in its political ideology sense. That nationality embeds aspects of the being 
human and collective being for most situated peoples of the (developing nations of the) world 
and hence is central to their sense of being in the global world is usually ignored. In other 
words, the territorial, linguistic, cultural and historical situatedness aspects of nationality 
constitute the moral otherness rather than a mere populist ideological dimension of a people’s 
ways of being. Failure to actively and meaningfully utilise nationality in education for 
democratic citizenship through continued pursuit of strong cosmopolitanism-oriented 
neutrality will perpetuate the huge justice deficit now prevailing in globalisation. 
The next chapter sketches the possibility of an education for global citizenship that is 
grounded in a relational rationality other than an individual-centric one. The chapter uses 
ubuntu as an alternative ethics to the individual-centrism of strong cosmopolitanism. 
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Chapter 6:  
Ubuntu in education and citizenship 
6.1. Introduction 
The argument this dissertation has been advancing is that strong cosmopolitanism, through its 
excessive commitment to individual-centrism, ultimately outlawing community interests as 
devoid of any moral worth, is problematic. Community interests are, not only morally 
legitimate in citizenship conceptualisation, but also necessary. As such in education, mother-
tongue instruction and teaching of history are integral to a meaningful education for 
democratic and global citizenship. 
In this chapter, I explore ubuntu ethics and how it may offer alternative perspectives in 
configuration of global and democratic citizenships, given the limitations of individual-
centric strong cosmopolitanism as highlighted in the previous chapters (see sections 3.4, 4.5, 
and 5.7.1.). Ubuntu ethics has been chosen as a representative of ethical orientations that are 
not exclusively individual-centric, but also communalistic. The relational rationality of 
ubuntu accords it a capacity ideal for addressing the systematic exclusion of mother-tongue 
instruction and history teaching in education for cosmopolitan citizenship, because ubuntu 
values the “communal embeddedness and connectedness of a person to other persons and 
highlights the importance attached to people and to human relationships” (Higgs, 2012: 48). 
Thus ubuntu ethics is a normatively contrasting alternative to strong cosmopolitan global 
citizenship whose major limitation is that it is “to a very large extent resistant to the need to 
live fluidity, complexity and indeterminacy” (Ramose, 2014: 31). It is also an ethics whose 
ideals are generally connected and identifiable with the social practice for much of sub-
Saharan Africa.  
In the chapter, I first discuss the nature of ubuntu, its core principles (of humanness, 
interconnectedness and harmony) and their implications. I later discuss how ubuntu ethics 
manages individual and community interests without sacrificing one for the other. Later in 
the chapter, I highlight the suitability of ubuntu to advance a deliberative universalism that is 
rooted in difference as argued in previous chapters (see sections 2.5.4, 3.6, and 5.7.1.) as an 
inevitable part of the solution for the prevailing community-undermining strong cosmopolitan 
global citizenship. Lastly, I explore the relevance of ubuntu in education for citizenship, 
especially through showing how it can better help fill the gaps in the prevalent and dominant 
framework of citizenship. This includes showing how ubuntu can be practically realised in 
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conceptualisation of education aims, its engagement with the curriculum, assessment practice 
and environmental education.  
6.2. The nature of ubuntu 
Characteristic of philosophy, there are variations of the ideal shape and substance of ubuntu 
ethics. I am cognisant that ubuntu ethics needs further research, debate and development to 
enrich it, not as an ideology, but as a more systematised philosophical theory. This, in all 
fairness, does take time because systematic written African philosophy has not existed in the 
same period of time of development as has Western philosophy. However, despite the 
shortage of very thoroughly developed ubuntu ethics theories, this chapter is based on those 
foundational principles that are generally uncontroversial among ubuntu theorists.  
The social contract tradition conceives the (Hobessean) human being as belonging to society, 
either for security and expectation, or as a (Kantian) member of the moral kingdom of ends 
all rational beings belong to, where each individual rationally wills to conform to a rational 
moral law (Cornell & Muvangua, 2012: 3). According to such thinking, the moral value of 
society is therefore extrinsic and varies across individuals. On the other hand, the ubuntu 
conception of society is based on the moral prominence of social bonds alongside the 
prominence of individual interest (Ngcoya, 2015: 253–255). Thus “ubuntu is both the African 
principle of transcendence for the individual, and the law of the social bond” (Cornell & 
Muvangua, 2012).  
Ubuntu means humanness (Murove, 2014: 37). It is a moral orientation whose origin draws 
from traditional African thought and practice which are or were predominantly relational 
other than individualistic (Bewaji, 2004: 396). As an ethic, ubuntu understands human beings 
as – 
[I]ntertwined in a world of ethical relations and obligations from the time they are born. The 
social bond, then, is not imagined as one of separate individuals (as in both of the versions of 
the social contract just described). This inscription by the other is fundamental in that we are 
born into a language, a kinship group, a tribe, a nation. But this inscription is not simply 
reduced to a social fact. We come into the world obligated to others, and in turn these others 
are obligated to us, to the individual. Thus, it is a profound misunderstanding of Ubuntu to 
confuse it with simple-minded communitarianism. It is only through the engagement and 
support of others that we are able to realize a true individuality and rise above our biological 
distinctiveness into a fully developed person whose uniqueness is inseparable from the 
journey to moral and ethical development (Cornell & Muvangua, 2012: 3). 
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In ubuntu thought, what assigns an action ethicality, is that it is “an action in relation to 
another being” (Cornell & Muvangua, 2012) and my individuation is supported by others. As 
such, my being is interconnected with that of the other. The connection one has with others 
that is rooted in the shared humanness is not a mere impotent abstract metaphysical property. 
Rather, it also places an active obligation on the agent to consider both his or her 
individuation, and well-being of others one is in community with, as not only overlapping, 
but as having equal moral compulsion on agency. Social cohesion and harmony in ubuntu 
thought are not valued as ends in themselves, but rather as serving the achievement of 
humanness (Cornell & Muvangua, 2012: 5).  
Asserting the centrality of communalism does not entail denying the recognition of 
individuality (Kaphagawani, 2004: 338). The communal thesis of ubuntu “underscores the 
processual nature of personhood, the gradual remaking of persons through, inter alia, the 
acquisition and mastery of both cultural and esoteric knowledge” (Kaphagawani, 2004: 338). 
Personhood in ubuntu is therefore not reducible to an abstract fixed essence of human nature 
only. In ubuntu, personhood is a process of being and becoming in interaction with others 
(Ngcoya, 2015: 255). It is about achieving a desirable condition, of harmony that requires 
consideration of other moral aspects besides the self and its interests. It is about achieving 
harmony between the self and community.  
Ubuntu is not a mere reproduction of a romanticised pre-colonial Africa as some critics tend 
to argue (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004; Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013). It is not a mere 
elevation of traditional African communalistic way of life into a philosophy. This is not to 
deny the huge debt ubuntu owes to African ethnophilosophy. However, as a philosophical 
ethics approach, ubuntu goes beyond the African traditions and practices, while being 
cognisant that a society’s cultural and linguistic facts are motivated by covert philosophical 
insights from which critical thinkers can glean and philosophise further (Bello, 2004: 266).  
Ubuntu theory is derived from the communal way of life of the Bantu people of Southern 
Africa (Mangena, 2016: 69). However, that ubuntu is connected to the past as the largest 
repository of lived African experiences, does not reduce its ethics to either restorative or 
reflective nostalgia (Müller, 2015: 3), neither does this make ubuntu a revivalism enterprise 
aimed at returning to a pristine past allegedly destroyed by colonialism (Matolino & 
Kwindingwi, 2013: 202). Ubuntu is therefore not a narrative of return to a romanticised past 
as some critics (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004; Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013) contend. The 
criticism that ubuntu ethics amounts to a romanticised narrative of return to the past could 
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only make sense, at least if ubuntu ethics the object of the return, was during the past, given 
the same room and space to exist and co-exist with competing ethical orientations to become 
and flourish freely, yet it still somehow failed to do so, ultimately losing any appeal it had. 
However, in mainstream philosophy, the same cannot be said about African thought, which 
was not only suppressed by colonialism, but also actively denigrated at a time when formal 
conventional education had just been introduced in Africa, and hence the thought was denied 
the privilege to develop as a systematic philosophy. Thus, criticisms of return presuppose that 
the opportunity to become and flourish was availed, and that the African philosophy declined 
in development due to its inherent lack of intellectual appeal. Such presuppositions however 
generally do not apply to much of the context of Africa and African philosophy.  
Furthermore, even if one were to concede that the return is indeed taking place, such 
criticisms presuppose that there is a departure from an exclusive philosophy whose 
metaphysics and epistemology are in earnest impartial, and exclusively disconnected from 
any people’s lived experiences and culture. But as the previous chapters have laboured to 
show (see sections 4.4, 4.5, and 5.5.1), dominant epistemologies and philosophies, in schools 
today are grounded in Eurocentric particularism, despite having universalistic dimensions 
(Andreotti, 2011a: 385; Abdi, 2015: 15; Swanson, 2015: 28). It is therefore worth recognising 
that there are particularistic and alternative although contrasting conceptions of reality that 
nevertheless actualise the same universal moral principles.  
One cannot deny the existence of some essentialist, nostalgic and romanticised theories of 
ubuntu ethics largely drawn from a very subjective pristine past in African philosophy. Such 
positions however, can hardly be sustained philosophically. It is also worth conceding that 
the actual structures of communalistic African societies from which much of the ideal 
objective ubuntu principles are derived, no longer exist at present in the same way they did in 
the past. However, although most societies are becoming industrialised and in principle 
individualised, Ubuntu as an ethical approach is sustainable and relevant for modern societies 
not only African societies. However, the extinction of the traditional African communities 
would not necessarily entail irrelevance of ubuntu ethics because besides an actual 
community, a (people’s) philosophy may embed such elements as their language (Coetzee, 
2003: 324; Assie’-Lumumba, 2016: 22) and traditions.  
The implication of these rebuttals against criticisms of obsoleteness of ubuntu is that ubuntu 
ethics need not be compelled to integrate into mainstream ethics by subjecting ubuntu to an 
assimilationist other-dismissing mode of hybridisation. It is proper that ubuntu philosophy be 
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recognised and be adequately developed through contestations to become part of a truly 
global hybridity, unlike the homogenising current one. African philosophy need not be 
reduced to making tokenistic inclusions of African aspects into the mainstream philosophy 
and ethics. Such an African philosophy only comes to adapt into the modus operandi. Rather, 
African philosophy should be allowed to raise its questions not raised by the mainstream. It 
should question the mainstream’s exclusivity character. This will achieve the ideal hybridity 
global ethics needs. Thus, references to manifestations of ubuntu in the past in so far as they 
are not essentialist but meant to fix the incompleteness and deficiencies of the present ethical 
order, are in no way morally problematic. Recollection of ways of life that were so long 
denigrated by colonialism and mainstream scholarship is relevant as long as it helps build a 
non-exclusive moral theory. This is not to say that the African past was tension-free and that 
the societies were homogenous. 
In moral theorisation, there are arguably two broad approaches: one regards moral agents’ 
concreteness as primary in that they offer “decision procedures which run on such 
particularistic contingencies as ethnicity, race, gender, culture, and language” (Coetzee, 2003: 
321). In the second approach, thinkers abstract from the concreteness of the people in order to 
establish “a universal stand-point, one operating with a minimal definition of what is morally 
relevant, such as rationality, or human nature, or the common factors in our understanding of 
moral problems” (Coetzee, 2003: 321). Most ubuntu critics ignore the relevance of the first 
approach that takes into consideration concreteness. In this chapter, without necessarily 
prizing one of these approaches over the other, I actively recognise the normative 
implications of people’s concreteness as being an inextricable ideal with the abstract, 
especially in conceptualisations of global citizenship.  
The established practices of a community reveal its moral life as well as models for 
contesting forms of the good life, in a way rendering its social practice as an exercise of its 
practical reason (Coetzee, 2003: 323). Understood this way, “culture is an open-ended 
resource of social meanings on which members of a community draw to mediate the 
contingencies of their everyday lives” and it “denotes the resources of a community’s 
material and moral worlds” (Coetzee, 2003: 322). What this entails is that people through 
culture express the value and foundation of certain moral principles as well as how to realise 
them. The philosopher may abstract these from the people’s culture. Furthermore, the fact 
that the people may seem to be living their concrete lives in a manner not always consistent 
with the principles, does not necessarily imply the principles lack moral validity. 
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Philosophical reflection can further develop the foundational principles abstracted from the 
community by drawing implications, which may not necessarily be prevalent in the society. It 
is therefore instructive to know that “though practical reason is tied to social practice, it is not 
the slave of practice, for practical reason can modify practice” (Coetzee, 2003: 327). 
6.2.1. Ubuntu principles: humanness, connectedness and harmony  
Ubuntu regards humanness as the highest moral good all human action must achieve 
(Menkiti, 2004: 326). Achieving humanness is not an individual project (Ramose, 2003). It is 
always in concert with others or their interests. The essence of humanness lies in recognising 
that one’s moral status as a moral person is meaningful only through and in relation with 
others. Though in ubuntu thought, one is a human being by virtue of being a Homo sapiens, 
personhood however, is “the sort of thing which has to be achieved, the sort of thing which 
individuals could fail” to achieve (Menkiti, 2004: 326). This is quite distinct from the 
Eurocentric concept of personhood that resides in possession of immutable and inherent 
essences. Personhood in individual-centric ethics is achieved independent of other humanity. 
It is fixed. With respect to others, all the autonomous person needs to do is to make sure he or 
she observes certain moral laws in the pursuit of his or her interests, where consideration for 
the other is usually only with respect to negative duties emanating from a social contract 
meant to optimise each member’s interests (Meyers, 2005: 28). Unlike in the social contract 
orientation, in ubuntu the community is not a mere institution of strategic cooperation that is 
primarily rooted in individual self-interest. Personhood is a result of achieving humanness 
(Menkiti, 2004: 326). This entails recognising and engaging the interests of others affected by 
one’s exercise of agency as the ultimate mark for respect for humanness in the other.  
Ubuntu thought also cherishes the principle of people’s connectedness that makes possible 
sharing of humanness (Coetzee, 2003: 330; Wiredu, 2003: 341). In ubuntu ethics, becoming a 
person “stretches beyond the raw capacities of the isolated individual, and it is a project 
which is laden with the possibility of triumph, but also of failure” (Menkiti, 2004: 326). 
Personhood is not an isolated property. Rather, it substantially derives from relationship with 
other persons, and as such, “it is not an incorrigible property of the individual but something 
that is shared with others and finds nourishment and flourishing in relationships with others”  
(Murove, 2014: 42). Personhood “articulates our inter-connectedness, our common humanity 
and the responsibility to each that flows from our connection” (Letseka, 2012: 54). My 
actions achieve humanness when they promote well-being not only in me, but in others too. 
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Such interconnectedness also includes attachment with the non-human world of nature (Le 
Grange, 2012: 334). 
The interconnectedness derived from our shared humanness founds another crucial principle 
that must be considered in all exercises of individual agency: the principle of harmony 
(Ramose, 2003: 276; Wiredu, 2003: 347). Sharing humanness is not merely a metaphysical 
property that only serves to justify individual self-determination. Rather, there is a more 
substantial mutual consideration of the other, whether a human being or non-human nature 
(Le Grange, 2012: 334) in one’s actions. There is an obligation to ensure that one’s action is 
considerate of particular interests of others who are likely to be affected directly or indirectly 
by your action (Metz, 2007a: 340).  
Metz’s (2007a) theory of ubuntu attempts to coalesce these principles (humanness, 
connectedness and harmony) into one theory of ubuntu. His theory holds that in ubuntu ethics 
“an action is right just insofar as it produces harmony and reduces discord; an act is wrong to 
the extent that it fails to develop community” (Metz, 2007a: 335). However, this theory that 
he endorses out of other hypothesised theories he himself proposes and later faults, risks 
being criticised for demanding social conformism and expending the individual’s freedom. 
Prior to settling for this theory, he hypothesises another and dismisses it almost entirely. This 
hypothesised theory held that “an action is right just insofar as it promotes the well-being of 
others without violating their rights; [and that] an act is wrong to the extent that it either 
violates rights or fails to enhance the welfare of one’s fellows without violating rights” 
(Metz, 2007a: 330). However, I find both some valuable merits and some deficiencies in both 
the hypothesis and his favoured theory stated earlier in this paragraph. My submission is that 
a more ideal theory would be obtained from marrying some elements of the hypothesis Metz 
(2007a) rejects with some elements of the ubuntu moral theory Metz (2007a) settles for. The 
marriage would give us a theory that holds that, in ubuntu ethics, an action is right insofar as 
it achieves harmony and reduces discord with others, without violating their rights; an act is 
wrong to the extent that it either violates rights or fails to achieve harmony with others. The 
most important thing here is the unity between and moral paramountcy of both human rights 
and responsibility towards harmony with others that personhood must always achieve. 
Restricting ourselves to promotion of harmony only, as does Metz’s (2007a) ultimate theory, 
may tolerate essentialising tendencies or sacrifice of legitimate individual interests in cases of 
social tyranny. An ubuntu ethics is therefore as committed to individual freedom as it is to 
harmony with others with whom the self is interconnected. 
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The harmony that ubuntu promotes is one that concedes humanity’s common identity as 
concretely embedded beings and is “grounded on good-will” (Metz, 2007a: 338). Rights-
based (essentially individual-centric) approaches to ethics generally regard such moral virtues 
as “love, generosity, and compassion” as having no intrinsic worth (Bell, 2002: 71). The 
danger with such a position is that in principle it makes civic life devoid of the human 
responsibility human beings have towards each other as the human beings they are, before 
assuming entitlements and rights-based relationships established on political cooperation. 
Such other-considering values of humanness and interconnectedness when duly considered 
make one realise that one’s personhood is inextricably tied to the humanness in others too. 
The intensity of the reality of my personhood (my concreteness) simultaneously gives me the 
recognition of (not only the generality of human beings in others), but rather that the other 
too shares the same capacity for concreteness worthy of my recognition, respect and 
compassion just as does my personhood. One achieves personhood or being fully human by 
affirming the “being-ness” (Etieyibo, 2017: 318) of others which in principle is their 
concreteness and not generality.  
Interconnectedness is fundamental for humanness. My being a person resides in recognising 
this interconnectedness. Humanness is a state at which I cannot independently or 
singlehandedly arrive. It is neither in me alone, so as to restrict the scope of moral 
considerations to my interest only, or ignore the concreteness of the other as having no 
intrinsic worth and hence undeserving of my moral concern (Murungi, 2004: 523). 
Humanness is in relation to how my thoughtful and considerate actions will affect the well-
being of others, because humanness is shared and not in me alone. Recognising my 
personhood or being a person implies recognising the existence of the concrete exercise of 
the agency capacity that demands I also respect such concreteness in the other. In this case, 
whenever I am in a moral situation, my individual interests are as cardinal as are the 
implications of my agency towards harmony with those with whom I am entangled (Bell, 
2002: 72). One can glean that what is distinct about ubuntu ethics is its respect for the 
concrete agency (not only agency capacity) of the other guided by, a desire for harmony that 
is guaranteed by incessant interaction and togetherness so as not to only project about the 
well-being of the other.  
The practical implications of an orientation of connectedness are many. For instance, I 
encountered associated practices at my former place of work in my seven years of working 
there. Together with colleagues, we were sharing an office with 15 workstations. Typically, 
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daily morning greetings were more informative than a mere exchange of pleasantries or just 
words of recognition of the other’s presence. When a person enters the room he or she greets 
individually those present with the greeting, “[m]wadzuka bwanji?” ([h]ow are you this 
morning?). The one being greeted is in principle expected to describe his or her personal 
condition of well-being such as “ndadzuka bwino kaya inu” (I have woken up fine, what 
about you).  
When greeting the immediate neighbours close to one’s workstation, the one greeting further 
asks, “kaya kunyumba kwacha bwanji?” (how have the people at home woken up this 
morning?). The phrase ‘people at home’ in this context refers to both one’s household and 
one’s wider community. As such the respondent may for example inform the one greeting, 
about a sick child in the home or bereavement in the neighbourhood where applicable. It is 
common for colleagues to continue following up for updates about an unfavourable condition 
regarding one’s ‘home’ they were told of the previous day. The one who extended the 
greeting, is also similarly expected to inform the other of the well-being of his or her ‘home’.  
Two things can be drawn from such common routine occurrences. First, is the fact that 
greetings in the Malawi society are not only about recognising the presence of the other but 
they are also informative. Second and more importantly, the concept of individual well-being 
is not restricted to an isolated detached sense of personhood.  In most cases the concept is 
connected to the condition of those in your community beyond the self. The deep 
entrenchment of such common practices must be understood in the context of the fact that 
social structures and arrangements are inspired by their people’s particular conceptions of 
personhood (Gyekye, 2003: 348).  
Individual well-being is not a matter of satisfaction of the autonomous person’s interests 
only. One’s failure to flourish due to some inabilities is everybody’s concern. This is not to 
romanticise the African community, for it is fraught with its own moral challenges. 
Nevertheless, such enactment of connectedness of humanness, reveals how ubuntu ethics 
demands that recognising and respecting the other should go beyond mere respect of the 
other’s capacity for agency. Rather, ubuntu demands that virtues such as of care about the 
concrete well-being of the other must also constitute my respect for the other’s agency. 
Establishment of the other’s concrete well-being is only achievable through interaction with 
the other. Thus ubuntu recognises that most aspects of the art of being a concrete individual 
person are largely sharable, and that one affects and is affected by the concreteness of others. 
This necessitates achievement of harmony in the exercise of one’s agency. 
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Claiming that one should consider the others’ interests does not necessarily entail regulation, 
or final authorisation by the interests of the community. Rather, this position implies that in 
actual moral situations, besides freedom of agency, what you freely do, when you freely do it, 
and even how you as an autonomous individual do it, is not entirely restricted to 
individualistic considerations. This is because my action in some way affects the other, who 
may be different from me, and possibly against my position, but yet I still share humanness 
with this other. This obliges me to be caring, considerate, and sensitive in being myself.  
These considerations are not just a matter of a range of things affected in the exercise of my 
agency. Considering the humanness of the other in my action is not just a matter of an 
awareness of likely inevitable unintended outcomes of my action that will unfavourably 
affect the other. Rather, it is about considering such probable effects on concrete others not as 
mere aftermaths of my action, but as crucial considerations in my designing of my personal 
project such that even where there is divergence of preference, my project should not 
disorient, humiliate, undermine and ignore the different concrete (and not abstract only) 
interests of others with whom I share humanness. This is why ubuntu demands “mutual 
recognition and respect complemented by mutual care and sharing” (Ramose, 2003: 386). 
Unlike the individual-centric community, the community in African thought does not 
understand relationships between persons to be “merely contingent, voluntary and optional” 
(Gyekye, 2003: 353). Relationships have normative weight. 
6.2.2. The individual and community in ubuntu 
The most unique attribute of ubuntu ethics is the idea of expecting moral agents always to 
exercise their agency with responsibility so as to achieve harmony with others (Metz, 2007a: 
340). Claiming that personhood is relational, does not entail that the self is enslaved by and 
cannot assume values that are against the community which the agent deems repressive and 
against human dignity (Gyekye, 2003: 358). The individual has the capacity to affirm, revise 
and even reject the common goals, values and practices (Gyekye, 2003: 358–359). Thus, 
community values are not immutable. At the same time, such a ‘free’ person who disapproves 
of the society’s values, still exercises his or her moral autonomy within the framework of the 
common humanness he or she shares with others. Should one completely ignore and 
disregard the common interconnectedness, he or she may achieve individual autonomy, but 
not necessarily “self-completeness” (Gyekye, 2003: 359) as a human being, because being 
human is inherently shareable. This is why consideration of the other in the exercise of 
agency is not only an abstract metaphysical phenomenon. Self-determination must as a matter 
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of necessity be contextualised in the, different, but morally legitimate concrete interests of 
other human beings. This is why ubuntu values the role of moral virtues in all moral actions 
(Ngcoya, 2015: 253). 
The most dominant virtues of ubuntu are “kindness, compassion, respect, and care” (Murove, 
2014: 37). The relevance of these virtues largely derives from the reality that personhood is 
not exclusively grounded in the concept of a detached independent self only but also in how 
the independent self relates with other concrete selves. The social contract conceptions of the 
individual as one who is economically and politically primarily driven by self-interest have 
shaped the prevalent (Western) conception of society as merely an efficient structure for 
maximizsation of self-interest (Held, 2006: 82; Murove, 2014: 39). Ubuntu thought, however, 
understands that placing the individual’s rational self-interest at the centre in the context of 
competition for scarce resources in social cooperation, hence understanding human relations 
solely in rights terms anchored in individual-centric conceptions only, is an incomplete 
account of what being human is (Ramose, 2010: 300). Ubuntu is cognisant of the fact that for 
concrete human beings aspiring to meaningful social cooperation, “the human resources of 
love, patronage, recognition, compassion or companionship, etc. are also scarce, and require 
deliberate efforts in both their generation and equitable distribution” (Bewaji, 2004: 397). 
Being a person is much more than having individual autonomy, unless such autonomy 
constantly considers and engages concrete relations one has with others (Murove, 2014: 42) .  
Ubuntu is therefore, not mere advancement and prioritisation of community interests and 
values in deference of individual interests. Contrary to Enslin and Horsthemke (2004: 555), 
communalism in Africa is not accepted or promoted in an uncritical manner just because it is 
or was once a common practice. Related criticisms are levelled by Matolino and Kwindingwi 
(2013: 199), who hold that ubuntu ethics owing to its emphasis on interconnectedness is 
hegemonic, depriving the individual of independent thought. Ubuntu however, is about taking 
into consideration human interconnectedness with humanity not merely as an inevitable 
unintended horizon affected by the consequence of one’s action, but rather as what to 
crucially consider in exercising one’s agency. Ubuntu draws from African tendencies and 
these are not necessarily essences; hence, the charge of ubuntu being essentialist and 
therefore demanding homogenous African communities does not hold (Metz, 2007b: 333). 
Contrary to the individual-centric conceptions that the community is a social construct, in 
ubuntu thought, “human beings are not social beings because they socialise with one another 
[but rather] they socialise with one another because they are social beings” (Murungi, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
265 
2004: 523). This, according to Murungi (2004: 523), should not be understood as entailing 
that Africa communities are “communistic or totalitarian social systems”. Thus, whilst we 
should guard against social tyranny, it is still worth recognising that in ubuntu thought, 
society is not reducible to a mere aggregation of self-interested individuals whose 
cooperation is based on an overlap of individual rational interests. The idea of community in 
ubuntu is not reducible to a collective of individuals whose autonomous lives coincidentally 
overlap (Etieyibo, 2017: 319) where the value of the cooperation is primarily with respect to 
optimisation of individual interest. In ubuntu thought, such a conception of the individual, 
and indeed of society, would alienate the individual from achieving humanness (Murungi, 
2004: 523), an enterprise that is interactive and not isolative. Rather, in ubuntu, the 
community is valuable because achieving humanness is a shareable enterprise as humanness 
is interconnected. Achieving humanness is in concert with the concrete being of the other I 
am in community with. 
Criticisms that ubuntu insinuates paternalism by the community over the individual are 
therefore ungrounded. All ubuntu requires in the exercise of agency is – 
[T]hat an individual has to consider not only how a course of action contemplated by him 
will affect him personally, but also how it will affect his family [and all those affected], 
either directly or in terms of the way in which they will be perceived in the society (Bewaji, 
2004: 396).  
The ideal ubuntu community is one which does not foreclose debate and deliberation about 
common values and practices (Gyekye, 2003: 359).  
It should be noted that requiring the moral agent to consider the other through acquisition, 
and utilisation of social virtues does not entail that the substance and source of communalistic 
values are esoteric, or paternalistic, or non-negotiable and absolute over the individual. 
Contrary to such positions, ubuntu thought values the role of consensus in moral disputes 
where mediation involves communal and individual considerations, in such a way that neither 
should trump the other (Coetzee, 2003: 328). In ubuntu ethics, “justice is a harmony of social 
arrangements. But harmony is not given; it has to be worked out” in order to ensure that the 
individual and others’ interests in the community are synchronised (Coetzee, 2003: 328). The 
deliberative nature of social practice ensures sustenance of a contested dialogue that “re-
negotiates and redefines the boundary between ‘private’ and ‘public’”. Therefore there is in 
principle no closure to “the nature of the issues that get pushed onto the agenda of the public 
dialogue” (Coetzee, 2003: 328). Thus, ubuntu demands that decision-making must occur after 
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comprehensive deliberation aimed at achieving “consensus and inclusiveness” (Radebe & 
Phooko, 2017: 246). 
Calling for inclusion of a predominantly communalistic conception of education for 
democratic citizenship (Gyekye, 2003: 349) is not tantamount to re-creating a grand African 
narrative that competes with other narratives. It should not also be conceived as the dismissal 
of universal ideals binding for every human community across the globe. Rather, calling for 
ubuntu perspectives is a recognition that universal ideals are realisable in alternative forms, 
such as the one of ubuntu that is dominant in Africa. Furthermore, the call for ubuntu 
perspectives is a recognition of the role of embeddedness in actualising universal ideals, and 
that the particularism of embeddedness is not inherently incompatible with nor counteracts 
the universality of the moral ideals. Ultimately, it is a recognition of the reality that normative 
ideals cannot be realised in an absolutist form uniform for all situated peoples of the world 
indifferent to the people’s particular lived experiences and situations. In the end, the 
universality of moral ideals is not necessarily lost by the vernacularisations (Benhabib, 2011: 
89) of the ideals by the people’s situatedness. Ideal moral theorisation ought to be about 
achieving universal ideals through negotiation between universal norms and the concrete 
situations that give them meaning.  
The essential implication, among others, of ubuntu ethics is that “the human person is 
naturally oriented toward other persons and must have relationships with them [and that] 
social relationships are not contingent but necessary” (Gyekye, 2003: 352). Calling for 
education for cosmopolitan citizenship to be informed by an ethic that does not inherently 
deny normativity to social relationships and the structures that enable such structures is based 
on the premise that such ethical perspectives as ubuntu have capacity to contribute solutions 
in those areas where the prevalent mainstream individual-centric global citizenship theory has 
deficiencies. Contrary to common criticism, ubuntu thought is compatible with individual 
freedom and diversity. What is entailed in ubuntu thought is the idea that in a moral situation, 
it is not only one’s interests and their acceptability or conformance with abstract moral 
contexts that are paramount for human agency. What equally matters, besides exercising 
agency, are the numerous concrete relationships one has with others. Inasmuch as I have 
freedom to be, ubuntu calls upon me not to stop there, but to consider the concrete 
implication of my action on the concrete relationships affected by that material action, by 
taking into consideration their morally reasonable concrete interests. The efficacy of ubuntu 
resides in it being a “relational rationality” (Murove, 2014: 37), which the moral agent uses in 
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exercising self-determination because human beings depend on others for the ultimate 
attainment of well-being.  
Ultimately, one can draw that in the ubuntu community the individual should not and cannot 
be left to choose between authenticity and its attendant exclusive individual entitlements on 
the one hand, and on the other, belonging to the community through active recognition of and 
responsibilities to relationships with others. In ubuntu ethics, the two mutually reinforce each 
other and each is insufficient and incomplete without the other. The individual needs both 
and whenever the two are in conflict, one is not left with an individual-centric default choice 
between entitlements and relationships, because whatever choice one makes, there must be 
active consideration of the other normative sphere. 
6.2.3. Ubuntu and a difference-grounded deliberative universalism 
Realisation of the Ubuntu principles of harmony, interconnectedness and humanness 
inevitably requires interaction with the concrete and not only general other (Cornell & Van 
Marle, 2012: 353). On this ground one can postulate that Ubuntu ethics accords paramountcy 
to people’s embeddedness towards both individual and collective flourishing. Social 
embeddedness and its subsequent social bonds are not mere accidents of nature with extrinsic 
and secondary value in relation to an ostensibly exclusively primary individual interest. 
Social bonds have normative value in that humanness is achieved by how my action enhances 
the humanness of the other, beyond my self-satisfaction.  
In Ubuntu ethics, shared humanness and interconnectedness generate a responsibility on each 
unit of the interconnection (Letseka, 2012: 54). This interconnection obliges me to ensure 
that both my individuation and what sustains the community of concrete others who support 
my being and who also share humanness are not undermined. The interconnection entails   
exercising my agency with an active awareness, derived from interaction with concrete 
others, how my agency would in concrete terms affect the other. Even though I may not agree 
with the motivation of the other’s concreteness, the other is still worth my respect even as I 
differ with them. Their well-being is a concrete consideration in, though not necessarily the 
regulator of, my choices and actions.  
In other words, the ubuntu call for conformity to humanness through achievement of 
harmony and its attendant virtues of care, compassion, love and generosity entail a due 
consideration of the well-being of the other in the exercising of one’s agency. This, as 
Benhabib (1992: 159) contends, can only be achieved through deliberation, engaging the 
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other, or acknowledging the worthiness of the interests of the other in one’s action, and not 
just being driven by self-interest. The implication for this is profound. In the Kantian 
deontological ethics, all what matters is whether my action conforms to the moral law. In the 
ubuntu paradigm, however, I may have the choice of performing an action, which is morally 
acceptable. However, my action may undermine (even without actively violating) some 
reasonable interests of other people and their sensibilities. The ubuntu paradigm is not merely 
preoccupied with my self-interest only. It will require that I be mindful of the likely moral 
offence my action may have on others. To achieve this, the other and I must, if possible, 
deliberate to exchange perspectives. Even where we cannot have a deliberation, I must act 
mindfully of the other’s concrete interests, which although not necessarily constituting a basis 
for outlawing my action, they are nevertheless worth considering as he or she is a sharer of 
the humanness we both participate in.  
Ubuntu is an “interactive ethic … in which who and how we can be as human beings is 
always shaped in our interaction with each other” (Cornell & Van Marle, 2012: 353). Its most 
profound interactive nature calls for an exercise of freedoms in a manner where the 
concreteness of the other is acknowledged and although it may not restrict acts of 
individuation or self-expression, one nevertheless, through interaction or reflection, considers 
the other. It therefore requires, as a crucial requirement, constant connection with the 
concrete interests, sensitivities, feelings, aspirations and interests of the other even though 
they may be strange, contradictory and in opposition to your familiar and morally legitimate 
motivations of self-expression. The humanness in the other is connected to the humanness in 
me such that “the Other is not simply the friend, but becomes the teacher, the possibility of 
transcendence” (Waghid & Smeyers, 2012: 13).  
In calling for morally appropriate conduct, for instance in most Malawian communities, one 
often hears the expression “muzichita zinthu mwa umunthu” (act with humanness). This 
claim embeds two crucial congruent and interactive principles: agency and humanness. 
Agency in this context is entailed by concession and recognition of the capacity for self-
determination, which is the preoccupation of individualistic ethics. Humanness on the other 
hand, entails the moral context which must exist for self-determination to be fully morally 
acceptable, which is a situation that calls for observance of moral ideals that lie beyond those 
captured in a rights perspective. Humanness is about the wider concrete context under which 
one self-actualises, where the interests of others in a community are not merely abstract, 
imaginary and impersonal.  Humanness therefore is about acting with care for the other’s 
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concrete being. In other words, the thought experiment in the self-actualisation process in the 
detached human being paradigm (Benhabib, 2011: 67) almost reduces the process to a 
mathematical calculation, lacking feeling, care and connection with others.  
For ubuntu, it is wrong to advance your interests insensitively, without care for the others’ 
interests. In a way, ubuntu is caring even for the strangest other whose otherness you should 
not just assume and project (Benhabib, 1992: 168). Even where the other is morally on the 
wrong side, you still must help their restoration. You must ensure that there is constant 
engagement with them so that they re-assume their humanness too (Oelofsen, 2015: 372). It 
is seeing, and expecting to see, humanness not only in oneself, but in others too. It is in this 
vein that, according to Cornell and Van Marle (2012: 353), in ubuntu thought, one’s freedom 
is as much as one’s responsibility especially to care for the other. My flourishing must be in 
the context of the flourishing of the other. This does not imply social conformism or that the 
community is the gatekeeper of the moral action, as a potential critic would argue. Rather this 
is about an emphasis of meaningful caring respect of the other, through engagement, 
deliberation and mutual concern. Ubuntu is therefore compatible with individuality and 
diversity. The deliberation is not meant always to arrive at a single position. The deliberating 
parties may end up holding contrasting positions. The most significant thing however, is that 
the deliberation was not merely procedural, but an expression of respect for the other. Even 
though the parties cannot share a substantially common position, they still get to appreciate 
what constitutes the otherness of the other and consider it in their respective self-actualisation 
projects. In the prevailing global order, the relevance of ubuntu in global citizenship lies in its 
ability to cultivate the virtues of care, empathy, connectedness, mutuality and interactive 
engagement with otherness, which are typically absent from the mainstream conceptions of 
global citizenship. An absence of such virtues is ultimately escalating marginalisation of 
otherness on the basis of the convenience of global integration. 
The idea of endeavouring to achieve harmony with humanness extends to those others who 
transgress and violate it. In ubuntu, morally inappropriate action disrupts the humanness in 
both the offender and offended (Oelofsen, 2015: 372). This is why ubuntu justice is aimed at 
restoring the humanness of the perpetrator, just as it also seeks to make restitution for the 
victim (Oko Elechi et al., 2010; Oelofsen, 2015). This is not equalising the levels of harm 
suffered, nor undermining the impact of the harm. Rather, it is meant to restore personhood in 
every individual including the offender, showing him or her that his or her complete 
personhood lies in seeing humanness and worthiness in the concrete other and that by failing 
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to achieve this, those in whom humanness is still intact must help restore him or her to his or 
her full personhood besides restitution duties he or she has. This is why African justice, in its 
aspiration to restore the humanness of the offender too, also greatly prizes the moral values of 
forgiveness, reconciliation and care (Oelofsen, 2015: 373). 
Given the primacy of achieving harmony with others, ubuntu places a premium on the ideals 
of sharing and caring as both the ends and means for social cohesion (Etieyibo, 2017: 319). 
Thus, ubuntu is incompatible with an agent’s indifference to the other just because the agent 
has not violated the rights of the other. Therefore, for instance, whereas a rights-approach to 
morality would be content with an individual who has achieved one’s goals and is now 
guaranteed of a thriving life of provision and self-sufficiency, the ubuntu approach, through 
its quest for harmony as well as its principles of connection, will not be indifferent to the 
plight and relative disadvantage of the other. Ubuntu will at least demand efforts to 
understand the other’s plight and its source and help in any way possible to change it. Thus, 
Ubuntu ethics goes beyond relating on the terms of entitlements to relating with the other in 
broader terms of care giving. Globally, an ubuntu ethic in considering the well-being of all 
people in the world would ensure not only tolerance of the morally inoffensive concreteness 
of otherness, but also (active or passive) support of such concreteness in whichever feasible 
way to ensure its flourishing.  
Critics such as Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 202) argue that ubuntu ethics depends on 
traditionally close ethnic communities whose foundation is based on unquestioning loyalty to 
the communal ethos and excludes the stranger other. They further argue that Africans like 
“any other people on earth are not predisposed metaphysically to be social, communal, anti-
social, altruistic or any other moral quality. On the contrary, such qualities are born of 
specific contexts and are driven by specific aims” (Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013: 203). One 
agrees that communalistic philosophy is not exclusively African. However, one disagrees 
with the claim that the non-existence of the traditional social structures necessarily implies 
the end of the philosophy that underpinned the life. The decline of traditional African 
communities does not translate into an end of the philosophy that characterised the traditional 
life. This is because among others intangible linguistic structures that still prevail today have 
the capacity of retaining the ideals of the philosophy (Assie’-Lumumba, 2016: 22–23). In 
other words, although ubuntu is connected to traditional life, as a philosophy it is nevertheless 
independent of it in its foundation and relevance. 
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The second criticism that communalism is not peculiar to Africa does not manage to dismiss 
that a particularly and arguably morally legitimate philosophy and ethics can peculiarly be 
embraced and developed in one social context while another society promotes a different one, 
yet both actualise the same universal moral ideals. The goal of philosophy is to keep refining 
communities’ moralities, through critiquing and hybridising them. Traceability of 
communalistic principles to African life should not be conflated with developing a 
descriptive morality about all Bantu-speaking people to which every constituent must 
conform. Rather it is an endeavour of abstracting dominant and consistent principles that 
characterise(d) their social practice for systematic normative theoretical development. This 
does not preclude the existence of competing and contradictory normative positions in the 
actual experiences of the people, both in the past and in the present, from which the 
abstraction is taking place. This therefore means that even global ethics stands to benefit from 
the ideals of ubuntu ethics. The ideals of ubuntu, despite being predominantly rooted in 
Africa, should not be reduced to African ethnophilosophy. Ubuntu moral pronouncements 
can help improve globe ethics, as will be shown in the next section.  
6.3. Ubuntu and education for citizenship 
Without necessarily making a relativism claim, it is necessary that a philosophy of education 
be connected with the theoretical foundations of the moral thought underlying the social 
context of the philosophy. It must be connected with the people’s philosophy of life to better 
serve their shared interests and ultimately advance the well-being of the societies and the 
constituent individual members (Venter, 2004: 155; Etieyibo, 2016). Thus education, just like 
the other disciplines of politics, economics, literature, art and education, needs a cultural 
anchor from the community in which the education is occurring. Education is meaningless 
when alienated from the community (Venter, 2004:156). 
Arguably, all open human communities despite having diverse social practices, in principle 
ultimately pursue the same universal moral ideals, but each community is characterised by a 
particular philosophy. As a result, it is the aspiration of communities that their institutions 
and systems embed their contestable common philosophies and ethical orientations in order 
for such elements to be meaningful. Arguably, most African communities are undergirded by 
ubuntu ethical principles, although the moral validity of such principles is not restricted to 
Africa (Cornell & Muvangua, 2012: 3).  
Given their communalistic orientation, most African communities’ conception of justice, for 
instance, is in some respects remarkably different from the Eurocentric one. Apart from 
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emphasising on reparations, ubuntu also values restoration of moral harmony in the 
administration of justice. The implication here is that an agent may violate or lose humanness 
by his or her misdeeds, or as a result of the morally harmful acts by another on him or her 
(Oelofsen, 2015). The ultimate aim of the restorative justice of ubuntu is not only to affirm 
the equality of the victim with all other human beings by compensating and making 
reparations to him or her when he or she is harmed. Rather, besides making restitution for the 
loss and making reparation for the harm caused or suffered by the victim, ubuntu justice also 
aims at restoring the humanness in the offended, offender and community (Oelofsen, 2015: 
373). This is why it emphasises the values of forgiveness and reconciliation, although not 
necessarily in lieu of the other demands of justice (Oelofsen, 2015: 374).  
Mogale (2012: 242) highlights the struggles in the nursing profession, where one is trained in 
Eurocentric conceptualisation of care, yet in the daily provision of nursing care in an African 
setting certain aspects of such orientations are inadequate and sometimes incompatible with 
the patient’s conceptualisations of care (Mogale, 2012: 242). Therefore, practising nursing 
under ubuntu  ethics requires the practitioner to go beyond fulfilling universalistic duties and 
obligations and instead give a contextualised understanding of care meaningful to the people 
involved in the situation (Haegert, 2000: 492). 
Just as health and justice provision are context responsive, schools too exist in peculiar social 
and cultural contexts which have their own peculiar localised challenges. Such socio-cultural 
contexts generate unique challenges that education and the school aims must resolve. In other 
words, the concept of education presupposes a particular shared (ideal) conception of social 
relations for a particular community, the school is expected to cultivate in learners (Piper, 
2016: 109; Etieyibo, 2017: 315) owing to the ability of the school to bring together the 
community’s or nation’s diverse people for a shared end.  
If we concede that learners require facilitation to develop an interest in and achieve a capacity 
for moral criticality, we need to be cognisant that inasmuch as there are issues where the 
learners will exercise their criticality in the future (such as voting when the learners are 
adults), there are still other challenges that the learners are currently experiencing whilst still 
minors that are tied to the learners’ social context. Such challenges may threaten even their 
very lives. In developing criticality, the school cannot skirt away from addressing such 
challenges that are tied to the society’s operational cultured structure. For instance, issues 
such as sexually transmitted diseases, gang violence, drug and substance abuse, physical and 
cyber bullying and teenage pregnancies are an imminent threat even to learners who are still 
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minors. The school therefore cannot be indifferent to the substance of education for 
citizenship by ignoring the learners’ situatedness and the unique challenges and opportunities 
the situatedness raises for their communities. The point being made is that an impartial and 
detached education for citizenship would alienate the lived experiences and situatedness of 
learners and their communities. In other words, it is necessary that a people’s lived 
philosophy informs their education for citizenship for the education to be meaningful. 
6.3.1. Ubuntu and education monetarisation 
One of the challenges of conventional education is that it is obsessed with individual pursuit 
of success which has in principle and practice monetarised education (Pais & Costa, 2017: 4). 
Much of education practice in the school is centred on interests of the individual learner who 
has an own seat, must do homework and most scholastic activities alone, and also fights for 
individual attainment the higher he or she climbs the educational ladder, ultimately giving 
very little consideration to the other and community interests (Brock-Utne, 2016: 30). 
Relational considerations are de-emphasised. 
Whilst conceding the indispensable value of individual achievement, which partly reflects 
individual responsibility, an ubuntu education emphasises “co-operative endeavour rather 
than individual advancement” only (Nyerere, 1968: 52). For Nyerere (1968) it is consistent 
with ubuntu ethics that educational success should more importantly be measured in “terms 
of human well-being, not prestige, buildings, cars, or other such things whether privately or 
publicly owned” (Nyerere, 1968: 52). The obsessive commitment to competition and 
individual achievement which characterise individual-centric education has an adverse 
impact on individuals and communities as it ultimately undermines the moral ideal of human 
equality. As Nyerere (1968: 55) holds, modern education is by and large elitist, hierarchically 
arranging people in favour of those “who are intellectually stronger than their fellows, 
inducing among those who succeed a feeling of superiority, and leaves the majority of the 
others hankering after something they will never obtain”. It is instructive to bear in mind that 
the distribution of intelligence and natural talents is morally arbitrary (Rawls, 1999) such that 
individual attainment is not always a reflection of individual investment. This entails that by 
implementing such stratifying and now monetarised education, new hierarchies emerge that 
split learners and communities exclusively in terms of ability, breaking the fabric of 
interconnectedness of ubuntu. Ultimately, education creates ‘us’ and ‘them’ categorisations.  
Demanding that education be informed by ubuntu to achieve harmony and humanness as is 
being done here, does not entail that individual achievement is inferior, morally speaking, and 
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that it is not worth of reward. Despite the fact that different people are differently endowed 
with the gifts and talents of nature, there is still much room where individual 
(ir)responsibility determines one’s life chances, and it is morally justifiable that individual 
effort be duly rewarded. However, what an ubuntu education calls for is an acknowledgement 
that there are diverse psychosocial determinants that affect individual achievement. At times, 
these are beyond the control of the individual learner (Rawls, 1999). Ubuntu requires 
thoughtful responses to the following questions: What does society do with those who have 
failed to attain the prestigious mark? How should those that have attained academic success 
relate with those who have failed to do so? Ubuntu will still require that teachers and 
education systems endeavour harmony and an interconnectedness among people irrespective 
of their academic attainment or lack thereof. This does not mean that all learners be rewarded 
in exactly the same manner. Rather, it is a call for those that have achieved academic 
attainment to bear in mind that their identity lies beyond their ‘distinctiveness’ in academic 
attainment. They share a common humanness with the others for whom they and the 
community must provide due care support. This way, ubuntu would call for care of others in 
how the ‘achiever’ relates with those who have not achieved. On the other hand, ubuntu 
would expect teachers and education systems to caringly help the ‘non-achievers’ actualise 
themselves and explore their other abilities.  
The challenge with the prevailing largely prestige-pursuing education order is that the 
educated elite become alienated from the low-quality life of the ‘uneducated’. Nyerere (1968: 
56) holds that the ‘achievers’ come to regard their educational achievement as meaning that 
as an educated person they have now graduated and are detached from the hard life and 
struggles which characterise the life of the low social classes where the majority of the 
population belong in most communities. This way the interconnectedness of human beings as 
one community, where each ought to care about not only one’s own opportunities, but also of 
the other, is broken. In other words, the education insulates the educated from the wider 
people, attributing the low status of the ‘non-achievers’ to choice-making and a lack of self-
discipline. This alienation has potential to disable the elite’s capacity to identify with and care 
for the struggles of the ‘uneducated’ communities in one’s capacity as an individual, citizen, 
or one with influence in public policy (Pais & Costa, 2017: 2). Only the epistemic languages 
of the educated elites are intelligible to the educated person such that he or she “will be more 
at home in the world of the educated than he [she] is among his [her] own [uneducated] 
parents” and community (Nyerere, 1968: 56). Thus, the alienation only escalates.  
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Ubuntu-inspired education would ensure that the curriculum does not prize individual 
achievement only, but rather individual achievement in the context of other people’s 
challenges and aspirations. To foster a sense of togetherness, such elements such as 
classroom sitting plan would have to be structured in a mode that also values caring for and 
connection with the other (Etieyibo, 2017: 321). In the school, ubuntu can aid achievement of 
intellectual virtues such as “open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, curiosity, and confidence in 
reason” through pedagogical experiences that are grounded in imaginative and creative 
thinking that is by and large collaborative and deliberative (Etieyibo, 2017: 313). 
As highlighted earlier, that ubuntu ethics derives from bantu-speaking African communities’ 
cultures does not reduce it to ethno-philosophy, hence restricting its relevance to Africa only. 
My submission is that ubuntu is an ethic that has potential to contribute towards improving 
the dominant modern global ethics that is evidently deficient in some respects. Some critics 
(Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013: 202) further argue that, “the success of ubuntu largely 
depends on undifferentiated, small and tight-knit communities that are relatively 
underdeveloped” and that such communities are hostile and intolerant of outsiders as well as 
divergence of thought, as such the ubuntu concept is incompatible with modern life. Matolini 
and Kwindingwi (2013: 298) therefore argue, “[u]buntu as a conceived ethical solution lacks 
both the capacity and context to be an ethical inspiration or code of ethics in the present 
context”. For such critics, the recent calls for ubuntu recognition are essentially a project of 
black elites garbed in restorative justice and a “so-called black identity” (Matolino & 
Kwindingwi, 2013: 197). 
Ubuntu ideals are necessary and relevant not only to African contexts, but also to the global 
order that is largely market-oriented (Metz, 2014: 69; Pais & Costa, 2017: 4). The principles 
of humanness and harmony of ubuntu are crucial for the modern global economy, where 
market forces and economic returns largely determine acceptability of public and global 
policies (Ramose, 2014). Designing public and global policies on the model of market forces 
is problematic in that market forces are understood as given and are therefore left untouched 
and unregulated on the basis of how the effects of these market forces profoundly affect 
humanness (Pais & Costa, 2017: 4). In global trade, for instance, what has escalated global 
iniquities is that nations and multinational corporations can establish trade agreements that 
are consensual or globally binding, yet they hurt the people in poor nations most (Oxfam, 
2002; Benhabib, 2011: 104).  
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In the prevailing global order, which is in principle operating on and aspiring towards a neo-
liberal conception of freedom realised through the paramountcy and exclusiveness of 
individual-centrism (Olssen et al., 2004: 136–137; Pais & Costa, 2017: 2), a deficit of ideals 
of the ubuntu type is glaring. The challenges of the modern world, as is being constantly 
revealed through political conflicts, tensions and unjust economic policies, have 
overwhelmed the individual-centric model whose ethical frameworks are inadequate to 
resolve the modern challenges.  
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement of the World 
Trade Organization (Yamabhai & Smith, 2012: 1–2; Hashim, 2013: 657–658)  is a 
demonstration of the inadequacy of rights approaches to human relations. The TRIPS 
agreement was meant to incentivise scientific research and reward researchers by retaining 
the intellectual property rights over the knowledge and products of the researchers, thus 
preventing other producers from using the knowledge or products for a given period of time 
until the manufacturers have recovered the production costs and profit (Collste, 2015: 165). 
In the case of HIV antiretroviral drugs, this proved very expensive for developing nations 
who were severely hit by HIV-related deaths, but could not afford the non-generic drugs 
manufactured by international pharmaceutical corporations who held the intellectual property 
rights, yet were generic drugs to be produced by other manufacturers, the market value would 
be drastically lower and affordable (Sundaram, 2015: 247). The neoliberal order should 
therefore not be construed as given, but normatively as inherently problematic as it is devoid 
of care for the other who is marginalised and diminishing. In as far as a rights and individual-
centric model is concerned, the primary interest of the pharmaceutical corporations are their 
economic interests. Once the economic interest of the corporation agent are legitimately 
satisfied, any other commitments are discretionary. 
The neoliberal order is thriving on, and is very consistent with, individual-centric ethics. The 
global order remains the inevitable outcome of radical individual-centric ethics in so far as 
such individual-centric ethics places mere instrumental value on human relations, ignoring 
care commitments, leading to the marginalisation of the communities’ concreteness across 
the globe and ultimately alienating the individuals constituting them. Ubuntu moral 
theorisation challenges the exclusion of the value of human relations as manifested in 
concrete communal interests. Ubuntu would therefore challenge the marginalisation of 
cultures, languages and ways of life around the world on account of their inability to attract 
financial returns. On the flipside, it would question the justifiability of some global cultures 
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and languages dominating literature, art and entertainment in the world because of their 
monetary force that subjugates those that lack financial potency. The ubuntu framework “has 
important implications for changing the prevailing market-driven ethos of education into one 
that is more moralistic, emancipatory, cultured and relevant to the needs and aspirations of 
the people” (Oviawe, 2016: 9). 
Ubuntu places a premium on the virtues of care and empathy (Ramose, 2003: 387). In global 
citizenship, ubuntu would demand engagement with the concreteness of a global other and 
not relate with him or her only on generalised otherness terms. Related ubuntu values of 
cooperation and togetherness are central in confronting modern-day global challenges that are 
largely perpetuated by a generalised conception of otherness. In education, this entails 
teaching learners that citizenship in the modern world is about much more than mere 
conformity to certain schedules of negative duties or rights or, living and letting live. Rather 
it is about mutuality and the necessity to always learn how one’s actions in the world are 
influencing the chances and opportunities of others. In other words, it is for learners to realise 
that personhood can be achieved or fail to be achieved if one is excessively self-centred, 
insulates oneself from and ignores to care for global others, learn of and from the interests of 
global others. Personhood always ought to be with respect to humanness not only in yourself 
but also in terms of that which you share with others in such mutually intricate ways that the 
lack of flourishing in another individual adversely affects me although each one of us is an 
autonomous individual.  
In the contractarian theories of society legitimacy that dominate modern democracies, the 
exclusive prioritization of private property ownership is prominent in conceptualisations of 
justice (Ramose, 2010: 292). By and large, whatever duties individuals owe each other, are 
generally centred on private property such that one can contend that for thinkers like Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke, property ownership and human dignity are each other’s flipsides. 
Ramose (2010: 293) criticises this centrality of private property in defining and determining 
social relations. He calls such a conceptualisation of society, a ‘timocracy’ because it is, 
unlike a democracy, a kind of political power distribution whose nature and extent are 
determined by wealth ownership (Ramose, 2010: 293). Ramose (2010) holds that wealth 
acquisition in the quest of meeting the necessities of life has become primary in social justice 
theorisation and practice. As a result, education is generally conceived as primarily aimed at 
achieving personal happiness derived from private wealth accumulation (Pais & Costa, 2017: 
10). Mostly, this leaves out the moral imperative that such individual pursuits must be prized 
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in the same measure as relations with others, such that ultimately education no longer values 
its link with social morality (Ramose, 2010: 296). 
The nature of neoliberal competition that the schools also replicate and advance among 
learners in such exclusive pursuits of personal happiness is hostile to meaningful relations 
with others. Today, the ontological conception of competition is adversarial, aimed at 
domineering and ultimately excluding the other and his or her interests in the pursuits of 
individual projects (Ramose, 2010: 297). However, according to Ramose (2010: 297), ideal 
competition entails that the people involved are in common pursuit of a common goal. This 
entails connection and cooperation among the pursuers (Ramose, 2010: 297) and generally an 
even playing field without arbitrary advantage over others (Rawls, 1999). Thus, in ideal 
competition, one “embraces the ‘other’ as a cooperative pursuer of a common goal” (Ramose, 
2010: 297). Such aspects of ideal competition are thus compatible with ubuntu values. Fixing 
education today would therefore greatly benefit from ubuntu ideals. 
Oviawe (2016: 5–6) contends that since the industrial revolution,  
[C]apitalist values have become embedded in education such that the humanistic values of 
education have been replaced by market-driven, mechanistic and commercialist benchmarks 
for measuring educational success. As a result, education is seen as an investment that must 
yield economic returns.  
Redeeming education from such a perilous mire, cannot happen without challenging the 
obsessive individualism that embeds modern education that reduces all collective relations 
and responsibility, to market value. One may suggest that this would be corrected by 
moderating individualism. However, that would only be temporal, as soon there would be a 
relapse. What is indispensable in correcting this is to bring to the centre of education 
discourse, the ubuntu values of connectedness, humanness, care and responsibility. It may not 
be the solution, but nevertheless an indispensable component of the ideal solution. 
Establishing social cooperation only in excessive individual-centric terms and rights 
paradigms, denying the normativity of a relational rationality undermines the interconnection 
of humanness. 
Primacy and prioritisation of capitalist interests characterise political and economic systems 
globally. Modern democracies understand the human subject in capitalist terms, and the 
subsequent human relations he or she necessarily must be in, as market relations (Thomas, 
2008: 42). Constitutions of states as well as their economic and public policies are also 
largely inspired by such a philosophy that manifests itself through minimum government, a 
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liberalised market, deregulation and privatisation of institutions providing public services 
(Thomas, 2008: 50). Such tendencies are said to be consistent with respecting individual 
rights such as individual economic rights and private property ownership where the state is 
ostensibly not justified to arbitrarily make determination of and partly appropriate the due 
property of an individual so as to redistribute to disadvantaged others (Olssen et al., 2004: 
138).  
Neoliberalism has subtly succeeded to be the ideology that also determines citizen–state 
relations (Olssen et al., 2004: 136–137). This has happened because the constitutions of most 
democracies conceptualise schedules and categorisation of human rights capable of being 
claimed from the state through a court of law in neoliberal frames (Thomas, 2008). Mostly, 
democratic states today “take a minimalist (as opposed to a maximalist) stance in the 
realization of [strategic] rights” (Thomas, 2008: 50) which if justiciable, can ensure an 
equitable access to opportunities, thus concretising the ubuntu core principle of humanness. 
For instance, Thomas (2008: 50) holds that in developing the new democratic constitution for 
South Africa to transition from the inequalities era of apartheid, a human right that is 
consistent with ubuntu, such as a right to decent housing, was not deemed worth including 
into the Constitution as a fundamental right whose obligation is incumbent upon the state, 
such that citizens can hold the state liable through the courts for failing to fulfil its obligation 
over securing the right. According to Thomas, (2008: 50) the understanding then among the 
constitutional developers was that hopefully, if not inevitably, embracing a minimal 
government would guarantee individual right to property, serving the demands of equity as 
each citizen would utmost be accorded an enabling environment to work and afford 
dignifying housing without state intervention or support. However, Thomas (2008: 50) argues 
that such minimalist commitment has only resulted in less compulsion on and lack of 
prioritisation by the state to ensure that all South Africans have decent housing, since such 
rights are not liable to claim from the government by citizens through the courts owing to 
how they have been rendered in the Constitution as non-absolute rights. Thomas (2008: 53) 
however, argues that the “constitutionalisation and justiciability of socioeconomic rights” in 
South Africa, if governed by ubuntu ideals, would go further to demand that they be 
conceived in maximalist terms.  
All this demonstrates how conceptualisation of the institutions of democracy, through its 
instruments of the state and its systems of distribution, are inherently overcome by the 
neoliberal ideology. Human relationality, which is in principle feeling with and for the other, 
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is rendered as morally arbitrary and insignificant under the neoliberal ideology. The 
pervasiveness of the neoliberal ideology in democracies worldwide, makes urgent the 
integration of ubuntu humanness in conceptualisations of personal freedom and individual 
success. Individual flourishing ought to be connected with the well-being of others one is in 
relation with. 
It is therefore imperative that education worldwide must help learners re-cultivate social 
values since the obsessive individual-centrism prevailing globally has prized individual 
survival as the ultimate goal for human existence and self-interest as its cardinal enabler 
(Ramose, 2010: 297). Ubuntu education would call for the transcendence of humanness over 
wealth possession in configurations and enactment of theories of justice and social relations 
(Ramose, 2010: 301). 
6.4. Implementing ubuntu in the school  
In this section, I discuss some of the practical ways in which ubuntu would contribute 
towards education for democratic and global citizenship. I explore how ubuntu would relate 
to the school curriculum, pedagogy and environmental education, so as to cultivate 
citizenship that is conscious of humanness, interconnectedness, care and the responsibilities 
that accrue from these.  
Because ubuntu is an ethics of becoming (Le Grange, 2012: 334), one can argue that ubuntu 
cannot fail to achieve cosmopolitan or global citizenship. It is relevant for both global and 
local democratic citizenship. As previously highlighted (see section 6.3.1), some ubuntu 
critics (see Enslin and Horsthemke, 2004; Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013) contend that the 
enabling social environment of ubuntu for communal life, they claim is traditionalist Africa, 
is long gone leading to the loss of the relevance of ubuntu ethics in modern life. However, 
what such a criticism ignores is that there are enduring related closely-knit communities 
today in the form of schools. The moment we consider the school as a community of diverse 
learners, teachers, public officials, parents and the community, one realises the 
indispensability of ubuntu in the education for citizenship for the modern industrialised 
Africa and world. Even if the so-called extinct traditional communalistic communities still 
persisted today, the learner in such communities would still spend much of his or her active 
time in the school than in the home. Therefore, presence or absence of communalistic 
communities does not alter the relevance of ubuntu in the school, given the community nature 
of the school. The learners need ubuntu because they are a community, but also because the 
school is the seedbed for citizenship development. 
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The next section looks at the role of achieving ubuntu citizenship through the curriculum and 
pedagogical experiences in the school. 
6.4.1. Ubuntu citizenship through curriculum and pedagogy 
In the school, development of ubuntu virtues in learners can be achieved through curriculum 
content, school practices and the nature of pedagogical experiences employed. Ubuntu values 
connectedness of humanness. This has an implication for education. Education must not be 
detached from the lived experiences of the learners (Waghid, 2004). More significantly, 
through pedagogy or curriculum development, education must confront the debilitating 
challenges of its communities. One challenge of the individualistic conceptualisation of 
education is that, although it recognises social challenges resulting from a society’s crisis of 
values, it largely steers clear of engaging issues of the good life, ostensibly out of fear of 
indoctrinating the learners and making learners embrace certain moral values they have to 
choose personally when they become adults. However, if learners can be engaged in the 
challenges that face their communities and they attempt to explore possible solutions to the 
challenges, there will be no detachment among and between learners and the actual 
community in which they exist.  
Because of the fundamentalism of connectedness of humanness, one can hold that by 
implication an ubuntu education for democratic citizenship would revolve on deliberation and 
engaging the other, to see the world from their perspective. Through practical group projects 
that probe social practice and social structuring, for instance, learners will develop 
responsibility, empathy and caring attitudes that concretise the humanness human beings’ 
share not as a mere metaphysical trait, but in concrete terms, as a learner engages with an 
other learner and teachers too engaging with an other learner. This way, learners would self-
criticise their attitudes towards the other. They will also be able to examine and evaluate the 
structure of their community and how it promotes or suffocates humanness not only in them, 
but equally importantly, in the other, including the non-human other. Educational planners, 
upon considering ubuntu ideals, would be mindful that education should aim at cultivating in 
learners the necessity of achieving harmony with humanness as one of the fundamental aims 
of education and not only to satisfy individual economic, national economic and political 
needs (Venter, 2004: 158). 
Ubuntu ethics would require that curriculum content about human rights should not be 
anchored in an individual-centric model alone. Human rights must also include a relational 
framework which also emphasises the other’s entitlements in my exercising of agency. 
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Mkabela (2014: 288–289) holds that much of human rights education in South Africa is 
based on the entitlements of the individual and the community is basically de-emphasised. 
The instrumentalist conception of the community in most individualistic conceptualisations 
of human rights is what results in the concern that learners have more knowledge about their 
own entitlements than they do about that of others (Olssen et al., 2004: 138). One gleans that 
this is mainly because duties to the other or community are mostly assumed to be 
automatically fulfilled only by desisting from certain actions against the other. Rights under 
the prevailing model only understand the other in terms of what one must refrain from doing 
to the other and scarcely about what one should do towards the other as a concrete other.  
Ubuntu emphasises the virtues of care, responsibility and empathy in exercising individual 
agency, because it understands the moral grounding of human rights to be relational, other 
than merely individualistic (Radebe & Phooko, 2017: 241). Owing to its interconnectedness 
heritage, an ubuntu conception of rights also places emphasis on the obligation of care the 
individual owes the other and not only to emphasise one’s entitlements as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 2015)  currently does (Murithi, 2007: 284). 
Thus, an ubuntu rights education would also emphasise the virtues of forgiveness and 
reconciliation without necessarily promoting impunity. 
An ubuntu-inspired education curriculum would also restore as a crucial ingredient in 
learners’ moral reflection, hitherto undermined communal interests that concretise all 
embedded autonomous beings. As highlighted earlier, one main challenge facing education 
today, which is owed to neoliberalism, is the role of the academic institution in knowledge 
production (Divala, 2016: 100). Should knowledge be produced for “local consumption [or] 
for global competitiveness?” (Divala, 2016: 100). In the prevailing education practice, the 
global domain is perceived to be the validating sphere for all education and has promises of 
financial returns for both the learner and education provider (Oviawe, 2016: 5–6). 
Consequently, institutions of learning are detached from their local communities’ needs in the 
quest of being recognised as globally relevant on global scales. University researchers aspire 
to earn the endorsement and praise of global scholarly and ranking communities which have 
special interests in a particular kind of research that necessarily does not usually prioritise the 
community interests of the locality of the university (Divala, 2016: 100). Education planners 
and curriculum developers (inspired by such globalist research) through their curriculum and 
pedagogy recommendations are thus committed to realising a globalist learner and citizen 
(Pais & Costa, 2017: 4). All such practices alienate the individual learner from his or her 
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local context. This disconnect is not only about curriculum content and practices. Since the 
alienation has almost attained an ideological status, it influences the learner’s moral intellect, 
as there is a clear disconnection between educational experiences and the concrete lived 
experiences of the community. Education no longer emphasises relations with and among 
people in the community. Interconnectedness gets lost. The higher one moves up the 
educational ladder the more isolated and alienated from the concrete needs of the community 
does one become. Being educated becomes synonymous with alienation (Nyerere, 1968: 56). 
As shown in the previous chapter (see section 5.5), language of instruction policies in the 
school too need to be guided by ubuntu considerations. Currently, education is associated 
with the prestigious global social-marking languages (Matiki, 2006). As a corollary, local 
languages are never associated with academic progress and rising on the social ladder 
(Probyn, 2005). However, this undermines the reality that the local languages are the 
languages of interconnectedness and togetherness among learners and with their community. 
One can deduce that such a stark intentional exclusion and absence of the local language is 
alienating the learner from his or her community. Upon being detached from her community, 
the learner is effectively compelled to consider his or her interests in the learning process, in 
the construction, value and use of knowledge only in the conceptual categories underlying the 
school language.  
The learner is also alienated from effectively engaging with subject content as there is a 
linguistic barrier (Bunyi, 2005: 133; Probyn, 2005: 166). Ubuntu education would therefore 
demand, among others, as Brock-Utne (2016: 34)  argues, the adoption of education policies 
that are grounded in “translanguaging frameworks which recognise alternation of languages 
… [to] help reorient multilingual and bilingual education towards the African value of 
Ubuntu” (Brock-Utne, 2016: 34). Calling for the embracing of ubuntu ideals does not entail 
jettisoning the moral and cultural attributes obtained from other cultures and moral outlooks, 
because there is no pristine culture (Beets & Le Grange, 2005: 1198). Furthermore, the 
translanguaging, unlike foreign monolingualism, is necessary because the lived experiences 
of actual embodied persons draw from diverse moral traditions and not exclusively one. 
Demanding that the curriculum be Africanised essentially entails blending “African-based 
paradigms” with “other knowledge paradigms” so that the curriculum has fair measures of 
each intellectual tradition (Etieyibo, 2016: 406). For instance, “language is not a neutral 
instrument of expression. It is a means through which a group expresses its worldview and 
history, its perceived role, and social relations” (Assie’-Lumumba, 2016: 22). Despite there 
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being universal moral truths, there are, however, diverse ways in which such truths are 
conceptualised and actualised.  
This position of variations in actualisations of universalism is not necessarily about ethical 
relativism originating from differences in cultural practices and outlooks. Rather, the position 
is that even at the philosophical and ethical levels, a fundamental ideal such as human dignity 
can be actualised in either an individualist ethic or a communalistic one. Cultures as people’s 
practice of the ethical ideals are in part significantly shaped by the people’s dominant 
philosophy. As Assié-Lumumba (2016: 22–23) argues, a people’s language sometimes 
embeds the philosophical ideals that drive their society.  
6.4.2. Ubuntu and assessment 
It is worth noting and emphasising that education for democratic and global citizenship is not 
the preserve of subjects whose content is essentially about civic values and life. Almost every 
subject, teacher, practice, tradition, pedagogy and experience in the school significantly 
contributes towards citizenship construction (Hansen, 2011: 117). Assessment practice is one 
such domain in the school that shapes citizenship and must therefore embrace ubuntu ideals. 
Beets and Le Grange (2005: 1200) argue, “assessment of/for/as learning should crucially be 
informed by the socio-cultural backgrounds of learners” and hence call for consideration of 
ubuntu values as an alternative perspective to the ontological condition of the learner, in 
order to depart from the predominantly and exclusively individualistic one (Beets & Le 
Grange, 2005: 1200). Questions of what should be the purpose of assessment and what mode 
of assessment to adopt need incessant engagement in order to achieve more authentic and 
meaningful ways of assessing (Beets & Le Grange, 2005: 1199). 
Beets and Le Grange (2005: 1200) contend: 
[In] Western(ised) countries assessment of learning (summative assessment) has dominated 
assessment practices. Such an approach separates assessment activities from teaching and 
learning activities and as a consequence produces relationships between teachers/lecturers 
and learners that are aloof. Summative assessments tend to present results in the form of 
quantitative indices reducing learner’s abilities/potential to mere numbers and more 
disturbingly learners who do not attain required pass marks are labelled failures – the effects 
of summative assessment could be described as inhumane.  
Summative assessment is therefore essentially hierarchical in that it ranks individuals in 
terms of their abilities. The position one has on the score rankings is arguably proportional to 
the prospects for success one has in the mainstream society. One would argue that in a way, 
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summative assessment is meant to profile learners in terms of their ability and employability 
for structured absorption into the labour market, which has become the ultimate and exclusive 
aim for education. Usually, those whose performance is deemed low or below the pass mark 
are regarded as ‘failures’ in the school, and most probably or inevitably, in general life. In 
principle, such a ‘failing’ learner is understood as being of less value or utility to the 
economic society as it were, and as such he or she does not command more attention from the 
teacher, school, the market, as well as the general community. This undermines their 
humanness. The point is not that there should be no aspects of summative assessment in the 
school. Rather, formative assessments should not exclusively monopolise, assessment 
practices in the school because in principle, they marginalise and indict those who are 
‘failures’. 
An ubuntu awareness, as Beets and Le Grange (2005) argue, develops room for a relation 
(connectedness) between the teacher, and their learners. Alternative forms of assessment 
ought to supplement summative assessment so that such exploring and enriching 
relationships between the learner and teacher develop. As Beets and Le Grange (2005: 1200) 
further observe, there is generally a consensus among thinkers for the need for models of 
assessment that involve cultivation and sustenance of a teacher–learner relationship, thus 
acknowledging that –  
[A]ssessment is not only about making a judgement (in an aloof manner), but rather about 
being with the learner every step of the way and being prepared to recognise learning 
difficulties in a respectful and dignified way [through] genuine sharing of acquired 
knowledge and skills with compassion to the achievement of the intended outcomes. 
In so far as competition and obsessive individualism typify education, it is difficult to 
humanise assessment (Beets & Le Grange, 2005: 1200). It is here where ubuntu ideals would 
help redeem the situation. Through its moral virtues of connectedness, care, responsibility 
and empathy, ubuntu would ensure that learners experience assessment in a positive, 
constructive way since “the teacher/lecturer who guides the learning process, is a humane and 
caring person who is fully aware of [learners’] fears and difficulties” (Beets & Le Grange, 
2005: 1202). Ubuntu would demand of the teacher to understand assessment as a means for 
giving feedback to the learners about the learning, as well as the teaching processes. The 
ultimate value of assessment rests on a caring and empathetic relationship with learners who 
have performed below minimal expectations, trying to discover the causative forces behind 
the performance and reflecting together on how to overcome them. In other words, 
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assessment ought to be more than fulfilling positivist duties aimed at having data for making 
valuation of learners’ performance and ability. It should be governed by care and empathy. 
6.4.3. Ubuntu and environmentalism  
The idea of ubuntu connection includes both humans and nature (Kayira, 2015: 123). Ubuntu 
emphasises the moral virtues of responsibility, reciprocity and care towards human and non-
human others (Kayira, 2015: 110) making its perspectives relevant in the pursuit of 
meaningful environmentalism in education for citizenship. Largely, modern education has 
departed from emphasising holistic thinking about relationships and interdependences within 
and among communities and how they relate with the ecology, to “a more positivist and 
segmented worldview that essentially separates humans from nature” (Oviawe, 2016: 5). 
Furthermore –  
[T]he global capitalist system which has influenced how education is conceptualised, 
designed and delivered around the world is often linear and mechanistic as opposed to 
organic and circular. As a result, communities, institutions and schools reflect silos that are 
reinforced with different levels of specialisation and credentialing (Oviawe, 2016: 5).  
In environmental education for instance, it is necessary that the curriculum and pedagogy 
should in fair measures consider both conventional scientific, as well as the local 
communities’ indigenous modes of comprehending nature (Kayira, 2015: 118). The 
implication here is that there is an intersection between Eurocentric science and the local 
knowledge, which is informed by the idea of ubuntu connectedness. As such “students, 
teachers, curriculum developers and community Elders [ought to] collaborate in the co-
construction of new hybrid meaning and interpretations of science” (Kayira, 2015: 118). One 
can draw that since the ubuntu idea of interconnectedness also extends to the non-human 
animal world as well as the biosphere, the environment is therefore not for individual, 
unmoderated exploitation, neither should it be used to the exclusion of the other. 
Whilst acknowledging that there are ambivalent attitudes in African ethnophilosophy towards 
the natural environment (Taringa, 2006; Ben & Woll, 2012), the ubuntu ethic still has 
potentiality to achieve sustainable environmental education. At the heart of achieving a 
sustainable environment is the problem of economics (Martin, 2013: 101). As already shown, 
the prevailing global neoliberal economic order is unsustainable with respect to the ecology. 
There is an urgency to humanise this obsessive individual-centric economics and this requires 
confronting the understanding of the essentialist rational self-interest nature of the human 
being and the implications such an essentialist nature has on the value of his or her 
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relationships with others including the non-human world. This is a gap that the 
interconnectedness, care and responsibility of ubuntu would greatly help to fill. The ubuntu 
principle of interconnectedness is not restricted to human beings only, but to the whole 
cosmos: among humans, as well as between humans and the biosphere (Le Grange, 2012: 
334). Ubuntu is therefore both “a condition of being and the state of becoming, or openness 
or ceaseless unfolding” hence crucial in global environmental management (Ramose, 2009, 
cited in Le Grange, 2012: 334).  
The global environmental crisis humanity is now experiencing is largely due to excessive and 
unsustainable pollution of the environment resulting from individual and national pursuits of 
economic aspirations in a fiercely competitive manner. As a consequence, there has been 
neglect of the reality that humanity is also connected through the biosphere. As such, in 
relating with the biosphere, wider and more stringent interests of the distant economically 
weak other of the globe need to be considered at the individual or national levels. There 
ought to be harmony among the three moral ecologies of the self, the social (or global sphere) 
and nature, the implication being that a broken environment will cause disharmony among 
these three ecologies (Le Grange, 2012: 334). Thus, the human being is neither isolated from 
nor apart from nature as an entity, which he or she may overcome and exploit without 
breaking the harmony. Ubuntu would therefore call for responsible utilisation of the 
environment that is governed primarily by the humanness you share with others such that the 
paramountcy of economic self-interest will be downgraded, regulated and moderated by the 
higher principles of humanness and interconnectedness. Learners would among other things 
be requested to explore how, as individuals and communities, they are faring in relation to 
sustenance of harmony among these three moral ecologies of self, community and nature. 
Ubuntu environmentalism does not entail teaching learners about myths and a distant 
romanticised past. Rather, it aspires to show learners in concrete terms how, not only they 
have an obligation to achieve harmony with global humanity, but that such harmony extends 
to and also depends on harmony with nature. As such, learners would be involved in projects 
or engaging local experiences about how mismanagement of the environment in their 
immediate communities leads to disharmony among humans, the self and others, ultimately 
threatening human existence. 
6.5. Conclusion 
The main challenge facing strong cosmopolitanism is its exclusion of the community in 
moral configurations of citizenship, regarding the community as inherently morally arbitrary. 
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However, the relational rationality of ubuntu ethics demonstrates that the community has 
moral value worth factoring into the moral theorisation of citizenship.  
The major ubuntu values of humanness, interconnectedness and harmony would help address 
the glaring gaps in the prevalent individual-centric conceptions of citizenship and education. 
These ideals further show that contrary to strong cosmopolitanism, the community interest is 
not at odds with universalism, equality and individuality.  
Furthermore, an ubuntu conception of citizenship, on account of its commitment to 
deliberation aimed at consensus-building, care and empathy, is compatible with the 
difference-grounded deliberative universalism that is lacking in the prevailing dominant 
global citizenship theories. In other words, ubuntu relational ethics is compatible with the 
concrete otherness of the world’s diverse people as Benhabib (1992: 153) argues.  
An ubuntu-inspired education for democratic and global citizenship, owing to its regard for 
humanness and interconnectedness, is also best suited to confront and challenge the prevalent 
monetarisation of education. This is because the thriving of the monetarisation of education is 
largely anchored in excessively individual-centric conceptualisations of education and society 
such as of the strong cosmopolitan type, ultimately prizing competition, and individual 
attainment only, at the expense of caring for common humanity. 
An ubuntu education for democratic citizenship can be realised through, among others, 
having a curriculum of which the content is in tandem with the people’s lived experiences, an 
assessment that is sensitive to our common humanness, rather than over-emphasising 
academic attainment-based stratification. Lastly, the interconnectedness of ubuntu among the 
moral ecologies of self, society and nature would ensure the sustainable use of the 
environment, as ubuntu conceives nature not as an object to be exploited for unbridled self-
interest.   
It is therefore evident that the exclusive claim of the individual-centric universalism of strong 
cosmopolitanism, that categorically dismisses relational being as subjective hence unfit for 
global citizenship conceptualisation is problematic. Ultimately, nationality which hosts such 
relational concreteness is indispensable in global citizenship conceptualisation. 
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Chapter 7:  
Concluding Reflections: Towards a New Cosmopolitanism 
7.1. Research summary 
Malawian primary education removed Malawian History (which is also absent at the 
secondary school level) from its curriculum.  Malawi has also just removed mother tongue 
instruction from the first four years of primary education, replacing it with English. The 
ultimate underlying motivation for these educational policy changes is the pursuit of 
cosmopolitan citizenship, where education should produce individuals whose scope of 
interests, obligations, and competetiveness extends beyond the nation-state.  
The necessity of cultivation of cosmopolitan values (as contrasted with only national 
citizenship values) through education for democratic citizenship in Malawi and across the 
globe is indisputable. Besides the normative imperativeness of cosmopolitan ideals, the 
demands of modern interconnectedness of all the people of the world in their everyday lives 
are inescapable. The interconnectedness also demands that the interests of the others of the 
world who are not co-nationals should be a priority in moral decision-making. The 
fundamentalism of the ideal of human equality and its consequent universal impartial duties 
(unrestrained by nationality) are thus non-negotiable.  
However, despite this consensus, the question of what the form and substance of ideal 
cosmopolitanism should constitute, is still left open and unresolved. Examining the nature of 
education for democratic citizenship being practised in Malawian education, the question of 
the role of (national) particularism in (cosmopolitan) universalism comes to the fore. Is 
nationality inherently inimical to cosmopolitanism? Does ideal education for democratic 
citizenship necessarily demand exclusion of patriotic considerations such as teaching and 
learning of a national history? Is employment of the mother tongue as the medium of 
instruction only a matter of effectiveness and efficiency in teaching and learning, and not a 
valid normative matter? There is also the question of the implications on ideal human 
equality, of the exclusive impartiality orientations of strong cosmopolitan citizenship among 
the people in developing nations under the prevailing global order.  
In response to these pertinent questions, this dissertation has argued that the citizenship that 
Malawi is pursuing through the removal of national history and mother tongue instruction in 
the first four years of primary education is normatively problematic, because it has adverse 
implications for human equality. Such policy expressions reveal the adoption and motivation 
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of strong cosmopolitanism. Ostensibly necessitated by the universalism duties of human 
equality, strong cosmopolitanism strips national particularity commitments of normative 
value, substituting them with and assigning value to the exclusive duties of impartiality only. 
This dissertation has argued that this brand of cosmopolitanism is problematic because it in 
principle undermines human equality.  
The education for democratic citizenship that Malawi is pursuing demands the 
marginalisation of the local language and history, and is therefore asymmetrical with ideal 
cosmopolitan equality. Ideal cosmopolitanism is a unity of opposites: it is an aspiration for 
achieving the universal in the local. Supplanting the local for the universal is a heritage of 
neo-Kantian essentialism which regards the subjective as not rational, and hence unworthy of 
inclusion in normative conceptualisations of the universalism of human equality.  
These policy changes reveal that for the Malawian government, the removal of mother tongue 
instruction in the context of globalist pressures is not regarded as a normative matter, but one 
only driven by convenience and efficiency. In other words, such positions do not either 
recognise the moral value of mother-tongue instruction, or when they do, such value is 
considered to be less weighty, normatively speaking, than the pragmatic utility of the global 
convenience derived from replacing the mother-tongue by English. 
This dissertation has argued in Chapter Two that nationality has normative value in that it 
embodies and hosts the local sources of individual and collective concreteness which 
substantially constitute the people’s being in the world. The individual person achieves the 
autonomous capacity through an indispensable reliance on the ‘subjective’ relations and the 
care others non-reciprocally give him or her. The common sharing of language, history, 
shared public culture, and territory make possible and sustain such relations and institutions 
of care. Since it hosts individuals’ and communities’ sources of concreteness, the nation is the 
edifice upon which the political community builds, and continues with the national 
community’s aspirations and mode of cohesion. Thus, the national community, in significant 
measure constitutes both the end and means for the political community’s struggles for 
justice. The political community inherits the struggles, injustices, achievements, and 
aspirations of the national community such that the shape and justness of the present political 
community are largely responses to its historical past. Nationality is therefore indispensable 
in the sustenance of a civic patriotism. Civic patriotism cannot be decoupled from nationality. 
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Nationality also provides members with the languages for active and meaningful participation 
in democratic life, thus promoting self-determination. A member’s lack of the modes of 
expression, the informal terms of engagement, the community’s meaning-making frames, 
civic values, and common culture would impede his or her meaningful participation, as well 
as sustenance of the political community itself.  
With respect to cosmopolitanism, this study has argued in Chapter Three that in both its ideal 
and historical origins cosmopolitanism is a dualistic ideal with the two faces of particularism 
and universalism enabling and regulating each other. Trying to take away one to remain with 
the other, only results in collapsing the very essence of cosmopolitanism.  
The elevation of impartiality by strong cosmopolitanism as the sole primary determinant of 
normativity of human relations is an inheritance from the neo-Kantian essentialist orientation 
of human nature as consisting of the rational and affective categories only. Ultimately, only 
the ‘objective’ impartial human interests are accorded moral worth, leading to the idea of the 
detached atomistic individual as the ultimate and exclusive pre-occupation of normativity. 
However, universalism of human equality can be conceptualised in other frameworks that are 
non-atomistic, yet still acknowledge the value of both relational being and individual-
centrism.  
The strong cosmopolitanism demand for neutrality over the particularism of nationality on 
the grounds that nationality is inimical to cosmopolitan universalism, is informed by a wrong 
diagnosis of the underlying causes of global inequality. Global inequalities cannot be 
meaningfully understood without considering the role of responsibility over the causation of 
the inequalities. Unless such a causation establishes who is responsible, blaming national 
interests by placing stringent impartial duties that undermine the nation, does not address the 
core problem. What also makes the prevailing global order unjust is not necessarily the 
ostensibly inherent problematicism of nationality. Rather, it is that the inevitable 
representation of national interests at the global level, is skewed against many peoples in 
developing nations. The solution therefore lies in balancing nations’ interests and not 
removing them, for the consequent global order emerging after extinguishing nationality 
would undermine people’s self-determination and promote tyranny as the order would only 
pursue global homogeneity.  
A meaningful cosmopolitanism, besides placing primacy on similarity among human beings, 
should also include difference, that which makes the people other, because in such otherness 
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reside individuation and the ultimate of being human. The inward dimension of patriotism 
would as such ensure that the patriarchy’s political community is consistent with higher 
normative ideals to ensure there is no oppression and marginalisation within it. On the other 
hand, the outward dimension of patriotism would ensure that the national community relates 
with other peoples’ collectives in a non-homogenising way which recognises both what 
makes other people other, as well as the generic impartial moral duties humanity owes each 
other irrespective of particularities. Cosmopolitan education should thus endeavour to 
achieve universalism through a dialogue regarding the people’s differences. Universalism 
should not be about making a choice between the particular and the universal, for none can 
singlehandedly serve human equality. Universalism ought to be about a difference-grounded 
dialogue that endeavours to realise the universal through the concreteness of the individuating 
otherness of the world’s peoples.  
In Chapter Four I have shown that one of the arguably central aims of education is that it 
must develop critical, authentic individuals. In as much as education is expected to sustain the 
social structure, it is not meant to reproduce it, but to be critical of it so as to make it as non-
oppressive as possible. However, I have argued that in the pursuit of authenticity, an 
absolutist prioritisation and unconditional primacy of impartiality that supplants national 
particularity in education for citizenship over-exaggerates the comprehensiveness of the 
generality of the human being with respect to community life. The sharing of linguistic, 
historical, cultural, and territorial commonalities makes the political community one of 
shared fate. The fate of the members substantially revolves around the elements of nationality 
even though they may value them differently. Furthermore, strong cosmopolitanism’s 
ostensibly impartial education for citizenship in essence inheres particularism and 
surreptitiously marginalises any other epistemologies on account of their being ‘subjective’. 
Education that is meaningful and just is that which is responsive to the learner’s lived 
experiences. An extensively impartial globalist education that mutes local particularism 
contravenes the fundamental requirement for meaningful education.   
In Chapter Five I have shown that the model of education for democratic citizenship that 
Malawi is currently pursuing, is asymmetrical with ideal human equality, and only serves to 
alienate her epistemological, historical, and linguistic concreteness from the global order. I 
have argued that in Malawian political history, nationality has been initially an inspiring, later 
troubling, and now a troubled ideal. It was the motivation and means for colonial resistance. 
However, upon achievement of political independence it became the object for oppression, 
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boundedness, indoctrination, alienation, and human rights violation. Currently though, it is 
under trouble as it is being systematically marginalised as normatively empty in deference to 
a cosmopolitanism of exclusive impartiality. A lack of political will, and pressure from the 
neoliberalism underlying global interconnectedness preside over this marginalisation.  
The consequence is that sources of Malawian concreteness and epistemologies, are being 
marginalised as incompatible with the detached individual and with the neoliberal interests of 
strong cosmopolitanism. The essentialist categorisation of the national local as subjective, 
following neo-Kantianism, effectively undermines the normative value of mother tongue 
instruction as well as the moral relevance of historicity to the Malawian community. Malawi, 
and indeed the world, need education for cosmopolitan citizenship that is inclusive of the 
subjectivity of national otherness. Other than being arbitrary, nationality embodies the frames 
of expression, epistemologies, and concreteness of the peoples of the world which can neither 
be substituted, nor rendered neuteral, without undermining the otherness that makes the 
‘invisible absent’ peoples of the world in developing nations both other and human. The 
essentialism of strong cosmopolitanism that generally regards the ‘subjective’ Other 
epistemologies and ethics as subaltern cannot achieve equality because the essentialism 
typically summarily marginalises them as inconsistent with the ‘objective’ standards. Only a 
re-imagination of cosmopolitanism achieved from and through the differences that 
indispensably constitute the global peoples’ being, making them the concrete human beings 
they are, can ensure cosmopolitan equality. Such a cosmopolitanism’s education recognises 
the normative value of both partiality and impartiality without sacrificing one for the other. 
Through vernacularisation, such cosmopolitanism regards a critical promotion of both as the 
necessary condition for achieving human equality. 
Through exploration of ubuntu principles, I have argued in Chapter Six that it is possible to 
have a normatively valid relational, as opposed to an exclusively individual-centric 
conceptualisation of human nature, that is compatible with recognising the normativity of 
individual and community interests. An excessively individual-centric conception of 
personhood that side-lines relational belonging is not exhaustively definitive of ultimate 
human nature. Relational perspectives of human nature, although they are not compatible 
with the essentialism of individual-centrism, are nevertheless more capable of recognising the 
value of the distinctive concreteness across global peoples’ communities. The relational 
rationality of ubuntu is also thus capable of confronting the prevalent monetarisation of 
education that is due to the advancement, by modern education, of an exclusively agent-
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centric impartial education. Without necessarily advocating relativism, the complexities of 
the modern world and the diversity of the heritage of global diversity demand going beyond 
the generality of human equality. There is a need to include and engage the otherness of the 
world. Citizenship founded on this model allows for room for the other to self-define and be 
recognised as an equal human being especially in terms of his or her subjectivities. From the 
perspective of global citizenship, such otherness is largely hosted in his or her shared 
language, history, common culture, and territory.  
All in all, this dissertation acknowledges that education for democratic citizenship today can 
no longer be restricted to the nation only, because the interconnectedness of people makes 
urgent imagination and performance of moral duties that transcend to the rest of humanity. 
However, the nature, breath, and scope of such duties ought not in any way displace 
particularistic duties. The two domains of duties are interactive, yet distinct. National 
particularism is an indispensable catalytic collaborator of cosmopolitan universalism. 
7.2. Contribution of the study 
The thesis makes three major contributions to the theorization of cosmopolitanism and global 
citizenship education. The first key contribution of this study lies in its arguing that 
reconceptualising universalism under a difference-grounded moral standpoint reveals that the 
central postulates of strong cosmopolitan impartiality in principle undermine, particularly 
among the less powerful peoples of the world, the very human equality ideal that the 
cosmopolitanism seeks to achieve. The inherent essentialist dismissal of historical, linguistic 
and cultural particularism that is embedded in strong cosmopolitanism denies recognition of 
the normativity of subjectivity in the imagination of global citizenship, denying the situated 
peoples of the world the concreteness of their being. Not only does such marginalization of 
concrete being ultimately deny them equality as equal human beings, but rather the denial of 
recognition of their concreteness also sets them up for assimilation into the dominant 
mainstream culture and epistemology that underly global citizenship education. If global 
citizenship education is to be grounded in human equality then it must necessarily be 
responsive to the concreteness of global peoples. Global citizenship must centre difference 
other than marginalise it by focusing only on what is common among humankind. Unless 
cosmopolitanism theorisation centres difference, it in principle hides and perpetuates the 
forms of inequality that undermine the equality of the less powerful people of the world 
owing to the lack of economic power of their languages, epistemologies, shared culture, and 
histories.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
295 
Secondly this dissertation has shown that the disdain for subjectivity and difference that 
inheres and informs the strong cosmopolitanism Malawian primary education is pursuing 
renders the cosmopolitanism particularistic. Strong cosmopolitan universalism is grounded in 
a particularistic conceptualisation of human nature that privileges individual-centrism.  
Making such a (Kantian) individual-centric perspective that is particularistic to be the 
universalism benchmark for dismissing subjectivities of concrete situatedness of people 
across the globe makes the cosmopolitanism assimilationist as it unduly privileges one of the 
alternative valid philosophical conceptualisations of being human as the ultimate standard.   
Thirdly, this dissertation has shown that ideal cosmopolitanism must necessarily presuppose 
an ideal global interconnectedness that is not characterised by inequality and hegemonic 
metaphysical conceptualisations of human nature. The global interconnectedness upon which 
strong cosmopolitanism depends has linguistic, cultural, metaphysical and epistemological 
hegemony, as it is inhered by Eurocentrism. Theories of cosmopolitanism that regard the 
cosmopolitanism-enabling global interconnectedness as pertaining only to non-ideal theory 
and not ideal theory are complicit in perpetuating the global inequalities that characterise 
globality. Ultimately, as long as the education for global citizenship is informed by such 
cosmopolitanism it will entrench epistemic, linguistic and cultural domination by selected 
worldviews over the rest of the world. Guarantees of ensuring equality in global citizenship 
greatly depends on demanding that cosmopolitan citizenship should be responsive to the 
concreteness of the peoples of the world. To be normatively justified, cosmopolitan 
citizenship conceptualisations must therefore necessarily center other than marginalise 
difference. 
The implications of this thesis on education policy and practice is that it demands affirmation 
of locality as a necessary requirement of ideal cosmopolitanism. Matters of deciding the place 
of mother tongue instruction and the teaching of national history in the curriculum should not 
be determined in financial utility terms or in terms of global convenience only. Such matters 
must be understood as having a normative dimension. Education for democratic citizenship 
must thus be democratised to be consistent with people’s concreteness. The education must 
centre local concreteness as a normative necessity. Besides centring local epistemologies, the 
school must employ pedagogical experiences that are consistent with the concrete 
philosophical worldviews of the learners. The education in Malawi and much of Africa must 
therefore be decolonised to be democratic. 
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7.3. Towards affirmation of the local 
As this dissertation has shown, individual and community concreteness as a core attribute of 
being, ought to contribute to the constitution of universalism. Such an inclusion neither 
negates, nor undermines the normative validity and relevance of the duties emanating from 
the generality of humanity i.e. the ‘objective’ duties of moral impartiality. Rather, these two 
moral standpoints ought to collaborate and one is insufficient and incomplete without the 
other. The implication of this for cosmopolitanism is that education for democratic 
citizenship should seek to cultivate universal ideals through democratic iterations where 
ideals will, upon being debated and deliberated, be vernacularised, thus be appropriated in the 
local frameworks of meaning-making. This means the essentialist classification of all 
subjectivity as being unfit to partly constitute the normativity of a cosmopolitan citizenship 
will no longer hold. Universalism will be a result of interaction between critical contestation 
of the local particular and vernacularisation of the universal. In education for democratic 
citizenship, this would, among others, entail as a normative requirement, teaching and 
learning in the mother tongue wherever feasible. It would also entail having learners critically 
assess the history of the nation, its practices, and values in terms of how the history affected 
and affects the moral entitlements of the people both within it and without. Requisite moral 
duties would thereafter be established, besides demanding care in how to relate with other 
nations in a non-homogenising way.  
Such inclusion of the otherness dimension of localness will ensure that the autonomous 
individual on whom strong cosmopolitanism is fixated and who is also an integral part of 
morality, has his or her sources of care provision retained, for their collapse disables 
achievement of autonomy. This is because nationality hosts some of the institutions and 
networks on which development of individual autonomy irreplaceably depends. 
It is also worth noting that cultivating cosmopolitanism does not pertain to curriculum 
content only, but pedagogical experiences too that involve encountering otherness. It is 
imperative for Malawi and Africa to actively develop their languages and epistemologies or 
else their people stand to be marginalised. With less than 1% of Malawians using English as 
their household language (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 1998), yet it is the official 
language and language of global opportunities, the marginalisation only escalates as they 
cannot realise their full potential and make appropriate contributions to the global order. 
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Their perspectives will continue to be missing in global education, knowledge, and 
scholarship, making very little profound and meaningful change to the African condition 
whose transformation rests largely on African initiatives. 
7.4. Africa’s responsibility 
This dissertation has shown that an impartiality ethic that builds on the prevailing global 
interconnectedness is problematic. Such an impartiality presupposes a global order that has 
equitable economic, epistemological, and cultural representation of the peoples of the world. 
Neglecting correction of global inequalities and merely building on its interconnection that is 
inhered by inequality, immediately renders absent and invisible the otherness of the majority 
of the economically weak nations of the world. Ultimately the absence of the other’s voices 
from the global order under the influence of neo-liberalism only compels them to integrate 
into the mainstream.  
However, besides this iniquitous global order, what needs emphasis is the role of African 
nations themselves in at least averting a homogenising global citizenship and education. In as 
much as Africa’s efforts to make the global order representative and equitable are thwarted 
by neo-liberalism and an imbalanced global order, there is still so much of Africa’s own 
collusion in perpetrating and sustaining her own disadvantaged condition. Neo-colonial 
attitudes still prevail in much of African public policy-making. Marginalisation of African 
languages where they would easily be employed such as in courts, parliament, schools, 
internet and public media is exclusively a choice that rests with African nations themselves.  
Affirmation of the value of the local substantially rests with African nations. Decolonisation 
of the curriculum in Africa cannot be effected by ‘impartial’ global forces. Africa must 
initiate it. Regional and continental organisations in Africa must pull together to affirm and 
develop their common languages and epistemologies. It is disempowering to observe that 
there is very little content in indigenous African languages on the internet, for instance, yet 
1.2 billion of the 7.3 billion world population lives in Africa (United Nations Population 
Division, 2017) and the internet is unavoidably at the centre of modern life. My position is 
that taking restorative steps towards affirmation of Africa’s alternative perspectives in 
education and knowledge construction, is possible only if and when African political 
leadership so decides.  
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7.5. Study limitations and further research 
This dissertation calls for the inclusion of nationality in conceptualisations of ideal 
citizenship. However, one of the realities of the modern world is that communities are 
increasingly becoming multi-cultural. The ideal national national response to such 
multiplicity is not simple, but it is also categorically not neutralism. Rather, there must be 
ways to establish what commonly binds the community as a community of shared fate 
without making others’ interests invisible. There is need for further research as to how the 
multi-cultural nation should ensure that it promotes a sense of legitimate unbounded 
patriotism, without side-lining and marginalising other groups within the community.  
Furthermore, with respect to the challenges being uniquely faced by developing nations, the 
question of negotiating between an ideal cosmopolitan theory and what is practicable in 
ensuring recognition and representation of the sources of concreteness of the peoples of the 
world in the global order is a complex matter that requires further study. For instance, how 
meaningfully and sustainably to develop one language out of many others in a nation into a 
language of education, science, and trade requires more researching, because there are moral, 
political, and economic implications for achieving such an endeavour. If it is not achievable 
as idealised, there is need to establish at least the approximations of the ideal that will ensure 
service of the minimum particularistic interests.  
Lastly, I am also cognisant of the fact that the substance constituting the nationality 
elements of history, common culture, language, and even territoriality is greatly 
contestable. There is need for further research into what should determine the content of 
patriotism in the curriculum without amounting to essentialism. The threat of bounded 
nationalism cannot be downplayed. 
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